essay of corruption of government

Corruption is a Global Problem for Development. To Fight It, We All Have a Role to Play

Oped published in French in La Tribune Afrique, June 13, 2023.

Oped by Ousmane Diagana, World Bank Vice President for Western and Central Africa and Mouhamadou Diagne, World Bank Vice President for Integrity.

Every day, we hear about the onslaught of crises facing the world—from climate change to conflict, inflation and debt, and the ongoing recovery from a years-long pandemic. Add to them the prospect of slow economic growth , and our efforts to overcome these challenges seem rife with obstacles. For developing countries, many with limited and already stretched resources, the confluence of crises will be especially difficult to navigate.

But if we are to achieve success over the challenges of our time, there is one scourge we cannot fail to confront: corruption.

The unfortunate truth is that corruption persists in all countries. It manifests in many ways—from petty bribes and kickbacks to grand theft of public resources. With advances in technology, corruption has increasingly become a transnational challenge without respect for borders, as money can now move more easily in and out of countries to hide illicit gains.

Corruption is also a fundamental problem for development.

Corruption harms the poor and vulnerable the most, increasing costs and reducing access to basic services, such as health, education, social programs, and even justice. It exacerbates inequality and reduces private sector investment to the detriment of markets, job opportunities, and economies. Corruption can also undermine a country’s response to emergencies, leading to unnecessary suffering and, at worst, death. Over time, corruption can undermine the trust and confidence that citizens have for their leaders and institutions, creating social friction and in some contexts increasing the risk of fragility, conflict, and violence.

To prevent these negative impacts, we must confront corruption with determined and deliberate action. For the World Bank Group, fighting corruption in development has been a long-standing commitment in our operational work. This commitment is reflected in our support for countries in building transparent, inclusive, and accountable institutions , but also through initiatives that go beyond developing countries to also include financial centers, take on the politics of corruption more openly than before, and harness new technologies to understand, address, and prevent corruption.  

Indeed, across western and central Africa in particular, it is one of the World Bank Group’s strategic priorities to emphasize issues of good governance, accountability, and transparency among our partner countries, with the aim of reducing corruption. We recognize that transparency in public affairs and the accountability of high-level officials are fundamental to the trust of citizens in their government and the effective delivery of public services. Working to rebuild and bolster trust between citizens and the state is critical today, especially in countries affected by fragility, conflict and violence that make up half of the countries in this region alone.

Across Africa, World Bank Group support is helping countries face these challenges. Recent investments in the Republic of Congo , Ghana , and Morocco , for example, will support institutional governance reforms to improve the performance and transparency of service delivery. In Kenya, our support will further fiscal management reforms for greater transparency in public procurement , thereby reducing opportunities for corruption. Strengthening citizen-state engagement is key: In Burkina Faso, for example, a World Bank-funded project helped the national government improve citizen engagement and public sector accountability through the development of a digital tool to monitor the performance of municipal service delivery. 

The World Bank Group’s commitment to fighting corruption is also reflected in robust mechanisms across the institution that enhance the integrity of our operations. Our independent Integrity Vice Presidency (INT) works to detect, deter, and prevent fraud and corruption involving World Bank Group funds. Over two decades of INT’s work, the World Bank has sanctioned more than 1,100 firms and individuals, often imposing debarments that make them ineligible to participate in the projects and operations we finance. In addition, we have enforced more than 640 cross-debarments from other multilateral development banks, standing with our MDB partners to help keep corruption out of development projects everywhere. Nevertheless, we must remain vigilant to the risks of fraud and corruption that remain.

The World Bank Group also leverages its position as global convener to support anticorruption actors at all levels and from around the world. That is why we are pleased to have organized the next edition of the World Bank Group’s International Corruption Hunters Alliance (ICHA) to take place in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, on June 14-16, 2023.

The ICHA forum is an opportunity for front-line practitioners committed to fighting corruption as well as policy makers and representatives from the private sector and civil society, to come together to share knowledge, experience, and insights for confronting corruption. For the first time since its inception in 2010, we are hosting the ICHA forum in an African country. This reflects the reality that the negative impacts of corruption can be more devastating for developing countries, who face unique challenges and have fewer resources to overcome them. Yet, it also acknowledges that there is a wealth of anticorruption strengths, skills, and expertise from these countries that we must draw upon.

Together, we can affirm that through our collective action, we can advance the fight against corruption even in an era of crises.  

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5 Essays About Corruption

Internationally, there is no legal definition of corruption, but it includes bribery, illegal profit, abuse of power, embezzlement, and more. Corrupt activities are illegal, so they are discreet and done in secrecy. Depending on how deep the corruption goes, there may be many people aware of what’s going on, but they choose to do nothing because they’ve been bribed or they’re afraid of retaliation. Any system can become corrupt. Here are five essays that explore where corruption exists, its effects, and how it can be addressed.

Learn more about anti-corruption in a free course .

Corruption in Global Health: The Open Secret

Dr. Patricia J. Garcia The Lancet (2019)

In this published lecture, Dr. Garcia uses her experience as a researcher, public health worker, and Minister of Health to draw attention to corruption in health systems. She explores the extent of the problem, its origins, and what’s happening in the present day. Additional topics include ideas on how to address the problem and why players like policymakers and researchers need to think about corruption as a disease. Dr. Garcia states that corruption is one of the most significant barriers to global universal health coverage.

Dr. Garcia is the former Minister of Health of Peru and a leader in global health. She also works as a professor and researcher/trainer in global health, STI/HIV, HPV, medical informatics, and reproductive health. She’s the first Peruvian to be appointed as a member to the United States National Academy of Medicine

‘Are women leaders less corrupt? No, but they shake things up”

Stella Dawson Reuters (2012)

This piece takes a closer look at the idea that more women in power will mean less corruption. Reality is more complicated than that. Women are not less vulnerable to corruption in terms of their resistance to greed, but there is a link between more female politicians and less corruption. The reason appears to be that women are simply more likely to achieve more power in democratic, open systems that are less tolerant of corruption. A better gender balance also means more effective problem-solving. This piece goes on to give some examples of lower corruption in systems with more women and the complexities. While this particular essay is old, newer research still supports that more women in power is linked to better ethics and lower corruption levels into systems, though women are not inherently less corrupt.

Stella Dawson left Reuters in 2015, where she worked as a global editor for economics and markets. At the Thomson Reuters Foundation and 100Reporters, she headed a network of reporters focusing on corruption issues. Dawson has been featured as a commentator for BBC, CNB, C-Span, and public radio.

“Transparency isn’t the solution to corruption – here’s why”

David Riverios Garcia One Young World

Many believe that corruption can be solved with transparency, but in this piece, Garcia explains why that isn’t the case. He writes that governments have exploited new technology (like open data platforms and government-monitoring acts) to appear like they care about corruption, but, in Garcia’s words, “transparency means nothing without accountability.” Garcia focuses on corruption in Latin America, including Paraguay where Garcia is originally from. He describes his background as a young anti-corruption activist, what he’s learned, and what he considers the real solution to corruption.

At the time of this essay’s publication, David Riverios Garcia was an Open Young World Ambassador. He ran a large-scale anti-corruption campaign (reAccion Paraguay), stopping corruption among local high school authorities. He’s also worked on poverty relief and education reform. The Ministry of Education recognized him for his achievements and in 2009, he was selected by the US Department of State as one of 10 Paraguayan Youth Ambassadors.

“What the World Could Teach America About Policing”

Yasmeen Serhan The Atlantic (2020)

The American police system has faced significant challenges with public trust for decades. In 2020, those issues have erupted and the country is at a tipping point. Corruption is rampant through the system. What can be done? In this piece, the author gives examples of how other countries have managed reform. These reforms include first dismantling the existing system, then providing better training. Once that system is off the ground, there needs to be oversight. Looking at other places in the world that have successfully made radical changes is essential for real change in the United States.

Atlantic staff writer Yasmeen Serhan is based in London.

“$2.6 Trillion Is Lost to Corruption Every Year — And It Hurts the Poor the Most”

Joe McCarthy Global Citizen (2018)

This short piece is a good introduction to just how significant the effects of corruption are. Schools, hospitals, and other essential services suffer, while the poorest and most vulnerable society carry the heaviest burdens. Because of corruption, these services don’t get the funding they need. Cycles of corruption erode citizens’ trust in systems and powerful government entities. What can be done to end the cycle?

Joe McCarthy is a staff writer for Global Citizen. He writes about global events and environmental issues.

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Corruption and economic growth: does the size of the government matter?

• Published: 19 June 2021
• Volume 55 , pages 543–576, ( 2022 )

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• António Afonso   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-6926-2653 1 , 2 &
• Eduardo de Sá Fortes Leitão Rodrigues 3  

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Corruption is often a source of contentious debate, covering different areas of knowledge, such as philosophy and sociology. In this paper we assess the effects of corruption on economic activity and highlight the relevance of the size of the government. We use dynamic models and the generalised method of moments approach for a panel of 48 countries, and as a measure of corruption the Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, from 2012 to 2019. We find a significant adverse effect of corruption on the level and growth of GDP per capita, but that large governments benefit less from reducing corruption. Furthermore, developing economies, regardless of government size, benefit less from reducing corruption, while government size is not sufficient to explain the influence of corruption on economic activity, although the level of effectiveness of public services is crucial. Finally, our findings suggest that private investment is a potential transmission channel for corruption.

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The sample has 36 developed countries and 12 developing countries. Unfortunately, it was not possible to expand the sample because some series were not available.

The voice and responsibility index indicates the perceptions that citizens have of participating in the selection of their government, freedom of expression and free media.

https://www.transparency.org/files/content/pressrelease/2012CPIUpdatedMethodologyEMBARGOEN:pdf

This sample includes four countries with missing data (gaps) in 2019.

Due to the lack of availability of more data for private investment, the sample is restricted to the period between 2012 and 2015.

Our models can have only 2 explanatory variables (CPI and L pc) or 3 explanatory variables (CPI, L pc and GFC pc) and the lagged dependent variable Y i, t-1 .

In addition to GMM models with orthogonal forward deviations (FOD), we also analyse the models in terms of difference (DF). We find that the coefficient associated with the CPI followed the same pattern as in the GMM-FOD model. Considering the significance level of 5%, the estimated models did not indicate a second-order correlation problem (AR2), nor problems related to over-identifying restrictions (validity of the instruments).

Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat (UN/DESA).

The index reflects the perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service, and the degree of its independence from political pressures, as well as the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies (World Bank).

Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the UK, and the USA.

After the comparative test, the fixed effects model proved to be more appropriate than the OLS model.

The CPI coefficient has a p-value equal to 0.108.

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Acknowledgements

We thank the very useful comments of two anonymous referees on a previous version of the paper. This work was supported by the FCT ( Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia ) [Grant Number UIDB/05069/2020]. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of their employers.

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16 and Figs. 

Corruption perception index and GDP per capita (average for 2012–2019).

Amplitude of corruption perception index (2012–2019).

Corruption perception index and government size (%GDP): small and medium–big governments

Government effectiveness and government size (%GDP): small and medium–big governments

Government effectiveness

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Afonso, A., de Sá Fortes Leitão Rodrigues, E. Corruption and economic growth: does the size of the government matter?. Econ Change Restruct 55 , 543–576 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10644-021-09338-4

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How Corruption Drives Inequality

To build the political will to end impunity, we need to do more to expose the problem and give voice to those most acutely affected., research & commentary, january 17, 2018.

by Louise Russell-Prywata

The Paradise Papers , and the Panama Papers before, have laid bare the financial secrecy that permits large-scale proceeds of corruption, tax avoidance, and criminal activity to be laundered, shifted around the globe, and stored out of view from authorities. The Azerbaijani Laundromat , a scheme exposed in September 2017 involving UK-registered shell companies, shined more light on how those at the top can use financial secrecy to launder vast sums through the global financial system and further widen the gap between “elites” and the rest of society.

Transparency International (TI), a global nongovernmental organization against corruption, cites several additional cases where UK companies and properties have been used to process and store the proceeds of money laundering and grand corruption. Hampstead mansions, luxury yachts, and fine art are monuments to lost funding for healthcare, education, or infrastructure. In other cases, corruption has diverted revenues towards corporate profits. Alleged corruption in a Shell oil deal came to light earlier this year that is believed to have deprived Nigeria and its people of $1.1 billion.

Such large-scale illegal diversions of public funds are a particularly egregious mechanism through which corruption drives inequality. And the problem is not simply bribery. Corrupt patronage networks can prevent fair access to economic and political power, serving to further the wealth and power of ruling elites, exacerbating inequality.

In many countries, everyday petty corruption is also driving inequality. Examples from TI’s work are sadly plentiful: from new mothers in Zimbabwe denied vaccinations for their babies unless illegal “consultation fees” are paid, to families in Cameroon whose children faced expulsion from school because they could not afford to pay illegal fees demanded by the head teacher. When citizens are forced to pay bribes in order to access public services that should be free of charge, the poor and marginalized often suffer the most.

Corruption also drives inequality in Western democracies. In 2009, 103 construction companies were fined a total of £130 million (US$176 million) for rigging bids to inflate the cost of major building projects in England, including publicly funded projects to build new schools and hospitals. Worryingly, since this case, successive UK governments’ efforts to “cut red tape” have actually decreased the state’s ability to detect corruption, such as when they abolished the Audit Commission, which was responsible for independently auditing local public bodies.

From enabling illicit accumulation of wealth by global elites to denying people access to basic services, corruption often drives inequality, both within national boundaries and internationally.

The terrible fire at London’s Grenfell Tower in June 2017 brought this issue — and several others relating to inequality — to the fore. There have been allegations of bribery and fraud and serious concerns about lack of oversight and accountability throughout the complex supply chains involved in the refurbishment and fitting of fire safety equipment. The inquiry will examine specific issues such as fire safety equipment, but unfortunately will not specifically ask whether corruption played a role.

Could this be symptomatic of a complacency towards corruption, be it in more “obvious” forms such as bribery, or in more nebulous — and harder to prove — forms such as inappropriate lobbying activities?

Whatever the level of complacency, how can we halt corruption as a driver of inequality? Here are three areas of possible action, along with some examples of how TI is contributing:

Corruption must be exposed.   Transparency takes away hiding places for corruption and decreases the opportunity for it to happen. It gives citizens the information they need to hold those in power to account. For example, TI is campaigning for greater transparency over the true owners of companies of the sort used in the Panama Papers scandals and the Azerbaijani Laundromat.

We need to end impunity.    Effective laws, when properly applied, can bring the corrupt to justice. In the UK, TI has successfully campaigned for two key legal powers that can rein in corruption around the world: the Bribery Act (2010), and Unexplained Wealth Orders , a tool to tackle suspected proceeds of corruption from anywhere in the world that are stored in UK assets such as property. These laws are on the statute book and, in the case of the Bribery Act, are already being used. But laws on paper alone do not fight corruption, and in order to end impunity law enforcement must have sufficient resources to pursue complex and lengthy cases. This requires political will.

By empowering citizens, more people can drive change . In many contexts, the best solutions to corruption are local and people-powered. Around the world TI facilitates participatory democratic acts such as social audits and citizen-led monitoring of public procurement. Such acts can help amplify and give voice to those who are most acutely affected, and create positive narratives that corruption can be addressed.

From enabling illicit accumulation of wealth by global elites to denying people access to basic services, corruption often drives inequality, both within national boundaries and internationally. But around the world, people are organizing and speaking out to hold those in power to account. It is their dedication and fearlessness that inspires many of the anti-corruption activists I know, and makes us certain that together we can continue to achieve change.

Louise Russell-Prywata is an Atlantic Fellow for Social and Economic Equity at the London School of Economics. This commentary was originally published on the  Atlantic Fellows Blog . 

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Corruption: A Very Short Introduction

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Corruption is one of the biggest global issues, ahead of extreme poverty, unemployment, the rising cost of food and energy, climate change, and terrorism. It is thought to be one of the principal causes of poverty around the globe. Its significance in the contemporary world cannot be overestimated. Corruption: A Very Short Introduction notes that corruption is as old as humanity itself, and then considers why the international community has only highlighted it as a problem in the past two decades. It explores the phenomenon from several different perspectives, from the cultural differences affecting how corruption is defined, its impact, its various causes, and the possible remedies.

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• Published: 20 July 2023

Corruption, anti-corruption, and economic development

• Miao Zhang 1 ,
• Houli Zhang 1 ,
• Li Zhang 1 ,
• Xu Peng 1 ,
• Jiaxuan Zhu 1 ,
• Duochenxi Liu 1 &
• Shibing You   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-0102-4149 1  

Humanities and Social Sciences Communications volume  10 , Article number:  434 ( 2023 ) Cite this article

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• Politics and international relations

Corruption and anti-corruption efforts are intertwined with political and economic concerns. From an economic and political perspective, as the government strives to enhance its governance capabilities, it becomes crucial to consider the costs of anti-corruption supervision and the losses incurred from corruption. This evaluation is essential for formulating a scientifically sound anti-corruption strategy that maximizes government benefits. To address this issue, the paper presents a model that incorporates levels of supervision and associated costs. The findings reveal that in the case of homogeneous officials, the optimal level of supervisory input, which maximizes government benefit, is nearly zero when per capita income is low due to budgetary constraints on anti-corruption control. However, as per capita income reaches a certain threshold, the optimal level of supervisory input suddenly rises to its maximum and decreases as per capita income increases. Alternatively, if the government adopts a zero-tolerance approach towards corruption and provides adequate remuneration to its employees, ensuring that all competent authorities can resist corruption, then corruption can be eliminated. Moreover, when officials exhibit heterogeneity in terms of their honesty levels, certain conditions give rise to a middle per capita income range, resulting in an optimal level of supervisory input that leads to a phenomenon known as “partial corruption.” During this phase, the wages paid by the government to its employees promote honesty, preventing them from engaging in corruption. However, they are unable to curb the corrupt activities of more dishonest officials. To some extent, this model also explains the challenges associated with eradicating corruption in several middle-income countries.

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Introduction

Corruption accompanies power, as the British politician Lord Acton remarked, “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” Corruption, as a misuse of power, is pervasive in all societies and is widely regarded as a major barrier to social and economic development. This is particularly true for developing countries, where the implications of corruption are the most damaging (UN, 2003 ). Shleifer and Vishny ( 1993 ) were among the first academics to define corruption as “the sale of government officials of government property for personal gain.” Similarly, Svensson ( 2005 ) defines corruption as “abuse of public office for private gain.” Later, Banerjee et al. ( 2013 ) defined corruption as a “violation of rules by officials for personal gain.” This includes not just overt corruption (officials accepting bribes), but also more subtle forms of bureaucratic corruption, such as nepotism. Corruption not only undermines fair competition and public trust, but it can also lead to resources misallocation ultimately reducing overall societal welfare. Consequently, identifying and effectively combating corruption is vital for every country or government.

Economic study on corruption has generally centered on two aspects: its causes and repercussions (Nie, 2014 ). Existing research on the causes of corruption typically discusses the roles of political systems, economic development levels, openness to foreign investment, legal traditions, education levels, culture, and religion (Acemoglu and Thierry, 2000 ; James et al., 2005 ; Šumah Š, 2018 ). Some studies also look into problems such as professional ethics, traditional customs, and demographics (Dollar et al., 2001 ; Rivas, 2013 ; Lee and Guven, 2013 ). In analyzing the repercussions of corruption, two extreme viewpoints have evolved (Aidt, 2009 ): those of the ‘sanders’ who believe corruption impedes progress, and those of the ‘greasers’ who believe corruption can (in certain cases) promote development. Given the multiplicity of causes of corruption and the fact that understanding these reasons can improve anti-corruption policy, there is significantly more research studying corruption’s causes than its economic impacts. For many developing countries, analyzing the fundamental mechanisms relating corruption, anti-corruption initiatives, and economic growth could provide insights into situations where high corruption coexists with high growth. A considerable amount of empirical analysis has been conducted on the causes and impacts of corruption (Adit, 2009 ; Dong and Torgler, 2010 ; Belgibayeva and Plekhanov, 2019 ). However, the principal-agent model, viewing corruption as an “agent violating the interests or preferences of the principal to benefit a third party,” provides a novel theoretical perspective that more effectively reveals the behavioral motivations and internal mechanisms underlying corruption.

Building on this foundation, the logical starting point of this study is that officials are motivated to engage in corruption to gain additional personal benefits when they have sufficient discretionary power, when economic rent exceeds salary levels, and when corruption detection and punishment are minimal (Yin and Nie, 2020 ). The government, on the other hand, has a similar reason to pass anti-corruption legislation. Anti-corruption actions, however, are not free; the government must invest significant human, physical, and financial resources in corruption surveillance and crackdowns. The relationship between such investment and government benefit is complex and varies depending on economic progress and governmental systems. Much of the existing research considers surveillance levels and costs from an exogenous perspective, assuming that they are determined by external variables rather than government decisions. However, in reality, when selecting anti-corruption strategies, governments must frequently evaluate monitoring levels and costs endogenously, incorporating these factors into their decision-making process. As a result, finding the best anti-corruption policy is a complex and critical topic.

Therefore, this study introduces a theoretical model that endogenizes the level of surveillance and costs to better understand how to balance corruption losses and the costs of anti-corruption surveillance investments, resulting in the optimal anti-corruption strategy under varying economic and political conditions. This study offers a fresh perspective on the coexistence of high corruption and high growth in certain developing countries. Furthermore, in many developing countries, such as those in East Asia, top-down supervision and incentives, rather than periodic elections, are the dominant influencers on official behavior. As a result, this research enriches the study of official behavior, which is ideally only influenced by the level of supervision.

The paper is divided into six sections. Following the introduction, the “Literature review” section provides a brief survey of the research on corruption and economic growth. The basic model’s construction is detailed in the “The basic model” section. The “Optimal choice of government supervision investment under homogeneous officials” section presents and discusses the government’s optimal choice. The “Optimum choice of government supervision investment under heterogeneous officials” section extends the problem to include a variety of corrupt officials. Finally, the “Conclusion and discussion” section provides research discussions and conclusions.

Literature review

Corruption and anti-corruption are both political issue and economic issue. The predominant focus of the economics community on the study of corruption is its impact on economic growth. However, consensus on this particular subject has yet to be established, with three prevailing opinions often voiced in the literature.

The first viewpoint is the “Harmful Corruption Hypothesis”. A group of scholars argue that rent-seeking activities not only cause inefficiencies but also lead to enormous unproductive waste (Krueger, 1974 ; Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1982 ). Furthermore, corruption encourages talented individuals to engage in rent-seeking activities, which reduces economic growth (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993 ; Murphy et al., 1993 ). Shleifer and Vishny ( 1994 ) discovered that when the goals of politicians and enterprises do not align with those of maximization of social welfare, result of bribery mechanism is by no means optimal. Wei ( 1997 , 2000 ) believes that corruption has a tax effect, which weakens foreign investment willingness. As for empirical research, Mauro ( 1995 ) analyzes relationship between corruption and economic growth using data from 58 countries. The result shows that corruption has a significant negative impact on investment and GDP growth. Mo ( 2001 ) examines transnational data from 1970 to 1985 and concludes that corruption directly causes a decrease in investment, a decline of human capital, and political instability, and therefore indirectly inhibits economic growth. Pellegrini and Gerlaph ( 2004 ) argue that corruption inhibits economic growth by affecting investment and trade policies. Some academics contend that corruption slows economic growth by affecting taxes (Blackburn et al., 2006 , Imam and Jacobs, 2014 , Ivanyna et al., 2016 ). After separating the indirect effects of corruption on economic growth, Swaleheen ( 2011 ) concludes that corruption has a direct negative impact on economic growth. Kunieda et al. ( 2014 ) argued that capital account liberalization would amplify the negative impact of corruption on economic growth. Gründler and Potrafke ( 2019 ) revisited the relationship between corruption and economic growth using the inverted Transparency International Perception of Corruption Index (CPI) from 2012 to 2018 across 175 countries/regions. Their study indicates that the impact of corruption on economic growth is most pronounced in autocratic countries and is transmitted to economic growth via a decline in FDI and an increase in inflation.

The second viewpoint is that “corruption leads to efficiencies”. In some countries, there are some ineffective and rigid regulations, and corruption can relieve or even circumvent those regulations that impede economic development, thereby enhancing market efficiency and economic development (Leff, 1964 ). The “queuing model” proposed by Lui ( 1985 ) describes a situation in which officials grant bribery enterprises priority when issuing business licenses, thereby accelerating approval process and improving market efficiency. The “auction model” proposed by Beck and Mayer ( 1986 ) is a concretization of the preceding model. They believe that companies that can afford to high bribes are the most likely to be the most productive. Therefore, the “auction” acquisition of operating rights will increase market efficiency. Acemoglu and Verdier ( 1998 \ 2000 ) discovers that if anti-corruption is expensive and resource allocation is significantly distorted, then the level of corruption that maximizes output or social welfare might be greater than zero. Dzhumashev ( 2014 ) believes that when government size exceeds the optimal value, corruption can increase market efficiency and stimulate economic growth. Egger and Winner ( 2005 ) discovered that corruption could stimulate direct foreign investment based on empirical research with data from 73 countries. Through enterprise-level data analysis in China, Wang and You ( 2012 ), found that corruption can enhance a firm’s revenues at a micro level. Jiang and Nie ( 2014 ) demonstrated empirically that regional corruption in China has a positive impact on the profitability of private enterprises but has no effect on the profitability of state-owned enterprises. Furthermore, natural experiments arising from exogenous changes in trade policies imply that corruption may aid private enterprises in evading government supervision, thus explaining the paradox of China’s high growth and high corruption.

The third viewpoint is that “corruption depends on its environment”. This viewpoint is a synthesis of the first two. It argues that both viewpoints have their reasons and environments for existence. Whether corruption is beneficial or not depends on the environment and system in which it lies. After restricting their sample to highly liberalized countries and controlling for some economic variables, Méndez and Sepúlveda ( 2006 ) found that the relationship between corruption and economic growth is not constant. Under the maximization of economic growth, the level of corruption is significantly greater than zero. When the level of corruption is low, it promotes economic growth; when the level of corruption is high, it inhibits economic growth. Aidt et al. ( 2008 ) found that corruption hampers economic growth when the government’s management system is relatively perfect, but has no effect when the government’s management system is poor. According to empirical research conducted by Meon and Weill ( 2010 ), the impediment of corruption to economic growth diminishes as system deficiencies increase. When system deficiencies are so severe that they result in extreme inefficiency, corruption can actually promote economic growth. Aidt ( 2009 ) reached a similar conclusion, namely that corruption only positively affects economic growth when the system is defective. Dong and Torgler ( 2010 ) discovered through empirical research on China’s data that corruption can impact economic growth in many ways, both positively and negatively. Its overall effect is the sum of all its individual effects. Zheng ( 2015 ) determined, using theoretical models, that under certain conditions, society may benefit from a certain level of corruption and that anti-corruption measures may reduce the efforts of competent officials more than those of lower ability. Alfada ( 2019 ) evaluated the threshold value at which corruption inhibits economic growth. And Petersen ( 2021 ) employs corruption scandals to explain the inverted-U relationship between democracy and corruption.

Regardless of one’s position on the advantages and disadvantages of corruption, its negative impact on social welfare cannot be denied in certain aspects, as evidenced by the preceding literature review. Extensive studies have been conducted on the consequences of corruption, and some scholars have attempted to investigate the causes and countermeasures of corruption using novel perspectives and methodologies. Due to the secretive nature of corruption, available data are frequently limited, making it difficult to draw conclusions about corruption’s underlying mechanisms. In recent years, some scholars have started employing laboratory experiments to analyze individual corruption behaviors. For instance, Banerjee ( 2016 ) employed laboratory corruption games to elucidate bribery behavior and disclose the impactful role of moral cost. This research also highlighted the crucial role of social norms against the backdrop of corrupt behavior. To explain the relationship between corruption and economic development, Yin and Nie ( 2020 ) developed a three-tier agent model involving the central government, local government, and enterprises. They proposed that companies’ adoption of non-compliant technology could spur economic growth but also lead to corruption issues. Banerjee et al. ( 2022 ), in their public goods laboratory experiment, discovered that the propensity for public officials to embezzle increased the likelihood of tax evasion among citizens, and that tax evasion in turn increased the likelihood of embezzlement. Introducing a policy to detect and penalize public officials for embezzling taxes significantly reduced tax evasion among citizens.

In conclusion, examining corruption from the perspective of anti-corruption measures seems to be a more fruitful research topic. Existing literature typically externalizes the cost of anti-corruption efforts and seeks to explore the specific pathways of corruption via its various direct and indirect impacts. However, among the numerous ways corruption impacts economic development, we cannot overlook the influence of anti-corruption efforts on economic growth. The construction of anti-corruption measures has never ceased despite the escalating phenomenon of corruption over the 30 years since China’s reform and opening up. China’s anti-corruption expenditures have reached an unignorable level, necessitating an evaluation of corruption issues from the perspective of the cost of anti-corruption supervision. In light of this, this paper proposes a supervisory model that internalizes anti-corruption efforts and examines, through comparative static analysis, how the government can choose the optimal supervisory level that maximizes social welfare under various circumstances.

The basic model

The government’s resources are limited during a country’s economic development, so policymakers should make rational and scientific decisions in preventing, regulating, and combating corruption to maximize government benefit. In order to concretize this process, this model takes anti-corruption supervision as a factor of decision-makers’ consideration and endogenously internalizes the probability that officials will be found engaging in corruption.

Consider a static economy made up of citizens, governments, and their employees. All citizens are risk-neutral rational individuals with a total of \(\lambda\) , their per capita income is \(y\) , and they pay taxes to the government at average tax rate \(t\) . The government is policymaker that seeks to maximize benefits. Government benefit is increased by gathering taxes and employing officials to implement infrastructure or public utilities projects. Obviously, the right to implement a project leaves space for official corruption, which can be detrimental to the government’s benefit. Therefore, a group of supervisors is hired to stop or prevent corruption. Thus, government employees are separated into two groups: officials and supervisors. The number of supervisors is \(n\) , and the number of officials is \(1 - n\) , for a grand total of 1. Per capita wage rate of government employees is \(w\) . To ensure that people are willing to become government employees, a minimum wage constraint should be imposed, i.e., the wage of government employees should not be less than per capita income, then \(w\) should be satisfied \(w \ge y\) . For the government, it is necessary to find an appropriate proportion of supervisors and a wage \(\left( {n,w} \right)\) for government employees satisfying the above constraints to maximize government benefit. Next, each object’s behavior will be analyzed.

Since this model focuses on the level of supervision, the number of citizens defined as \(\lambda \left( {\lambda > 0} \right)\) , per capita income \(y\left( {y > 0} \right)\) , and average tax rate \(t\left( {t > 0} \right)\) are exogenous variables. The amount of tax paid by all citizens, i.e., government’s fiscal revenue f , is

where \(\gamma = t\lambda\) .

Supervisors

The government hires supervisors to supervise the behavior of officials. Define that all supervisors are homogeneous and have two states: normal working state and abnormal working state(laziness). Assuming that the probability \(p\) found by a supervisor that an official is in an abnormal working state is a function of the number \(n_e\) of supervisors in a normal working state, that \(p\) should be an increasing function of \(n_e\) , so we may define as

That is to say, \(p\) is exactly the proportion of the number of supervisors in normal work among government employees.

Because of the information asymmetry between the government and supervisors, the government does not know if supervisors are in an abnormal working state. In order to ensure their normal work, the government provides supervisors with an incentive on the basic wage \(w\) , that is, the salaries of all officials found to have abnormal working behaviors will be confiscated and distributed equally to all supervisors as an additional incentive. Assuming that the additional benefit of laziness is zero, in addition to the normal wage \(w\) , for each supervisor, the probability that an official in an abnormal working state will be found increases when he works normally compared with laziness, and there is a potentially higher possibility \(p\) of obtaining additional benefit, therefore, the benefit of each supervisor’s choice of normal work will not be lower than that of idleness. Thus, under government’s incentive policy, every supervisor will not choose to be lazy, so there are

Then, probability \(p\) that officials in abnormal working state will be found is

The government employs officials to operate infrastructure and public utility projects. Officials are fully aware of the number \(n\) of inspectors employed by the government, and the probability that officials will be discovered engaging in abnormal work is \(p(n) = n\) . Due to officials’ participation in the implementation of specific projects, there is room for corruption. We use the concept of “corruption space” to quantify officials’ rights, which demonstrates that officials can maximize their rent-seeking benefits. Total corruption space for all officials is defined as \(b\) , while the average corruption space per official is \(b/\left( {1 - n} \right)\) . It shows that a corrupt official will receive additional benefits of \(b/\left( {1 - n} \right)\) without being discovered. At the same time, effort input in infrastructure and public utilities projects will reduce by \(b/\left( {1 - n} \right)\) .

There are two states for all officials: the normal working state and the corrupt state. In a normal working state, officials will receive a basic wage \(w\) ; in a corrupt state, there is \(p(n)\) probability that they will be found corrupt. Once found, all wages and corrupt income will be confiscated, so the expected return of an official in a corrupt position is \(\left[ {1 - p\left( n \right)} \right]\left[ {w + b/\left( {1 - n} \right)} \right]\) , and the expected return can be used to represent the officials’ utility, \(U = \max \left\{ {w,\left[ {1 - p\left( n \right)} \right]\left[ {w + b/\left( {1 - n} \right)} \right]} \right\}\) . Since \(p(n) = n\) , the formula of anticipated income can be converted to \(\left( {1 - n} \right)w + b\) .

So, if there is

where the official’s income in the normal working state is not less than the anticipated income in the corrupt working state, the official will choose the normal working state.

Conversely, if

where the official’s income in the normal working state is less than the anticipated income in the corrupt state, then the official will choose to corrupt rather than work.

The government’s objective is to maximize the government’s benefit function by choosing an appropriate proportion of supervisors and wages of government employees \(\left( {n,\,w} \right)\) . Define the government benefit function \(G\left( {n,\,w} \right)\) as follows,

where \(B\left( {n,w} \right)\) is the total corruption benefit accrued by all officials without being detected by supervisors, both \(\alpha\) and \(\beta\) are coefficients.

The government benefit function \(G(n,w)\) is as follows: The government’s budget is total income tax \(f\) , of which a portion is used to pay government employees’ wages and the rest is for infrastructure and public utilities projects. Since corruption of officials may result in loss of \(B\left( {n,w} \right)\) and proportion \(p(n)\) is recovered by supervisor, part of resources ultimately devoted to infrastructure and public utilities is \(f - w - (1 - p(n))B(n,w)\) , which defined \(\alpha (\alpha > 0)\) as government benefit generated by investment of unit infrastructure and public utilities. Consequently, the government benefit from this part is \(\alpha [f - w - (1 - p(n))B(n,w)]\) . In addition, the supervisor is only responsible for supervising the official, whereas the official contributes directly to the government benefit of the supervisor. At this level, it is evident that the larger the number of officials, the greater the government’s benefit. Assuming that, regardless of officials’ working status, their contribution to government benefit in the implementation of infrastructure and public utilities projects is \(\beta (\beta > 0)\) , the additional government benefit generated by all officials is \(\beta \left( {1 - n} \right)\) .

In light of the above model, government’s objective is to:

It shows that the goal of policymakers is to maximize the government benefit function \(G(n,w)\) within certain constraints.

Optimal choice of government supervision investment under homogeneous officials

The above-described basic model has one feature: all officials are homogeneous, and their corruption space is identical and \(b/\left( {1 - n} \right)\) . Here, we will explore the optimal choice of government under the basic model of homogeneous officials.

The government makes decisions with the goal of maximizing the government benefit function \(G(n,w)\) , which is accomplished by employing a certain number \(n\) of supervisors and setting a base wage \(w\) for each official. Individual officials, on the other hand, decide whether to engage in corruption with the goal of maximizing payoffs based on three factors: the level of wages offered by the government \(w\) , the probability \(p(p(n) = n)\) that an official in a non-normal work situation will be detected, and the exogenously given corruption space \(b\) . When the payoff \(w\) under normal work is comparable to the anticipated payoff \((1 - n)w + b\) under corrupt work, officials choose to work normally. Because government may lead to different behavior of officials when setting different wage levels, the total corruption benefit \(B\left( {n,w} \right)\) of officials will vary without being detected, thereby affecting the form of government benefit function. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze various situations to determine the optimal choice of government. The analysis is divided into three sections: first, government’s optimal choice when low wage is \(w < b/n\) ; second, government’s optimal choice when high wage is \(w \ge b/n\) ; third, government’s optimal choice \(\left( {n^ \ast ,w^ \ast } \right)\) when the first two situations are combined.

Prior to analysis, model parameters need to be constrained. Clearly, if the total corruption space B of all officials is large enough, it signifies an unlimited expansion of power, where no decision can prevent the occurrence of corruption; therefore, the total corruption space B should be controlled to a certain range. In addition, in order to reflect the informational and professional advantages of officials in the implementation of infrastructure or public utilities projects, the influence gap between unit officials and unit resources investment on government benefit should not be too large; otherwise, there would be no reason for the government to employ officials to carry out specific projects, so coefficient \(\beta /\alpha\) should be increased. In light of this, we apply the following assumptions to full text, unless otherwise specified:

Assumption 1 . The parameters \(b\) , \(\alpha\) and \(\beta\) satisfy the following condition

Optimal choice for low wage ( \(w < b/n\) )

When the wage \(w < b/n\) is low, rational officials will find that the expected income from corruption \(\left( {1 - n} \right)w + b\) exceeds that \(w\) of normal work. Under such conditions, every official would choose to engage in corrupt practices. Consequently, the subsequent discussion will be solely devoted to analyzing the optimal choices for the government to maximize the government benefit function \(G(n,w)\) .

If each official’s corruption behavior will have additional benefits \(b/\left( {1 - n} \right)\) that not discovered by supervisor, then the total corruption benefit \(B\left( {n,w} \right)\) of each official is as follows:

and the government benefit function \(G(n,w)\) is reduced to

Thus, we have the following proposition.

Proposition 1 . When wages \(w < b/n\) are lower, the optimal number of supervisors and their salaries are \(\left( {n_1^ \ast ,w_1^ \ast } \right) = \left( {0,y} \right)\) , the value of government benefit function is

The conclusion of Proposition 1 is evident in Fig. 1 . As shown in Fig. 1 , shaded area between straight line \(w = y\) , \(n = 0\) , \(n = 1\) and curve \(w = b/n\) is value \(n\) and \(w\) can be obtained. Since the objective function \(G(n,w)\) is a linear function about \(n\) and \(w\) , the indifference curve is a straight line. The closer it is to origin, greater is the objective function \(G(n,w)\) . When the indifference curve is closest to the origin, when \(n\) and \(w\) are zero and \(y\) respectively, the government benefit function reaches its maximal value.

When wages are low ( w ), the optimal choice is at the intersection of w  =  y and n  = 0.

If government does not provide sufficient wages, rational officials will engage in corruption at the risk of being caught. If the government also employs some supervisors, the contribution of illicit funds recovered by supervisors to government benefit cannot compensate for the loss of government benefit caused by wages paid to supervisors. In this case, the cost of combating corruption exceeds the societal loss induced by its acceptance. In order to maximize government benefit, a rational government will inevitably decide not to employ any supervisors, and to reduce the wages of government employees to the lowest level, that is, per capita income \(y\) .

Optimal choice for high wage ( \(w \ge b/n\) )

When wage ( \(w \ge b/n\) ) is higher, rational officials will discover that the benefits \(w\) of normal work will not be less than the anticipated benefits of corruption \(\left( {1 - n} \right)w + b\) , so all officials will choose to work normally. Similar to the previous scenario, the focus of this section will be on analyzing the government’s optimal choices to maximize the government benefit function G ( n , w ).

At this time, the total benefits of official corruption \(B\left( {n,w} \right)\) will be 0, and the government benefit function \(G(n,w)\) will be reduced to

Proposition 2 . When wage ( \(w \ge b/n\) ) is higher, the optimal number of supervisors and wages \(\left( {n_2^ \ast ,w_2^ \ast } \right)\) that the government should choose can be divided two situations:

i. If \(y < \sqrt {\beta b/\alpha }\) , then

where value of government benefit function is

ii. If \(y \ge \sqrt {\beta b/\alpha }\) , then

Graphically, if the government increases wages, the spectrum of values \(\left( {n,w} \right)\) in Fig. 1 will not fall below the curve \(w = b/n\) . As shown in Fig. 2 , shaded area between straight line \(w = y\) , \(n = 1\) and curve \(w = b/n\) is value \(n\) and \(w\) can be obtained. Currently, the objective function \(G(n,w)\) is still a linear function with respect to \(n\) and \(w\) , so the indifference curve is a straight line. Similarly, the closer to origin indifference curve represents, the greater value of objective function. Obviously, if the minimum wage constraint is small, i.e., \(y\) is small, then the optimal choice must be at the point where the indifference curve and \(w = b/n\) tangent; on the other hand, if the minimum wage constraint is large, optimal choice is at the point where \(w = y\) and \(w = b/n\) intersect, as shown in Fig. 3 .

If the minimum wage constraint is small, the optimal choice is at the point where w  =  b / n is tangent to G ( n , w ).

If the minimum wage constraint is large, optimal choice is at the point where \(w = y\) and \(w = b/n\) intersect.

If the government implements a policy to “cultivate honesty and integrity through high pay”, that is, to ensure that wages are sufficiently high to persuade rational officials to abandon the idea of corruption, then Proposition 2 describes the optimal course of action. When per capita income is very low, the government is not concerned about the impact of the minimum wage on government expenditure or government benefit. In order to ensure that payment is appropriate to “cultivate honesty and integrity”, the government will carefully consider the relationship between investment in supervisors and improvements in government benefits. It will then determine the best amount of investment and pay for supervisors. The equilibrium pay level will be more than the per capita income, and the equilibrium supervisor input will also be greater than zero. On the other hand, the minimum wage restriction has an effect on government decision-making when per capita income is high. Maintaining a large number of supervisors will be more expensive due to the high expense of paying employees. Therefore, in an ideal case, government will set the minimum per capita wage, and the number of inspectors will remain at the level necessary to “cultivate honesty and integrity” even if officials are paid per capita. As shown by Proposition 2, as per capita income increases, the minimum wage restriction also ensures a sufficiently high wage, so the optimal number of supervisors decreases as per capita income increases. This shows that as a society becomes wealthier, on the one hand, the risk of corruption increases, reduces possibility of official corruption, and the cost of anti-corruption measures rises, causing the number of supervisors to decrease.

Optimum choice of comprehensive consideration of wages

If the government only requires a minimum wage (i.e., wage should not be less than per capita income) and does not impose a high or low wage, then when choosing optimal combination of supervisors and wages \(\left( {n,w} \right)\) , the government will consider the first two situations comprehensively to maximize the government benefit function \(G(n,w)\) and get optimal choice \(\left( {n^ \ast ,w^ \ast } \right)\) . In this way, the corollaries for proposition 1 and 2 are as follows (see appendix for proof).

Corollary 1 . If the government only restricts its employees’ minimum wage, the optimal number of supervisors and wages \(\left( {n^ \ast ,w^ \ast } \right)\) that the government should choose can be divided into the two situations below.

i. If \(y < \beta /\alpha\) , then

ii. If \(y \ge \beta /\alpha\) , then

Corollary 1 indicates that the best option for government investment in supervisors is to invest in none if per capita income y is so low that it drops below a particular threshold. The government currently believes that the benefits of fighting corruption surpass the expenses, even if only a small amount of effort is made. All officials are employed by the government. The highest degree of governmental gain will still be realized despite the lack of oversight and corruption among all officials. Specifically, if an economic society is relatively poor and has a low per capita income \(y\) , the government’s budget \(\gamma y\) will be quite limited. To improve government benefit, the government can only improve the quality of investment in infrastructure and public utilities. Therefore, government must employ sufficient officials with relevant information and expertize to operate specific infrastructure and public utilities projects. The government’s budget constrains its anti-corruption efforts. Considering that officials, whether corrupt or not, will contribute as much to government benefit as they do to the professionalism of project implementation, and that in order to obtain such “professional” benefits from officials, the government abandoned corruption supervision when the budget was limited, in such cases corruption will not offset an official’s contribution to government benefit in a “professional” way, even if the official is corrupt.

In addition, another portion of Corollary 1 states that if per capita income y exceeds a certain threshold value, the optimal choice of government investment in supervisors is greater than zero, and its value decreases as per capita income y rises. Specifically, when a society reaches a certain level of development, the per capita income is relatively high and the government will have relatively abundant budget γy . Therefore, in pursuit of high government benefit, the government does not rely entirely on officials to enhance the quality of implementation of infrastructure and public utilities projects. The government will consider officials more. Negative impact of staff corruption on government benefit maintains a team of supervisors greater than zero. Considering that when per capita income is higher than \(y \ge \beta /\alpha\) , there is \(w^ \ast = b/n^ \ast\) , the government has determined a reasonable proportion of supervisors and wage rate so that the expected income of officials in corrupt situations will not be higher than normal wage income; therefore, no rational official will participate in corruption activities under these conditions. It is worth mentioning that as a society becomes more affluent, the per capita income level y continues to rise, and the minimum wage constraint increases accordingly. As a result, the risk of corruption among officials rises, and an increase in their normal wages inhibits corruption to some extent, so the government needs fewer supervisors to ensure that a rational official is not corrupt.

Figure 4 shows the relationship between the optimal number of government supervisors \(n^ \ast\) and per capita income \(y\) . As shown in Fig. 4 , the optimal number of supervisors remains at zero as per capita income increases from zero until per capita income exceeds a critical value of \(\beta /\alpha\) , which we refer to as the “ critical value of supervising input of income.”

As per capita income y increases from 0, the optimal number of supervisors n undergoes a process of initially remaining at 0 level, then reaching a peak at b / y (when per capita income y reaches the critical value of β / α ), and finally gradually decreasing to approach zero infinitely.

The number of optimal supervisors surged abruptly to \(b/y\) and peaked at the critical point of \(\alpha b/\beta\) . As per capita income increased, the number of optimal supervisors began to decrease gradually. When per capita income approached infinity, that is, when \(y \to \infty\) , the number of optimal supervisors was infinitely close to zero. Figure 4 is also in line with reality. In fact, often poorer countries frequently lack anti-corruption measures, and corruption levels are relatively high. On the contrary, the wealthier developed countries can maintain a low level of corruption while spending less on supervision. For developing countries like China, the per capita income is at a medium-level, so it is likely located close to \(\alpha b/\beta\) (the highest level of supervision).

In addition, according to the definition of \(\alpha\) and \(\beta\) , if the influence of unit officials on government benefit is greater because of their own information or professional advantages, the impact of unit resources input on government benefit is relatively small. Then, the critical value of supervision input \(N\) will be larger, and the government will rely more on officials, so it will wait until a higher per capita income level to combat corruption. On the contrary, if the influence of unit officials on government benefit is relatively small due to their own information or professional advantages, and the impact of unit resource investment on government benefit is relatively large, then the critical value of supervision input \(N\) will be relatively small. Due to low capacity of officials, the government may take anti-corruption actions in advance to reduce losses.

Because we assume that all officials are homogeneous and confront the same size of corruption space, in this section of discussion, all officials will be in the same state, that is, all corrupt acts or all normal work. In the next section, we will introduce heterogeneous officials into the model and expand it to some extent.

Optimum choice of government supervision investment under heterogeneous officials

In reality, it is unlikely that all officials share the same “corruption preferences” or are completely homogeneous. Therefore, this section will discuss the optimal choice of government investment in supervision when officials have heterogeneous “corruption preferences”.

Assuming that only officials with a ratio \(m\left( {m \in \left( {0,1} \right)} \right)\) maintain original assumption, we refer to these Group \(A\) officials. The remaining officials with a ratio \(1 - m\) are more honest than the former. The “corruption space” has decreased due to their own reasons. We refer to them as Group \(B\) officials. Defining a “corruption preference coefficient” \(\sigma \left( {\sigma \in \left( {0,1} \right)} \right)\) , which indicates officials’ inherent degree of corruption. We believe that Group \(B\) officials, due to their own integrity, will not fully use rights allocated to them to corrupt. Therefore, they impose restrictions on themselves to alter corruption space \(\sigma b/\left( {1 - n} \right)\) . If corruption occurs with this official, he will receive additional benefit \(\sigma b/\left( {1 - n} \right)\) without being discovered, and investment in infrastructure or public utilities projects will decrease \(\sigma b/\left( {1 - n} \right)\) . The smaller the “corruption preference coefficient” \(\sigma\) , the more honest officials, and vice versa, the larger the corrupt officials. The “Corruption preference coefficient” of Group A officials are obviously 1.

Similarly, all officials may be in two states: normal work and corrupt state. Behavioral analysis of Group \(A\) officials can be found in the above model. For Group \(B\) officials, under normal working conditions, the benefit that each official will receive is basic wage \(w\) . In a corrupt state, every official has the probability of \(p(n)\) being found to be corrupt. Once found, all wages and corrupt income will be confiscated.

Therefore, under corruption, the expected income of Group \(B\) officials is

Thus, the utility function of Group \(B\) officials can be written as

Substituting \(p(n) = n\) , the formula becomes \(\left( {1 - n} \right)w + \sigma b\) . So, if there is

where the benefit of Group B officials under normal work is not less than expected benefits under corrupt work, so Group B officials will choose normal work.

Conversely, if \(w < \sigma b/n\) , where the benefit of Group \(B\) officials under normal work is less than the expected benefit under corrupt work, so Group \(B\) officials will choose corrupt work over normal work.

Obviously, the minimum wage to ensure that Group officials are not corrupt varies based on the varying levels of honesty of Group \(A\) officials and Group \(B\) officials themselves. In order to prevent corruption, the more honest Group \(B\) officials require a lower wage \(\sigma b/n\) . The optimal choice for a government, as determined by homogeneity of officials, is either to tolerate the corruption of all officials or to have zero-tolerance for corruption, as determined by the conclusion of a previous analysis. If officials’ “corruption preference” is heterogeneous, will there be an optimal choice for the government to supervise input if some officials will choose to corrupt while others do not? Intuitively, this is possible because there is a wage range \(w \in \left[ {\sigma b/n,\,b/n} \right)\) . When the wage is in this range, corruption will happen to Group \(A\) officials, but not Group \(B\) officials. If the cost of guaranteeing the non-corruption of Group \(B\) officials is less than the cost of guaranteeing non-corruption of all officials, then optimal choice of government supervision must be that wages are \(w \in \left[ {\sigma b/n,\,b/n} \right)\) , where it will be a society with “partial corruption”. Next, we will confirm existence of “partial corruption” through analysis.

Similarly, when the government formulates different wage levels, it may lead to different official behavior, resulting in varying levels of corruption income \(B\left( {n,w} \right)\) of officials without detection, which will affect the form of government benefit function. Considering the inconsistent behavior of Group \(A\) officials and Group \(B\) officials, we will discuss it in three cases: the first is the optimal choice of supervision input when the wage is low, i.e., \(w < \sigma b/n\) . The second is optimal choice of supervisory input when the medium wage is \(\sigma b < w < b/n\) . The third is optimal choice of supervisory input when the wage is high, i.e., \(w \ge b/n\) .

Optimal choice for low wage ( \(w < \sigma b/n\) )

When lower the wage \(w < \sigma b/n\) , according to the previous analysis, both Group \(A\) and Group \(B\) officials will find that the expected benefits of corruption will be greater than those of their normal work, so all officials will choose to corrupt. Corruption of Group \(A\) officials will have additional benefits \(b/\left( {1 - n} \right)\) if it is not discovered by supervisor. Corruption of Group \(B\) officials will have additional benefits \(b/\left( {1 - n} \right)\) if it is not discovered by supervisor, then total corruption benefits of officials \(B\left( {n,w} \right)\) is

and government benefit function \(G(n,w)\) is reduced to

Proposition 3 . When the wage ( \(w < \sigma b/n\) ) is lower, the optimal number of supervisors and their salaries \(\left( {n_3^ \ast ,w_3^ \ast } \right)\) are \(\left( {n_3^ \ast ,w_3^ \ast } \right) = \left( {0,y} \right)\) , the value of government benefit function is

Similar to Proposition 1, the conclusion of Proposition 3 can be obtained by making a slight modification to Fig. 1 . As shown in Fig. 5 , the shaded area enclosed between the line \(w = y,n = 0,n = 1\) and the curve \(w = \sigma b/n\) are the values that can be obtained for \(n\) and \(w\) . The indifference curve remains a straight line. The closer it is to the origin, the larger the objective function \(G(n,w)\) becomes. Therefore, when the indifference curve is closest to the origin, the \(n\) and \(w\) are 0 and y , respectively, where the government benefit function reaches its maximum.

When the wage ( w  <  σb / n ) is low, the optimal number of supervisors and their salaries satisfy n  = 0 and w  =  y .

If the salary is insufficient, then both Group \(A\) and Group \(B\) officials will choose to engage in corruption at the risk of being discovered. If government continues to employ some supervisors, even though corruption losses caused by more honest Group \(B\) officials will be less than in the previous model, the contribution of corrupt funds recovered by supervisors to government benefit still cannot make up for wages paid to supervisors. The loss, or in this case, the cost of curbing corruption for the entire society is greater than that of tolerating it. When wages are restricted by an upper limit, a reasonable government will inevitably choose not to employ any supervisors and reduce wages of government employees to the lowest level, that is, per capita income \(y\) , so as to obtain the highest level of government benefit.

In addition, it is simple to find that the optimal value of the government benefit function is a decreasing function of both the proportion m of Group \(A\) officials and the corruption preference coefficient \(\sigma\) of Group \(B\) officials. This demonstrates that when proportion \(m\) of corrupt Group \(A\) officials m is smaller and proportion \(1 - m\) of honest Group \(B\) officials is larger, the value of optimal government benefit function is larger. At the same time, if the corruption preference coefficient \(\sigma\) of Group \(B\) officials is small, indicating that the level of honesty of Group \(B\) officials is higher, then the value of optimal government benefit function will be large. These conclusions are also in line with our intuitive understanding. The smaller \(m\) and \(\sigma\) , the more honest a society is, the greater government benefit will obviously be.

Optimal choice for medium wage ( \(\sigma b \le w < b/n\) )

When wages are in a medium range \(\sigma b \le w < b/n\) , rational Group \(A\) officials will find that the expected benefits of corruption \(\left( {1 - n} \right)w + b\) are greater than those w of normal work, while rational Group \(B\) officials will observe that the expected benefits of normal work will not be less than those of corruption \(\left( {1 - n} \right)w + \sigma b\) at this time, as all Group \(A\) officials will choose corruption work and all Group \(B\) officials will choose normal work. Currently, total revenue of corruption \(B\left( {n,w} \right)\) is as follows

and the government benefit function \(G\bf \left( {n,w} \right)\) is reduced to

Thus, we have the following proposition (proof omitted).

Proposition 4 . When wages are within the medium-level range \(\sigma b \le w < b/n\) , the optimal number of supervisors and their salaries \(\left( {n_4^ \ast ,w_4^ \ast } \right)\) depend on income per capital y .

i. If \(y < \sqrt {\sigma b\left( {\beta - \alpha bm} \right)/\alpha }\) , then

where the value of government benefit function is

ii. If \(y \ge \sqrt {\sigma b\left( {\beta - \alpha bm} \right)/\alpha }\) , then

As depicted in Fig. 6 , if the government sets wages at the mediate-level, the range \(\left( {n,w} \right)\) of values will be between curves \(w = b/n\) , \(w = \sigma b/n\) . Therefore, the value of the shadowed area surrounded by straight line \(w = y\) , \(n = 1\) and curves \(w = b/n\) , \(w = \sigma b/n\) can be obtained by \(n\) and \(w\) , At this time, the objective function \(G(n,w)\) is still a linear function about \(n\) and \(w\) , so the indifference curve is a straight line. Similarly, the closer to origin indifference curve represents, the greater value of objective function. Similar to previous results, if the minimum wage constraint is small, that is, \(y\) is small, then the optimal choice must be at the point where difference curve and \(w = \sigma b/n\) are tangent. If the minimum wage constraint is large, however, the optimal choice is the intersection of \(w = y\) and \(w = \sigma b/n\) .

If the minimum wage constraint is small, the optimal choice must be at the point where difference curve and w  <  σb / n are tangent. If the minimum wage constraint is large, the optimal choice is the intersection of w  =  y and w  <  σb / n .

The situation described in Proposition 4 is a form of “partial corruption”, in which only a part of officials (Group \(A\) officials) will be corrupted while the rest will not. If the government can only set wages within a certain range, which may lead to “partial corruption” due to certain constraints, then the government’s optimal choice is as outlined in Proposition 4. When per capita income is very low, the government is unconcerned about the impact of the minimum wage on government expenditure or government benefits. Government will thoroughly evaluate the relationship between investment in supervisors and improvement in government benefits, and determine an optimal investment of supervisors and wage level. Since it cannot fundamentally restrain corruption of Group \(A\) officials, the government will employ a high proportion of supervisors to ensure investigation rate of corruption after an incident, and will also pay higher wages than the per capita income. On the other hand, when per capita income is high, however, the minimum wage constraint has a certain impact on government’s decision-making. Because the cost of paying wages is too high, maintaining a higher number of supervisors will incur additional cost. Therefore, in the optimal case, the government will establish a minimum per capita wage. As the government function cannot prevent the corruption of Group \(A\) officials, it will maintain the number of supervisors at a level that only the average salary of Group \(B\) officials can guarantee to “cultivate honesty and integrity”.

When wages are higher \(w \ge b/n\) , both Group \(A\) and Group \(B\) officials will find that the benefits of normal work will not be less than expected benefits of corruption. Therefore, all officials will opt to work normally. At this time, the total revenue from official corruption \(B\) is 0, and the government benefit function \(G(n,w)\) is reduced to

Consequently, we are in the same situation as in section 2 of the previous part, so Proposition 2 is the conclusion.

It can be seen that when the government sets a high enough wage, regardless of how different officials are, they will not engage in corruption, so the heterogeneity of officials will not influence government’s decision-making.

Optimal choice with comprehensive consideration of salary when corruption preference is heterogeneous

If only minimum wage is required (i.e., wages should be no less than per capita income) and there are no other interval constraints, the government will consider the first three situations to maximize the government benefit function \(G(n,w)\) and obtain the optimal choice \(\left( {n^ \ast ,w^ \ast } \right)\) when determining the optimal combination of supervisors and wages \(\left( {n,w} \right)\) . It is noteworthy that the optimal choice of government lead to the emergence of “partial corruption” due to the heterogeneity of officials. We are concerned about whether it is possible for the government to consider all circumstances and choose the optimal wage to be set within an interval where “partial corruption” will occur if government’s wages are not constrained by interval. First, we argue that if per capita income is low, the optimal choice for government, similar to the case of homogeneous officials, is to maintain wages in per capita income without employing any supervisors. The following inferences are provided (see appendix for proof).

Corollary 2 . If only the minimum wage is constrained, then when \(y < \sqrt {\beta b/\alpha }\) , the value of the government benefit function is \(\left( {n^ \ast ,w^ \ast } \right) = \left( {0,y} \right)\) , where the value of government benefit function is

Corollary 2 demonstrates that if the per capita income \(y\) is below a certain value, the optimal choice for government investment in supervisors is to not invest in any supervisors. Similar to the previous part of Corollary 1, Corollary 2 states that when per capita income is low, the government’s budget and limitations cannot support the cost of anti-corruption. Even if society is relatively honest, that is, there are smaller \(m\) and smaller \(\sigma\) , the government will not raise wages to combat the corruption of the more honest Group \(B\) officials.

Obviously, we know from corollary 2 that if \(y < \sqrt {\beta b/\alpha }\) , the optimal choice of government does not occur to be “partial corruption”. Then when \(y \ge \sqrt {\beta b/\alpha }\) , is it possible for this situation to occur? The answer is yes; we provide lemma (see appendix for proof).

Lemma 1 . Denote a function of \(m\) :

where \(\delta = \beta /\alpha\) . There exist \(\sigma \in \left( {0,1} \right)\) and \(m \in \left( {0,1} \right)\) such that \(\sigma < g\left( m \right)\) .

In other words, set \(p = \left\{ {\left( {m,\sigma } \right)\left| {\sigma < g\left( m \right),m \in \left( {0,1} \right),\sigma \in \left( {0,1} \right)} \right.} \right\}\) satisfies \(P \ne \emptyset\) .

As a result, we stipulate that government’s optimal choice may lead to “partial corruption”. Assuming that Assumption 2 is true, we provide Proposition 5 (See Appendix for proof).

Assumption 2 . The ratio \(m\) of Group \(A\) officials and corruption preference coefficient \(\sigma\) of Group \(B\) officials satisfy the following constraints:

Proposition 5 . If only the minimum wage of its employees is constrained, then, if and only if Assumption 2 holds, there exists a per capita income range that causes “partial corruption” if the optimal supervising input level chosen by the government is optimal. The government weighs the number of supervisors and wages \(\left( {n^ \ast ,w^ \ast } \right)\) that maximize government benefit in all cases into three categories.

i. If \(y < \frac{{\delta - bm}}{{1 - m}}\) , then

at this time, the value of government benefit function is

ii. If \(\frac{{\delta - bm}}{{1 - m}} \le y < \frac{{\delta \left( {1 - \sigma } \right)}}{m} + \sigma b\) , then

at this time, value of government benefit function is

iii. If \(y \ge \frac{{\delta \left( {1 - \sigma } \right)}}{m} + \sigma b\) , then

In the case of Assumption 2 being satisfied, cases i and ii in Proposition 5 are analogous to those of Corollary 1; that is, when per capita income \(y\) is very low and even lower than a certain critical value, the optimal choice for investing in supervisors is zero. Now, all officials will attempt to corrupt, but when the per capita income \(y\) is high enough and even higher than some critical value, the government will invest more in supervision to prevent corruption. Notably, in case ii of Proposition 5, when per capita income \(y\) is at a mediate-level, the optimal choice for the government is to invest a certain number of supervisors to prevent Group B officials from engaging in corruption. In other words, the government believes that only the most honest officials will not invest in corruption supervising costs. Relative to government benefit, benefits are relatively small. At the same time, the cost of investing so heavily in supervisors that no government officials will attempt to corrupt them is greater than the increase in government benefit. In this way, “partial corruption” results from the government’s optimal choice.

Proposition 5 reveals the existence of “partial corruption”, but its existence is contingent on the truth of Assumption 2. When ratio \(m\) of Group \(A\) officials and corruption preference coefficient \(\sigma\) of Group \(B\) officials are within set \(P\) , it is conceivable for “partial corruption” to occur, noting definition of set \(P\) , that is, when \(\sigma < g\left( m \right)\) , there will be “partial corruption”. As far as we know, \(g\left( m \right)\) is the decreasing function of \(m\) , so when both σ and m are smaller, it is easier to satisfy \(\sigma < g\left( m \right)\) , and “partial corruption” is more likely to occur. Intuitively, the smaller the \(m\) , the fewer corrupt Group \(A\) officials and the greater the number of honest Group \(B\) officials. Government chooses appropriate supervising input so that Group \(B\) officials will not attempt to corrupt benefits of situation will be greater than the larger m , and the cost of supervising input has not changed. Therefore, it is more likely that “partial corruption” will occur. In addition, the smaller the σ is, the more honest Group \(B\) officials are. Government selects appropriate supervising input and only makes the cost of Group \(B\) officials not attempting corruption smaller than that of the larger \(\sigma\) , so “partial corruption” is also more likely to occur. To sum up, a smaller m means that stopping corruption of Group \(B\) officials will produce greater benefits, and a smaller σ means that stopping corruption of Group \(B\) officials will produce smaller costs, and the combination of the two makes the emergence of “partial corruption” possible. This also partially explains why it has always been difficult to eradicate corruption in some middle-income countries.

The result of Proposition 5 suggests a possible relationship between the optimal number of supervisors n * and per capita income y under heterogeneous officials. Figure 7 illustrates the relationship If Assumption 2. As shown in Fig. 7 , the critical value of supervising input for income \(N\) is \(N\left( m \right) = \frac{{\delta - bm}}{{1 - m}}\) .

The critical value of supervising input for income is N ( m ) = ( δ − bm )/(1 −  m ) in a period of “partial corruption”. Correspondingly, in the period of “comprehensive anti-corruption”, the critical value of comprehensive supervising of income can be denoted as L ( m , σ ) = δ (1 −  σ )/(1 −  m ) + σb .

Since \(N\left( m \right)\) is an increasing function as to \(m\) , therefore, when \(m\) is smaller, the critical value of supervising input is smaller, and the society will enter an anti-corruption period earlier as per capita income rises. Intuitively, the smaller \(m\) is, the more honest its officials, the greater the likelihood that the government will invest in proactive supervising. As the government knows that the cost of supervising honest officials is not excessively high, but because there are such officials, it will receive more government benefits.

Figure 7’s optimal supervising input exhibits two jumps compared to Fig. 4 . Obviously, the first jump in critical value of supervision input ushers in a period of “partial corruption”, whereas the second jump ushers in a period of “comprehensive anti-corruption”, so the government will invest fully in inspectors so that no officials will attempt corruption. We will turn this jump point as “ critical value of comprehensive supervising of income”, and denote as \(L\) , according to Proposition 5 and Fig. 7 , we have

Since \(L\left( {m,\sigma } \right)\) is a decreasing function as to \(m\) and \(\sigma\) , the larger \(m\) and \(\sigma\) are, the smaller \(L\left( {m,\sigma } \right)\) is, and the earlier the government will enter comprehensive anti-corruption period. Intuitively speaking, the larger \(m\) and \(\sigma\) indicates that Group \(A\) officials are more and Group \(B\) officials are less honest than Group \(A\) officials. Group \(B\) officials does not pay sufficient attention to Group \(A\) officials due to their small number and lack of difference from Group officials in terms of corruption. Therefore, the government will be more aware of anti-corruption’s flaws and will advance comprehensive anti-corruption. In addition, as shown in Fig. 5 , when per capita income is close to the “critical value of overall supervising of income” \(L\left( {m,\sigma } \right)\) , the optimal level of supervising input may be the same, but the economy and society before per capita income is \(L\left( {m,\sigma } \right)\) will produce “partial corruption”, whereas the economy and society after \(L\left( {m,\sigma } \right)\) will not. If \(L\left( {m,\sigma } \right)\) is regarded as demarcation point between middle-income countries and developed countries, then this model partially explains why poorer countries have more corruption than richer countries in terms of supervising investment at a lower level.

As shown in Fig. 7 , the optimal level of government supervision input causes per capita income range of “partial corruption” occur between the critical value of supervising input of income \(N\) and the critical value of overall supervising of income \(L\) . From the monotony of \(N\left( m \right)\) and \(L\left( {m,\sigma } \right)\) , it can be deduced that the range enlarges with a decrease of \(m\) and \(\sigma\) , and with the increase of \(m\) and \(\sigma\) . When \(m\) and \(\sigma\) reaches a certain value, the area ceases to exist and degenerates to the situation depicted in Fig. 4 , that is, “partial corruption” does not exist, as shown by Proposition 6 (see appendix for evidence).

Proposition 6 . If Assumption 2 is false and the government only restricts its employees’ minimum wage, then the optimal level of supervision input chosen by government will not result in “partial corruption” regardless of the per capita income. To maximize government benefit in all circumstances, the government weighs the number of supervisors and their wages \(\left( {n^ \ast ,w^ \ast } \right)\) . It can be divided into two cases:

i. If \(y < \frac{\delta }{{m + \left( {1 - m} \right)\sigma }}\) , then

ii. If \(y \ge \frac{\delta }{{m + \left( {1 - m} \right)\sigma }}\) , then

If Assumption 2 is invalid, then Proposition 6 gives relationship between the optimal level of supervising input level and per capita income. Its figure resembles Fig. 4 . Only difference is that the critical value of supervising input of income \(N\) is

Since \(N\left( {m,\sigma } \right)\) is a decreasing function of \(m\) and \(\sigma\) , the larger \(m\) and \(\sigma\) are, the smaller \(N\left( {m,\sigma } \right)\) is, and the earlier the government will enter a comprehensive anti-corruption period. Obviously, because \(m + \left( {1 - m} \right)\sigma < 1\) , the critical value of input from income supervising is larger than that of homogeneous officials. This is due to the fact that existence of Group \(B\) officials make the whole society more honest than homogeneous officials. Therefore, under the same level of per capita income, if comprehensive anti-corruption measures are taken. Obviously, higher benefits can be obtained in societies with greater corruption. In other words, the existence of more honest Group \(B\) officials reduce the government’s concern about corruption, resulting in the government taking supervision inputs later.

Conclusion and discussion

Corruption has always been a worldwide issue, particularly in developing countries. In light of the fact that people do not yet have a clear understanding of how to balance the cost of corruption and anti-corruption supervision input, this paper has conducted a certain amount of theoretical research in this area.

Our research indicates that when per capita income is low, the optimal level of surveillance investment is virtually zero. Specifically, in a poorer socio-economic context where per capita income is below the “surveillance investment threshold,” government budgets are severely limited and unable to cover the costs of rigorous anti-corruption measures. Even minor efforts against corruption yield societal benefits that transcend the costs of such initiatives. Hence, governments can only enhance the quality of infrastructure and public service investment to advance government benefits. The chosen strategy entails hiring enough officers with relevant information and professional skills to implement specific infrastructure and public service projects with nearly zero investment in surveillance personnel. This choice is driven by the fact that officials, whether corrupt or not, can provide the same amount of government benefit due to their professional expertize in project implementation.

Secondly, when per capita income grows to a certain level, the optimal level of surveillance investment suddenly maximizes and declines as per capita income increases but always maintains a level greater than zero. In other words, as a society develops to a certain level, per capita income rises above the “surveillance investment threshold,” allowing the government a more flexible fiscal budget. At this stage, the government’s pursuit of high government benefits does not rely solely on improving project implementation quality by officers. The government also considers the negative impact of official corruption on societal welfare, therefore maintaining a positive level of supervision, reaching a maximum when per capita income is at the “surveillance investment threshold.” Furthermore, when per capita income is relatively high, the government determines a reasonable proportion and wage rate for surveillance personnel so that officials’ expected benefits from corruption do not exceed their normal wage income. In such a scenario, no rational official would participate in corrupt activities.

Finally, when officials’ corruption levels are heterogeneous, the proportion of more honest officials is larger, and their degree of honesty is higher. There may exist a middle per capita income range where an optimal level of supervising input results in “partial corruption.” In this scenario, the government only needs to maintain supervision input at a level that prevents honest officials from engaging in corruption. This conclusion also partly explains why poorer countries have higher corruption levels compared to wealthier countries when supervising investment is at a lower level. Additionally, this paper sheds light on the persistent challenge of eradicating corruption in certain middle-income countries.

The findings of this research provide a new perspective for understanding and addressing the corruption problem. However, it is worth noting the limitations of our study. First, our model is based on idealized assumptions and does not fully consider other potential factors affecting corruption, such as cultural factors, political environment, legal system, etc. The omission of these factors may impose certain restrictions on the practical application of our model. Second, our model is theoretically driven but lacks sufficient empirical data for validation, which could lead to potential bias in our conclusions. Third, our study assumes that the government’s budget allocation is solely based on economic efficiency considerations without considering the realities of political trade-offs and societal pressures. These factors can play a crucial role in the actual decision-making process. Moreover, our study predominantly features a static model without fully considering the time factor. For instance, as socio-economic development progresses, public tolerance of corruption may change, affecting the optimal level of corruption and anti-corruption surveillance investment. Future research could build a dynamic model to examine the influence of temporal variations and multiple factors on corruption and anti-corruption surveillance investment. In addition, laboratory experiments involving corruption games provide a more intuitive and operational method to assess and understand corruption decision-making behavior, presenting another area for continued development and refinement in future studies.

Data availability

Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analyzed during the current study.

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We would like to thank He Huang for her proofreading work on this manuscript.

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Miao Zhang, Houli Zhang, Li Zhang, Xu Peng, Jiaxuan Zhu, Duochenxi Liu & Shibing You

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All authors have contributed to the research and manuscript. SY and MZ conceptualized the overall study scope, design, and methodology. MZ, HZ, and LZ conducted the analyses, and interpreted the results. The corresponding author, XP, JZ, and DL supervise the study. MZ and HZ prepared the draft of the manuscript. MZ, HZ, DL, XP, and JZ reviewed the draft. All authors have approved the final version.

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A Handful of Unlawful Behaviors, Led by Fraud and Bribery, Account for Nearly All Public Corruption Convictions Since 1985

A comprehensive analysis of nearly 57,000 corruption cases in federal courts spanning 30 years revealed that fraud and bribery dominated the types of conduct underlying criminal cases, accounting for 76% of the lead charges in cases resulting in convictions. Those two unlawful behavior types, combined with extortion and conspiracy, broadly informed the lead charges in virtually all examined corruption convictions in federal courts from 1985 to 2015.

That was a key finding of a case records study by a research team led by Jay S. Albanese of Virginia Commonwealth University. The purpose of the study, sponsored by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), was to fill a literature gap with empirically based knowledge of prosecution practices, corruption-fighting statutes, and types of behavior underlying prosecutions. New insights on corrupt behavior could inform new policies to prevent some corrupt conduct and discover some corrupt acts earlier. [1] The findings may also help the justice system focus crime prevention and enforcement strategies on those behaviors most often associated with criminal prosecution, and distinguish among types of corruption more likely to occur at the federal, state, or local level, the researchers said. [2]

All of the corruption case records examined came from federal courts, accessed in court and prosecutor databases, and the researchers compared cases in three different tiers: federal-level, state-level, and local-level corruption.

Corruption Crime Types Vary Among Government Levels 

Fraud was the focus of corruption charges in 40.6% of all analyzed cases, with bribery accounting for the lead charge in 35.6% of cases. [3] But the prevalence of charged conduct categories varied somewhat depending on the level of government activity addressed in the prosecution. In federal-level corruption litigation, the first-charged conduct was fraud in 5,579 of 12,663 cases (44.1%) and bribery in 5,129 cases (41%). Similarly, in state-level cases, lead fraud charges outnumbered lead bribery charges, 1,112 cases (29.3%) to 1,070 (28%), out of a total of 3,792 state-level convictions. But in local-government corruption matters, lead bribery charges exceeded lead fraud charges, 2,421 cases (34%) to 2,051 (29%), out of 7,090 total convictions.

Extortion charges were a distant third among lead charges in federal- and local-level corruption cases in federal court, but extortion led all crime types charged in state-level matters. In those cases, extortion led fraud by 1,156 to 1,112 charge types (30% to 29%), with bribery trailing slightly at 1,070 (28%), out of the total of 3,792 state-level corruption charge types.  

Together, the four prevalent categories of corrupt behavior — fraud, bribery, and extortion, along with conspiracy — “form the operational meaning of corruption in practice,” the researchers concluded. [4]

Drilling down, the team identified eight discrete corrupt activities, covering all public corruption, through a closer analysis of about 2,400 cases from 2013 to 2015. Those eight activities are: [5]

• Receipt of a bribe
• Solicitation of a bribe
• Contract fraud
• Embezzlement
• Official misconduct
• Obstruction of justice
• Violation of regulatory laws

The researchers noted a nexus between heightened corruption risk and public service at the state and, especially, local levels. They pointed out that public officials serving on government boards and councils, as well as in elected office and law enforcement positions, were often employed part time, undertrained, and undersupervised. The report on corrupt behavior types said that the “lack of professionalism” in the public officials’ roles and expectations “provided the space to exploit opportunities to enrich themselves.” [6]

Remedies for Corruption

The researchers propose several corruption remedies, including: [7]

• Transparency in contract award processes and government spending practices.
• Dual training of individuals on public duties to avoid having a single person authorizing and reviewing payments.
• Introducing mandatory ethics training for government entities.
• Better protections for whistleblowers.
• A focus on fairness in prosecutions.
• Mandatory ethics training for federal programs and state and local entities.

What Motivated Corruption?

A separate aspect of the research by Albanese and his colleagues was an empirical analysis of corruption defendants’ criminal motivation broken down into four categories: [8]

Positive — motivated by external factors, usually social or economic, that push the individual toward crime. An assumption underlying this explanation is that changing the influences on individuals will prevent crime.

Classical — an individual decision to maximize personal benefit through corrupt conduct; it can be deterred by increasing the threat of apprehension and punishment.

Structural — driven by systemic political and economic conditions; it can be deterred by legal and structural changes to election processes, balance of power, enforcement of laws, and due process. 

Ethical — guided by individual decisions to act ethically or wrongfully; it can be deterred by education and reinforcement of ethical decisions.

For the corruption motivation analysis, researchers interviewed 72 individuals who have direct experience, in different capacities, with a variety of public corruption matters, [9] The themes that were discussed informed the coding of the interviews, and qualitative analysis software completed the evaluation.

Of the four corruption cause categories, ethical explanations led, at 38% of total explanations gleaned from the interviews and analysis; 28% offered a structural explanation; 19% offered a classical explanation; and 15% offered a positivist explanation.

About This Article

The research described in this article was funded by NIJ grant 2015-IJ-CX-0007, awarded to Virginia Commonwealth University. This article is based on three reports: the grantee Final Summary Overview on the project, “ Developing Empirically-Driven Public Corruption Prevention Strategies ” (2018), Jay S. Albanese, principal investigator; and two published articles, also written by members of the research team:

• Jay S. Albanese, Kristine Artello, and Linh Thi Nguyen, “ Distinguishing Corruption in Law and Practice: Empirically Separating Conviction Charges from Underlying Behaviors ,” Public Integrity 21 no. 1 (2019): 22-37.
• Jay Albanese and Kristine Artello, “Focusing Anti-Corruption Efforts More Effectively: An Empirical Look at Offender Motivation—Positive, Classical, Structural and Ethical Approaches,” Advances in Applied Sociology 8 no. 6 (2018): 471-485.

[note 1] , [note 2] , [note 3] , [note 6] , [note 7] Jay S. Albanese, Kristine Artello, and Linh Thi Nguyen, “Distinguishing Corruption in Law and Practice: Empirically Separating Conviction Charges from Underlying Behaviors,” Public Integrity 21 no. 1 (2019): 25.  

[note 4] , [note 5] Jay Albanese, “Final Summary Overview: Developing Empirically-Driven Public Corruption Prevention Strategies,” Final Report to the National Institute of Justice, grant number 2015-IJ-CX-0007, 2018, 4.

[note 8] , [note 9] Jay Albanese and Kristine Artello, “Focusing Anti-Corruption Efforts More Effectively: An Empirical Look at Offender Motivation—Positive, Classical, Structural and Ethical Approaches,” Advances in Applied Sociology 8 no. 6 (2018): 471-485, at 478. 

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Public Policy on Corruption Essay

Introduction.

Corruption denotes improper utilization of public office for personal gains. Widespread corruption is a clear indication that a given government is malfunctioning. A public policy created in this context regards anti-corruption. It is important to endorse a public policy, which advocates that no individual or any public/private office should indulge in corrupt dealings of any form. In most cases, characteristics of corruption are practiced in markets or organizations.

A lot of studies carried out indicate that corruption does not only reduce economic growth but it also lowers investments. This indicates why the proposed public policy is necessary. Corruption leads to reduced private savings and also destroys political stability. Foreign investors have also shown little interest in countries showing high prevalence of corruption. Studies also indicate that the level of corruption in countries importing goods have a negative effect on the business structures (Kellow, 2007).

A number of scholars have greatly contributed toward the analysis of corruption. The major reasons why corruption exists are low pay and poor monitoring system. Despite, an anticorruption policy will be viable in this context. Consequently, to create reliable policies on corruption, the government and the public should cooperate in eliminating such vices. In addition, action should be taken against those who violate these laws.

Details of the policy based on the Rational Model

This policy is going to affect all shareholder and employees. In addition, it will be applied to all the directors and officers in every institution. Going against the policy will lead to a severe punishment and disciplinary measures. An individual found corrupt will not only be sucked from his or her job but will also be referred to the relevant authority for castigation. With regard to the rational model, implementing this theory will experience some challenges.

In addition, some of the policymakers will not completely contribute to its implementation when they realize that it may affect them later. For example, a corrupt politician will be against the enforcement of this policy. However, to obtain zero tolerance on corruption, the following policies are required.

Employees are not allowed to take or give bribes for their own personal gains. Conversely, it is also illegal for employees to make some donations in form of payment with an aim of gaining. They are also prohibited from facilitating payments. According to the proposed anticorruption policy, it is also illegal for them to give gifts to clients and government officials.

In addition, when carrying out company business, an employee is not allowed to provide any gifts and entertainments to influence the rationality of such individuals. Records on the other hand must also be properly kept, all expenses are required to be adequately documented and maintained for long (Mbaku, 2007).

Before doing any business with a third party, an employee should ensure that the involved official meet the record keeping standards with regard to expenses connected with government officials. A written approval is generally needed when a given threshold has been exceeded. Before making any contracts with an organization, the employee must make sure that he or she is aware of the company’s background.

In addition, the employee should also have some information on the reputation of the company and its business capability. However, such acts must also contain provisions on anti-corruption. Finally, to ensure that there is compliance, proper training with regard to policies on anti-corruption as well as their roles must be carried out to the employees. When it comes to implementing these policies, some policymakers will not fully contribute to it due to their selfish interests.

The rationale of the policy

The rationale of this policy is to eliminate corruption. Internationally, corruption is hardly accepted. Factually, the vice slows down growth and development within institutions. Conversely, the policy intends to create viable provisions meant to deal with various aspects of corruption. This will be applicable to both public and private sectors. It is crucial to agree that the atrocities created by corruption are numerous. Nonetheless, it is possible to curb this menace despite the looming challenges.

How the model will assist policymakers in decision-making and implementation processes

This model is going to ensure that there is no biasness when it comes to the establishment and implementation of the concerned policy. In addition, people with self-interests will also be accommodated (Sapru, 2010). Besides, this model will ensure that there is universality when it comes to the application of these policies. Every policymaker will equally contribute to putting these policies into practice. Consequently, full transparency will be observed.

Evaluating the Rational Model

Contextually, the model monitors adherence to virtues concerning anti-corruption policies. This concerns the formulation of credible public policies. Additionally, the model exhausts all provisions of the policy-making criteria. It recognizes every aspect of viable public policies. Rationally, the model identifies the provisions of self-interest and biasness that might occur during the formulation of the previously mentioned public policy (anti-corruption policy).

It is important to report any suspected violation of anti-corruption policy to the concerned authorities as required by the model (Nicholls, 2011). Precisely, this model provides credible structures helpful in establishing, implementing, and evaluating the concerned policy. Hence, this indicates the viability of this model in formulating functional public policies.

Kellow, A. J. (2007). Science and public policy: The virtuous corruption of virtual environmental science . Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

Mbaku, J. (2007). Corruption in Africa: Causes, consequences, and cleanups . Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Nicholls, C. (2011). Corruption and misuse of public office . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sapru, R. (2010). Public policy: Art and craft of policy analysis . New Delhi: PHI Learning.

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Essay on Corruption

Here we have shared the Essay on Corruption in detail so you can use it in your exam or assignment of 150, 250, 400, 500, or 1000 words.

You can use this Essay on Corruption in any assignment or project whether you are in school (class 10th or 12th), college, or preparing for answer writing in competitive exams. 

Topics covered in this article.

Essay on Corruption in 150-250 words

Essay on corruption in 300-400 words, essay on corruption in 500-1000 words.

Corruption is a pervasive problem that plagues societies worldwide, undermining progress, eroding trust in institutions, and hindering economic development. It involves the abuse of entrusted power for personal gain, often through bribery, embezzlement, or nepotism.

Corruption has severe consequences for societies. It diverts public resources away from essential services such as healthcare, education, and infrastructure, exacerbating inequality and impeding socio-economic progress. It undermines the rule of law, erodes public trust in government institutions, and fosters a culture of impunity.

Addressing corruption requires a comprehensive approach. Transparency, accountability, and strong institutions are essential. Governments must enact and enforce stringent anti-corruption laws, establish independent oversight bodies, and promote transparency in public procurement and financial transactions. Strengthening the judicial system and providing protection to whistleblowers are also crucial steps.

Moreover, fostering a culture of integrity and ethical behavior is vital. Education and awareness campaigns should highlight the damaging effects of corruption and promote the values of honesty, fairness, and accountability. Civil society plays a crucial role in monitoring and advocating for anti-corruption measures, and individuals must reject corrupt practices and demand ethical conduct from their leaders.

In conclusion, corruption is a pervasive problem that undermines societal progress and hampers economic development. Combating corruption requires the concerted efforts of governments, institutions, and individuals. By promoting transparency, accountability, and a culture of integrity, we can build a society that upholds the values of honesty, fairness, and justice, fostering a brighter future for all.

Corruption is a deep-rooted issue that plagues societies worldwide, undermining trust in institutions, hindering economic growth, and perpetuating inequality. It refers to the misuse of power or position for personal gain, often through bribery, embezzlement, or nepotism.

Corruption has far-reaching consequences. It siphons public resources away from essential services such as healthcare, education, and infrastructure, leaving societies deprived of much-needed development. It perpetuates a culture of unfairness and inequality, as those with wealth and connections can manipulate systems for their advantage while the marginalized suffer the consequences.

Furthermore, corruption erodes the rule of law and weakens institutions meant to uphold justice and fairness. It erodes public trust in governments and fosters cynicism among citizens, leading to apathy and disengagement from civic life. Corruption also undermines investment and economic growth, as it deters both domestic and foreign investors who fear unfair competition and lack of accountability.

Addressing corruption requires a multi-faceted approach. Strong institutions, transparency, and accountability are crucial. Governments must enact and enforce robust anti-corruption laws, establish independent oversight bodies, and ensure the swift prosecution of offenders. Strengthening the judicial system and providing protection to whistleblowers are essential steps toward combating corruption effectively.

Promoting a culture of integrity and ethics is equally important. Education and awareness campaigns should emphasize the damaging effects of corruption and instill values of honesty, fairness, and accountability in individuals from an early age. Anti-corruption education should be integrated into school curricula, and training programs should be provided to public officials to promote ethical behavior and strengthen their resistance to corruption temptations.

Civil society plays a crucial role in fighting corruption. NGOs, media outlets, and citizen-led initiatives can monitor and expose corrupt practices, advocate for transparency, and hold public officials accountable. Empowering and protecting whistleblowers is vital to encourage reporting and ensure their safety.

Individuals also have a responsibility to reject corruption and demand ethical conduct from their leaders. By exercising their rights, participating in civic activities, and promoting transparency and accountability, citizens can contribute to building a corruption-free society.

In conclusion, corruption remains a grave challenge that hampers progress and undermines societal well-being. Tackling corruption requires a comprehensive approach involving strong institutions, transparency, education, and citizen participation. By promoting integrity, demanding accountability, and fostering a culture that values ethics and fairness, we can build a more just and prosperous society for all.

Title: Corruption – A Cancer Eating Away at Societal Progress

Introduction :

Corruption is a deeply rooted problem that plagues societies worldwide, hindering progress, eroding public trust, and perpetuating inequality. It refers to the misuse of power, position, or resources for personal gain, often through bribery, embezzlement, or nepotism. This essay explores the causes and consequences of corruption, its impact on society and development, effective measures to combat it, and the importance of promoting transparency, accountability, and ethical behavior.

Understanding Corruption

Corruption manifests in various forms, including grand corruption at the highest levels of government and petty corruption in everyday interactions. It arises from factors such as weak governance, lack of transparency, inadequate accountability mechanisms, and a culture of impunity. Additionally, socioeconomic factors, such as poverty and income inequality, can exacerbate corruption by creating opportunities for bribery and favoritism.

Consequences of Corruption

Corruption has severe consequences for societies. It diverts resources away from essential public services, leading to inadequate healthcare, education, and infrastructure. The marginalized and vulnerable bear the brunt of corruption, as it perpetuates inequality and undermines social justice. Moreover, corruption weakens institutions, erodes the rule of law, and fosters a culture of unfairness, eroding public trust in governments and democratic processes.

Economically, corruption hampers development and stifles investment. It distorts markets, creates an uneven playing field, and deters domestic and foreign investors who fear unfair competition and lack of transparency. The misallocation of resources and compromised governance systems hinder economic growth and perpetuate cycles of poverty.

Effective Measures to Combat Corruption

Combating corruption requires a multi-pronged approach at various levels:

a. Strengthening Institutions

B. legislation and enforcement, c. transparency and access to information, d. international cooperation, e. ethical leadership and political will.

Governments must establish strong, independent institutions and enforce the rule of law. This includes establishing robust anti-corruption agencies, promoting transparency and accountability, and ensuring the impartiality and efficiency of the judicial system.

Enacting comprehensive anti-corruption laws and enforcing them rigorously are vital. Governments should criminalize bribery, embezzlement, and illicit enrichment while providing protection for whistleblowers and witnesses.

Governments should promote transparency in public administration, budgeting processes, and procurement practices. Implementing freedom of information laws and establishing mechanisms for public scrutiny can curb corrupt practices and empower citizens to hold officials accountable.

Corruption often crosses borders, necessitating international cooperation in combating it. Governments should collaborate to trace and recover stolen assets, exchange information, and strengthen legal frameworks to prevent money laundering and illicit financial flows.

Leaders must lead by example, demonstrating a commitment to ethical behavior and the fight against corruption. Governments should promote a culture of integrity, fostering ethical conduct in public service and discouraging tolerance for corruption.

Promoting Transparency and Accountability

Transparency and accountability are essential in preventing corruption. Governments should establish mechanisms for public oversight, such as independent auditing bodies and ombudsman offices, to monitor the activities of public officials and ensure adherence to ethical standards. Promoting the use of technology, such as e-governance platforms and online portals for public information, can enhance transparency and reduce opportunities for corruption.

Civil society plays a crucial role in holding governments accountable and advocating for transparency. NGOs, media outlets, and citizen-led initiatives can monitor public spending, expose corrupt practices, and raise awareness about the damaging effects of corruption. Whistleblower protection laws should be enacted and enforced to encourage reporting and safeguard those who expose corruption.

Changing Attitudes and Promoting Ethics

Addressing corruption also requires a shift in societal attitudes and values. Education plays a vital role in promoting ethics, integrity, and responsible citizenship. Incorporating anti-corruption education into school curricula can foster a culture of transparency and ethical behavior from an early age.

Furthermore, promoting a culture of integrity in both public and private sectors is essential. Businesses should adopt robust anti-corruption policies, implement ethical practices, and adhere to international anti-corruption standards. Ethical behavior should be recognized, rewarded, and celebrated, while those engaged in corrupt practices should face consequences.

Conclusion :

Corruption remains a global challenge that undermines societal progress, perpetuates inequality, and hampers development. Addressing corruption requires a comprehensive approach that encompasses strong institutions, transparency, accountability, and a culture of integrity. By enacting and enforcing anti-corruption legislation, promoting transparency and access to information, and fostering ethical leadership, societies can root out corruption and build a more just and prosperous future for all.

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Essay on Corruption for Students and Children

500+ words essay on corruption.

Essay on Corruption – Corruption refers to a form of criminal activity or dishonesty. It refers to an evil act by an individual or a group. Most noteworthy, this act compromises the rights and privileges of others. Furthermore, Corruption primarily includes activities like bribery or embezzlement. However, Corruption can take place in many ways. Most probably, people in positions of authority are susceptible to Corruption. Corruption certainly reflects greedy and selfish behavior.

Methods of Corruption

First of all, Bribery is the most common method of Corruption. Bribery involves the improper use of favours and gifts in exchange for personal gain. Furthermore, the types of favours are diverse. Above all, the favours include money, gifts, company shares, sexual favours, employment , entertainment, and political benefits. Also, personal gain can be – giving preferential treatment and overlooking crime.

Embezzlement refers to the act of withholding assets for the purpose of theft. Furthermore, it takes place by one or more individuals who were entrusted with these assets. Above all, embezzlement is a type of financial fraud.

The graft is a global form of Corruption. Most noteworthy, it refers to the illegal use of a politician’s authority for personal gain. Furthermore, a popular way for the graft is misdirecting public funds for the benefit of politicians .

Extortion is another major method of Corruption. It means to obtain property, money or services illegally. Above all, this obtainment takes place by coercing individuals or organizations. Hence, Extortion is quite similar to blackmail.

Favouritism and nepotism is quite an old form of Corruption still in usage. This refers to a person favouring one’s own relatives and friends to jobs. This is certainly a very unfair practice. This is because many deserving candidates fail to get jobs.

Abuse of discretion is another method of Corruption. Here, a person misuses one’s power and authority. An example can be a judge unjustly dismissing a criminal’s case.

Finally, influence peddling is the last method here. This refers to illegally using one’s influence with the government or other authorized individuals. Furthermore, it takes place in order to obtain preferential treatment or favour.

Get the huge list of more than 500 Essay Topics and Ideas

Ways of Stopping Corruption

One important way of preventing Corruption is to give a better salary in a government job. Many government employees receive pretty low salaries. Therefore, they resort to bribery to meet their expenses. So, government employees should receive higher salaries. Consequently, high salaries would reduce their motivation and resolve to engage in bribery.

Tough laws are very important for stopping Corruption. Above all, strict punishments need to be meted out to guilty individuals. Furthermore, there should be an efficient and quick implementation of strict laws.

Applying cameras in workplaces is an excellent way to prevent corruption. Above all, many individuals would refrain from indulging in Corruption due to fear of being caught. Furthermore, these individuals would have otherwise engaged in Corruption.

The government must make sure to keep inflation low. Due to the rise in prices, many people feel their incomes to be too low. Consequently, this increases Corruption among the masses. Businessmen raise prices to sell their stock of goods at higher prices. Furthermore, the politician supports them due to the benefits they receive.

To sum it up, Corruption is a great evil of society. This evil should be quickly eliminated from society. Corruption is the poison that has penetrated the minds of many individuals these days. Hopefully, with consistent political and social efforts, we can get rid of Corruption.

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Supreme Court Poised to Cut Back Scope of Anti-Corruption Law

The question for the justices was whether a federal law prohibits not only before-the-fact bribes but also after-the-fact rewards.

By Adam Liptak

Reporting from Washington

The Supreme Court seemed ready on Monday to limit the reach of a federal statute that makes it a crime for state and local officials, along with institutions that receive federal money, to accept gifts and payments meant to influence or reward their actions.

In a lively argument studded with hypothetical questions about gifts as varied as cookies, Starbucks gift cards, meals at the Cheesecake Factory and 10-figure donations to hospitals, a majority of the justices seemed persuaded that the government’s interpretation of the law was too broad.

Before the argument, Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. announced that Justice Clarence Thomas would be absent but would participate in the case by reading the briefs and the transcript of the argument. The chief justice did not say why.

The case concerned James Snyder, who was mayor of Portage, Ind., along Lake Michigan, when the city bought garbage trucks from a local company under a bidding process that prosecutors said had been manipulated to ensure the company prevailed. After the process was complete, the company paid Mr. Snyder $13,000 for what he later said were consulting services.

Prosecutors charged Mr. Snyder with violating the federal law, which covers anyone “who solicits or demands for the benefit of any person, or accepts or agrees to accept, anything of value from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded.” He was found guilty in March 2021 and sentenced to 21 months in prison.

The question for the justices was whether the law applies only to before-the-fact bribes or also to after-the-fact gratuities.

Lisa S. Blatt, a lawyer for Mr. Snyder, warned the justices that a broad reading of the law would turn routine gifts into crimes backed by 10-year prison sentences. She added that it was impossible to draw a workable line between prohibited gifts and permissible ones.

“I don’t know where on the Harry & David menu the gift becomes corrupt,” she said, referring to the retailer known for its fruit baskets.

Along the same lines, under the government’s theory, she said, the gift of a meal at Chipotle was probably permissible, while one at the Inn at Little Washington, an expensive restaurant in Virginia, would not be. The hard question, she said, suggesting that the line-drawing exercise was absurd, was the Cheesecake Factory.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor noted that the law requires that the payment be made in connection with actions worth at least $5,000. Ms. Blatt said that amount was easily satisfied.

“The doctor who removes your wart, fine,” she said, indicating that such a procedure may not meet the threshold. “But the doctor who takes your gallbladder out or does your face, like my plastic surgeon, no, that’s worth over $5,000.”

Colleen R. Sinzdak, a lawyer for the federal government, said the anti-corruption law was not concerned with “innocuous gift-giving activity that occurs in the ordinary course of business.”

Better hypothetical examples, she said, were demands from a police chief for $10,000 payment after his officers foiled a burglary or a request for $30,000 from a safety inspector after he issued a permit for a dangerous project. She argued that Mr. Snyder’s case was along those lines.

Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh agreed that “the facts of this case are great” for the government’s interpretation of the law. But he added that the court must decide how it should apply in other cases.

Justice Elena Kagan echoed the point. “This statute applies not just to government officials but to pretty much, like, every important institution in America,” she said, asking about a hypothetical hospital that provides a billionaire with special treatment in hopes of receiving a big contribution.

“That would land you 10 years in prison?” she asked.

Ms. Sindzak said the government would not bring questionable cases. Chief Justice Roberts responded that “we don’t rely on the good faith of the prosecutors in deciding cases like this.”

In earlier rulings, the court has interpreted anti-corruption laws narrowly.

Last year, the court threw out two fraud convictions involving accusations of bid-rigging and illicit payments during the administration of Gov. Andrew M. Cuomo, a New York Democrat.

In 2020, the court unanimously overturned the convictions of two defendants in the so-called Bridgegate scandal, in which associates of Chris Christie, a Republican who was the governor of New Jersey, closed access lanes to the George Washington Bridge in 2013 to punish one of the governor’s political opponents. That was an abuse of power, the court ruled, but not a federal crime.

Similarly, the court in 2016 unanimously overturned the conviction of Bob McDonnell, a former governor of Virginia. Mr. McDonnell, a Republican, had accepted luxury products, loans and vacations from a business executive.

Adam Liptak covers the Supreme Court and writes Sidebar, a column on legal developments. A graduate of Yale Law School, he practiced law for 14 years before joining The Times in 2002. More about Adam Liptak

Corruption or Just Politics? Supreme Court Weighs New Bribery Case as More Clashes Are Brewing

W ASHINGTON—The Supreme Court for years has been making it more challenging for prosecutors to bring corruption cases against public officials, guided by the belief that some of the dealmaking and fundraising in the political realm is unseemly but not illegal.

A new batch of cases making their way through the courts shows that where to draw the line remains in flux.

In New York, a U.S. appeals court recently revived the prosecution of a former lieutenant governor after a trial judge earlier tossed the charges. In Ohio, a group of top former Justice Department officials is criticizing the bribery prosecution of a former Cincinnati City Council member whose political-action committee took money from undercover FBI agents posing as businessmen working with a developer.

And the Supreme Court jumped back into the fray on Monday in a case that examines the viability of prosecutions against officials who take gratuities after performing actions that helped their benefactors.

City contracts, then a check

The justices heard arguments in an appeal by James Snyder, the former mayor of Portage, Ind., who was convicted of bribery in 2021.

Portage needed new garbage trucks when Snyder took office, so he arranged a public bidding process. The city eventually awarded two contracts worth a combined $1.1 million to a local truck dealership whose owners Snyder was frequently calling and texting at the time. Not long after the second contract was awarded, the dealership gave Snyder a $13,000 check.

The former mayor said the money was an upfront payment for future consulting services he was to provide. Prosecutors said the money was an illegal reward for Snyder directing city business to the dealership.

Snyder, a Republican, was sentenced to 21 months in prison. The Seventh U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction last year, in a decision that highlighted a split in the lower courts on whether federal bribery law covers gratuities paid to public officials to reward them for acts they have already taken, as opposed to upfront payments made to secure a favor.

The Supreme Court is poised to resolve that disagreement.

Lisa Blatt, a lawyer for Snyder, said the prosecution’s theory would potentially criminalize all sorts of thank-you gifts that constituents give to public officials, as well as campaign contributions made in recognition of an official’s past actions.

“Congress did not plausibly subject all of these people to 10 years in prison just for accepting gifts,” Blatt told the court.

Justice Department lawyer Colleen Sinzdak said Snyder’s parade of horribles wasn’t grounded in reality. Gratuities have long been viewed as a type of corrupt payment that can be addressed under the antibribery statute used against Snyder, Sinzdak said.

A decision is expected by late June.

Wins for the defense

The latest case comes on the heels of Supreme Court rulings last year that threw out a pair of corruption convictions stemming from the tenure of former Democratic New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo.

The court in one of those cases sided with longtime Cuomo aide Joseph Percoco, who had been prosecuted for taking payments to assist a developer during a period when he had left his state job to run Cuomo’s re-election campaign. The decision didn’t accept all of Percoco’s arguments, but the court found that the jury instructions in the case had been flawed.

In 2020, the Supreme Court unanimously tossed a pair of public-corruption convictions in the New Jersey scandal known as Bridgegate. And in a unanimous 2016 ruling, the court invalidated the conviction of former Virginia Gov. Bob McDonnell.

Some lawyers have applauded these rulings as a safeguard against prosecutorial overreach, saying the court needed to restrain the Justice Department from using broadly worded fraud statutes in ways Congress never intended.

“I think it’s wrong to take away from these cases that the court doesn’t want to do anything about public corruption,” said Temple University law Prof. Lauren Ouziel. “I’m not that cynical.”

Others say the court has gone too far, effectively blessing a range of corrupt conduct.

“In the Snyder case, the court stands on the precipice of further hindering the ability of the federal government to guard against corruption,” said Jessica Levinson, a professor at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles.

Contribution cases to come

More cases could land at the high court soon. The Cincinnati case, now on appeal, has drawn an unusual amount of interest from former Justice Department leaders. They argue federal prosecutors went too far in pursuing former city councilman Alexander “P.G.” Sittenfeld, who was convicted of soliciting $20,000 in bribes for his political-action committee.

Prosecutors alleged that Sittenfeld, a Democrat, took the money in exchange for promising to vote for a development project.

Sittenfeld, who is serving a 16-month prison sentence, said he was simply a pro-development politician who touted those views while raising funds from developers. The First Amendment protects political donations, he noted, and said he was constitutionally entitled to solicit them.

Sittenfeld has drawn support from three former U.S. attorneys general—William Barr, John Ashcroft and Michael Mukasey—as well as former Obama White House counsel Greg Craig. A group of business executives, including from Google and Procter & Gamble, also filed a brief in support of Sittenfeld, citing free-speech concerns.

“Without a clear line, the resultant political environment is a minefield,” the executives said.

In New York, the state’s former Lt. Gov. Brian Benjamin has pledged to petition the Supreme Court after an appeals court revived bribery charges against him dating from his time as a state senator.

Benjamin, a Democrat, is fighting charges that he funneled a $50,000 state grant to a real-estate developer’s nonprofit in Harlem in exchange for illegal campaign contributions. A trial judge threw out most of the case in 2022, saying prosecutors hadn’t alleged an explicit agreement between Benjamin and the developer. But the judge also noted that there was “confusion among the courts” about how bribery laws apply to campaign contributions.

The Second U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals last month said the prosecution was valid and could move forward. The court said it didn’t matter that the alleged agreement between Benjamin and the developer wasn’t spelled out, because both men understood the pact.

Benjamin’s alleged deal “would not become legal if he simply avoided memorializing it expressly in words or in writing,” the appeals court said.

Write to Jan Wolfe at [email protected] and C. Ryan Barber at [email protected]

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