essay on wealth and happiness

Can Money Really Buy Happiness?

Money and happiness are related—but not in the way you think..

Updated November 10, 2023 | Reviewed by Chloe Williams

• More money is linked to increased happiness, some research shows.
• People who won the lottery have greater life satisfaction, even years later.
• Wealth is not associated with happiness globally; non-material things are more likely to predict wellbeing.
• Money, in and of itself, cannot buy happiness, but it can provide a means to the things we value in life.

Money is a big part of our lives, our identities, and perhaps our well-being. Sometimes, it can feel like your happiness hinges on how much cash is in your bank account. Have you ever thought to yourself, “If only I could increase my salary by 12 percent, I’d feel better”? How about, “I wish I had an inheritance. How easier life would be!” I don’t blame you — I’ve had the same thoughts many times.

But what does psychological research say about the age-old question: Can money really buy happiness? Let’s take a brutally honest exploration of how money and happiness are (and aren’t) related. (Spoiler alert: I’ve got bad news, good news, and lots of caveats.)

Higher earners are generally happier

Over 10 years ago, a study based on Gallup Poll data on 1,000 people made a big headline in the news. It found that people with higher incomes report being happier... but only up to an annual income of $75,000 (equivalent to about $90,000 today). After this point, a high emotional well-being wasn’t directly correlated to more money. This seemed to show that once a persons’ basic (and some “advanced”) needs are comfortably met, more money isn’t necessary for well-being.

But a new 2021 study of over one million participants found that there’s no such thing as an inflection point where more money doesn’t equal more happiness, at least not up to an annual salary of $500,000. In this study, participants’ well-being was measured in more detail. Instead of being asked to remember how well they felt in the past week, month, or year, they were asked how they felt right now in the moment. And based on this real-time assessment, very high earners were feeling great.

Similarly, a Swedish study on lottery winners found that even after years, people who won the lottery had greater life satisfaction, mental health, and were more prepared to face misfortune like divorce , illness, and being alone than regular folks who didn’t win the lottery. It’s almost as if having a pile of money made those things less difficult to cope with for the winners.

Evaluative vs. experienced well-being

At this point, it's important to suss out what researchers actually mean by "happiness." There are two major types of well-being psychologists measure: evaluative and experienced. Evaluative well-being refers to your answer to, “How do you think your life is going?” It’s what you think about your life. Experienced well-being, however, is your answer to, “What emotions are you feeling from day to day, and in what proportions?” It is your actual experience of positive and negative emotions.

In both of these studies — the one that found the happiness curve to flatten after $75,000 and the one that didn't — the researchers were focusing on experienced well-being. That means there's a disagreement in the research about whether day-to-day experiences of positive emotions really increase with higher and higher incomes, without limit. Which study is more accurate? Well, the 2021 study surveyed many more people, so it has the advantage of being more representative. However, there is a big caveat...

Material wealth is not associated with happiness everywhere in the world

If you’re not a very high earner, you may be feeling a bit irritated right now. How unfair that the rest of us can’t even comfort ourselves with the idea that millionaires must be sad in their giant mansions!

But not so fast.

Yes, in the large million-person study, experienced well-being (aka, happiness) did continually increase with higher income. But this study only included people in the United States. It wouldn't be a stretch to say that our culture is quite materialistic, more so than other countries, and income level plays a huge role in our lifestyle.

Another study of Mayan people in a poor, rural region of Yucatan, Mexico, did not find the level of wealth to be related to happiness, which the participants had high levels of overall. Separately, a Gallup World Poll study of people from many countries and cultures also found that, although higher income was associated with higher life evaluation, it was non-material things that predicted experienced well-being (e.g., learning, autonomy, respect, social support).

Earned wealth generates more happiness than inherited wealth

More good news: For those of us with really big dreams of “making it” and striking it rich through talent and hard work, know that the actual process of reaching your dream will not only bring you cash but also happiness. A study of ultra-rich millionaires (net worth of at least $8,000,000) found that those who earned their wealth through work and effort got more of a happiness boost from their money than those who inherited it. So keep dreaming big and reaching for your entrepreneurial goals … as long as you’re not sacrificing your actual well-being in the pursuit.

There are different types of happiness, and wealth is better for some than others

We’ve been talking about “happiness” as if it’s one big thing. But happiness actually has many different components and flavors. Think about all the positive emotions you’ve felt — can we break them down into more specifics? How about:

• Contentment
• Gratefulness

...and that's just a short list.

It turns out that wealth may be associated with some of these categories of “happiness,” specifically self-focused positive emotions such as pride and contentment, whereas less wealthy people have more other-focused positive emotions like love and compassion.

In fact, in the Swedish lottery winners study, people’s feelings about their social well-being (with friends, family, neighbors, and society) were no different between lottery winners and regular people.

Money is a means to the things we value, not happiness itself

One major difference between lottery winners and non-winners, it turns out, is that lottery winners have more spare time. This is the thing that really makes me envious , and I would hypothesize that this is the main reason why lottery winners are more satisfied with their life.

Consider this simply: If we had the financial security to spend time on things we enjoy and value, instead of feeling pressured to generate income all the time, why wouldn’t we be happier?

This is good news. It’s a reminder that money, in and of itself, cannot literally buy happiness. It can buy time and peace of mind. It can buy security and aesthetic experiences, and the ability to be generous to your family and friends. It makes room for other things that are important in life.

In fact, the researchers in that lottery winner study used statistical approaches to benchmark how much happiness winning $100,000 brings in the short-term (less than one year) and long-term (more than five years) compared to other major life events. For better or worse, getting married and having a baby each give a bigger short-term happiness boost than winning money, but in the long run, all three of these events have the same impact.

What does this mean? We make of our wealth and our life what we will. This is especially true for the vast majority of the world made up of people struggling to meet basic needs and to rise out of insecurity. We’ve learned that being rich can boost your life satisfaction and make it easier to have positive emotions, so it’s certainly worth your effort to set goals, work hard, and move towards financial health.

But getting rich is not the only way to be happy. You can still earn health, compassion, community, love, pride, connectedness, and so much more, even if you don’t have a lot of zeros in your bank account. After all, the original definition of “wealth” referred to a person’s holistic wellness in life, which means we all have the potential to be wealthy... in body, mind, and soul.

Kahneman, D., & Deaton, A.. High income improves evaluation of life but not emotional well-being. . Proceedings of the national academy of sciences. 2010.

Killingsworth, M. A. . Experienced well-being rises with income, even above $75,000 per year .. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 2021.

Lindqvist, E., Östling, R., & Cesarini, D. . Long-run effects of lottery wealth on psychological well-being. . The Review of Economic Studies. 2020.

Guardiola, J., González‐Gómez, F., García‐Rubio, M. A., & Lendechy‐Grajales, Á.. Does higher income equal higher levels of happiness in every society? The case of the Mayan people. . International Journal of Social Welfare. 2013.

Diener, E., Ng, W., Harter, J., & Arora, R. . Wealth and happiness across the world: material prosperity predicts life evaluation, whereas psychosocial prosperity predicts positive feeling. . Journal of personality and social psychology. 2010.

Donnelly, G. E., Zheng, T., Haisley, E., & Norton, M. I.. The amount and source of millionaires’ wealth (moderately) predict their happiness . . Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 2018.

Piff, P. K., & Moskowitz, J. P. . Wealth, poverty, and happiness: Social class is differentially associated with positive emotions.. Emotion. 2018.

Jade Wu, Ph.D., is a clinical health psychologist and host of the Savvy Psychologist podcast. She specializes in helping those with sleep problems and anxiety disorders.

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Does more money correlate with greater happiness?

Reconciling previously contradictory results, researchers from penn and princeton find a steady association between larger incomes and greater happiness for most people but a rise and plateau for an unhappy minority..

Are people who earn more money happier in daily life? Though it seems like a straightforward question, research had previously returned contradictory findings, leaving uncertainty about its answer.

Foundational work published in 2010 from Princeton University ’s Daniel Kahneman and Angus Deaton had found that day-to-day happiness rose as annual income increased, but above $75,000 it leveled off and happiness plateaued. In contrast, work published in 2021 from the University of Pennsylvania ’s Matthew Killingsworth found that happiness rose steadily with income well beyond $75,000, without evidence of a plateau.

To reconcile the differences, the two paired up in what’s known as an adversarial collaboration, joining forces with Penn Integrates Knowledge University Professor Barbara Mellers as arbiter. In a new Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences paper , the trio shows that, on average, larger incomes are associated with ever-increasing levels of happiness. Zoom in, however, and the relationship becomes more complex, revealing that within that overall trend, an unhappy cohort in each income group shows a sharp rise in happiness up to $100,000 annually and then plateaus.

“In the simplest terms, this suggests that for most people larger incomes are associated with greater happiness,” says Killingsworth, a senior fellow at Penn’s Wharton School and lead paper author. “The exception is people who are financially well-off but unhappy. For instance, if you’re rich and miserable, more money won’t help. For everyone else, more money was associated with higher happiness to somewhat varying degrees.”

Mellers digs into this last notion, noting that emotional well-being and income aren’t connected by a single relationship. “The function differs for people with different levels of emotional well-being,” she says. Specifically, for the least happy group, happiness rises with income until $100,000, then shows no further increase as income grows. For those in the middle range of emotional well-being, happiness increases linearly with income, and for the happiest group the association actually accelerates above $100,000.

Joining forces

The researchers began this combined effort recognizing that their previous work had drawn different conclusions. Kahneman’s 2010 study showed a flattening pattern where Killingsworth’s 2021 study did not. As its name suggests, an adversarial collaboration of this type—a notion originated by Kahneman—aims to solve scientific disputes or disagreements by bringing together the differing parties, along with a third-party mediator.

Killingsworth, Kahneman, and Mellers focused on a new hypothesis that both a happy majority and an unhappy minority exist. For the former, they surmised, happiness keeps rising as more money comes in; the latter’s happiness improves as income rises but only up to a certain income threshold, after which it progresses no further.

To test this new hypothesis, they looked for the flattening pattern in data from Killingworth’s study, which he had collected through an app he created called Track Your Happiness. Several times a day, the app pings participants at random moments, asking a variety of questions including how they feel on a scale from “very good” to “very bad.” Taking an average of the person’s happiness and income, Killingsworth draws conclusions about how the two variables are linked.

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A breakthrough in the new partnership came early on when the researchers realized that the 2010 data, which had revealed the happiness plateau, had actually been measuring unhappiness in particular rather than happiness in general.

“It’s easiest to understand with an example,” Killingsworth says. Imagine a cognitive test for dementia that most healthy people pass easily. While such a test could detect the presence and severity of cognitive dysfunction, it wouldn’t reveal much about general intelligence since most healthy people would receive the same perfect score.

“In the same way, the 2010 data showing a plateau in happiness had mostly perfect scores, so it tells us about the trend in the unhappy end of the happiness distribution, rather than the trend of happiness in general. Once you recognize that, the two seemingly contradictory findings aren’t necessarily incompatible,” Killingsworth says. “And what we found bore out that possibility in an incredibly beautiful way. When we looked at the happiness trend for unhappy people in the 2021 data, we found exactly the same pattern as was found in 2010; happiness rises relatively steeply with income and then plateaus.”

“The two findings that seemed utterly contradictory actually result from data that are amazingly consistent,” he says.

Implications of this work

Drawing these conclusions would have been challenging had the two research teams not come together, says Mellers, who suggests there’s no better way than adversarial collaborations to resolve scientific conflict.

“This kind of collaboration requires far greater self-discipline and precision in thought than the standard procedure,” she says. “Collaborating with an adversary—or even a non-adversary—is not easy, but both parties are likelier to recognize the limits of their claims.” Indeed, that’s what happened, leading to a better understanding of the relationship between money and happiness.

And these findings have real-world implications, according to Killingsworth. For one, they could inform thinking about tax rates or how to compensate employees. And, of course, they matter to individuals as they navigate career choices or weigh a larger income against other priorities in life, Killingsworth says.

However, he adds that for emotional well-being money isn’t the be all end all. “Money is just one of the many determinants of happiness,” he says. “Money is not the secret to happiness, but it can probably help a bit.”

Matthew Killingsworth is a senior fellow in Wharton People Analytics in the Wharton School and an associate in MindCORE in the School of Arts & Sciences at the University of Pennsylvania .

Daniel Kahneman is professor of psychology and public affairs emeritus at the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs , the Eugene Higgins Professor of Psychology Emeritus at Princeton University , and a fellow of the Federmann Center for Rationality at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem .

Barbara Mellers is the I. George Heyman Penn Integrates Knowledge University Professor with appointments in the Department of Psychology in the School of Arts & Sciences and in the Department of Marketing in the Wharton School at Penn.

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A Global Look at the Connections Between Happiness, Income, and Meaning

Wealthy people may be happier. But a new study finds that money can’t buy a sense of purpose.

January 28, 2022

Researchers found a link between money, meaning, and happiness across more than 120 countries. | iStock/MundusImages

“Humans think happiness is this one thing: You’re either happy or you’re not,” Jennifer Aaker says. Of course, it’s not so simple: New research conducted by Aaker and her colleagues not only challenges the assumption that happiness is binary but also finds that the relationship between happiness and our sense of meaning can change depending on our financial situation.

“This is particularly interesting because research has shown when people get wealthier, they experience greater happiness,” explains Aaker , a marketing professor at Stanford Graduate School of Business who has extensively studied happiness, meaning, and money. “But this research suggests that the nature of happiness also shifts based on income.”

In a forthcoming study in the journal Emotion , Aaker and her coauthors find that meaning is a stronger predictor of happiness for people with low incomes than those with greater financial resources. In other words, people with more money may be happier, but people with less money view happiness as tied to a sense of meaning — the belief that their life has purpose, value, and direction. And, remarkably, that connection is consistent across much of the world.

The paper, cowritten by Rhia Catapano of the University of Toronto, Jordi Quoidbach of Esade Business School, and Cassie Mogilner of UCLA, is one of the first to explore how income and wealth affect the relationship between meaning and happiness on a global scale. (Catapano and Mogilner studied with Aaker while receiving their doctorates at Stanford GSB.)

The researchers began by looking at the United States, where they first discovered the correlation between meaning and happiness as income decreases. At first, they wondered if this was particular to Americans or “a fluke,” Aaker says. Yet as the team expanded its study to analyze large-scale datasets spanning more than 500,000 people from 123 countries on six continents, the same patterns emerged.

“The results were almost universally consistent across the United States and much of the world,” Aaker says. “Among low-income people, having a sense of meaning in one’s life is more closely associated with overall happiness.”

The visual representation of the findings — a world map with the countries where the results hold true are shaded — is “striking,” she says: “It’s an interesting pattern to see so robustly across different cultures.”

Wealth and Mental Health

Aaker cautions that these findings should not be used to minimize or dismiss the real disadvantages that low-income people and communities face. Instead, the paper provides additional context for future research and policymaking. “In addition to improving basic conditions for lower-income people, policies should not neglect the importance of meaning” in life, she says.

As income inequality grows and poverty rises worldwide due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Aaker and her coauthors say their research could influence mental health interventions in low-income communities and countries. According to studies cited in their paper, low-income people are twice as likely to suffer from depression as people with higher incomes, and reduced household incomes are associated with an increased risk for incident mood disorders.

Quote People who succeed in finding meaning experience both meaning and happiness, but those who can’t find meaning aren’t happy. Attribution Jennifer Aaker

“Whereas mental health treatments in low- and middle-income countries most commonly encourage people to identify their thoughts and feelings, engage in problem-solving and eliciting support, our findings suggest that one additional avenue for such interventions might be rooted in meaning,” they write.

There are important implications for wealthy people as well, Aaker says, pointing to her research showing that having a sense of meaningfulness is associated with longer-lasting well-being than happiness alone. And lacking a sense of meaning is not irreparable: People seeking more meaning in their lives can proactively choose to look beyond themselves and give more to others.

The Meaning of Meaning

Because the studies in the new paper are correlational, the authors cannot say whether meaning causes happiness or vice versa. However, they hypothesize that each plays a role in driving the other. “People who succeed in finding meaning experience both meaning and happiness, but those who can’t find meaning aren’t happy, consistent with other research,” Aaker says.

The researchers propose a few possibilities for why meaning has a stronger correlation with happiness for people with less income. “It’s possible that financial constraints pose such practical and emotional strain that people are compelled to try to make sense of their situation,” Aaker says. She notes other research that has found that “having negative or challenging experiences and then being able to make sense of them is one route to experiencing life as meaningful.”

In the paper, Aaker and her colleagues hypothesize that affluent people have greater access to “external sources of happiness” and so may not rely on an “internally constructed sense of meaning.” As Aaker puts it, “For wealthier individuals, getting them to benefit from the meaning they already have in their lives, but aren’t turning into happiness, may be more effective.”

Aaker and her coauthors also point out that experiences that have been shown to contribute to a sense of meaning — including strong relationships and religion — often don’t cost a thing.

For Aaker, an expert on how meaning and purpose shape people’s choices and how money and time can cultivate long-lasting happiness, the paper is the latest in a series of explorations into well-being. In 2021, she published Humor, Seriously: Why Humor Is A Secret Weapon in Business and Life with Stanford GSB lecturer Naomi Bagdonas , with whom she also teaches a Stanford GSB class on the topic.

For media inquiries, visit the Newsroom .

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Financial Resources Impact the Relationship between Meaning and Happiness Rhia Catapano Jordi Quoidbach Cassie Mogilner Jennifer Aaker

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November 01, 2021 Class Takeaways — Humor is Serious Business Five lessons in five minutes: Professor Jennifer Aaker and her team teach you how to make humor your superpower.

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• Front Psychol

Money Does Not Always Buy Happiness, but Are Richer People Less Happy in Their Daily Lives? It Depends on How You Analyze Income

Laura kudrna.

1 Institute of Applied Health Research, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom

Kostadin Kushlev

2 Department of Psychology, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, United States

Associated Data

Publicly available datasets were analyzed in this study. These data can be found at: https://www.atusdata.org (The ATUS extract builder was used to create the ATUS dataset, see Hofferth et al., 2017 ). GSOEP data were requested from https://www.diw.de/en/diw_02.c.222516.en/data.html , see Richter and Schupp, 2015 .

Do people who have more money feel happier during their daily activities? Some prior research has found no relationship between income and daily happiness when treating income as a continuous variable in OLS regressions, although results differ between studies. We re-analyzed existing data from the United States and Germany, treating household income as a categorical variable and using lowess and spline regressions to explore nonlinearities. Our analyses reveal that these methodological decisions change the results and conclusions about the relationship between income and happiness. In American and German diary data from 2010 to 2015, results for the continuous treatment of income showed a null relationship with happiness, whereas the categorization of income showed that some of those with higher incomes reported feeling less happy than some of those with lower incomes. Lowess and spline regressions suggested null results overall, and there was no evidence of a relationship between income and happiness in Experience Sampling Methodology (ESM) data. Not all analytic approaches generate the same results, which may contribute to explaining discrepant results in existing studies about the correlates of happiness. Future research should be explicit about their approaches to measuring and analyzing income when studying its relationship with subjective well-being, ideally testing different approaches, and making conclusions based on the pattern of results across approaches.

Introduction

Does having more money make someone feel happier? The answer to this longstanding question has implications for how individuals live their lives and societies are structured. It is often assumed that more income brings more happiness (with happiness broadly defined herein as hedonic feelings, while recognizing closely related constructs, including satisfaction and eudaimonia; Tiberius, 2006 ; Angner, 2010 ; Dolan and Kudrna, 2016 ; Sunstein, 2021 ). In many aspects of policy, upward income mobility is encouraged, and poverty can result in exclusion, stigmatization, and discrimination by institutions and members of the public. More income provides people with opportunities and, sometimes, capabilities to consume more and thus satisfy more of their preferences, meet their desires and obtain more of what they want and need ( Harsanyi, 1997 ; Sen, 1999 ; Nussbaum, 2008 ). These are all reasons to assume that higher income will bring greater happiness—or, at least, that low income will bring low happiness.

Some research challenges the assumption that earning more should lead to greater happiness. First, because people expect that more money should make them happier, people may feel less happy when their high expectations are not met ( Graham and Pettinato, 2002 ; Nickerson et al., 2003 ) and they may adapt more quickly to more income than they expect ( Aknin et al., 2009 ; Di Tella et al., 2010 ). Second, since the 1980s in many developed countries, the well-educated have had less leisure time than those who are not ( Aguiar and Hurst, 2007 ) and people living in high-earning and well-educated households report feeling more time stress and dissatisfaction with their leisure time ( Hamermesh and Lee, 2007 ; Nikolaev, 2018 ). The quantity of leisure time is not linearly related to happiness, with both too much and too little having a negative association ( Sharif et al., 2021 ). Evidence also shows that people with higher incomes spend more time alone ( Bianchi and Vohs, 2016 ). The lower quality and quantity of leisure and social time of people with higher incomes may, in turn, negatively impact their happiness, especially given there are strong links between social capital or “relational goods” and well-being ( Helliwell and Putnam, 2004 ; Becchetti et al., 2008 ).

At the same time, some—but not all—evidence suggests that working class individuals tend to be more generous and empathetic than more affluent individuals ( Kraus et al., 2010 ; Piff et al., 2010 ; Balakrishnan et al., 2017 ; Macchia and Whillans, 2022 ), and such kindness toward others has been associated with higher well-being ( Dunn et al., 2008 ; Aknin et al., 2012 ). Relatedly, psychological research suggests that people with lower socioeconomic status have a more interdependent sense of self ( Snibbe and Markus, 2005 ; Stephens et al., 2007 ). It is, therefore, possible that people high in income have lower well-being because they experience less of the internal “warm glow” ( Andreoni, 1990 ) benefit that comes along with valuing social relationships and group membership. In theory, therefore, there are reasons to suppose that high income has both benefits and costs for well-being, and empirical evidence can inform the debate about when and whether these different perspectives are supported.

Empirical Evidence on Income and Happiness

The standard finding in existing literature is that higher income predicts greater happiness, but with a declining marginal utility ( Dolan et al., 2008 ; Layard et al., 2008 ): that is, higher income is most closely associated with happiness among those with the least income and is least closely associated with happiness for those with the most income. Recently, this finding has been qualified by studies showing that the relationship between income and happiness depends on how happiness is conceptualized and measured: as an overall evaluation of one’s life or as daily emotional states ( Kahneman and Deaton, 2010 ; Killingsworth, 2021 ). In this vein, authors Kushlev et al. (2015) found no relationship between income and daily happiness in the American Time Use Survey (ATUS), which has recently been found for other happiness measures, too ( Casinillo et al., 2020 , 2021 ) The finding from Kushlev et al. (2015) was replicated in the German Socioeconomic Panel Survey (GSEOP) by Hudson et al. (2016) , and in another analysis of the ATUS by Stone et al. (2018) .

Some research has focused specifically on the effect of high income on happiness. Kahneman and Deaton (2010) conducted regression analyses using a Gallup sample of United States residents, finding that annual income beyond ~$75K was not associated with any higher daily emotional well-being. Income beyond ~$75K, however, predicted better life evaluations. Using a self-selecting sample of experiential data in the United States, Killingsworth (2021) conducted piecewise regressions and found no evidence of satiation or turning points. Jebb et al. (2018) fit regression spline models to global Gallup data, showing that the satiation point in daily experiences found by Kahneman and Deaton (2010) was also apparent in other countries. Unlike Kahneman and Deaton (2010) , however, Jebb et al. (2018) also found evidence of satiation in people’s life evaluations, and even some evidence for “turning points”—whereby richer people evaluated their lives as worse than some of those with lower incomes. A satiation point in life evaluations was also found in European countries at around €28K annually ( Muresan et al., 2020 ).

This pattern of findings could partly depend on the choice of analytic strategy. In analyses of the same dataset as Jebb et al. (2018) but using lowess regression, researchers found no evidence of satiation or turning points in the relationship between income and people’s life evaluations ( Sacks et al., 2012 ; Stevenson and Wolfers, 2012 ). These conflicting results suggest that the effect of analytic strategy on results deserves a closer examination.

The Research Gap

While there has been much research on income and happiness, including according to how happiness is defined and measured, we are not away of any studies that have compared the relationship between income and happiness according to how income is defined and measured. We propose that the relationship between income and happiness may depend not only on how happiness is measured, but also on how income is measured and analyzed. To improve our knowledge of the relationship between income and happiness, this paper, we focus on nonlinearities in the relationship between income and happiness and re-analyze the ATUS data used by Kushlev et al. (2015) and Stone et al. (2018) , as well as the GSOEP data used by Hudson et al. (2016) . Specifically, while Kushlev et al. (2015) analyzed income as a continuous variable in the ATUS, we treat income the way it was measured: as a categorical variable. We compare these results to GSOEP data where we re-code the original continuous measure of income into categorical quantiles. To further explore nonlinearities in the relationship between income and happiness, we also conduct local linear “lowess” and spline regression analyses.

We chose to re-analyze these data to address the question of differences in the relationship between income and happiness according to the measurement and analysis of income because the ATUS and GSOEP provide nationally representative data on people’s feelings as experienced during specific “episodes” of the day after asking them to reconstruct what they did during the entire day. Thus, compared to data from Gallup, which measures affect “yesterday,” measurements in the ATUS are more grounded in specific experiences, and therefore, less subject to recall bias ( Kahneman et al., 2004 ). And unlike Gallup, which uses more crude, dichotomous (“yes-no”) response scales, ATUS measures happiness along a standard seven-point Likert-type scale. In the GSOEP, we were also able to analyze data from the Experience Sampling Methodology (ESM), which asks people how they are feeling during specific episodes during the day and, as such, is even more grounded in specific experiences.

Measuring and Analyzing Income

The original ATUS income variable—family income—contains 16 uneven categories (see Table 1 ). For example, Category 11 has a range of ~$10K, whereas Category 14 has a range of ~$25K. The increasingly larger categories are designed to reflect declining marginal utility as an innate quality of income. Based on this, Kushlev et al. (2015) analyzed income as a continuous variable using the original uneven categories. Continuous scales, however, assume equal intervals between scale points—a strong assumption to make for the relatively arbitrary rate of change in the category ranges. Is increasing one’s income from $20,000 to $25,000 really equidistant to increasing it from $35,000 to $40,000 ( Table 1 )? And can we really assume, for example, that adding $5,000 of additional income to $35,000 is the same as adding $10,000 of additional income to $40,000? Recognizing this issue, income researchers have adopted alternative strategies. For example, Stone et al. (2018) took the midpoints of each category of income, and then log-transformed it. Thus, they transformed the categorical measure of income into a continuous measure. This approach produced results for happiness consistent with the findings of Kushlev et al. (2015) .

The original categories of income in the ATUS family income measure with number of individuals in each income category in the ATUS 2010, 2012, and 2013 well-being modules.

Complete cases only for all variables analyzed.

Both the increasing ranges of the income scale itself and its log-transformations reflect an assumed declining marginal utility of income: They treat a given amount of income increase at the higher end of the income distribution as having less utility than the same amount at the lower end of the distribution. But by subsuming income’s declining utility in its very measurement (or transformation thereof), it becomes difficult to interpret a null relationship with happiness. In other words, we might not be seeing a declining marginal utility of income reflected on happiness because the income variable itself reflects its declining utility.

Even when the income variable itself does not reflect its declining utility, a null relationship between income and daily experiences of happiness has been observed. Hudson et al. (2016) used GSOEP, which contains a measure of income that is continuous in its original form. Whether analyzing this income measure in its raw original form or in transformed log and quadratic forms, a null relationship with happiness was observed. This approach, however, does not consider whether there might be nonlinear/log/quadratic turning or satiation points at higher levels of income—an issue also applicable to previous analyses of ATUS ( Kushlev et al., 2015 ; Stone et al., 2018 ). This is important because there are theoretically both benefits and costs to achieving higher levels of income that could occur at various levels of income; however, this possibility has not yet been fully explored in ATUS or GSOEP data.

In sum, past research using ATUS has treated categorically measured income as a continuous variable, either assuming equidistance between scale points or attempting to create equidistance through statistical transformations. By doing so, however, researchers may have statistically accounted for the very utility of income for happiness that they are trying to test. In both ATUS and GSOEP, the question of whether there might be satiation and/or turning points at higher levels of income has not been fully considered. The present research explores whether treating income as a categorical variable in both ATUS and GSOEP would replicate past findings or reveal novel insights, focusing on possible nonlinearities in the relationship between income and happiness.

Materials and Methods

We used data from ATUS well-being modules in 2010, 2012, and 2013. To facilitate future replications of this research, the ATUS extract builder was used to create the dataset ( Hofferth et al., 2017 ). 1 The ATUS is a repeated cross-sectional survey and is nationally representative of United States household residents aged 15 years and older. Its sampling frame is the Current Population Survey (CPS), which was conducted 2–5 months prior to the ATUS. Some items in the ATUS come from the CPS, including the household income item that we analyze.

Data from the GSOEP come from the Innovation Sample (IS), which is a subsample of the larger main GSOEP ( Richter and Schupp, 2015 ). The main GSOEP and the IS are designed to be nationally representative. The IS contains information on household residents aged 17 years of age and older. We used two modules from these data: the 2012–2015 DRM module, which is a longitudinal survey, and the 2014–2015 ESM module.

Outcome Measures

In ATUS, participants were called on the phone and asked how they spent their time yesterday: what activities they were doing, for how long, who they spent time with and where they were located. This information was used to create their time use diary. A random selection of three activities were taken from these diaries and participants were asked how they felt during them. The feelings items were tired, sad, stressed, pain, and happy. Participants were also asked how meaningful what they were doing felt.

In GSOEP, participants were interviewed face to face for the DRM questions and through smartphones for the ESM questions. In the DRM, as in the ATUS, they were asked how they spent their time yesterday and, for a random selection of three activities, they were asked further details about how they felt. In the ESM, participants were randomly notified on mobile phones at seven random points during the day for around 1 week. As in the DRM, they were asked how they were spending their time at the point of notification, as well as how they felt. Participants in both ESM and DRM samples were asked about whether they were feeling happy, as well as other emotions such as sadness, stress, and boredom.

The focus of this research is on the happiness items from both the ATUS and GSOEP to highlight differences according to the treatment of the independent measure of income rather than differences according to the dependent outcome of emotional well-being.

Data were analyzed in STATA 15 and jamovi. The Supplementary Material S1 file contains the STATA command file for the main commands written to analyze the data. In both ATUS and GSOEP, OLS regressions were conducted with happiness as the outcome measure and income as the explanatory measure. Following Kushlev et al. (2015) and Hudson et al. (2016) , the average happiness across all activities each day was taken to create an individual-level measure. Because the GSOEP DRM sample contained multiple observations across years, the SEs were clustered at the individual level for models using this dataset.

The treatment of income differed according to the dataset because income was collected differently in each dataset. In the ATUS, income was first analyzed in continuous, log, and quadratic forms in OLS regressions, as in other research ( Kushlev et al., 2015 ; Hudson et al., 2016 ). Next, it was analyzed as a categorical variable with 16 categories, preserving the identical format that it was originally collected in from the CPS questionnaire.

In GSOEP, the income variable in the dataset is provided in continuous form because participants reported their monthly income as an integer. To compare to the ATUS results, 16 quantiles of income were created and analyzed in GSOEP DRMs (see Table 2 - note that there were insufficient observations to conduct these analyses with GSOEP ESMs). This income variable was also analyzed in continuous, log, and quadratic forms.

The range and number of person-year observations of the GSOEP Income 4 variable divided into 16 quantiles.

Omnibus F -tests and effect sizes ( n 2 ) are also reported to compare the categorical, continuous, log, and quadratic approaches.

We conducted lowess and spline regressions to further investigate possible nonlinearities in the relationship between income and happiness. For the lowess regressions, the smoothing parameter was set at of 0.08. For the regression splines, we fitted knots at four quartiles and five quantiles of income. We also used the results of OLS regressions treating income as a categorical variable, as well as the results of the lowess regression treating income as continuous, to fit knots at pre-specified values of income (where these analyses suggested there could be turning and/or satiation points).

Complete case analyses were conducted with 33,976 individuals in ATUS, 6,766 individuals in German DRMs, and 249 individuals in German ESMs. There was item-missing data in some samples (ATUS, 1.7% missing; GSOEP DRMs, 8.2% missing; GSOEP ESMs data, and 6.0% missing). We make analytical and not population inferences and therefore do not use survey weights ( Pfeffermann, 1996 ).

Results are presented without and with controls for demographic and diary characteristics. Following Kushlev et al. (2015) , Hudson et al. (2016) , and Stone et al. (2018) , these controls were age, gender, marital status, ethnic background, 2 health, 3 employment status, children, 4 and whether the day was a weekend. We also control for the year of the survey in ATUS DRM data to address the issue that our results are not due to new data but rather how we treat the income variable.

The list of variables we use in analyses are in Table 3 .

List of variables used in analyses in ATUS and GSOEP.

In both ATUS and GSOEP, daily happiness was analyzed using a 0–6 scale (in GSOEP scale points 1–7 were recoded to 0–6 to match ATUS). The ATUS mean happiness was 4.38 (SD = 1.33). The GSOEP DRM mean happiness was 2.91 (SD = 1.46), and the GSOEP ESM mean happiness was 2.65 (SD = 1.03).

The magnitude of our results can be considered in the context of effect sizes from other research on demographic characteristics and daily happiness ( Kahneman et al., 2004 ; Stone et al., 2010 ; Luhmann et al., 2012 ; Hudson et al., 2019 ). For example, the effect size for the relationship between age and daily experiences of happiness was 0.16 in Stone et al. (2010) . Our effect sizes range from 0.06 to 0.37. Throughout, we focus on coefficients, their 95% CIs, and visualizations of these coefficients and CIs, rather than on their statistical significance ( Lakens, 2021 ). The purpose of this is to highlight how analytic treatments of income affect the magnitude and precision of the relationship between income and happiness.

When treating the 16-category family income variable as continuous in OLS regressions, there was no substantive relationship between income and happiness as in other prior research ( Kushlev et al., 2015 ; Hudson et al., 2016 ; Stone et al., 2018 ). Out of the linear, squared, and log coefficients without and with controls, the largest and most precise coefficients were with controls; for linear income it was ( b  = −0.006, 95% CI = −0.01, −0.002), squared income ( b  = −0.0001, 95% CI = 0.0003, 0.00006), and log income ( b  = −0.03, 95% CI = −0.05, 0.001). The omnibus F -test (without controls) for linear income was F  = 0.28, n 2  = 0.000008 (95% CI = 0.00, 0.0002), for income squared was F  = 1.60, n 2  = 0.00005 (95% CI = 0.00, 0.0003), and for log income was F  = 0.23, n 2  = 0.000006 (95% CI = 0.00,0.0002).

The categorization of income focused attention on those with incomes of $35–40K, who appeared substantively happier than some of those with higher incomes (and lower incomes; see Figure 1 ). For example, with controls, those with incomes of $35–40K appeared happier relative to those with incomes of $150K+ ( b  = 0.16, 95% CI: 0.08, 0.24) and $100–150K ( b  = 0.14, 95% CI: 0.07, 0.221). The omnibus test for categorical income was F  = 1.61, n 2  = 0.007 (95% CI = 0.00, 0.0009).

Predicted values of average individual happiness in the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) at the 16 values of the family income variable without and with controls. Covariates at means. 95% CI.

Results from regression splines and a lowess regression suggested null results overall (see Figure 2 ). Further details of the analyses are in Supplementary Material S2 .

Line graph of predicted values from lowess regressions explaining variance in happiness from income treated as a continuous variable in ATUS.

When treating the continuous household income variable as continuous (in €10,000s) in OLS regressions, there was no substantive relationship between income and happiness as in other prior research ( Kushlev et al., 2015 ; Hudson et al., 2016 ; Stone et al., 2018 ). The association with the largest magnitude and most precision was for log income with controls ( b  = −0.08, 95% CI = −0.18, 0.01). 5

As in ATUS, treating the variable as categorical suggested some relationships between income and happiness. These results drew attention to those third quantile (~€14–18K), who seemed happier than those both higher and lower in income (see Figure 3 ). For example, with controls, they were happier than those in quantiles 13 (€42.6–48K, b  = 0.46, 95% CI = 0.25, 0.67), seven (~€24–27K, b  = 0.34, 95% CI = 0.13, 0.56), and one (€2.40–11,520K, b  = 0.28, 95% CI = 0.05, 0.51). The omnibus test for categorical income was F  = 4.00, n 2  = 0.009 (95% CI = 0.003, 0.01), whereas the omnibus test for linear income was F  = 0.09, n 2  = 0.00001 (95% CI = 0.00, 0.0007). The omnibus for log income was F  = 1.42, n 2  = 0.0002 (95% CI = 0.00, 0.0001) and for income squared it was F  = 0.96, n 2  = 0.0001 (95% CI = 0.00, 0.001).

Predicted values of average person-year happiness from GSOEP DRMs at 16 quantiles of income (Income 4) without and with controls. Covariates at means. 95% CI.

The lowess and spline regressions suggested null results overall, as the coefficients were small in magnitude (see Figure 4 ). Further details of the analyses are in Supplementary Material S3 .

Line graph of predicted values from lowess regressions explaining variance in happiness from income treated as a continuous variable in GSOEP DRMs at 16 quantiles of income.

There was no evidence to suggest any substantive association between income and happiness in ESM data for linear income, income squared, log income, in the lowess regressions, or regression splines. A visualization of the lowess results are in Figure 5 and further details of the analyses are in Supplementary Material S4 .

Results of local linear “lowess” regression from GSOEP Experience Sampling Methodology (ESM) data with happiness as the outcome and continuous annual income as the explanatory variable.

The omnibus F -test for linear income was F  = 0.53, n 2  = 0.002 (95%CI = −0.00, 0.03), and for log income it was F  = 0.12, n 2  = 0.0005, 95%CI = 0.00, 0.02. For income squared it was F  = 0.63, n 2  = 0.003, 95%CI = 0.00 0.03.

Is income creating a signal in these data on daily experiences of happiness, or is it all simply noise? The present results suggest that whether income can be concluded as being associated with daily experiences of happiness may depend on how income is analyzed. When income in ATUS is analyzed in its original, categorical form, there is some evidence that some people with higher incomes feel somewhat less happy than some of those with lower incomes. When the continuous income variable in GSOEP is split into categories, a similar pattern is observed. This is not inconsistent with the findings of Kushlev et al. (2015) , Hudson et al. (2016) , and Stone et al. (2018) , who found no relationship between income and daily feelings of happiness in the same data when income was analyzed as a continuous variable. It simply illustrates that a relationship between income and happiness could be interpreted when treating income categorically rather than continuously.

There are at least three possible interpretations to our overall results. One interpretation tends toward conservative. We conducted multiple comparisons of many transformations of income, which might inspire some to question whether we should have accounted for this in some way by adjusting for multiple comparisons. Although we found some evidence of differences in happiness according to income, such an adjustment might lead to an overall null conclusion when characterizing the relationship between income on happiness. A second interpretation is more generous. Within this perspective, one might emphasize the fact that because our income measures were correlated, no correction for multiple comparisons was required. It could then be argued that because we found some evidence for the relationship between income on happiness, there is good evidence that the overall effect is not null. A more moderate perspective, and the one adopted in this paper, is that because the overall pattern of our results showed mixed null and nonnull results, we can make an overall conclusion of some differences in happiness according to income. We also noticed that equivalizing income in the German data strengthened the relationship of income and happiness, further supporting the conclusion of some differences—and that the analytic treatment of income matters.

Based on the moderate perspective, we conclude that there is very little evidence of any relationship between income and daily experiences of happiness—and any relationship that does exist would suggest higher income could be associated with less happiness. The results do not support the results of Sacks et al. (2012) or Killingsworth (2021) , where a greater income was associated with greater happiness, and there were no satiation or turning points (see also Stevenson and Wolfers, 2012 ). These results are more aligned with Kahneman and Deaton (2010) , who found a satiation point in the relationship between income daily experiences of happiness, researchers finding no association between income and happiness ( Kushlev et al., 2015 ; Jebb et al., 2018 ; Casinillo et al., 2020 , 2021 ), who found that higher income can be associated with worse evaluations of life. We suggest the analytic strategy for income could contribute to explaining discrepant results in existing literature, and researchers should be clear about the approaches they have tested, although we acknowledge that sampling differences could play a role, too.

Overall, the results were broadly consistent between countries because there was no substantive relationship between income and happiness when income was treated continuously but there appeared to be relationships when treating income categorically. Despite a similar overall pattern in the income results, there were other difference between countries. German residents rated their happiness as lower than United States residents (a difference of ~1.5 scale points out of seven). This could be because of different interpretations of the word “happiness” in Germany and the United States. The word for happiness in German used in the survey— glück —can mean something more akin to lucky or optimistic—which is different from the meaning of word “happy” in the United States. Despite this linguistic difference, those with higher incomes were still less happy than some of those with lower incomes in both samples.

Limitations

One limitation to our results is the representativeness of the income distribution. Household surveys like those that we used do not tend to capture the “tails” of the income distribution very well: People in institutions and without addresses are excluded from these sample populations, which omits populations such as those living in nursing homes and prisons, as well as the homeless. Moreover, people do not always self-report their income accurately due to issues such as social desirability bias ( Angel et al., 2019 ). Existing studies that have focused on those with very low incomes do tend to find that low income is associated with low happiness ( Diener and Biswas-Diener, 2002 ; Clark et al., 2016 ; Adesanya et al., 2017 ). In ATUS, the highest household income value available was $150K, whereas in GSOEP it was €360K. Thus, it is not always clear whether the very affluent, such as millionaires, are represented in these samples ( Smeets et al., 2020 ). Overall, our results cannot be taken as representative of people who are very poor or rich and should not be interpreted as such.

Another limitation is that the present results cannot be interpreted casually because there has been no manipulation of income in these data nor exploration of mechanisms and there was no longitudinal data in ATUS. As discussed by Kushlev et al. (2015) , there are issues such as reverse causality. Here, however, some of our results potentially suggest an alternative reverse causality pathway, whereby less happy people may select into earning more income. Because the counterfactual is not apparent—we do not know how happy people with high incomes would be without their higher income—it could also be that those with high incomes would be even less happy than they currently are if they had not attained their current level of income. In other words, people with high incomes may have started out as less happy in the first place and be even less happy if they did not have high incomes.

A further limitation is the time period of the data, especially that they were collected prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. This could be an issue because it is possible that the relationship between income and daily experiences of happiness has changed, such as due to the exacerbation of health inequalities and restrictions on freedom of movement due to nationwide lockdowns. Our study does not provide any information on the longer-term and health and well-being consequences of both COVID-19 itself and the policy response to COVID-19 ( Aknin et al., 2022 ). As one example, access to green space, which has health and well-being benefits, is lower among those with low income, and this mechanism between income and happiness may have become more salient during COVID-19 ( Geary et al., 2021 ). Overall, it is important to consider the regional, political, and socioeconomic contexts in which income is attained to understand its relationship with well-being, including levels of income in reference groups such as neighbors, friends, and colleagues ( Luttmer, 2005 ; De Neve and Sachs, 2020 ). It would be important to replicate the results in this research with more recent data to address the limitation that the data we used are not recent, considering our broader point that the measurement and analysis of income should be considered as carefully as the measurement and analysis of happiness.

Future Directions

This research points to several directions for future research. One direction relates to data and measures: Nonlinearities in the relationship between income and happiness could be examined using time use data from other countries, considered between countries and/or within countries over time ( Deaton et al., 2008 ; De Neve et al., 2018 ), and investigated for measures of emotional states other than happiness ( Piff and Moskowitz, 2018 ). In general, our results suggest that researchers should pay attention to how income is measured and analyzed when considering how it is related to happiness, which complements findings from other research that the way happiness is measured and analyzed is important ( Kahneman and Deaton, 2010 ; Jebb et al., 2018 ).

Future research could also explore mechanisms that may explain our findings. In addition to those mentioned in the Introduction—expectations ( Graham and Pettinato, 2002 ; Nickerson et al., 2003 ), time use ( Aguiar and Hurst, 2007 ; Hamermesh and Lee, 2007 ; Bianchi and Vohs, 2016 ; Nikolaev, 2018 ; Sharif et al., 2021 ); generosity ( Dunn et al., 2008 ; Kraus et al., 2010 ; Piff et al., 2010 ; Aknin et al., 2012 ; Balakrishnan et al., 2017 ; Macchia and Whillans, 2022 ), and sense of self ( Snibbe and Markus, 2005 ; Stephens et al., 2007 )—another is the identity-related effect of transitioning between socioeconomic groups. Though one might expect upward mobility to be associated with greater happiness, research suggests that some working class people do not wish to become upwardly mobile because it could lead to a loss of identity and change in community ( Akerlof, 1997 ; Friedman, 2014 ). Indeed, upward intergenerational mobility is associated with worse life evaluations in the United Kingdom—though not in Switzerland ( Hadjar and Samuel, 2015 ), although recent findings show substantial negative effects of downward mobility, too ( Dolan and Lordan, 2021 ). Over time, therefore, the degree of mobility in a population could influence the relationship between income and happiness in both positive and negative directions.

Additionally, social comparisons could drive the effects of higher income on happiness. Higher income might not benefit happiness if one’s reference group—that is, the people to whom we compare or have knowledge of in some form ( Hyman, 1942 ; Shibutani, 1955 ; Runciman, 1966 )—changes with higher socioeconomic status. As income increases, people might compare themselves to others who are also doing similarly or better to them, and then not feel or think that they are doing any better by comparison—or even feel worse ( Cheung and Lucas, 2016 ). This is one of the explanations for the well-known “Easterlin Paradox” ( Easterlin, 1974 ), which suggests that as national income rises people do not become happier because they compare their achievements to others. The paradox is debated ( Sacks et al., 2012 ). Additionally, some research shows that it is possible to view others’ greater success as one’s own future opportunity and for upward social comparisons to then positively impact upon well-being ( Senik, 2004 ; Davis and Wu, 2014 ; Ifcher et al., 2018 ). As with the role of mobility in the relationship between income and happiness, it is unclear whether the role of social comparisons would create a positive or negative impact over time and future research could explore this.

Final Remarks

Overall, our results provide some evidence that individual attainment in terms of income may not equate to the attainment of individual happiness—and could even be associated with less daily happiness, depending upon how income is measured and analyzed. These results suggest that how income is associated with happiness depends on how income is measured and analyzed. They provide some support to the idea that financial achievement can have both costs and benefits, potentially informing normative discussions about the optimal distribution of income in society.

Data Availability Statement

Ethics statement.

Ethical review and approval was not required for the study on human participants in accordance with the local legislation and institutional requirements. Written informed consent from the participants’ legal guardian/next of kin was not required to participate in this study in accordance with the national legislation and the institutional requirements.

Author Contributions

LK and KK contributed to conception and design of the study. LK organized the data, performed the statistical analysis in STATA, and wrote the first draft of the manuscript. KK performed additional statistical analysis in jamovi and wrote sections of the manuscript. All authors contributed to the article and approved the submitted version.

LK was supported by a London School of Economics PhD scholarship during early work and later by the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) Applied Research Collaboration (ARC) West Midlands. The views expressed are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the NIHR or the Department of Health and Social Care.

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Publisher’s Note

All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article, or claim that may be made by its manufacturer, is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.

Acknowledgments

LK thanks Professor Paul Dolan and Dr Georgios Kavetsos for their support early on in conducting this research, as well as Professor Richard Lilford for insights about multiple comparisons.

1 https://www.atusdata.org

2 In the ATUS this was Hispanic and Black, in GSOEP this was German origin.

3 In the ATUS this was whether the respondent had any physical or cognitive difficulty (yes/no), in GSOEP this was self-rated general health (bad, poor, satisfactory, good, and very good).

4 In the ATUS this was presence of children <18 years in the household, in GSOEP this was number of children.

5 This association was stronger and more precise when equivalizing income (dividing by the square root of household size), b  = −0.16, 95%CI = −0.06, −0.27, underscoring the importance of transparency in the treatment of income.

Supplementary Material

The Supplementary Material for this article can be found online at: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.883137/full#supplementary-material

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There are roughly two philosophical literatures on “happiness,” each corresponding to a different sense of the term. One uses ‘happiness’ as a value term, roughly synonymous with well-being or flourishing. The other body of work uses the word as a purely descriptive psychological term, akin to ‘depression’ or ‘tranquility’. An important project in the philosophy of happiness is simply getting clear on what various writers are talking about: what are the important meanings of the term and how do they connect? While the “well-being” sense of happiness receives significant attention in the contemporary literature on well-being, the psychological notion is undergoing a revival as a major focus of philosophical inquiry, following on recent developments in the science of happiness. This entry focuses on the psychological sense of happiness (for the well-being notion, see the entry on well-being ). The main accounts of happiness in this sense are hedonism, the life satisfaction theory, and the emotional state theory. Leaving verbal questions behind, we find that happiness in the psychological sense has always been an important concern of philosophers. Yet the significance of happiness for a good life has been hotly disputed in recent decades. Further questions of contemporary interest concern the relation between the philosophy and science of happiness, as well as the role of happiness in social and political decision-making.

1.1 Two senses of ‘happiness’

1.2 clarifying our inquiry, 2.1 the chief candidates, 2.2 methodology: settling on a theory, 2.3 life satisfaction versus affect-based accounts, 2.4 hedonism versus emotional state, 2.5 hybrid accounts, 3.1 can happiness be measured, 3.2 empirical findings: overview, 3.3 the sources of happiness, 4.1 doubts about the value of happiness, 4.2 restoring happiness to the theory of well-being, 4.3 is happiness overrated, 5.1 normative issues, 5.2 mistakes in the pursuit of happiness, 5.3 the politics of happiness, other internet resources, related entries, 1. the meanings of ‘happiness’.

What is happiness? This question has no straightforward answer, because the meaning of the question itself is unclear. What exactly is being asked? Perhaps you want to know what the word ‘happiness’ means. In that case your inquiry is linguistic. Chances are you had something more interesting in mind: perhaps you want to know about the thing , happiness, itself. Is it pleasure, a life of prosperity, something else? Yet we can’t answer that question until we have some notion of what we mean by the word.

Philosophers who write about “happiness” typically take their subject matter to be either of two things, each corresponding to a different sense of the term:

• A state of mind
• A life that goes well for the person leading it

In the first case our concern is simply a psychological matter. Just as inquiry about pleasure or depression fundamentally concerns questions of psychology, inquiry about happiness in this sense—call it the (long-term) “psychological sense”—is fundamentally the study of certain mental states. What is this state of mind we call happiness? Typical answers to this question include life satisfaction, pleasure, or a positive emotional condition.

Having answered that question, a further question arises: how valuable is this mental state? Since ‘happiness’ in this sense is just a psychological term, you could intelligibly say that happiness isn’t valuable at all. Perhaps you are a high-achieving intellectual who thinks that only ignoramuses can be happy. On this sort of view, happy people are to be pitied, not envied. The present article will center on happiness in the psychological sense.

In the second case, our subject matter is a kind of value , namely what philosophers nowadays tend to call prudential value —or, more commonly, well-being , welfare , utility or flourishing . (For further discussion, see the entry on well-being . Whether these terms are really equivalent remains a matter of dispute, but this article will usually treat them as interchangeable.) “Happiness” in this sense concerns what benefits a person, is good for her, makes her better off, serves her interests, or is desirable for her for her sake. To be high in well-being is to be faring well, doing well, fortunate, or in an enviable condition. Ill-being, or doing badly, may call for sympathy or pity, whereas we envy or rejoice in the good fortune of others, and feel gratitude for our own. Being good for someone differs from simply being good, period: perhaps it is always good, period, for you to be honest; yet it may not always be good for you , as when it entails self-sacrifice. Not coincidentally, the word ‘happiness’ derives from the term for good fortune, or “good hap,” and indeed the terms used to translate it in other languages often have similar roots. In this sense of the term—call it the “well-being sense”—happiness refers to a life of well-being or flourishing: a life that goes well for you.

Importantly, to ascribe happiness in the well-being sense is to make a value judgment : namely, that the person has whatever it is that benefits a person. [ 1 ] If you and I and have different values, then we may well differ about which lives we consider happy. I might think Genghis Khan had a happy life, because I think what matters for well-being is getting what you want; while you deny this because you think a life of evildoing, however “successful,” is sad and impoverished.

Theories of well-being—and hence of “happiness” in the well-being sense—come in three basic flavors, according to the best-known taxonomy (Parfit 1984): hedonism, desire theories, and objective list theories. Whereas hedonists identify well-being roughly with experiences of pleasure, desire theorists equate it with the satisfaction of one’s desires— actually getting what you want, versus merely having certain experiences. Both hedonism and desire theories are in some sense subjectivist, since they ground well-being in the individual’s subjective states. Objective list theorists, by contrast, think some things benefit us independently of our attitudes or feelings: there are objective prudential goods. Aristotelians are the best-known example: they take well-being ( eudaimonia ) to consist in a life of virtuous activity—or more broadly, the fulfillment of our human capacities. A passive but contented couch potato may be getting what he wants, and he may enjoy it. But he would not, on Aristotelian and other objective list theories, count as doing well, or leading a happy life.

Now we can sharpen the initial question somewhat: when you ask what happiness is, are you asking what sort of life benefits a person? If so, then your question concerns matters of value, namely what is good for people—the sort of thing that ethical theorists are trained to address. Alternatively, perhaps you simply want to know about the nature of a certain state of mind—happiness in the psychological sense. In this case, some sort of psychological inquiry will be needed, either philosophical or scientific. (Laypersons often have neither sort of question in mind, but are really asking about the sources of happiness. Thus it might be claimed, say, that “happiness is being with good friends.” This is not a view about the nature or definition of happiness, but rather a theory about the sorts of things that tend to make us happy. It leaves unanswered, or takes for granted, the question of just what happiness is , such that friends are a good source of it.)

In short, philosophical “theories of happiness” can be about either of at least two different things: well-being, or a state of mind. [ 2 ] Accordingly, there are essentially two bodies of philosophical literature about “happiness” and two sets of debates about its nature, though writers often fail to distinguish them. Such failures have generated much confusion, sometimes yielding bogus disagreements that prove to be merely verbal. [ 3 ] For instance, some psychologists identify “happiness” with attitudes of life satisfaction while remaining neutral on questions of value, or whether Bentham, Mill, Aristotle, or any other thinker about the good life was correct. Such researchers employ the term in the psychological sense. Yet it is sometimes objected against such claims that life satisfaction cannot suffice for “happiness” because other things, like achievement or knowledge, matter for human well-being. The objectors are confused: their opponents have made no claims about well-being at all, and the two “sides,” as it were, are simply using ‘happiness’ to talk about different things. One might just as sensibly object to an economist’s tract on “banks” that it has nothing to say about rivers and streams.

Which use of ‘happiness’ corresponds to the true meaning of the term in contemporary English? Arguably, both. The well-being usage clearly dominates in the historical literature through at least the early modern era, for instance in translations of the ancient Greeks’ ‘ eudaimonia ’ or the Latin ‘ beatitudo ’, though this translation has long been a source of controversy. Jefferson’s famous reference to “the pursuit of happiness” probably employed the well-being sense. Even later writers such as Mill may have used the term in its well-being sense, though it is often difficult to tell since well-being itself is often taken to consist in mental states like pleasure. In ordinary usage, the abstract noun ‘happiness’ often invites a well-being reading. And the locution ‘happy life ’ may not naturally take a psychological interpretation, for the simple reason that lives aren’t normally regarded as psychological entities.

Contrast this with the very different meaning that seems to attach to talk of “ being happy.” Here it is much less clear that we are talking about a property of a person’s life; it seems rather to be a property of the person herself. To be happy, it seems, is just to be in a certain sort of psychological state or condition. Similarly when we say that so-and-so “is happy” (as opposed to saying that he is leading a happy life). This psychological usage, arguably, predominates in the current vernacular. Researchers engaged in the self-described “science of happiness” usually do not take themselves to be making value judgments when they proclaim individuals in their studies to be happy. Nor, when asserting that a life satisfaction study shows Utahans to be happier than New Yorkers, are they committing themselves to the tendentious claim that Utahans are better off . (If they are, then the psychology journals that are publishing this research may need to revise their peer-review protocols to include ethicists among their referees.) And the many recent popular books on happiness, as well as innumerable media accounts of research on happiness, nearly all appear to take it for granted that they are talking about nothing more than a psychological condition.

Henceforth ‘happiness’ will be used in the long-term psychological sense, unless otherwise specified. Note, however, that a number of important books and other works on “happiness” in recent decades have employed the well-being sense of the term. Books of this sort appear to include Almeder 2000, Annas 1993, 2011, Bloomfield 2014, Cahn and Vitrano 2015, Kenny and Kenny 2006, McMahon 2005, McPherson 2020, Noddings 2003, Russell 2013, White 2006, and Vitrano 2014, though again it is not always clear how a given author uses the term. For discussion of the well-being notion, see the entry on well-being . [ 4 ]

2. Theories of happiness

Philosophers have most commonly distinguished two accounts of happiness: hedonism , and the life satisfaction theory. Hedonists identify happiness with the individual’s balance of pleasant over unpleasant experience, in the same way that welfare hedonists do. [ 5 ] The difference is that the hedonist about happiness need not accept the stronger doctrine of welfare hedonism; this emerges clearly in arguments against the classical Utilitarian focus on happiness as the aim of social choice. Such arguments tend to grant the identification of happiness with pleasure, but challenge the idea that this should be our primary or sole concern, and often as well the idea that happiness is all that matters for well-being.

Life satisfaction theories identify happiness with having a favorable attitude toward one’s life as a whole. This basic schema can be filled out in a variety of ways, but typically involves some sort of global judgment: an endorsement or affirmation of one’s life as a whole. This judgment may be more or less explicit, and may involve or accompany some form of affect. It may also involve or accompany some aggregate of judgments about particular items or domains within one’s life. [ 6 ]

A third theory, the emotional state view, departs from hedonism in a different way: instead of identifying happiness with pleasant experience, it identifies happiness with an agent’s emotional condition as a whole, of what is often called “emotional well-being.” [ 7 ] This includes nonexperiential aspects of emotions and moods (or perhaps just moods), and excludes pleasures that don’t directly involve the individual’s emotional state. It might also include a person’s propensity for experiencing various moods, which can vary over time, though several authors have argued against this suggestion (e.g., Hill 2007, Klausen 2015, Rossi 2018). Happiness on such a view is more nearly the opposite of depression or anxiety—a broad psychological condition—whereas hedonistic happiness is simply opposed to unpleasantness. For example, a deeply distressed individual might distract herself enough with constant activity to maintain a mostly pleasant existence—broken only by tearful breakdowns during the odd quiet moment—thus perhaps counting as happy on a hedonistic but not emotional state view. The states involved in happiness, on an emotional state view, can range widely, far more so that the ordinary notion of mood or emotion. On one proposal, happiness involves three broad categories of affective state, including “endorsement” states like joy versus sadness, “engagement” states like flow or a sense of vitality, and “attunement” states like tranquility, emotional expansiveness versus compression, and confidence. Given the departures from commonsensical notions of being in a “good mood,” happiness is characterized in this proposal as “psychic affirmation,” or “psychic flourishing” in pronounced forms.

A fourth family of views, hybrid theories , attempts an irenic solution to our diverse intuitions about happiness: identify happiness with both life satisfaction and pleasure or emotional state, perhaps along with other states such as domain satisfactions. The most obvious candidate here is subjective well-being , which is typically defined as a compound of life satisfaction, domain satisfactions, and positive and negative affect. (Researchers often seem to identify happiness with subjective well-being, sometimes with life satisfaction, and perhaps most commonly with emotional or hedonic state.) The chief appeal of hybrid theories is their inclusiveness: all the components of subjective well-being seem important, and there is probably no component of subjective well-being that does not at times get included in “happiness” in ordinary usage.

How do we determine which theory is correct? Traditional philosophical methods of conceptual or linguistic analysis can give us some guidance, indicating that some accounts offer a better fit with the ordinary concept of happiness. Thus it has been argued that hedonism is false to the concept of happiness as we know it; the intuitions taken to support hedonism point instead to an emotional state view (Haybron 2001). And some have argued that life satisfaction is compatible with profoundly negative emotional states like depression—a suffering artist might not value emotional matters much, and wholeheartedly affirm her life (Carson 1981, Davis 1981b, Haybron 2005, Feldman 2010). Yet it might seem counterintuitive to deem such a person happy. At the same time, people do sometimes use ‘happiness’ to denote states of life satisfaction: life satisfaction theories do seem faithful to some ordinary uses of ‘happiness’. The trouble is that HAPPINESS appears to be a “mongrel concept,” as Ned Block (1995) called the concept of consciousness: the ordinary notion is something of a mess. We use the term to denote different things in different contexts, and often have no clear notion of what we are referring to. This suggests that accounts of happiness must be somewhat revisionary, and that we must assess theories on grounds other than simple fidelity to the lay concept of happiness—“descriptive adequacy,” in Sumner’s (1996) terms. One candidate is practical utility: which conception of happiness best answers to our interests in the notion? We talk about happiness because we care about it. The question is why we care about it, and which psychological states within the extension of the ordinary term make the most sense of this concern. Even if there is no simple answer to the question what happiness is, it may well turn out that our interests in happiness cluster so strongly around a particular psychological kind that happiness can best, or most profitably, be understood in terms of that type of state (Haybron 2003). Alternatively, we may choose to distinguish different varieties of happiness. It will be less important how we use the word, however, than that we be clear about the nature and significance of the phenomena that interest us.

The debate over theories of happiness falls along a couple of lines. The most interesting questions concern the choice between life satisfaction and affect-based views like hedonism and the emotional state theory. [ 8 ] Proponents of life satisfaction see two major advantages to their account. First, life satisfaction is holistic , ranging over the whole of one’s life, or the totality of one’s life over a certain period of time. It reflects not just the aggregate of moments in one’s life, but also the global quality of one’s life taken as a whole (but see Raibley 2010). And we seem to care not just about the total quantity of good in our lives, but about its distribution—a happy ending, say, counts for more than a happy middle (Slote 1982, Velleman 1991). Second, life satisfaction seems more closely linked to our priorities than affect is, as the suffering artist case illustrates. While a focus on affect makes sense insofar as we care about such matters, most people care about other things as well, and how their lives are going relative to their priorities may not be fully mirrored in their affective states. Life satisfaction theories thus seem to fit more closely with liberal ideals of individual sovereignty, on which how well my life is going for me is for me to decide. My satisfaction with my life seems to embody that judgment. Of course a theory of happiness need not capture everything that matters for well-being; the point is that a life satisfaction view might explain why we should care so much about happiness, and so enjoy substantive as well as intuitive support. [ 9 ]

But several objections have been raised against life satisfaction views. The most common complaint has already been noted, namely that a person could apparently be satisfied with her life even while leading a highly unpleasant or emotionally distressed existence, and it can seem counterintuitive to regard such a person as happy (see section 2.2). Some life satisfaction theorists deny that such cases are possible (Benditt 1978), but it could also be argued that such possibilities are part and parcel of life satisfaction’s appeal: some people may not get much pleasure out of life because they don’t care particularly about affective matters, and a life satisfaction theory allows that they can, in their own fashion, be happy.

Two other objections are more substantive, raising questions about whether life satisfaction has the right sort of importance. One concern is whether people often enough have well-grounded attitudes of life satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Evaluating one’s life as a whole can be a complicated business, and there is some question whether people typically have well-defined attitudes toward their lives that accurately reflect how well their lives measure up relative to their priorities. Some research, for instance, suggests that life satisfaction reports tend to reflect judgments made on the spot, drawing on whatever information comes readily to mind, with substantial influences by transient contextual factors like the weather, finding a dime, etc. (Schwarz and Strack 1999). Debate persists over whether this work undermines the significance of life satisfaction judgments, but it does raise a question whether life satisfaction attitudes tend to be well-enough grounded to have the kind of importance that people normally ascribe to happiness.

The third objection is somewhat intricate, so it will require some explaining. The claim is that a wide range of life satisfaction attitudes might be consistent with individuals’ perceptions of how well their lives are going relative to what they care about, raising doubts about the importance of life satisfaction (Haybron 2016). You might reasonably be satisfied when getting very little of what you want, or dissatisfied when getting most of what you want. One reason for this is that people tend to have many incommensurable values, leaving it open how to add them up. Looking at the various ups and downs of your life, it may be arbitrary whether to rate your life a four out of ten, or a seven. A second reason is that life satisfaction attitudes are not merely assessments of subjective success or personal welfare: they involve assessments of whether one’s life is good enough —satisfactory. Yet people’s values may radically underdetermine where they should set the bar for a “good enough” life, again rendering the judgment somewhat arbitrary. Given your values, you might reasonably be satisfied with a two, or require a nine to be satisfied. While it may seem important how well people see their lives going relative to what they care about, it is not obviously so important whether people see their lives going well enough that they are willing to judge them satisfactory.

If life satisfaction attitudes are substantially arbitrary relative to subjective success, then people might reasonably base those attitudes on other factors, such as ethical ideals (e.g., valuing gratitude or noncomplacency) or pragmatic concerns (e.g., comforting oneself). Shifts in perspective might also reasonably alter life satisfaction attitudes. After the funeral, you might be highly satisfied with your life, whereas the high school reunion leaves you dissatisfied; yet neither judgment need be mistaken, or less authoritative.

As a result, life satisfaction attitudes may be poor indicators of well-being, even from the individual’s own point of view. That people in a given country register high levels of life satisfaction may reflect nothing more than that they set the bar extremely low; they might be satisfied with anything short of pure agony. Another country’s citizens might be dissatisfied with their lives, but only because they set the bar much higher. Relative to what they care about, people in the dissatisfied nation could be better off than those in the satisfied nation. To take another example, a cancer patient might be more satisfied with his life than he was before the diagnosis, for he now looks at his life from a different perspective and emphasizes different virtues like fortitude and gratitude as opposed to (say) humility and non-complacency. Yet he need not think himself better off at all: he might believe himself worse off than he was when he was less satisfied. Neither judgment need seem to him or us to be mistaken: it’s just that he now looks at his life differently. Indeed, he might think he’s doing badly, even as he is satisfied with his life: he endorses it, warts and all, and is grateful just have his not-so-good life rather than some of the much worse alternatives.

For present purposes, the worry is that life satisfaction may not have the kind of significance happiness is normally thought to have. This may pose a difficulty for the identification of life satisfaction with happiness: for people frequently seem to use happiness as a proxy for well-being, a reasonably concrete and value-free stand-in that facilitates quick-and-dirty assessments of welfare. Given the discovery that someone is happy, we might infer that he is doing well; if we learn that someone is unhappy, we may conclude that she is doing poorly. Such inferences are defeasible: if we later find that the happy Ned’s wife and friends secretly hate him, we need not decide that he isn’t happy after all; we simply withdraw the conclusion that he is doing well. So long as happiness tracks well-being well enough in most cases, this sort of practice is perfectly respectable. But if we identify happiness with life satisfaction, then we may have a problem: maybe Sally is satisfied only because she values being grateful for the good things in life. This sort of case may not be merely a theoretical possibility: perhaps the very high rates of self-reported life satisfaction in the United States and many other places substantially reflects a broad acceptance of norms of gratitude and a general tendency to emphasize the positives, or perhaps a sense that not to endorse your life amounts to a lack of self-regard. It is not implausible that most people, even those enduring great hardship, can readily find grounds for satisfaction with their lives. Life may have to be pretty hard for a person to be incapable of affirming it.

Despite these concerns there is significant intuitive appeal in the idea that to be happy is to be satisfied with one’s life. Perhaps a different way of conceiving life satisfaction, for instance dispensing with the global judgment and aggregating particular satisfactions and dissatisfactions, would lessen the force of these objections. Alternatively, it is possible that idealized or qualified forms of life satisfaction would mitigate these concerns for some purposes, such as a theory of well-being. [ 10 ]

A second set of issues concerns the differences between the two affect-based views, hedonism and emotional state. The appeal of hedonism is fairly obvious: the pleasantness of our experience is plainly a matter of great significance; many have claimed it to be the only thing that matters. What, by contrast, motivates the emotional state account, which bears obvious similarities to hedonism yet excludes many pleasures from happiness? The question of motivation appears to be the chief worry facing the emotional state theory: what’s to be gained by focusing on emotional state rather than pleasure?

One argument for taking such a view is intuitive: some find it implausible to think that psychologically superficial pleasures invariably make a difference in how happy one is—the typical pleasure of eating a cracker, say, or even the intense pleasure of an orgasm that nonetheless fails to move one, as can happen with meaningless sexual activity. The intuitive distinction seems akin to distinctions made by some ancient philosophers; consider, for instance, the following passage from Epictetus’s Discourses :

‘I have a headache.’ Well, do not say ‘Alas!’ ‘I have an earache.’ Do not say ‘Alas!’ And I am not saying that it is not permissible to groan, only do not groan in the centre of your being . ( Discourses , 1.18.19, emphasis added).

The Stoics did not expect us never to feel unpleasant sensations, which would plainly be impossible; rather, the idea was not to let such things get to us , to impact our emotional conditions.

Why should anyone care to press such a distinction in characterizing happiness? For most people, the hedonic difference between happiness on an emotional state versus a hedonistic view is probably minimal. But while little will be lost, what will be gained? One possibility is that the more “central” affects involving our emotional conditions may bear a special relation to the person or the self , whereas more “peripheral” affects, like the pleasantness of eating a cracker, might pertain to the subpersonal aspects of our psychologies. Since well-being is commonly linked to ideas of self-fulfillment, this sort of distinction might signal a difference in the importance of these states. Another reason to focus on emotional condition rather than experience alone may be the greater psychological depth of the former: its impact on our mental lives, physiology, and behavior is arguably deeper and more pervasive. This enhances the explanatory and predictive significance of happiness, and more importantly its desirability: happiness on this view is not merely pleasant, but a major source of pleasure and other good outcomes (Fredrickson 2004, Lyubomirsky, King et al . 2005). Compare health on this score: while many think it matters chiefly or entirely because of its connection with pleasure, there are few skeptics about the importance of health. As well, emotional state views may capture the idea that happiness concerns the individual’s psychological orientation or disposition : to be happy, on an emotional state theory, is not just to be subjected to a certain sequence of experiences, but for one’s very being to manifest a favorable orientation toward the conditions of one’s life—a kind of psychic affirmation of one’s life. This reflects a point of similarity with life satisfaction views of happiness: contra hedonism, both views take happiness to be substantially dispositional, involving some sort of favorable orientation toward one’s life. But life satisfaction views tend to emphasize reflective or rational endorsement, whereas emotional state views emphasize the verdicts of our emotional natures.

While hedonism and emotional state theories are major contenders in the contemporary literature, all affect-based theories confront the worries, noted earlier, that motivate life satisfaction views—notably, their looser connection with people’s priorities, as well as their limited ability to reflect the quality of people’s lives taken as a whole.

Given the limitations of narrower theories of happiness, a hybrid account such as a subjective well-being theory may seem an attractive solution. This strategy has not been fully explored in the philosophical literature, though Sumner’s “life satisfaction” theory may best be classified as a hybrid (1996; see also Martin 2012). In any event, a hybrid approach draws objections of its own. If we arrive at a hybrid theory by this route, it could seem like either the marriage of two unpromising accounts, or of a promising account with an unpromising one. Such a union may not yield wholesome results. Second, people have different intuitions about what counts as happiness, so that no theory can accommodate all of them. Any theory that tries to thus risks pleasing no one. A third concern is that the various components of any hybrid are liable to matter for quite different reasons, so that happiness, thus understood, might fail to answer to any coherent set of concerns. Ascriptions of happiness could be relatively uninformative if they cast their net too widely.

3. The science of happiness

With the explosive rise of empirical research on happiness, a central question is how far, and how, happiness might be measured. [ 11 ] There seems to be no in-principle barrier to the idea of measuring, at least roughly, how happy people are. Investigators may never enjoy the precision of the “hedonimeter” once envisaged by Edgeworth to show just how happy a person is (Edgeworth 1881). Indeed, such a device might be impossible even in principle, since happiness might involve multiple dimensions that either cannot be precisely quantified or summed together. If so, it could still be feasible to develop approximate measures of happiness, or at least its various dimensions. Similarly, depression may not admit of precise quantification in a single number, yet many useful if imprecise measures of depression exist. In the case of happiness, it is plausible that even current measures provide information about how anxious, cheerful, satisfied, etc. people are, and thus tell us something about their happiness. Even the simplest self-report measures used in the literature have been found to correlate well with many intuitively relevant variables, such as friends’ reports, smiling, physiological measures, health, longevity, and so forth (Pavot 2008).

Importantly, most scientific research needs only to discern patterns across large numbers of individuals—to take an easy case, determining whether widows tend to be less happy than newlyweds—and this is compatible with substantial unreliability in assessing individual happiness. Similarly, an inaccurate thermometer might be a poor guide to the temperature, but readings from many such thermometers could correlate fairly well with actual temperatures—telling us, for instance, that Minnesota is colder than Florida.

This point reveals an important caveat: measures of happiness could correlate well with how happy people are, thus telling us which groups of people tend to be happier, while being completely wrong about absolute levels of happiness. Self-reports of happiness, for instance, might correctly indicate that unemployed people are considerably less happy than those with jobs. But every one of those reports could be wrong, say if everyone is unhappy yet claims to be happy, or vice-versa, so long as the unemployed report lower happiness than the employed. Similarly, bad thermometers may show that Minnesota is colder than Florida without giving the correct temperature.

Two morals emerge from these reflections. First, self-report measures of happiness could be reliable guides to relative happiness, though telling us little about how happy, in absolute terms, people are. We may know who is happier, that is, but not whether people are in fact happy. Second, even comparisons of relative happiness will be inaccurate if the groups being compared systematically bias their reports in different ways. This worry is particularly acute for cross-cultural comparisons of happiness, where differing norms about happiness may undermine the comparability of self-reports. The French might report lower happiness than Americans, for instance, not because their lives are less satisfying or pleasant, but because they tend to put a less positive spin on things. For this reason it may be useful to employ instruments, including narrower questions or physiological measures, that are less prone to cultural biasing. [ 12 ]

The discussion thus far has assumed that people can be wrong about how happy they are. Is this plausible? Some have argued that (sincerely) self-reported happiness cannot, even in principle, be mistaken. If you think you’re happy, goes a common sentiment, then you are happy. This claim is not plausible on a hedonistic or emotional state view of happiness, since those theories take judgments of happiness to encompass not just how one is feeling at the moment but also past states, and memories of those can obviously be spurious. Further, it has been argued that even judgments of how one feels at the present moment may often be mistaken, particularly regarding moods like anxiety. [ 13 ]

The idea that sincere self-reports of happiness are incorrigible can only be correct, it seems, given a quite specific conception of happiness—a kind of life satisfaction theory of happiness on which people count as satisfied with their lives so long as they are disposed to judge explicitly that they are satisfied with their lives on the whole. Also assumed here is that self-reports of happiness are in fact wholly grounded in life satisfaction judgments like these—that is, that people take questions about “happiness” to be questions about life satisfaction. Given these assumptions, we can plausibly conclude that self-reports of happiness are incorrigible. One question is whether happiness, thus conceived, is very important. As well, it is unlikely that respondents invariably interpret happiness questions as being about life satisfaction. At any rate, even life satisfaction theorists might balk at this variant of the account, since life satisfaction is sometimes taken to involve, not just explicit global judgments of life satisfaction, but also our responses to the particular things or domains we care about. Some will hesitate to deem satisfied people who hate many of the important things in their lives, however satisfied they claim to be with their lives as a whole.

In a similar vein, the common practice of measuring happiness simply by asking people to report explicitly on how “happy” they are is sometimes defended on the grounds that it lets people decide for themselves what happiness is. The reasoning again seems to presuppose, controversially, that self-reports of happiness employ a life satisfaction view of happiness, the idea being that whether you are satisfied (“happy”) will depend on what you care about. Alternatively, the point might be literally to leave it up to the respondent to decide whether ‘happy’ means hedonic state, emotional state, life satisfaction, or something else. Thus one respondent’s “I’m happy” might mean “my experience is generally pleasant,” while another’s might mean “I am satisfied with my life as a whole.” It is not clear, however, that asking ambiguous questions of this sort is a useful enterprise, since different respondents will in effect be answering different questions.

To measure happiness through self-reports, then, it may be wiser to employ terms other than ‘happiness’ and its cognates—terms whose meaning is relatively well-known and fixed. In other words, researchers should decide in advance what they want to measure—be it life satisfaction, hedonic state, emotional state, or something else—and then ask questions that refer unambiguously to those states. [ 14 ] This stratagem may be all the more necessary in cross-cultural work, where finding suitable translations of ‘happy’ can be daunting—particularly when the English meaning of the term remains a matter of contention (Wierzbicka 2004).

This entry focuses on subjective well-being studies, since that work is standardly deemed “happiness” research. But psychological research on well-being can take other forms, notably in the “eudaimonic”—commonly opposed to “hedonic”—literature, which assesses a broader range of indicators taken to represent objective human needs, such as meaning, personal growth, relatedness, autonomy, competence, etc. [ 15 ] (The assimilation of subjective well-being to the “hedonic” realm may be misleading, since life satisfaction seems primarily to be a non -hedonic value, as noted earlier.) Other well-being instruments may not clearly fall under either the “happiness” or eudaimonic rubrics, for instance extending subjective well-being measures by adding questions about the extent to which activities are seen as meaningful or worthwhile (White and Dolan 2009). An important question going forward is how far well-being research needs to incorporate indicators beyond subjective well-being.

The scientific literature on happiness has grown to proportions far too large for this article to do more than briefly touch on a few highlights. [ 16 ] Here is a sampling of oft-cited claims:

• Most people are happy
• People adapt to most changes, tending to return over time to their happiness “set point”
• People are prone to make serious mistakes in assessing and pursuing happiness
• Material prosperity has a surprisingly modest impact on happiness

The first claim, that most people are happy, appears to be a consensus position among subjective well-being researchers (for a seminal argument, see Diener and Diener 1996). The contention reflects three lines of evidence: most people, in most places, report being happy; most people report being satisfied with their lives; and most people experience more positive affect than negative. On any of the major theories of happiness, then, the evidence seems to show that most people are, indeed, happy. Yet this conclusion might be resisted, on a couple of grounds. First, life satisfaction theorists might question whether self-reports of life satisfaction suffice to establish that people are in fact satisfied with their lives. Perhaps self-reports can be mistaken, say if the individual believes herself satisfied yet shows many signs of dissatisfaction in her behavior, for instance complaining about or striving to change important things in her life. Second, defenders of affect-based theories—hedonistic and emotional state views—might reject the notion that a bare majority of positive affect suffices for happiness. While the traditional view among hedonists has indeed been that happiness requires no more than a >1:1 ratio of positive to negative affect, this contention has received little defense and has been disputed in the recent literature. Some investigators have claimed that “flourishing” requires greater than a 3:1 ratio of positive to negative affect, as this ratio might represent a threshold for broadly favorable psychological functioning (e.g., Larsen and Prizmic 2008). While the evidence for any specific ratio is highly controversial, if anything like this proportion were adopted as the threshold for happiness, on a hedonistic or emotional state theory, then some of the evidence taken to show that people are happy could in fact show the opposite. In any event, the empirical claim relies heavily on nontrivial philosophical views about the nature of happiness, illustrating one way in which philosophical work on happiness can inform scientific research.

The second claim, regarding adaptation and set points, reflects well-known findings that many major life events, like being disabled in an accident or winning the lottery, appear strongly to impact happiness only for a relatively brief period, after which individuals may return to a level of happiness not very different from before. [ 17 ] As well, twin studies have found that subjective well-being is substantially heritable, with .50 being a commonly accepted figure. Consequently many researchers have posited that each individual has a characteristic “set point” level of happiness, toward which he tends to gravitate over time. Such claims have caused some consternation over whether the pursuit and promotion of happiness are largely futile enterprises (Lykken and Tellegen 1996; Millgram 2000). However, the dominant view now seems to be that the early claims about extreme adaptation and set points were exaggerated: while adaptation is a very real phenomenon, many factors—including disability—can have substantial, and lasting, effects on how happy people are. [ 18 ] This point was already apparent from the literature on correlates and causes of happiness, discussed below: if things like relationships and engaging work are important for happiness, then happiness is probably not simply a matter of personality or temperament. As well, the large cross-national differences in measured happiness are unlikely to be entirely an artifact of personality variables. Note that even highly heritable traits can be strongly susceptible to improvement. Better living conditions have raised the stature of men in the Netherlands by eight inches—going from short (five foot four) to tall (over six feet)—in the last 150 years (Fogel 2005). Yet height is considered much more heritable than happiness, with typical heritability estimates ranging from .60 to over .90 (e.g., Silventoinen, Sammalisto et al . 2003). [ 19 ]

The question of mistakes will be taken up in section 5.2. But the last claim—that material prosperity has relatively modest impacts on happiness—has lately become the subject of heated debate. For some time the standard view among subjective well-being researchers was that, beyond a low threshold where basic needs are met, economic gains have only a small impact on happiness levels. According to the well-known “Easterlin Paradox,” for instance, wealthier people do tend to be happier within nations, but richer nations are little happier than less prosperous counterparts, and—most strikingly—economic growth has virtually no impact (Easterlin 1974). In the U.S., for example, measured happiness has not increased significantly since at least 1947, despite massive increases in wealth and income. In short, once you’re out of poverty, absolute levels of wealth and income make little difference in how happy people are.

Against these claims, some authors have argued that absolute income has a large impact on happiness across the income spectrum (e.g., Stevenson and Wolfers 2008). The question continues to be much debated, but in 2010 a pair of large-scale studies using Gallup data sets, including improved measures of life satisfaction and affect, suggested that both sides may be partly right (Kahneman and Deaton 2010; Diener, Ng et al . 2010). Surveying large numbers of Americans in one case, and what is claimed to be the first globally representative sample of humanity in the other, these studies found that income does indeed correlate substantially (.44 in the global sample), at all levels, with life satisfaction—strictly speaking, a “life evaluation” measure that asks respondents to rate their lives without saying whether they are satisfied. Yet the correlation of household income with the affect measures is far weaker: globally, .17 for positive affect, –.09 for negative affect; and in the United States, essentially zero above $75,000 (though quite strong at low income levels). For more recent discussions of empirical work, see Jebb et al. 2018 along with relevant chapters in Diener et al. 2018 and the annual World Happiness Reports from 2012 onward (Helliwell et al. 2012). Research on the complex money-happiness relationship resists simple characterization, but a crude summary is that the connection tends to be positive and substantial, strong at lower income levels while modest to weak or even negative at higher incomes, and stronger and less prone to satiation for life evaluation than emotional well-being metrics. But again, these are very rough generalizations that gloss over a variety of important factors and admit of many exceptions across both individuals and societies.

In short, the relationship between money and happiness may depend on which theory of happiness we accept: on a life satisfaction view, the relationship may be strong; whereas affect-based views may yield a much weaker connection, again above some modest threshold. Here, again, philosophical views about the nature and significance of happiness may play an important role in understanding empirical results and their practical upshot. Economic growth, for instance, has long been a top priority for governments, and findings about its impact on human well-being may have substantial implications for policy.

It is important to note that studies of this nature focus on generic trends, not specific cases, and there is no dispute that significant exceptions exist—notably, populations that enjoy high levels of happiness amid low levels of material prosperity. Among others, a number of Latin American countries, Maasai herders, Inughuit hunter-gatherers, and Amish communities have registered highly positive results in subjective well-being studies, sometimes higher than those in many affluent nations, and numerous informal accounts accord with the data. [ 20 ] Such “positive outliers” suggest that some societies can support high levels of happiness with extremely modest material holdings. The importance of money for happiness may depend strongly on what kind of society one inhabits. An interesting question, particularly in light of common environmental concerns, is how far the lessons of such societies can, or should, be transferred to other social forms, where material attainment and happiness are presently more tightly coupled. Perhaps some degree of decoupling of happiness and money would be desirable.

So the role of money in happiness appears, at this juncture, to be a mixed bag, depending heavily on how we conceive of happiness and what range of societies we are considering. What (else), then, does matter most for happiness? There is no definitive list of the main sources of happiness in the literature, partly because it is not clear how to divide them up. But the following items seem generally to be accepted as among the chief correlates of happiness: supportive relationships, engagement in interesting and challenging activities, material and physical security, a sense of meaning or purpose, a positive outlook, and autonomy or control. [ 21 ] Significant correlates may also include—among many others—religion, good governance, trust, helping others, values (e.g., having non-materialistic values), achieving goals, not being unemployed, and connection with the natural environment. [ 22 ]

An illustrative study of the correlates of happiness from a global perspective is the Gallup World Poll study noted earlier (Diener, Ng et al . 2010; see also Jebb et al. 2020). In that study, the life satisfaction measure was more strongly related to material prosperity, as noted above: household income, along with possession of luxury conveniences and satisfaction with standard of living. The affect measures, by contrast, correlated most strongly with what the authors call “psychosocial prosperity”: whether people reported being treated with respect in the last day, having family and friends to count on, learning something new, doing what they do best, and choosing how their time was spent.

What these results show depends partly on the reliability of the measures. One possible source of error is that this study might exaggerate the relationship between life satisfaction and material attainments through the use of a “ladder” scale for life evaluation, ladders being associated with material aspirations. Errors might also arise through salience biases whereby material concerns might be more easily recalled than other important values, such as whether one has succeeded in having children; or through differences in positivity biases across income levels (perhaps wealthier people tend to be more “positive-responding” than poorer individuals). Another question is whether the affect measures adequately track the various dimensions of people’s emotional lives. However, the results are roughly consonant with other research, so they are unlikely to be entirely an artifact of the instruments used in this study. [ 23 ] A further point of uncertainty is the causal story behind the correlations—whether the correlates, like psychosocial prosperity, cause happiness; whether happiness causes them; whether other factors cause both; or, as is likely, some combination of the three.

Such concerns duly noted, the research plausibly suggests that, on average, material progress has some tendency to help people to better get what they want in life, as found in the life satisfaction measures, while relationships and engaging activities are more important for people’s emotional lives. What this means for happiness depends on which view of happiness is correct.

4. The importance of happiness

Were you to survey public attitudes about the value of happiness, at least in liberal Western democracies, you would likely find considerable support for the proposition that happiness is all that really matters for human well-being. Many philosophers over the ages have likewise endorsed such a view, typically assuming a hedonistic account of happiness. (A few, like Almeder 2000, have identified well-being with happiness understood as life satisfaction.)

Most philosophers, however, have rejected hedonistic and other mental state accounts of well-being, and with them the idea that happiness could suffice for well-being. [ 24 ] (See the entry on well-being .) Objections to mental state theories of well-being tend to cluster around two sets of concerns. First, it is widely believed that the non-mental conditions of our lives matter for well-being: whether our families really love us, whether our putative achievements are genuine, whether the things we care about actually obtain. The most influential objection of this sort is Robert Nozick’s experience machine case, wherein we are asked to imagine a virtual reality device that can perfectly simulate any reality for its user, who will think the experience is genuine (Nozick 1974). Would you plug in to such a machine for life? Most people would not, and the case is widely taken to vitiate mental state theories of well-being. Beyond having positive mental states, it seems to matter both that our lives go well and that our state of mind is appropriately related to how things are. [ 25 ]

A second set of objections concerns various ways in which a happy person might nonetheless seem intuitively to be leading an impoverished or stunted life. The most influential of these worries involves adaptation , where individuals facing oppressive circumstances scale back their expectations and find contentment in “small mercies,” as Sen put it. [ 26 ] Even a slave might come to internalize the values of his oppressors and be happy, and this strikes most as an unenviable life indeed. Related worries involve people with diminished capacities (blindness, Down Syndrome), or choosing to lead narrow and cramped or simpleminded lives (e.g., counting blades of grass). Worries about impoverished lives are a prime motivator of Aristotelian theories of well-being, which emphasize the full and proper exercise of our human capacities.

In the face of these and other objections most commentators have concluded that neither happiness nor any other mental state can suffice for well-being. Philosophical interest in happiness has consequently flagged, since its theoretical importance becomes unclear if it does not play a starring role in our account of the good.

Even as happiness might fail to suffice for well-being, well-being itself may be only one component of a good life , and not the most important one at that. Here ‘good life’ means a life that is good all things considered, taking account of all the values that matter in life, whether they benefit the individual or not. Kant, for example, considered both morality and well-being to be important but distinct elements of a good life. Yet morality should be our first priority, never to be sacrificed for personal happiness.

In fact there is a broad consensus, or near-consensus, among ethical theorists on a doctrine we might call the priority of virtue : broadly and crudely speaking, the demands of virtue or morality trump other values in life. [ 27 ] We ought above all to act and live well, or at least not badly or wrongly. This view need not take the strong form of insisting that we must always act as virtuously as possible, or that moral reasons always take precedence. But it does mean, at least, that when being happy requires acting badly, one’s happiness must be sacrificed. If it would be wrong to leave your family, in which you are unhappy, then you must remain unhappy, or find more acceptable ways to seek happiness.

The mainstream views in all three of the major approaches to ethical theory—consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics—agree on some form of the priority of virtue. Where these views chiefly differ is not on the importance of being good, but on whether being good necessarily benefits us. Virtue ethicists tend to answer in the affirmative, the other two schools in the negative. Building virtue into well-being, as Aristotelians do, may seem to yield a more demanding ethics, and in some ways it does. Yet many deontologists and consequentialists—notably Kant—advocate sterner, more starkly moralistic visions of the good life than Aristotle would ever have dreamt of (e.g., Singer 1972).

Happiness, in short, is believed by most philosophers to be insufficient for well-being, and still less important for the good life. These points may seem to vitiate any substantial role for happiness in ethical thought. However, well-being itself is still regarded as a central concept in ethical thought, denoting one of the chief elements of a good life even if not the sole element. And there are reasons for thinking happiness important, both practically and theoretically, despite the worries noted above.

Even if happiness does not suffice for well-being—a point that not all philosophers would accept—it might still rate a privileged spot in theories of well-being. This could happen in either of two ways.

First, happiness could be a major component of a theory of well-being. Objective list theories of well-being sometimes include happiness or related mental states such as enjoyment among the fundamental constituents of well-being. A more ambitious proposal, originated by L.W. Sumner, identifies well-being with authentic happiness —happiness that is authentic in the sense of being both informed and autonomous (Sumner 1996). The root idea is that well-being involves being happy, where one’s happiness is a response of one’s own (autonomous), to a life that genuinely is one’s own (informed). The authenticity constraint is meant to address both experience machine-type worries and “happy slave” objections relating to adaptation, where happiness may be non-autonomous, depending on manipulation or the uncritical acceptance of oppressive values. Since these have been the most influential objections to mental state accounts of well-being, Sumner’s approach promises to considerably strengthen the position of happiness-centered approaches to well-being, and several philosophers have developed variants or close relations of the authentic happiness theory (Brülde 2007, Haybron 2008a, Tiberius and Plakias 2010, Višak 2015). The approach remains fairly new, however, so its long-term prospects remain unclear. [ 28 ]

A second strategy forsakes the project of giving a unitary theory of well-being, recognizing instead a family of two or more kinds of prudential value. Happiness could be central to, or even exhaustive of, one of those values. Shelly Kagan, for instance, has suggested that welfare hedonism could be correct as a theory of how well a person is doing, but not of how well a person’s life is going, which should perhaps be regarded as a distinct value (Kagan 1992, 1994). In short, we might distinguish narrow and wide well-being concepts. An experience machine user might be doing well in the narrow sense, but not the wide—she is doing well, though her life is quite sad. Happiness might, then, suffice for well-being, but only in the narrow sense. Others have made similar points, but uptake has been limited, perhaps because distinguishing multiple concepts of prudential value makes the already difficult job of giving a theory of well-being much harder, as Kagan pointedly observes. [ 29 ] An interesting possibility is that the locution ‘happy life’, and the corresponding well-being sense of happiness, actually refers to a specific variety of well-being—perhaps well-being in the wide sense just suggested, or well-being taken as an ideal state, an ultimate goal of deliberation. This might explain the continued use of ‘happiness’ for the well-being notion in the philosophical literature, rather than the more standard ‘wellbeing.’

The preceding section discussed ways that happiness might figure prominently even in non-mental state theories of well-being. The question there concerned the role of happiness in theories of well-being. This is a different question from how important happiness is for well-being itself. Even a theory of well-being that includes no mention at all of happiness can allow that happiness is nonetheless a major component or contributor to well-being, because of its relation to the things that ultimately constitute well-being. If you hold a desire theory of well-being, for instance, you will very likely allow that, for most people, happiness is a central aspect of well-being, since most people very much desire to be happy. Indeed, some desire theorists have argued that the account actually yields a form of hedonism, on the grounds that people ultimately desire nothing else but happiness or pleasure (Sidgwick 1907 [1966], Brandt 1979, 1989).

Happiness may be thought important even on theories normally believed to take a dismissive view of it. Aristotelians identify well-being with virtuous activity, yet Aristotle plainly takes this to be a highly pleasant condition, indeed the most pleasant kind of life there is (see, e.g., NE , Bk. I 8; Bk. VII 13). You cannot flourish, on Aristotelian terms, without being happy, and unhappiness is clearly incompatible with well-being. Even the Stoics, who notoriously regard all but a virtuous inner state as at best indifferent, would still assign happiness a kind of importance: at the very least, to be unhappy would be unvirtuous; and virtue itself arguably entails a kind of happiness, namely a pleasant state of tranquility. As well, happiness would likely be a preferred indifferent in most cases, to be chosen over unhappiness. To be sure, both Aristotelian and Stoic accounts are clear that happiness alone does not suffice for well-being, that its significance is not what common opinion takes it to be, and that some kinds of happiness can be worthless or even bad. But neither denies that happiness is somehow quite important for human well-being.

In fact it is questionable whether any major school of philosophical thought denies outright the importance of happiness, at least on one of the plausible accounts of the matter. Doubts about its significance probably owe to several factors. Some skeptics, for example, focus on relatively weak conceptions of happiness, such as the idea that it is little more than the simple emotion of feeling happy—an idea that few hedonists or emotional state theorists would accept. Or, alternatively, assuming that a concern for happiness has only to do with positive states. Yet ‘happiness’ also serves as a blanket term for a domain of concern that involves both positive and negative states, namely the kinds of mental states involved in being happy or unhappy. Just as “health” care tends to focus mainly on ill health, so might happiness researchers choose to focus much of their effort on the study and alleviation of unhappiness—depression, suffering, anxiety, and other conditions whose importance is uncontroversial. The study of happiness need be no more concerned with smiles than with frowns.

5. The pursuit and promotion of happiness

The last set of questions we will examine centers on the pursuit of happiness, both individual and collective. Most of the popular literature on happiness discusses how to make oneself happier, with little attention given to whether this is an appropriate goal, or how various means of pursuing happiness measure up from an ethical standpoint. More broadly, how if at all should one pursue happiness as part of a good life?

We saw earlier that most philosophers regard happiness as secondary to morality in a good life. The individual pursuit of happiness may be subject to nonmoral norms as well, prudence being the most obvious among them. Prudential norms need not be as plain as “don’t shoot yourself in the foot.” On Sumner’s authentic happiness view of well-being, for instance, we stand to gain little by pursuing happiness in inauthentic ways, for instance through self-deception or powerful drugs like Huxley’s soma , which guarantees happiness come what may (Huxley 1932 [2005]). The view raises interesting questions about the benefits of less extreme pharmaceuticals, such as the therapeutic use of antidepressants; such medications can make life more pleasant, but many people worry whether they pose a threat to authenticity, perhaps undercutting their benefits. It is possible that such drugs involve prudential tradeoffs, promoting well-being in some ways while undermining it in others; whether the tradeoffs are worth it will depend on how, in a given case, the balance is struck. Another possibility is that such drugs sometimes promote authenticity, if for instance a depressive disorder prevents a person from being “himself.”

Looking to more broadly ethical, but not yet moral, norms, it may be possible to act badly without acting either immorally or imprudently. While Aristotle himself regarded acting badly as inherently imprudent, his catalogue of virtues is instructive, as many of them (wit, friendliness, etc.) are not what we normally regard as moral virtues. Some morally permissible methods of pursuing happiness may nonetheless be inappropriate because they conflict with such “ethical” virtues. They might, for instance, be undignified or imbecilic.

Outwardly virtuous conduct undertaken in the name of personal happiness might, if wrongly motivated, be incompatible with genuine virtue. One might, for instance, engage in philanthropy solely to make oneself happier, and indeed work hard at fine-tuning one’s assistance to maximize the hedonic payoff. This sort of conduct would not obviously instantiate the virtue of compassion or kindness, and indeed might be reasonably deemed contemptible. Similarly, it might be admirable, morally or otherwise, to be grateful for the good things in one’s life. Yet the virtue of gratitude might be undermined by certain kinds of gratitude intervention, whereby one tries to become happier by focusing on the things one is grateful for. If expressions of gratitude become phony or purely instrumental, the sole reason for giving thanks being to become happy—and not that one actually has something to be thankful for—then the “gratitude” might cease to be admirable, and may indeed be unvirtuous. [ 30 ]

A different question is what means of pursuing happiness are most effective . This is fundamentally an empirical question, but there are some in-principle issues that philosophical reflection might inform. One oft-heard claim, commonly called the “paradox of hedonism,” is that the pursuit of happiness is self-defeating; to be happy, don’t pursue happiness. It is not clear how to interpret this dictum, however, so that it is both interesting and true. It is plainly imprudent to make happiness one’s focus at every moment, but doubtful that this has often been denied. Yet never considering happiness also seems an improbable strategy for becoming happier. If you are choosing among several equally worthwhile occupations, and have good evidence that some of them will make you miserable, while one of them is likely to be highly fulfilling, it would not seem imprudent to take that information into account. Yet to do so just is to pursue happiness. The so-called paradox of hedonism is perhaps best seen as a vague caution against focusing too much on making oneself happy, not a blanket dismissal of the prospects for expressly seeking happiness—and for this modest point there is good empirical evidence (Schooler, Ariely et al . 2003, Lyubomirsky 2007).

That happiness is sometimes worth seeking does not mean we will always do a good job of it (Haybron 2008b). In recent decades a massive body of empirical evidence has gathered on various ways in which people seem systematically prone to make mistakes in the pursuit of their interests, including happiness. Such tendencies have been suggested in several domains relating to the pursuit of happiness, including (with recent surveys cited):

• Assessing how happy we are, or were in the past (Haybron 2007)
• Predicting (“forecasting”) what will make us happy (Gilbert 2006)
• Choosing rationally (Kahneman and Tversky 2000, Gilovitch, Griffin et al . 2002, Hsee and Hastie 2006)

A related body of literature explores the costs and benefits of (ostensibly) making it easier to pursue happiness by increasing people’s options; it turns out that having more choices might often make people less happy, for instance by increasing the burdens of deliberation or the likelihood of regret (Schwartz 2004). Less discussed in this context, but highly relevant, is the large body of research indicating that human psychology and behavior are remarkably prone to unconscious social and other situational influences, most infamously reported in the Milgram obedience experiments (Doris 2002, 2015, Haybron 2014). Human functioning, and the pursuit of happiness, may be more profoundly social than many commentators have assumed. [ 31 ]

Taken together, this research bears heavily on two central questions in the philosophical literature: first, the broad character of human nature (e.g., in what sense are we rational animals? How should we conceive of human autonomy?); second, the philosophical ideals of the good society and good government.

Just a decade ago the idea of happiness policy was something of a novelty. While it remains on the fringes in some locales, notably the United States, in much of the world there has been a surge of interest in making happiness an explicit target of policy consideration. Attention has largely shifted, however, to a broader focus on well-being to reflect not just happiness but also other welfare concerns of citizens, and dozens of governments now incorporate well-being metrics in their national statistics. [ 32 ]

Let’s consider the rationale for policies aimed at promoting well-being. In political thought, the modern liberal tradition has tended to assume an optimistic view of human nature and the individual’s capacities for prudent choice. Partly for this reason, the preservation and expansion of individual freedoms, including people’s options, is widely taken to be a central goal, if not the goal, of legitimate governments. People should be freed to seek the good life as they see it, and beyond that the state should, by and large, stay out of the well-being-promotion business.

This vision of the good society rests on empirical assumptions that have been the subject of considerable debate. If it turns out that people systematically and predictably err in the pursuit of their interests, then it may be possible for governments to devise policies that correct for such mistakes. [ 33 ] Of course, government intervention can introduce other sorts of mistakes, and there is some debate about whether such measures are likely to do more harm than good (e.g., Glaeser 2006).

But even if governments cannot effectively counteract human imprudence, it may still be that people fare better in social forms that influence or even constrain choices in ways that make serious mistakes less likely. (Food culture and its impact on health may be an instructive example here.) The idea that people tend to fare best when their lives are substantially constrained or guided by their social and physical context has recently been dubbed contextualism ; the contrary view, that people do best when their lives are, as much as possible, determined by the individuals themselves, is individualism (Haybron 2008b). Recent contextualists include communitarians and many perfectionists, though contextualism is not a political doctrine and is compatible with liberalism and even libertarian political morality. Contextualism about the promotion of well-being is related to recent work in moral psychology that emphasizes the social character of human agency, such as situationism and social intuitionism. [ 34 ]

Quite apart from matters of efficacy, there are moral questions about the state promotion of happiness, which has been a major subject of debate, both because of the literature on mistakes and research suggesting that the traditional focus of state efforts to promote well-being, economic growth, has a surprisingly modest impact on happiness. One concern is paternalism : does happiness-based policy infringe too much on personal liberty? Some fear a politics that may too closely approximate Huxley’s Brave New World, where the state ensures a drug-induced happiness for all (Huxley 1932 [2005]). Extant policy suggestions, however, have been more modest. Efforts to steer choice, for instance in favor of retirement savings, may be paternalistic, but advocates argue that such policies can be sufficiently light-handed that no one should object to them, in some cases even going so far as to deem it “libertarian paternalism” (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). [ 35 ] The idea is that gentle “nudges,” like setting default options on hiring forms to setting aside money for retirement, interfere only trivially with choice, imposing little or no cost for those who wish to choose differently, and would very likely be welcomed by most of those targeted.

Also relatively light-handed, and perhaps not paternalistic at all, are state efforts to promote happiness directly through social policy, for instance by prioritizing unemployment over economic growth on the grounds that the former has a larger impact on happiness. Other policies might include trying to reduce commute times, or making walkable neighborhoods and green space a priority in urban planning, again on happiness grounds. Some may deem such measures paternalistic insofar as they trade freedom (in the form of economic prosperity) for a substantive good, happiness, that people value unevenly, though it has also been argued that refusing to take citizens’ values like happiness into consideration in policy deliberation on their behalf can amount to paternalism (Haybron and Alexandrova 2013).

A related sort of objection to happiness-based policy argues that happiness, or even well-being, is simply the wrong object of policy, which ought instead to focus on the promotion of resources or capabilities (Rawls 1971, Nussbaum 2000, Quong 2011, Sen 2009). Several reasons have been cited for this sort of view, one being that policies aimed at promoting happiness or well-being violate commonly accepted requirements of “liberal neutrality,” according to which policy must be neutral among conceptions of the good. According to this constraint, governments must not promote any view of the good life, and happiness-based policy might be argued to flout it. Worries about paternalism also surface here, the idea being that states should only focus on affording people the option to be happy or whatever, leaving the actual achievement of well-being up to the autonomous individual. As we just saw, however, it is not clear how far happiness policy initiatives actually infringe on personal liberty or autonomy. A further worry is that, happiness isn’t really, or primarily, what matters for human well-being (Nussbaum 2008).

But a major motivation for thinking happiness the wrong object of policy is that neither happiness nor well-being are the appropriate focus of a theory of justice . What justice requires of society, on this view, is not that it make us happy; we do not have a right to be happy. Rather, justice demands only that each has sufficient opportunity (in the form of resources or capabilities, say) to achieve a good life, or that each gets a fair share of the benefits of social cooperation. However plausible such points may be, it is not clear how far they apply to many proposals for happiness-based policy, save the strongest claims that happiness should be the sole aim of policy: many policy decisions are not primarily concerned with questions of social justice, nor with constitutional fundamentals, the focus of some theories of justice. Happiness could be a poor candidate for the “currency” of justice, yet still remain a major policy concern. Indeed, the chief target of happiness policy advocates has been, not theories of justice, but governments’ overwhelming emphasis on promoting GDP and other indices of economic growth. This is not, in the main, a debate about justice, and as of yet the philosophical literature has not extensively engaged with it.

However, the push for happiness-based policy is a recent development. In coming years, such questions will likely receive considerably more attention in the philosophical literature.

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Aquinas, Thomas | Aristotle | Bentham, Jeremy | character, moral: empirical approaches | communitarianism | consequentialism | economics: philosophy of | emotion | ethics: ancient | ethics: virtue | hedonism | Kant, Immanuel | liberalism | Mill, John Stuart | moral psychology: empirical approaches | pain | paternalism | Plato | pleasure | well-being

Acknowledgments

For helpful comments, many thanks are due to Anna Alexandrova, Robert Biswas-Diener, Thomas Carson, Irwin Goldstein, Richard Lucas, Jason Raibley, Eric Schwitzgebel, Stephen Schueller, Adam Shriver, Edward Zalta, and an anonymous referee for the SEP. Portions of Section 2 are adapted from Haybron 2008, “Philosophy and the Science of Subjective Well-Being,” in Eid and Larsen, The Science of Subjective Well-Being , and used with kind permission of Guilford Press.

Copyright © 2020 by Dan Haybron < dan . haybron @ slu . edu >

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Society Articles & More

How does valuing money affect your happiness, two new studies find that tying your self-worth to financial success hampers happiness and well-being—even for the well-off..

It may seem that money is a sure path to prestige and happiness. After all, many of our most well-paid citizens are held up as role models of success, leading seemingly perfect, enviable lives. Still, some people embrace the opposite idea: Money can’t buy you happiness. So, which of these is right?

In recent studies, scientists have found that the connection between wealth and well-being is not clear-cut. While some studies seem to tie wealth to well-being, others show that, after a certain point, a higher income will not bring more happiness or life satisfaction.

Now two new studies shed further light on the relationship between wealth and happiness. Their findings suggest that money doesn’t fulfill basic psychological needs, like belonging and competence. That’s why making more of it will not increase your happiness, even if you value money above other things. In fact, it may do the opposite.

What money can and can’t do for you

In one study , University of Buffalo researcher Lora Park and her colleagues investigated what happens when people tie their self-worth to financial success, scoring high on the “Financial Contingency of Self-Worth” scale, or FCWS. The researchers found that doing so made people engage in more social comparisons, experience more stress and anxiety, and feel less autonomy than those who didn’t tie their self-worth to income, regardless of their actual economic status.

“People in this society are often focused on pursuing money, and they don’t think there is anything bad about that,” says Park. “But in terms of your psychological well-being, there are all kinds of negative consequences.”

It also might affect your problem-solving ability. Park and her colleagues randomly assigned participants to write about their dissatisfaction with either an aspect of their financial situation—like not having enough money to pay rent—or their academic performance, like getting a bad test grade. Afterwards, they reported on what coping strategies they would use in response to the situation.

Research assistants analyzed the essays and found that participants who scored high in FCSW used more emotionally negative words and reported more disengagement strategies—like giving up or avoiding solutions—when writing about a financial stressor versus an academic stressor than people scoring low in FCSW. None of the results were affected by the actual income of the students.

People who are facing a problem should, logically, be focused on figuring out ways to solve it, says Park. “But what we found is that high financial contingency of self-worth somehow blocks that response.”

Why would this be?

Park believes that when people feel their self-concept is threatened in some way, they will become more self-protective so as not to experience low self-esteem. So, if your self-esteem is tied to money, a financial stressor will cause a lot more stress than it would for someone who doesn’t feel that way. Some support for her argument comes from another part of her experiment, where having participants high in FCSW remind themselves of their character strengths—like their intelligence or sense of humor—seemed to negate these avoidance effects.

Affirming Important Values

When your self-image takes a hit, reflect on what matters

“When people take a step back and have a broader perspective on their sense of self, that’s often enough to take them out of the self-esteem rumination/narrow focus they otherwise have,” says Park.

As prior research suggests, it can also be the case that people simply want money to do something that it cannot. “Self-esteem, like happiness, is a byproduct of meeting psychological needs—like meaning or purpose, feeling competent, having close relationships, or having a sense of autonomy—and basing your self-worth on financial success actually detracts from fulfilling those needs,” says Park.

Why community beats money

Park’s findings mirror other recent findings from the University of San Francisco’s Matthew Monnot, who studied financial success and well-being in China.

In his study , Monnot notes that, as China’s economy has grown, its citizens seem to be facing some of the same issues that Americans have faced. A growing number of people equate individual success with making more money and valuing money—an extrinsic reward—over other, more intrinsic rewards, like relationships or community. To see how this trend has affected well-being, he conducted a series of studies involving thousands of participants from several cities in China.

In one experiment, Monnot showed that job satisfaction did not rise in tandem with income. In fact, as with prior studies, wealth beyond a certain point tended to make Chinese workers no more satisfied with their jobs or their incomes, suggesting that money has only so much power to increase our life satisfaction.

“Our findings are pretty aligned with prior research,” says Monnot. “The correlation between income and job satisfaction is really small, to the extent that it predicts about five percent of job satisfaction.”

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To tease out why, Monnot looked at how individual values shape the relationship between money and income satisfaction. He asked participants to pick the five factors they thought were most important for well-being from a list of 25 possible choices—including income—and then measured how satisfied they were with their income as it rose. Though one might expect people valuing income to be happier as they made more money, Monnot found the opposite: People who picked income as an important value were significantly less satisfied, even at higher levels.

“If income is important to you, then income is actually less satisfying as income goes up than if income is not important to you,” he says.

Though this seems paradoxical, Monnot says it makes some sense, when you understand how intrinsic versus extrinsic values affect our happiness.

“Not all goals are equal in terms of producing well-being, productivity, job satisfaction, or life satisfaction,” says Monnot. “If you say income is something really important to you, because income is an extrinsic reward and not part of your intrinsic needs, if you focus on it, it won’t make you happy.”

In other words, look inside of yourself, not your wallet, for happiness.

Monnot was curious to see how living in different cities in China might affect the relationship between valuing income and well-being. After all, if the government is developing policies to increase income in certain areas of the country, it would be good to know the impact this is having on happiness.

Again, he had people pick out five things they valued; but this time he separated people into different groups depending on whether they placed high value on materialistic things, like income and status, and placed low value on relationships and community, or vice versa. When he compared these two groups, people who valued relationships or community versus materialistic things had greater job satisfaction and overall life satisfaction. This was true regardless of their city’s per-capita income.

“The big idea is that higher GDP or people having more money is all great—especially at a societal level. You want your economy to be more productive and to have more resources and money available,” says Monnot. “Well, maybe that’s not necessarily in and of itself something that’s going to produce a happier population.”

Both Monnot and Park hope that their research might lead people to think a bit differently about the supposed benefits of striving for more money. Though neither would deny that we need money to survive, valuing it too highly or tying it to your self-worth is clearly a mistake.

Monnot hopes his research might help individuals—and business leaders and policymakers—to realize that fulfilling psychological needs is more important to happiness than making a lot of money.


“Autonomy, developing a skill set to be good at what you do, being affiliative with others, having a sense of connection to your community—these are all things that we as researchers are fairly convinced are innate, evolved human tendencies that bring happiness,” he says.

“If you can get people to focus on fulfilling those needs, they’ll become happier. The research is strongly in favor of that.”

About the Author

Jill Suttie

Jill Suttie, Psy.D. , is Greater Good ’s former book review editor and now serves as a staff writer and contributing editor for the magazine. She received her doctorate of psychology from the University of San Francisco in 1998 and was a psychologist in private practice before coming to Greater Good .

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Money and Happiness: Income, Wealth and Subjective Well-Being

• Published: 12 September 2019
• Volume 148 , pages 47–66, ( 2020 )

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• Conchita D’Ambrosio   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-8469-6126 1 ,
• Markus Jäntti 2 &
• Anthony Lepinteur 1  

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We examine the complex relationship between money and happiness. We find that both permanent income and wealth are better predictors of life satisfaction than current income and wealth. They matter not only in absolute terms but also in comparative terms. However, their relative impacts differ. The first exerts a comparison effect—the higher the permanent income of the reference group, the lower life satisfaction—the second exerts an information effect—the higher the permanent wealth of the reference group, the higher life satisfaction. We also show that negative transitory shocks to income reduce life satisfaction while transitory shocks to wealth have no effect. Lastly, we analyse the effects of their components and find that not all of them predict life satisfaction: permanent taxes do not matter, while only the value of permanent real estate, financial and business assets do. Finally, we use quantile regression and analyse to what extent our results vary along the well-being distribution, finding the impacts to be larger at lower levels of life satisfaction.

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In an alternative specification, available upon request, we make use of a more standard equivalent income measure using the modified OECD scale instead of the per-capita measure. Regression results shown in the empirical section below are robust with respect to the choice of the two equivalence scales.

By using linear models, we treat life satisfaction as cardinal. As life satisfaction is measured on an ordinal scale, ordered response models may be more appropriate. We re-estimated all our regressions using ordered logit model and confirm the findings of Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters ( 2004 ): our conclusions do not depend upon the estimation method and results of the ordered logit models can be found in the online appendix.

We also used these demographics separately to define the reference group and results remains qualitatively unchanged.

Table A1 in our online appendix [ https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-019-02186-w ] shows regression estimates that do not include the controls.

One may worry that the difference in adjusted in R 2 between columns (9) and (10) is too small to be statistically significant. To formally test whether the model with permanent and transitory income and wealth has a better predictive power than the model with actual income and wealth, we follow Wooldridge ( 2010 ) and perform a Vuong closeness test for non-nested models (Vuong 1989 ). The Vuong closeness test confirms that the predictive power of the former model is statistically higher (at the 1% level) than the latter model.

To the extent measurement errors are non-permanent, our transitory shocks will reflect both true income shocks and measurement errors. Our results may thus be downward-biased; as we have more current income than wealth measurements, measurement noise in wealth could be greater relative to signal than for income, we might find transitory income matters but wealth not. It is, unfortunately, very difficult to think of a valid instrument – one that is uncorrelated with measurement errors and life satisfaction but is correlated with true transitory wealth shocks – that would allow us to address this.

We replicated our analysis using other measures of rank (quartiles and deciles) and the results remain qualitatively the same.

We also estimate the effects of gains and losses in the different components of income and wealth and find that only losses in capital income, in government income and in debt are significant predictors of future life satisfaction. Results (not reported for brevity) are available upon request.

We performed a Vuong closeness test and confirm that the predictive power of the specification in the column (8) is significantly higher at the 1% level than the predictive power of the specification in the column (7).

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Acknowledgements

We are grateful to Andrew Clark for useful comments and thank the editor, Filomena Maggino, and two anonymous referees for very useful suggestions. D’Ambrosio and Lepinteur gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Fonds National de la Recherche Luxembourg. Some of the ideas of this paper were discussed by D’Ambrosio and Jäntti with Joachim R. Frick in 2008 during their time at DIW Berlin and appeared in D'Ambrosio et al. ( 2009 ). Joachim is still greatly missed. This work was funded by Fonds National de la Recherche Luxembourg (Grant Nos. FNR/P11/05 & FNR/P11/05BIS & FNR/P12/06).

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D’Ambrosio, C., Jäntti, M. & Lepinteur, A. Money and Happiness: Income, Wealth and Subjective Well-Being. Soc Indic Res 148 , 47–66 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-019-02186-w

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Does Money Buy Happiness? Here’s What the Research Says

March 28, 2023 • 5 min read.

Reconciling previously contradictory results, researchers from Wharton and Princeton find a steady association between larger incomes and greater happiness for most people but a rise and plateau for an unhappy minority.

• Finance & Accounting

The following article was originally published on Penn Today .

Does money buy happiness? Though it seems like a straightforward question, research had previously returned contradictory findings, leaving uncertainty about its answer.

Foundational work published in 2010 from Princeton University’s  Daniel Kahneman  and Angus Deaton had found that day-to-day happiness rose as annual income increased, but above $75,000 it leveled off and happiness plateaued. In contrast, work published in 2021 from the University of Pennsylvania’s  Matthew Killingsworth  found that happiness rose steadily with income well beyond $75,000, without evidence of a plateau.

To reconcile the differences, Kahneman and Killingsworth paired up in what’s known as an adversarial collaboration, joining forces with Penn Integrates Knowledge  University Professor  Barbara Mellers  as arbiter. In a new  Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences  paper , the trio shows that, on average, larger incomes are associated with ever-increasing levels of happiness. Zoom in, however, and the relationship becomes more complex, revealing that within that overall trend, an unhappy cohort in each income group shows a sharp rise in happiness up to $100,000 annually and then plateaus.

“In the simplest terms, this suggests that for most people larger incomes are associated with greater happiness,” says Killingsworth, a senior fellow at Wharton and lead paper author. “The exception is people who are financially well-off but unhappy. For instance, if you’re rich and miserable, more money won’t help. For everyone else, more money was associated with higher happiness to somewhat varying degrees.”

Mellers digs into this last notion, noting that emotional well-being and income aren’t connected by a single relationship. “The function differs for people with different levels of emotional well-being,” she says. Specifically, for the least happy group, happiness rises with income until $100,000, then shows no further increase as income grows. For those in the middle range of emotional well-being, happiness increases linearly with income, and for the happiest group the association actually accelerates above $100,000.

Joining Forces to Ask: “Does Money Buy Happiness?”

The researchers began this combined effort recognizing that their previous work had drawn different conclusions. Kahneman’s 2010 study showed a flattening pattern where Killingsworth’s 2021 study did not. As its name suggests, an adversarial collaboration of this type — a notion originated by Kahneman — aims to solve scientific disputes or disagreements by bringing together the differing parties, along with a third-party mediator.

Killingsworth, Kahneman, and Mellers focused on a new hypothesis that both a happy majority and an unhappy minority exist. For the former, they surmised, happiness keeps rising as more money comes in; the latter’s happiness improves as income rises but only up to a certain income threshold, after which it progresses no further.

To test this new hypothesis, they looked for the flattening pattern in data from Killingworth’s study, which he had collected through an app he created called Track Your Happiness. Several times a day, the app pings participants at random moments, asking a variety of questions including how they feel on a scale from “very good” to “very bad.” Taking an average of the person’s happiness and income, Killingsworth draws conclusions about how the two variables are linked.

A breakthrough in the new partnership came early on when the researchers realized that the 2010 data, which had revealed the happiness plateau, had actually been measuring unhappiness in particular rather than happiness in general.

“It’s easiest to understand with an example,” Killingsworth says. Imagine a cognitive test for dementia that most healthy people pass easily. While such a test could detect the presence and severity of cognitive dysfunction, it wouldn’t reveal much about general intelligence since most healthy people would receive the same perfect score.

“In the same way, the 2010 data showing a plateau in happiness had mostly perfect scores, so it tells us about the trend in the unhappy end of the happiness distribution, rather than the trend of happiness in general. Once you recognize that, the two seemingly contradictory findings aren’t necessarily incompatible,” Killingsworth says. “And what we found bore out that possibility in an incredibly beautiful way. When we looked at the happiness trend for unhappy people in the 2021 data, we found exactly the same pattern as was found in 2010; happiness rises relatively steeply with income and then plateaus.”

“The two findings that seemed utterly contradictory actually result from data that are amazingly consistent,” he says.

Does It Matter Whether Money Can Buy Happiness?

Drawing these conclusions would have been challenging had the two research teams not come together, says Mellers, who suggests there’s no better way than adversarial collaborations to resolve scientific conflict.

“This kind of collaboration requires far greater self-discipline and precision in thought than the standard procedure,” she says. “Collaborating with an adversary — or even a non-adversary — is not easy, but both parties are likelier to recognize the limits of their claims.” Indeed, that’s what happened, leading to a better understanding of the relationship between money and happiness.

And these findings have real-world implications, according to Killingsworth. For one, they could inform thinking about tax rates or how to compensate employees. And, of course, they matter to individuals as they navigate career choices or weigh a larger income against other priorities in life, Killingsworth says.

However, he adds that for emotional well-being money isn’t the be all end all. “Money is just one of the many determinants of happiness,” he says. “Money is not the secret to happiness, but it can probably help a bit.”

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Guest Essay

The Rich Are Not Who We Think They Are. And Happiness Is Not What We Think It Is, Either.

By Seth Stephens-Davidowitz

Mr. Stephens-Davidowitz is the author of “ Don’t Trust Your Gut : Using Data to Get What You Really Want in Life,” from which this essay is adapted.

We now know who is rich in America. And it’s not who you might have guessed.

A groundbreaking 2019 study by four economists, “Capitalists in the Twenty-First Century,” analyzed de-identified data of the complete universe of American taxpayers to determine who dominated the top 0.1 percent of earners.

The study didn’t tell us about the small number of well-known tech and shopping billionaires but instead about the more than 140,000 Americans who earn more than $1.58 million per year. The researchers found that the typical rich American is, in their words, the owner of a “regional business,” such as an “auto dealer” or a “beverage distributor.”

This shocked me. Over the past four years, in the course of doing research for a book about how insights buried in big data sets can help people make decisions, I read thousands of academic studies. It is rare that I read a sentence that changes how I view the world. This was one of them. I hadn’t thought of owning an auto dealership as a path to getting rich; I didn’t even know what a beverage distribution company was.

What are the lessons from the data on rich earners?

First, rich people own. Among members of the top 0.1 percent, the researchers found, about three times as many make the majority of their income from owning a business as from being paid a wage. Salaries don’t make people rich nearly as often as equity does.

Second, rich people tend to own unsexy businesses. A different study , by the statisticians Tian Luo and Philip B. Stark, examined which businesses were most likely to fold fastest. The kind most likely to go out of business most quickly is a record store. The average record store lasts just 2.5 years. (For comparison, the average dentist’s office lasts more than 19.5 years.) Other businesses that fold quickly include toy stores (3.25 years), clothing stores (3.75 years) and cosmetics stores (4.0 years).

There are, however, plenty of unsexy businesses from which a few people are getting rich. These include auto repair shops, gas stations and business equipment contractors.

The third important factor in gaining wealth is some way to avoid ruthless price competition, to build a local monopoly. The prevalence of owners of auto dealerships among the top 0.1 percent gives a clue to what it takes to get rich.

Comparing data from the appendix of the economists’ study with data from the SUSB Annual Data Tables put out by the Census Bureau, I estimate that more than 20 percent of auto dealerships in America have an owner making more than $1.58 million per year.

Auto dealerships have legal protections; state franchising laws often give auto dealers exclusive rights to sell cars in a territory. Same for many beverage distributors, which act as middlemen between alcohol companies and stores and supermarkets. Beverage distributors have long been protected by a system set up after Prohibition that prevents beverage companies from distributing their products themselves.

Of course, if upon learning this, you try to buy someone’s auto dealership, you may not have much luck. Owners of auto dealerships know how good they have it.

Is there any business that tends to make people rich that you might have a better shot at?

My data-driven advice for getting rich for someone with good analytical skills and deep experience in a field is to start a market research business. Use your specialized knowledge in the field to write up reports; sell them widely and charge a fortune to your contacts in the field. I have estimated that more than 10 percent of owners of market research businesses are in the top 0.1 percent.

If pop culture is right, getting rich is a path to happiness. Is that true? Does money actually make people happy?

Just as anonymous tax data, which has been made widely available to researchers only in the past few years, has led to credible research on what actually makes people rich, new sources of data in the past decade have given us many insights into what actually makes people happy.

And money is not a reliable path to happiness. Matthew Killingsworth of the University of Pennsylvania has studied data from more than 30,000 adults, far more than previous studies of money and happiness. He debunked a popular myth that there is no effect of money on happiness beyond $75,000 per year, but he did confirm a law of diminishing returns to money. In the end, Dr. Killingsworth found, the effects of money level off: You need to keep doubling your income to get the same happiness boost.

A study of thousands of millionaires led by researchers at Harvard Business School did find a gain in happiness that kicks in when people’s net worth rises above $8 million. But the effect was small: A net worth of $8 million offers a boost of happiness that is roughly half as large as the happiness boost from being married.

What, in addition to being married, tends to make people happy?

The most important happiness study, in my opinion, is the Mappiness project, founded by the British economists Susana Mourato and George MacKerron. The researchers pinged tens of thousands of people on their smartphones and asked them simple questions: Who are they with? What are they doing? How happy are they?

From this, they built a sample of more than three million data points, orders of magnitude more than previous studies on happiness. So what do three million happiness data points tell us?

The activities that make people happiest include sex, exercise and gardening. People get a big happiness boost from being with a romantic partner or friends but not from other people, like colleagues, children or acquaintances. Weather plays only a small role in happiness, except that people get a hearty mood boost on extraordinary days, such as those above 75 degrees and sunny. People are consistently happier when they are out in nature, particularly near a body of water, particularly when the scenery is beautiful .

The findings on the data of happiness are, to be honest, obvious. When I told my friends about these studies, the most common response was, “Did we need scientists to tell us this?”

But I would argue that there is profundity in the obviousness of the data on happiness.

Sometimes, big data reveals a shocking secret. At other times, big data tells us that there is no secret. And that’s the case with happiness.

This is crucial to keep in mind for the many of us who are not doing the obvious things that make people happy. We are falling for traps that the data says are unlikely to make us happy.

Many of us work far too hard at jobs with people we don’t like — not a likely path to happiness. Dr. MacKerron and the economist Alex Bryson found that work is the second-most-miserable activity; of 40 activities, only being sick in bed makes people less happy than working. The economist Steven Levitt found that when people are uncertain whether to quit a job, they can be nudged to quit. And when they quit, they report increased happiness months later.

Many of us move to big cities and spend little time in nature — also not a path to happiness. A study by the economists Ed Glaeser and Josh Gottlieb ranked the happiness of every American metropolitan area. They found that New York City was just about the least happy. Boston, Los Angeles and San Francisco also scored low. The happiest places include Flagstaff, Ariz.; Naples, Fla., and pretty much all of Hawaii. And when people move out of unhappy cities to happy places, they report increased happiness.

Many of us while away hours on social media — also not a path to happiness. The Mappiness project found that, of 27 leisure activities, social media ranks dead last in how much happiness it brings. A randomized controlled trial on the effects of social media found that when people were paid to stop using Facebook, they spent more time socializing and reported higher subjective well-being.

Big data tells us there are very simple things that do make people happy, things that have been around for thousands of years. After reading all the studies on happiness, I concluded that modern happiness research could be summed up in one sentence, a sentence we might jokingly call the data-driven answer to life.

The data-driven answer to life is as follows: Be with your love, on an 80-degree and sunny day, overlooking a beautiful body of water, having sex.

It’s a lot easier than owning an auto dealership.

Seth Stephens-Davidowitz ( @SethS_D ) is the author of “ Don’t Trust Your Gut : Using Data to Get What You Really Want in Life” and “ Everybody Lies : Big Data, New Data, and What the Internet Can Tell Us About Who We Really Are.”

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips . And here’s our email: [email protected] .

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The Science of Happiness in Positive Psychology 101

Whether on a global or an individual level, the pursuit of happiness is one that is gaining traction and scientific recognition.

There are many definitions of happiness, and we will also explore those in this article. For now, we invite you to think of a time when you were happy. Were you alone? With others? Inside? Outside.

At the end of this article, revisit that memory. You may have new insight as to what made that moment “happy,” as well as tips to train your brain towards more happiness.

Before you continue, we thought you might like to download our three Happiness & Subjective Wellbeing Exercises for free . These detailed, science-based exercises will help you or your clients identify sources of authentic happiness and strategies to boost wellbeing.

This Article Contains:

A definition of happiness, a look at the science of happiness, the scientific research on happiness at work, 17 interesting facts and findings, a study showing how acts of kindness make us happier, the global pursuit of happiness, measures of happiness, four qualities of life.

• How to Train your Brain for Happiness

A Take-Home Message

In general, happiness is understood as the positive emotions we have in regards to the pleasurable activities we take part in through our daily lives.

Pleasure, comfort, gratitude, hope, and inspiration are examples of positive emotions that increase our happiness and move us to flourish. In scientific literature, happiness is referred to as hedonia (Ryan & Deci, 2001), the presence of positive emotions and the absence of negative emotions.

In a more broad understanding, human wellbeing is made up of both hedonic and Eudaimonic principles, the literature on which is vast and describes our personal meaning and purpose in life (Ryan & Deci, 2001).

Research on happiness over the years has found that there are some contributing correlational factors that affect our happiness. These include (Ryan & Deci, 2001):

• Personality Type
• Positive Emotions versus Negative Emotions
• Attitude towards Physical Health
• Social Class and Wealth
• Attachment and Relatedness
• Goals and Self-Efficacy
• Time and Place.

So what is the “ science of happiness? ”

This is one of those times when something is exactly what it sounds like – it’s all about the science behinds what happiness is and how to experience it, what happy people do differently, and what we can do to feel happier.

This focus on happiness is new to the field of psychology; for many decades – basically since the foundation of psychology as a science in the mid- to late-1800s – the focus was on the less pleasant in life. The field focused on pathology, on the worst-scenario cases, on what can go wrong in our lives.

Although there was some attention paid to wellbeing, success, and high functioning, the vast majority of funding and research was dedicated to those who were struggling the most: those with severe mental illness, mental disorders, or those who have survived trauma and tragedy.

While there’s certainly nothing wrong with doing what we can to raise up those who are struggling, there was an unfortunate lack of knowledge about what we can do to bring us all up to a higher level of functioning and happiness.

Positive psychology changed all of that. Suddenly, there was space at the table for a focus on the positive in life, for “ what thoughts, actions, and behaviors make us more productive at work, happier in our relationships, and more fulfilled at the end of the day ” (Happify Daily, n.d.).

The science of happiness has opened our eyes to a plethora of new findings about the sunny side of life.

Current research and studies

For instance, we have learned a lot about what happiness is and what drives us.

Recent studies have shown us that:

• Money can only buy happiness up to about $75,000 – after that, it has no significant effect on our emotional wellbeing (Kahneman & Deaton, 2010).
• Most of our happiness is not determined by our genetics, but by our experiences and our day-to-day lives (Lyubomirsky et al., 2005).
• Trying too hard to find happiness often has the opposite effect and can lead us to be overly selfish (Mauss et al., 2012).
• Pursuing happiness through social means (e.g., spending more time with family and friends) is more likely to be effective than other methods (Rohrer et al., 2018).
• The pursuit of happiness is one place where we should consider ditching the SMART goals; it may be more effective to pursue “vague” happiness goals than more specific ones (Rodas et al., 2018).
• Happiness makes us better citizens – it is a good predictor of civic engagement in the transition to adulthood (Fang et al., 2018).
• Happiness leads to career success, and it doesn’t have to be “natural” happiness – researchers found that “experimentally enhancing” positive emotions also contributed to improved outcomes at work (Walsh et al., 2018).
• There is a linear relationship between religious involvement and happiness. Higher worship service attendance is correlated with more commitment to faith, and commitment to faith is related to greater compassion. Those more compassionate individuals are more likely to provide emotional support to others, and those who provide emotional support to others are more likely to be happy (Krause et al., 2018). It’s a long road, but a direct one!

Download 3 Free Happiness Exercises (PDF)

These detailed, science-based exercises will equip you or your clients with tools to discover authentic happiness and cultivate subjective well-being.

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There’s been a ton of research on the effects of happiness in the workplace. Much of this is driven by companies who want to find a way to improve productivity, attract new talent, and get a dose of good publicity, all at the same time. After all, who wouldn’t want to do business with and/or work for a company full of happy employees?

Although the jury is still out on exactly how happy employees “should” be for maximum productivity, efficiency, and health, we have learned a few things about the effects of a happy workforce:

• People who are happy with their jobs are less likely to leave their jobs, less likely to be absent, and less likely to engage in counterproductive behaviors at work.
• People who are happy with their jobs are more likely to engage in behavior that contributes to a happy and productive organization, more likely to be physically healthy, and more likely to be mentally healthy.
• Happiness and job performance are related—and the relationship likely works in both directions (e.g., happy people do a better job and people who do a good job are more likely to be happy).
• Unit- or team-level happiness is also linked to positive outcomes, including higher customer satisfaction, profit, productivity, employee turnover, and a safer work environment.
• In general, a happier organization is a more productive and successful organization (Fisher, 2010).

To sum up the findings we have so far, it’s easy to see that happiness at work does matter – for individuals, for teams, and for organizations overall. We don’t have all the answers about exactly how the relationship between happiness and productivity works, but we know that there is a relationship there.

Lately, many human resources managers, executives, and other organizational leaders have decided that knowing there’s a relationship is good enough evidence to establish happiness-boosting practices at work, which means that we have a lot of opportunities to see the impact of greater happiness at work in the future.

Research in this field is booming, and new findings are coming out all the time. Here are a few of the most interesting facts and findings so far:

• Happiness is linked to lower heart rate and blood pressure, as well as healthier heart rate variability.
• Happiness can also act as a barrier between you and germs – happier people are less likely to get sick.
• People who are happier enjoy greater protection against stress and release less of the stress hormone cortisol.
• Happy people tend to experience fewer aches and pains, including dizziness, muscle strain, and heartburn.
• Happiness acts as a protective factor against disease and disability (in general, of course).
• Those who are happiest tend to live significantly longer than those who are not.
• Happiness boosts our immune system, which can help us fight and fend off the common cold.
• Happy people tend to make others happier as well, and vice versa – those who do good, feel good!
• A portion of our happiness is determined by our genetics (but there’s still plenty of room for attitude adjustments and happiness-boosting exercises!).
• Smelling floral scents like roses can make us happier.
• Those who are paid by the hour may be happier than those on salary (however, these findings are limited, so take them with a grain of salt!).
• Relationships are much more conducive to a happy life than money.
• Happier people tend to wear bright colors; it’s not certain which way the relationship works, but it can’t hurt to throw on some brighter hues once in a while—just in case!
• Happiness can help people cope with arthritis and chronic pain better.
• Being outdoors – especially near the water – can make us happier.
• The holidays can be a stressful time, even for the happiest among us – an estimated 44% of women and 31% of men get the “holiday blues.”
• Happiness is contagious! When we spend time around happy people, we’re likely to get a boost of happiness as well.

Newman (2015) is the source for the first six facts and findings, and Florentine (2016) for the latter 11 .

Feeling blue? Treat yourself to a decadent dessert.

Feeling frustrated after an argument with a friend? Skip your workout and have an extra scoop of ice cream.

The message is clear: If you want to feel happy, you should focus on your own wishes and desires. Yet this is not the advice that many people grew up hearing. Indeed, most of the world’s religions (and grandmothers everywhere) have long suggested that people should focus on others first and themselves second.

Psychologists refer to such behavior as prosocial behavior and many recent studies have shown that when people have a prosocial focus, doing kind acts for others, their own happiness increases.

But how does prosocial behavior compare to treating yourself in terms of your happiness? And does treating yourself really make you feel happy?

Nelson et al. (2016) presented their research answering these questions.

Participants were divided into four groups and given new instructions each week for four weeks.

One group was instructed to perform random acts of kindness for themselves (such as going shopping or enjoying a favorite hobby); the second group was instructed to perform acts of kindness for others (such as visiting an elderly relative or helping someone carry groceries); the third group was instructed to perform acts of kindness to improve the world (such as recycling or donating to charity); the fourth group was instructed to keep track of their daily activities.

Each week, the participants reported their activities from the previous week, as well as their experience of positive and negative emotions.

At the beginning, the end, and again two weeks after the four-week period, participants completed a questionnaire to assess their psychological flourishing. As a measure of overall happiness, the questionnaire included questions about psychological, social, and emotional wellbeing .

The Results

The results of the study were striking. Only participants who engaged in prosocial behavior demonstrated improvements in psychological flourishing.

Participants who practiced prosocial behavior demonstrated increases in positive emotions from one week to the next. In turn, these increases in feelings such as happiness, joy, and enjoyment predicted increases in psychological flourishing at the end of the study. In other words, positive emotions appeared to have been a critical ingredient linking prosocial behavior to increases in flourishing.

But what about the people who treated themselves?

They did not show the same increases in positive emotions or psychological flourishing as those who engaged in acts of kindness. In fact, people who treated themselves did not differ in positive emotions, negative emotions, or psychological flourishing over the course of the study compared to those who merely kept track of their daily activities.

This research does not say that we shouldn’t treat ourselves, show ourselves self-love when we need it, or enjoy our relaxation when we have it. However, the results of this study strongly suggest that we are more likely to reach greater levels of happiness when we exhibit prosocial behavior and show others kindness through our actions.

In world economic circles, Richard Easterlin investigated the relationship between money and wellbeing.

The Easterlin paradox—”money does not buy happiness” (Mohun, 2012)—sparked a new wave of thinking about wealth and wellbeing.

In 1972, Bhutan chose to pursue a policy of happiness rather than a focus on economic growth tracked via their gross domestic product (GDPP). Subsequently, this little nation has been among the happiest, ranking amongst nations with far superior wealth (Kelly, 2012).

More global organizations and nations are becoming aware and supportive of the importance of happiness in today’s world. This has lead to The United Nations inviting nations to take part in a happiness survey, resulting in the “ World Happiness Report ,” a basis from which to steer public policy. Learn about the World Happiness Report for 2016 .

The United Nations also established  World Happiness Day , March 20 th , which was the result of efforts of the Bhutan Kingdom and their Gross National Happiness initiative (Helliwell et al., 2013).

Organizations such as the  New Economic Foundation are playing an influential role as an economic think tank that focuses on steering economic policy and development for the betterment of human wellbeing.

Ruut Veenhoven, a world authority on the scientific study of happiness, was one of the sources of inspiration for the United Nations General Assembly (2013) adopting happiness measures. Veenhoven is a founding member of the World Database of Happiness , which is a comprehensive scientific repository of happiness measures worldwide.

The objective of this organization is to provide a coordinated collection of data, with common interpretation according to a scientifically validated happiness theory, model, and body of research.

At this point, you might be wondering: Is it possible to measure happiness? Many psychologists have devoted their careers to answering this question and in short, the answer is yes.

Happiness can be measured by these three factors: the presence of positive emotions, the absence of negative emotions, and life satisfaction (Ryan & Deci, 2001). It is a uniquely subjective experience, which means that nobody is better at reporting on someone’s happiness than the individuals themselves.

For this reason scales, self-report measures, and questionnaires are the most common formats for measuring happiness. The most recognized examples are the following:

• The PANAS (Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule);
• The SWLS (Satisfaction With Life Scale) ;
• The SHS (Subjective Happiness Scale)

However, there are  many instruments available to measure happiness that have proven reliable and valid over time (Hefferon & Boniwell, 2011).

Of the four dimensions, satisfaction is our personal subjective measure of happiness as we interpret life as a whole. Veenhoven’s (2010) global research into happiness suggests that happiness is possible for many.

This is an overview of his Four Qualities:

Using Veenhoven’s Four Qualities it is possible to assess the happiness of any country.

Liveability of environment

This dimension includes factors such as law, freedom, schooling, employment, electricity or gas, etc. It is a measurement of how well an environment meets what Maslow proposed as our basic needs (safety, security, shelter, food) (Maslow, 1943).

Life-ability of individuals

The ability of individuals to deal with life is important; both mental and physical health are identified as important factors, together with social values of solidarity, tolerance, and love (Veenhoven, 2010).

Utility of life

In this dimension, Veenhoven (2010) references a higher-order meaning, for example, religious affiliations.

Uchida et al. (2014) found that high levels of national disaster negatively impacted a nation’s level of happiness.

Satisfaction

Happiness is a complex construct that cannot be directly controlled. Through policy and individual and organizational action, one can endeavor to influence and increase happiness (Veenhoven, 2010).

However, happiness is a subjective experience and only once we change the way we perceive the world can we really begin sharing and creating happiness for others.

But is it possible to train yourself to be happier?

The answer is yes!

How to Train Your Brain for Happiness

At birth, our genetics provide us a set point that accounts for some portion of our happiness. Having enough food, shelter, and safety account for another portion.

There’s also quite a bit of happiness that’s entirely up to us (Lyubomirsky et al., 2005).

By training our brain through awareness and exercises to think in a happier, more optimistic, and more resilient way, we can effectively train our brains for happiness.

New discoveries in the field of positive psychology show that physical health, psychological wellbeing, and physiological functioning are all improved by how we learn to “feel good” (Fredrickson, et al., 2000).

What Are The Patterns We Need To “Train Out” of Our Brains?

• Perfectionism  – Often confused with conscientiousness, which involves appropriate and tangible expectations, perfectionism involves inappropriate levels of expectations and intangible goals. It often produces problems for adults, adolescents, and children.
• Social comparison  – When we compare ourselves to others we often find ourselves lacking. Healthy social comparison is about finding what you admire in others and learning to strive for those qualities. However, the best comparisons we can make are with ourselves. How are you better than you were in the past?
• Materialism – Attaching our happiness to external things and material wealth is dangerous, as we can lose our happiness if our material circumstances change (Carter & Gilovich, 2010).
• Maximizing  – Maximizers search for better options even when they are satisfied. This leaves them little time to be present for the good moments in their lives and with very little gratitude (Schwartz et al., 2002).

Misconceptions About Mind Training

Some of the misconceptions about retraining your brain are simply untrue. Here are a few myths that need debunking:

1. We are products of our genetics so we cannot create change in our brains.

Our minds are malleable. Ten years ago we thought brain pathways were set in early childhood. In fact, we now know that there is huge potential for large changes through to your twenties, and neuroplasticity is still changing throughout one’s life.

The myelin sheath that covers your neural pathways gets thicker and stronger the more it is used (think of the plastic protective covering on wires); the more a pathway is used, the stronger the myelin and the faster the neural pathway. Simply put, when you practice feeling grateful, you notice more things to be grateful for.

2. Brain training is brainwashing.

Brainwashing is an involuntary change. If we focus on training our mind to see the glass half full instead of half empty, that is a choice.

3. If we are too happy we run the risk of becoming overly optimistic.

There is no such thing as overly optimistic, and science shows that brain training for positivity includes practices like  mindfulness and gratitude. No one has ever overdosed on these habits.

How Is The Brain Wired For Happiness?

Our brains come already designed for happiness. We have caregiving systems in place for eye contact, touch, and vocalizations to let others know we are trustworthy and secure .

Our brains also regulate chemicals like oxytocin.

People who have more oxytocin trust more readily, have increased tendencies towards monogamy, and exhibit more caregiving behavior. These behaviors reduce stress which lowers production of hormones like cortisol and inhibits the cardiovascular response to stress (Kosfeld et al., 2005).

The following TED talk provides an insight into how we can overcome our negative mental patterns:

If happiness has little to do with having too many resources, then it is an inner state that we have the power to cultivate. The above video even offers specific exercises for you to try. Just by doing them, you are actively re-wiring your brain towards calm and happy sensations.

Meanwhile, this TED talk gives a better understanding of how to wire your brain to accept the positivity and happiness in your life:

The negativity bias that Dr. Rick Hanson discusses can help us understand how we can activate and “install” positive thinking as part of our core brain chemistry. If you don’t have a moment to watch either of these videos now, make time for it later—they are rich with relevant data and tips.

17 Exercises To Increase Happiness and Wellbeing

Add these 17 Happiness & Subjective Well-Being Exercises [PDF] to your toolkit and help others experience greater purpose, meaning, and positive emotions.

Created by Experts. 100% Science-based.

Happiness is the overall subjective experience of our positive emotions. There are many factors which influence our happiness, and ongoing research continues to uncover what makes us happiest.

This global pursuit of happiness has resulted in measures such as the World Happiness Report, while the World Happiness Database is working to collaborate and consolidate the existing happiness pursuits of different nations.

We are living in a time when the conditions for happiness are known. This can be disheartening at times when there is much negativity in the world.

There is, however, good news in this situation: neuroplasticity.

The human brain is wired for happiness and positive connections with others. It is actually possible to experience and learn happiness despite what has been genetically hardwired.

In a world where the focus on happiness is growing and the mirror is turning back towards ourselves, the happiness of the world relies on the happiness within each one of us and how we act, share, and voice the importance of happiness for everyone.

What are the steps you are taking to make yourself and others happier? Let us know by leaving a comment below!

We hope you enjoyed reading this article. Don’t forget to download our three Happiness Exercises for free .

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• Fang, S., Galambos, N. L., Johnson, M. D., & Krahn, H. J. (2018). Happiness is the way: Paths to civic engagement between young adulthood and midlife.  International Journal of Behavioral Development, 42 (4), 425–433.
• Fisher, C. D. (2010). Happiness at work.  International Journal of Management Reviews ,  12 (4), 384–412.
• Florentine, E. (2016, July 1).  11 Scientific facts about happiness.  Bustle . Retrieved from https://www.bustle.com/articles/169675-11-scientific-facts-about-happiness-that-youll-want-to-know.
• Fredrickson, B. L., Mancuso, R. A., Branigan, C., & Tugade, M. M. (2000). The undoing effect of positive emotions . Motivation and Emotion , 24 (4), 237–258.
• Happify Daily. (n.d.).  What is the science of happiness? Retrieved from https://www.happify.com/hd/what-is-the-science-of-happiness/.
• Hefferon, K., & Boniwell, I. (2011). Positive psychology: Theory, research, and applications . Open University Press.
• Helliwell, J., Layard, R., & Sachs, J. (2013) . World happiness report 2013. United Nations.
• Kahneman, D., & Deaton, A. (2010). High income improves evaluation of life but not emotional well-being.  Proceeding of the National Academy of Sciences ,  107 (38), 16489–16493.
• Kelly, A. (2012) Gross national happiness in Bhutan: the big idea from a tiny state that could change the world. The Guardian . Retrieved from: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/01/bhutan-wealth-happiness-counts?CMP=share_btn_link
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• Krause, N., Ironson, G., & Hill, P. (2018). Religious involvement and happiness: Assessing the mediating role of compassion and helping others.  The Journal of Social Psychology ,  158 (2), 256–270.
• Lyubomirsky, S., Sheldon, K. M., & Schkade, D. (2005). Pursuing happiness: The architecture of sustainable change.  Review of General Psychology, 9 (2), 111–131.
• Maguire, E., Gadian, D., Johnsrude, I., Good, C., Ashburne, J., Frackowiak, R., & Frith, C. (2000). Navigation-related structural change in the hippocampi of taxi drivers . Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences , 97(8), 4398-4403.
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• Mauss, I. B., Savino, N. S., Anderson, C. L., Weisbuch, M., Tamir, M., & Laudenslager, M. L. (2012). The pursuit of happiness can be lonely.  Emotion, 12 (5), 908–912.
• Mohun, J. (2012) The economics book . DK.
• Nelson, S. K., Layous, K., Cole, S. W., & Lyubomirsky, S. (2016). Do unto others or treat yourself? The effects of prosocial and self-focused behavior on psychological flourishing.  Emotion, 16 (6), 850–861.
• Newman, K. M. (2015, July 28). Six ways happiness is good for your health . Greater Good Magazine .  Retrieved from https://greatergood.berkeley.edu/article/item/six_ways_happiness_is_good_for_your_health
• Rodas, M. A., Ahluwalia, R., & Olson, N. J. (2018). A path to more enduring happiness: Take a detour from specific emotional goals.  Journal of Consumer Psychology, 28 (4), 673–681.
• Rohrer, J. M., Richter, D., Brümmer, M., Wagner, G. G., & Schmukle, S. C. (2018). Successfully striving for happiness: Socially engaged pursuits predict increases in life satisfaction.  Association for Psychological Science ,  29 (8), 1291–1298.
• Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2001). On happiness and human potentials: A review of research on hedonic and eudaimonic well-being. Annual Reviews Psychology, 52 , 141–66.
• Ryff, C. D., & Singer, B. H. (2006). Know Thyself and Become What You Are: A Eudemonic approach to psychological well-being. Journal of Happiness Studies 9:13 -39, 2008.
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• Sheldon, K. M., & Lyubomirsky, (2006). Achieving Sustainable Gains in Happiness: Change your actions, not your circumstances . Journal of Happiness Studies (2006) 7:55-86.
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What our readers think.

Thank you for this beautiful well written article. I came across it during my research regarding the science of happiness. The beauty in writing this post is the power to influence souls in a positive manner many who you will not meet.

Sending some love and light to you and all those who get to read your blog.

Being in the field of Human Resource for four decades, coming across and dealing with millions of minds, after reading your article, gives a feeling that I have learnt something new today…

Thank you and congratulations for such a informative work.

God bless…

Thank you for your search light into one of the nerve center of our generation. i will like to use part of this in my upcoming book

Hello Katherine, Now reading https://positivepsychology.com/happiness/ Salute to you for enriching us. Nearly hundred of us relatives are creating an audio book for our blind uncle about life skills. Any quote from you that I can add in the document? Will be grateful. regards, Prabodh Sirur

Hi Prabodh,

Wow, that sounds like a lovely gift for your uncle! We actually have a couple of posts containing quotes about happiness, so you may want to take a look at those for some inspiration. You can find those here and here .

Hope this helps, and good luck with the audiobook!

– Nicole | Community Manager

Thanks for your article, I translated this article for a mental health lesson and I really enjoyed this article.

Thank you for this super helpful article!!

Thank You for such an Informative and Detailed Article on Science of Happiness. I am a Budding Happiness Life Coach and stumbled on this Article. This gives me more understanding of Happiness in Scientific way, with your permission, I would like to share my learning in my course. Thank You and looking forward for more such Articles. Thank You and God Bless You

Hi Srinivas, Thank you for your lovely feedback. We’re glad you liked the article. Feel free to share it with others by clicking ‘Yes’ on the ‘Was this article useful to you’ button. From there, a range of sharing options will appear. – Nicole | Community Manager

Thanks, very nice lecture and informative But I wish to know more about role of religious effects on Happiness? another thing is it ok to translate lecture to other language and share it? Regards Dr Eirebi Albogasim

Hi Dr. Albogasim, Thanks for reading. There’s quite a bit of research showing that those who practice religion tend to be happier than the general population ( here’s an article on the topic). And yes, feel free to translate and share the lecture. – Nicole | Community Manager

I stumbled on your article as I am researching on Happiness to publish my 3rd book. Thanks for sharing! A very elaborate and informative article. The “Take home message” is very encouraging. And I vouch for the neuroplasticity of the brain. We can train ourselves to be Happy. Once we change our attitude, it is easy to be Happy. I learnt how to be Happy at the age of 23. Few years back I posted an article sharing my findings on Happiness in this Linked-in forum. Please see the link for the same https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/easy-happy-ramesh-thota-pmp-cqa/ . Appreciate if you can share your views.

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Essays About Happiness: 5 Essay Examples and 6 Writing Prompts

Being happy and content is essential to living a successful life. If you are writing essays about happiness, start by reading our helpful guide.

Whenever we feel positive emotions rushing through our heads, chances are we are feeling happy. Happiness is what you feel when you enter the house, the smell of your favorite food being cooked or when you finally save up enough money to buy something you’ve wanted. It is an undeniably magical feeling. 

Happiness can do wonders for your productivity and well-being; when you are happy, you are more energetic, optimistic, and motivated. So it is, without a doubt, important. However, do not become caught up in trying to be happy, as this may lead to worse problems. Instead, allow yourself to feel your emotions; be authentic, even if that means feeling a little more negative.

5 Top Essay Examples

1. causes of happiness by otis curtis, 2. how to be happy by tara parker-pope, 3. reflections on ‘happiness’ by shahzada sultan.

• 4.  Happiness is Overrated by John Gorman

5. Toxic positivity by Suhani Mahajan

6 prompts for essays about happiness, 1. why is it important to be happy, 2. what is happiness to you, 3. the role of material things in happiness, 4. how does happiness make you more productive, 5. is true happiness achievable, 6. happiness vs. truth.

“If you don’t feel good about yourself you will have a similarly negative attitude towards others and education is one way of having good self-esteem, as it helps you to live life successfully and happily. Education is one way of getting that dream job and education is an essential cog in the wheel to living comfortably and happily. One English survey that included over 15,000 participants revealed that 81 percent of people who had achieved a good level of education had a high level of life satisfaction.”

Based on personal beliefs and research, Curtis’ essay describes different contributing causes to people’s happiness. These include a loving, stable family and good health. Interestingly, there is a positive correlation between education level and happiness, as Curtis cites statistics showing that education leads to high self-esteem, which can make you happier. 

“Socratic questioning is the process of challenging and changing irrational thoughts. Studies show that this method can reduce depression symptoms. The goal is to get you from a negative mindset (“I’m a failure.”) to a more positive one (“I’ve had a lot of success in my career. This is just one setback that doesn’t reflect on me. I can learn from it and be better.”)”

Parker-Pope writes about the different factors of happiness and how to practice mindfulness and positivity in this guide. She gives tips such as doing breathing exercises, moving around more, and spending time in places and with people that make you happy. Most importantly, however, she reminds readers that negative thoughts should not be repressed. Instead, we should accept them but challenge that mindset.

“Happiness is our choice of not leaving our mind and soul at the mercy of the sways of excitement. Happiness cannot eliminate sorrow, suffering, pain or death from the scheme of things, but it can help keep fear, anxiety, sadness, hopelessness, pessimism and other fathers of unhappiness at bay.”

Sultan discusses what happiness means to her personally. It provides an escape from all the dreariness and lousy news of daily life, not eliminating negative thoughts but keeping them at a distance, even just for a moment. She writes that to be happy; we should not base our happiness on the outcomes of our actions. We cannot control the world around us, so we should not link our happiness to it. If something doesn’t go our way, that is just how the world works. It is useless to be sad over what we cannot control.

4.   Happiness is Overrated by John Gorman

“Our souls do float across the sea of life, taking on water as they go, sinking ever so slightly — perhaps even imperceptibly — into despair. But our souls are not the bucket. Happiness itself is. And it’s the bucket we use to pour water out our souls and keep us afloat. What we really need is peace. Peace patches the holes in our souls and stops the leaking. Once we have peace, we will no longer need to seek happiness.”

In his essay, Gorman reflects on how he stopped trying to chase happiness and instead focused on finding peace in life. He writes that we are often so desperate looking for happiness that our lives become complicated, chaotic, and even depressing at times. He wants readers to do what they are passionate about and be their authentic selves; that way, they will find true happiness. You might also be interested in these essays about courage .

“That’s the mindset most of us have. Half of toxic positivity is just the suppression of 200% acceptable feelings such as anger, fear, sadness, confusion, and more. Any combination of such feelings is deemed “negative.” Honestly, mix ‘em up and serve them to me in a cocktail, eh? (Fine, fine, a mocktail. I reserve my right to one of those little umbrellas though.)

But by closing ourselves off to anything but positivity, we’re experiencing the same effects as being emotionally numb. Why are we doing this to ourselves?”

Mahajan writes about the phenomenon known as “toxic positivity” in which everyone is expected to be happy with their lives. It trivializes people’s misfortunes and sufferings, telling them to be happy with what they have instead. Mahajan opposes this, believing that everyone’s feelings are valid. She writes that it’s okay to be sad or angry at times, and the stigma around “negative feelings” should be erased. When we force ourselves to be happy, we may feel emotionally numb or even sad, the exact opposite of being happy. 

Many would say that happiness aids you in many aspects of your life. Based on personal experience and research, discuss the importance of being happy. Give a few benefits or advantages of happiness. These can include physical, mental, and psychological benefits, as well as anything else you can think of. 

Happiness means different things to different people and may come from various sources. In your essay, you can also explain how you define happiness. Reflect on this feeling and write about what makes you happy and why. Explain in detail for a more convincing essay; be sure to describe what you are writing about well. 

Happiness has a myriad of causes, many of which are material. Research the extent to which material possessions can make one happy, and write your essay about whether or not material things can truly make us happy. Consider the question, “Can money buy happiness?” Evaluate the extent to which it can or cannot, depending on your stance.  

Happiness has often been associated with a higher level of productivity. In your essay, look into the link between these two. In particular, discuss the mental and chemical effects of happiness. Since this topic is rooted in research and statistics, vet your sources carefully: only use the most credible sources for an accurate essay.

In their essays, many, including Gorman and Mahajan, seem to hold a more critical view of happiness. Our world is full of suffering and despair, so some ask: “Can we truly be happy on this earth?” Reflect on this question and make the argument for your position. Be sure to provide evidence from your own experiences and those of others. 

In dystopian stories, authorities often restrict people’s knowledge to keep them happy. We are seeing this even today, with some governments withholding crucial information to keep the population satisfied or stable. Write about whether you believe what they are doing is defensible or not, and provide evidence to support your point. 

For help with this topic, read our guide explaining “what is persuasive writing ?”

For help picking your next essay topic, check out our top essay topics about love .

Martin is an avid writer specializing in editing and proofreading. He also enjoys literary analysis and writing about food and travel.

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Essay 46 – Wealth and money do not guarantee happiness

Gt writing task 2 (essay writing) sample # 46.

You should spend about 40 minutes on this task.

Write about the following topic:

Wealth and money enable us to own many things but do not necessarily guarantee happiness.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Give reasons for your answer and include any relevant examples from your own knowledge or experience.

Write at least 250 words.

Model Answer 1: [Agree – Money can not buy happiness] Money is often considered the key to happiness by a group of people while many others consider it as the root of all evil. No doubt our wealth increases our purchasing power and with it, we can buy things we need for our necessities as well as for luxury, but it can’t buy happiness for us. With or without money, we can be happy and ironically, having much wealth can sometimes deter us from being happy in life.

To begin with, rich people have much greater purchasing power and have the luxury to spend money the way they like. But, this economic freedom and earthly possessions do not guarantee happiness for them as it is a state of mind and cannot be acquired just with money. It is not the cash that makes us happy, rather, a caring family, good neighbours and relatives, friends, children, our mental satisfaction and a sound physical condition make us satisfied. Thus anyone, with or without wealth, can have the secret ingredients and perfect mental state to be felicitous.

Moreover, it is often found that when people have just enough money to meet their basic needs, they can concentrate on other important aspects of life. But, when they have an excessive amount of money and they are driven by greed to make more, they can’t contemplate the essential things in life like family, friendship, hobby and thus suffer from loneliness and discomfort. People with great wealth and money are in constant fear of losing it. They also become snobbish about who they meet and become close as they often treat people to be thieves or con artists.

To conclude, money empowers us to buy earthly things but, unfortunately, happiness is not one of them. We can be happy in a hut or a royal palace when we have the right constituents o happiness and mental gratification.

Model Answer 2: [Agree – Wealth and money can not guarantee happiness.] Many say that while wealth and money provide individuals with the means to acquire material possessions and fulfil their desires, they do not guarantee long-lasting happiness. In this essay, I will argue against the notion that wealth and money directly lead to happiness, providing compelling reasons and examples to support my viewpoint.

Firstly, it is important to recognise that happiness is a multifaceted concept that extends beyond material possessions. True happiness stems from fulfilling relationships, personal growth, and a sense of purpose. Wealth and money can create a superficial sense of happiness through the acquisition of luxurious items, but this happiness is often fleeting and dependent on external factors. For example, a person who constantly seeks material wealth may find themselves in a cycle of insatiable desires, constantly chasing the next purchase to maintain their temporary sense of happiness.

Moreover, studies have shown that once basic needs are met, the correlation between wealth and happiness diminishes. Research indicates that after reaching a certain income threshold that covers essential needs, additional income does not significantly contribute to overall happiness. Instead, factors such as strong social connections, personal well-being, and a sense of purpose have a more profound impact on individual happiness. For instance, individuals with close-knit relationships and a sense of community often report higher levels of satisfaction and well-being, even if their financial resources are modest.

In conclusion, while wealth and money provide individuals with opportunities and material comforts, they do not guarantee lasting happiness. Genuine happiness is rooted in factors beyond financial success, such as meaningful relationships, personal fulfilment, and a sense of purpose.

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