speech on knowledge is more important than marks

Economic Sociology & Political Economy

The global community of academics, practitioners, and activists – led by dr. oleg komlik, albert einstein on the power of ideas and imagination in science.

“In nearly every detective novel since the admirable stories of Conan Doyle there comes a time when the investigator has collected all the facts he needs for at least some phase of his problem. These facts often seem quite strange, incoherent, and wholly unrelated. The great detective, however, realizes that no further investigation is needed at the moment, and that only pure thinking will lead to a correlation of the facts collected. So he plays his violin, or lounges in his armchair enjoying a pipe, when suddenly, by Jove, he has it! Not only does he have an explanation for the clues at hand but he knows that certain other events must have happened. Since he now knows exactly where to look for it, he may go out, if he likes, to collect further confirmation for his theory (pp. 4-5)… It is a familiar fact to readers of detective fiction that a false clue muddles the story and postpones the solution (6)… Intuitive conclusions based on immediate observation are not always to be trusted, for they sometimes lead to the wrong clues. But where does intuition go wrong? (7)… In a good mystery story the most obvious clues often lead to the wrong suspects… the most obvious intuitive explanation is often the wrong one (9)… Science must create its own language, its own concepts, for its own use . Scientific concepts often begin with those used in ordinary language for the affairs, of everyday life, but they develop quite differently. They are transformed and lose the ambiguity associated with them in ordinary language, gaining in rigorousness so that they may be applied to scientific thought (14)… Our interest here lies in the first stages of development, in following initial clues, in showing how new… concepts are born in the painful struggle with old ideas. We are concerned only with pioneer work in science, which consists of finding new and unexpected paths of development; with the adventures in scientific thought which create an ever-changing picture of the universe. The initial and fundamental steps are always of a revolutionary character. Scientific imagination finds old concepts too confining, and replaces them by new ones. The continued development along any line already initiated is more in the nature of evolution, until the next turning point is reached when a still newer field must be conquered. In order to understand, however, what reasons and what difficulties force a change in important concepts, we must know not only the initial clues, but also the conclusions which can be drawn (28)… Most of the fundamental ideas of science are essentially simple, and may, as a rule, be expressed in a language comprehensible to everyone. To follow up these ideas demands the knowledge of a highly refined technique of investigation (29)… Nearly every great advance in science arises from a crisis in the old theory, through an endeavour to find a way out of the difficulties created. We must examine old ideas, old theories, although they belong to the past, for this is the only way to understand the importance of the new ones and the extent of their validity. In the first pages of our book we compared the role of an investigator to that of a detective who, after gathering the requisite facts, finds the right solution by pure thinking. In one essential this comparison must be regarded as highly superficial. Both in life and in detective novels the crime is given. The detective must look for letters, fingerprints, bullets, guns, but at least he knows that a murder has been committed. This is not so for a scientist…. For the detective the crime is given, the problem formulated: who killed Cock Robin? The scientist must, at least in part, commit his own crime, as well as carry out the investigation. Moreover, his task is not to explain just one case, but all phenomena which have happened or may still happen (77-8)… Yet we may choose to be conservative and seek a solution [to a result that shakes our belief] within the frame of old ideas. Difficulties of this kind, sudden and unexpected obstacles in the triumphant development of a theory, arise frequently in science. Sometimes a simple generalization of the old ideas seems, at least temporarily, to be a good way out… Very often, however, it is impossible to patch up an old theory, and the difficulties result in its downfall and the rise of a new one (93-4)… The formulation of a problem is often more essential than its solution , which may be merely a matter of… experimental skill. To raise new questions, new possibilities, to regard old problems from a new angle, requires creative imagination and marks real advance in science (95)… Creating a new theory is not like destroying an old barn and erecting a sky scraper in its place. It is rather like climbing a mountain, gaining new and wider views, discovering new connections between our starting point and its rich environment. But the point from which we started still exists and can be seen, although it appears smaller and forms a tiny part of our broad view gained by the mastery of the obstacles on our way up (159)… Science forces us to create new ideas, new theories. Their aim is to break down the wall of contradictions which frequently blocks the way of scientific progress. All the essential ideas in science were born in a dramatic conflict between reality and our attempts at understanding. Here again is a problem for the solution of which new principles are needed (280)… The association of solved problems with those unsolved may throw new light on our difficulties by suggesting new ideas. It is easy to find a superficial analogy which really expresses nothing. But to discover some essential common features, hidden beneath a surface of external differences, to form, on this basis, a new successful theory, is important creative work ” ( Einstein and Infeld 1938: 286-7 ).

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The Value of Knowledge

The value of knowledge has always been a central topic within epistemology. Going all the way back to Plato’s Meno , philosophers have asked, why is knowledge more valuable than mere true belief? Interest in this question has grown in recent years, with theorists proposing a range of answers. But some reject the premise of the question and claim that the value of knowledge is ‘swamped’ by the value of true belief. And others argue that statuses other than knowledge, such as justification or understanding, are distinctively valuable. We will call the general question of why knowledge is valuable the value problem .

1. Value problems

2. reliabilism and the meno problem, 3. virtue epistemology and the value problem, 4. understanding and epistemic value, 5. the value of knowledge-how, 6. other accounts of the value of knowledge, 7. weak and strong conceptions of knowledge, 8. the value of true belief, 9. the value of extended knowledge, works cited, other important works, other internet resources, related entries.

In Plato’s Meno , Socrates raises the question of why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. Call this the Meno problem or, anticipating distinctions made below, the primary value problem .

Initially, we might appeal to the fact that knowledge appears to be of more practical use than true belief in order to mark this difference in value. But, as Socrates notes, this could be questioned, because a true belief that this is the way to Larissa will get you to Larissa just as well as knowledge that this is the way to Larissa. Plato’s own solution was that knowledge is formed in a special way distinguishing it from belief: knowledge, unlike belief, must be ‘tied down’ to the truth, like the mythical tethered statues of Daedalus. As a result, knowledge is better suited to guide action. For example, if one knows, rather than merely truly believes, that this is the way to Larissa, then one might be less likely to be perturbed by the fact that the road initially seems to be going in the wrong direction. Mere true belief at this point might be lost, since one might lose all confidence that this is the right way to go.

The primary value problem has been distinguished from the secondary value problem (Pritchard 2007: §2). The secondary value problem pertains to why knowledge is more valuable, from an epistemic point of view, than any proper subset of its parts. Put otherwise, why is knowledge better than any epistemic standing falling short of knowing? This includes, but is not restricted to, mere true belief. To illustrate the distinction, consider a possible solution to the primary value problem: knowledge is justified true belief, and justified true belief is better than mere true belief, which explains why knowledge is better than true belief. If correct, this hypothesis successfully answers the primary value problem. However, it requires further development to answer the secondary value problem. For example, it requires further development to explain why knowledge is better than justified belief.

Of course, on many standard theories of knowledge, knowledge is not defined as justified true belief. For instance, according to some theorists, knowledge is undefeated justified true belief (Lehrer & Paxson 1969); on other widely discussed accounts, knowledge is true belief that is non-accidental (Unger 1968), sensitive (Nozick 1981), safe (Sosa 1999), appropriately caused (Goldman 1967), or produced by intellectual virtue (Zagzebski 1996). This puts us in a position to appreciate what some theorists call the tertiary value problem . The tertiary value problem pertains to why knowledge is qualitatively better than any epistemic standing falling short of knowledge. Consider that if knowledge were only quantitatively better than that which falls just short—for instance, on an envisioned continuum of epistemic value—then it would be mysterious why epistemologists have given such attention to this particular point on the continuum.

Why does knowledge have this “distinctive value” not shared by that which falls just short of knowledge (Pritchard 2009: 14)?

Not all theorists accept that the value problems are genuine. For example, in light of the literature on the Gettier problem, some theorists deny that the secondary value problem is genuine. On this approach, whatever is added to justified true belief to rule out Gettier cases does not increase the value of the agent’s intellectual state: it is of no consequence whether we have Gettier-proof justified true belief rather than mere justified true belief (Kaplan 1985). Of course, Gettier cases are peculiar and presumably rare, so in practice having Gettier-proof justified true belief is almost invariably confounded with having mere justified true belief. This could lead some theorists to mistake the value of the latter for that of the former. Other theorists deny that the primary value problem is genuine. For example, on one approach, knowledge just is true belief (Sartwell 1991). If knowledge is true belief, then knowledge cannot be better than true belief, because nothing can be better than itself. However, the definition of knowledge as true belief has not been widely accepted.

The first contemporary wave of work on the value problem largely concerned whether this problem raised a distinctive difficulty for reliabilist accounts of knowledge—i.e., those views which essentially define knowledge as reliably-formed true belief. In particular, the claim was that reliabilism was unable to offer an answer even to the primary value problem.

A fairly clear statement of what is at issue here is given in a number of places by Linda Zagzebski (e.g., 2003a; cf. DePaul 1993; Zagzebski 1996; Jones 1997; Swinburne 1999, 2000; Riggs 2002a; Kvanvig 2003; Sosa 2007: ch. 4; Carter & Jarvis 2012). To begin with, Zagzebski argues that the reliability of the process by which something is produced does not automatically add value to that thing, and thus that it cannot be assumed that the reliability of the process by which a true belief is produced will add value to that true belief. In defense of this claim, she offers the analogy of a cup of coffee. She claims that a good cup of coffee which is produced by a reliable coffee machine—i.e., one that regularly produces good cups of coffee—is of no more value than an equally good cup of coffee that is produced by an unreliable coffee machine.

Furthermore, as this line of objection goes, true belief is in the relevant respects like coffee: a true belief formed via a reliable belief-forming process is no more valuable than a true belief formed via an unreliable belief-forming process. In both cases, the value of the reliability of the process accrues in virtue of its tendency to produce a certain valuable effect (good coffee/true belief), but this means that where the effect has been produced—where one has a good cup of coffee or a true belief—then the value of the product is no greater for having been produced in a reliable way.

Elsewhere in the literature (e.g., Kvanvig 2003), this problem has been called the “swamping problem”, on account of how the value of true belief ‘swamps’ the value of the true belief being produced in a reliable (i.e., truth-conducive) way. So expressed, the moral of the problem seems to be that where reliabilists go awry is by treating the value of the process as being solely captured by the reliability of the process—i.e., its tendency to produce the desired effect. Since the value of the effect swamps the value of the reliability of the process by which the effect was achieved, this means that reliabilism has no resources available to it to explain why knowledge is more valuable than true belief.

It’s actually not clear that this is a problem that is specific to reliabilism. That is, it seems that if this is a bona fide problem, then it will affect any account of the value of knowledge which has the same relevant features as reliabilism—i.e., which regards the greater value of knowledge over true belief as instrumental value, where the instrumental value in question is relative to the valuable good of true belief. In particular, it will affect veritist proposals about epistemic value which treat truth as the fundamental epistemic good. See Kvanvig (2003: Ch. 3) for discussion of how internalist approaches to epistemic justification interface with the swamping problem; see Pettigrew (2018) and Pritchard (2019) for responses to the swamping argument on behalf of the veritist.

Furthermore, as J. Adam Carter and Benjamin Jarvis (2012) have argued, there are reasons to be suspicious of a key premise driving the swamping argument. The premise in question, which has been referred to as the “Swamping Thesis” (Pritchard 2011), states that if the value of a property possessed by an item is instrumentally valuable only relative to a further good, and that good is already present in that item, then it can confer no additional value. Carter and Jarvis contend that one who embraces the Swamping Thesis should also, by parity of reasoning, embrace a corollary thesis which they call the Swamping Thesis Complement, according to which, if the value of a property possessed by an item is instrumentally valuable only relative to a further good, and that good has already failed to be present in that item, then it can confer no additional value. However, as they argue, the Swamping Thesis and the Swamping Thesis Complement, along with other plausible premises, jointly entail the unpalatable conclusion that non-factive epistemic properties—most notably, justification—are never epistemically valuable properties of a belief. See Dutant (2013) and Bjelde (2020) for critical responses to Carter and Jarvis’ line of reasoning and Sylvan (2018) for a separate challenge to the swamping argument, which rejects its tacit commitment to epistemic instrumentalism (cf., Bjelde 2020). For an overview of the key moves of the argument, see Pritchard (2011).

However, even granting the main elements of the swamping argument, there are moves that the reliabilist can make in response (see, e.g., Goldman & Olsson 2009; Olsson 2011; Bates 2013; Roush 2010; cf. Brown 2012; Davis, & Jäger 2012; Hovarth 2009; Piller 2009). For example, it is surely open to the reliabilist to argue that the greater instrumental value of reliable true belief over mere true belief does not need to be understood purely in terms of instrumental value relative to the good of true belief. There could, for instance, be all sorts of practical benefits of having a reliable true belief which generate instrumental value. Indeed, it is worth noting that the line of response to the Meno problem sketched by Plato, which we noted above, seems to specifically appeal to the greater practical instrumental value of knowledge over mere true belief.

Moreover, there is reason to think that this objection will only at best have an impact on process reliabilist proposals—i.e., those views that treat all reliable belief-forming processes as conferring a positive epistemic standing on the beliefs so formed. For example, agent reliabilism (e.g., Greco 1999, 2000) might be thought to be untouched by this sort of argument. This is because, according to agent reliabilism, it is not any sort of reliable process that confers positive epistemic status to belief, but only those processes that are stable features of the agent’s “cognitive character”. The main motivation for this restriction on reliable processes is that it excludes certain kinds of reliable but nonetheless strange and fleeting processes which notoriously cause problems for the view (such as processes where the reliability is due to some quirk in the subject’s environment, rather than because of any cognitive trait possessed by the agent herself). Plausibly, however, one might argue that the reliable traits that make up an agent’s cognitive character have some value independently of the instrumental value they possess in virtue of being reliable—i.e., that they have some final or intrinsic value. If this is right, then this opens up the possibility that agent-reliabilists can evade the problem noted for pure reliabilists.

Zagzebski’s diagnosis of what is motivating this problem for reliabilism seems , however, explicitly to exclude such a counter-response. She argues that what gives rise to this difficulty is the fact that the reliabilist has signed up to a “machine-product model of belief”—see especially, Zagzebski (2003a)—where the product is external to the cause. It is not clear what exactly Zagzebski means by this point, but she thinks it shows that even where the reliable process is independently valuable—i.e., independently of its being reliable—it still doesn’t follow that the value of the cause will transfer to add value to the effect. Here again the coffee analogy is appealed to: even if a reliable coffee machine were independently valuable, it would not thereby confer additional value on a good cup of coffee.

Perhaps the best way to evaluate the above line of argument is to consider what is required in order to resolve the problem it poses. Perhaps what is needed is an ‘internal’ connection between product and cause, such as the kind of internal connection that exists between an act and its motive which is highlighted by how we explicitly evaluate actions in terms of the motives that led to them (Zagzebski 2003a). On this picture, then, we are not to understand knowledge as a state consisting of a known belief, but rather as a state which consists of both the true belief and the source from which that true belief was acquired. In short, then, the problem with the machine-product model of belief is that it leads us to evaluate the state of the knowledge independently of the means by which the knowledge was acquired. If, in contrast, we have a conception of knowledge that incorporates into the very state of knowledge the way that the knowledge was acquired, we can avoid this problem.

Once one effects this transition away from the machine-product model of belief, one can allow that the independent value of the reliable process can ensure that knowledge, by being produced in this way, is more valuable than mere true belief (Zagzebski 2003a). In particular, if the process by which one gained the true belief is an epistemic virtue—a character trait which is both reliable and intrinsically valuable—then this can ensure that the value of the knowing state in this case is more valuable than any corresponding state which simply consisted of a true belief.

Other commentators in the virtue epistemology camp, broadly conceived, have put forward similar suggestions. For example, Wayne Riggs (2002a) and Greco (e.g., 2003) have argued for a ‘credit’ version of virtue epistemology, according to which the agent, in virtue of bringing about the positively valuable outcome of a true belief, is due credit as a result. Rather than treating the extra value of knowledge over true belief as deriving simply from the agent’s attainment of the target true belief, however, Riggs and Greco instead argue that we should regard the agent’s knowing as the state the agent is in when she is responsible for her true belief. Only in so doing, they claim, can we answer the value problem. Jason Baehr (2012), by contrast with Riggs and Greco, has argued that credit theories of knowledge do not answer the value problem but, rather, ‘provide grounds for denying’ (2012: 1) that knowledge has value over and above the value of true belief.

Interestingly, however, other virtue epistemologists, most notably Ernest Sosa (2003), have also advocated a ‘credit’ view, yet seem to stay within the machine-product picture of belief. That is, rather than analyze the state of knowing as consisting of both the true belief and its source, they regard the state of knowing as distinct from the process, yet treat the fact that the process is intrinsically valuable as conferring additional value on any true belief so produced. With Sosa’s view in mind, it is interesting to ask just why we need to analyze knowledge in the way that Zagzebski and others suggest in order to get around the value problem.

The most direct way to approach this question is by considering whether it is really true that a valuable cause cannot confer value on its effect where cause and effect are kept separate in the way that Zagzebski claims is problematic in the case of knowledge. One commentator who has objected to Zagzebski’s argument by querying this claim on her part is Berit Brogaard (2007; cf. Percival 2003; Pritchard 2007: §2), who claims that a valuable cause can indeed confer value on its effect in the relevant cases. Brogaard claims that virtue epistemologists like Zagzebski and Riggs endorse this claim because they adhere to what she calls a “Moorean” conception of value, on which if two things have the same intrinsic properties, then they are equally valuable. Accordingly, if true belief and knowledge have the same intrinsic properties (which is what would be the case on the view of knowledge that they reject), it follows that they must have the same value. Hence, it is crucial to understand knowledge as having distinct intrinsic properties from true belief before one can hope to resolve the value problem.

If one holds that there is only intrinsic and instrumental value, then this conception of value is compelling, since objects with the same intrinsic properties trivially have the same amount of intrinsic value, and they also plausibly have the same amount of instrumental value as well (at least in the same sort of environment). However, the Moorean conception of value is problematic because—as Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (1999, 2003) have pointed out—there seem to be objects which we value for their own sake but whose value derives from their being extrinsically related to something else that we value. That is, such objects are finally —i.e., non-instrumentally—valuable without thereby being intrinsically valuable. For criticism of this account of final value, see Bradley (2002).

The standard example in this regard is Princess Diana’s dress. This would be regarded as more valuable than an exact replica simply because it belonged to Diana, which is clearly an extrinsic property of the object. Even though the extra value that accrues to the object is due to its extrinsic properties, however, it is still the case that this dress is (properly) valued for its own sake, and thus valued non-instrumentally.

Given that value of this sort is possible, then it follows that it could well be the case that we value one true belief over another because of its extrinsic features—i.e., that the one true belief, but not the other, was produced by a reliable cognitive trait that is independently valuable. For example, it could be that we value forming a true belief via a reliable cognitive trait more than a mere true belief because the former belief is produced in such a way that it is of credit to us that we believe the truth. There is thus a crucial lacuna in Zagzebski’s argument.

A different response to the challenge that Zagzebski raises for reliabilism is given by Michael Brady (2006). In defense of reliabilism, Brady appeals to the idea that to be valuable is to be a fitting or appropriate object of positive evaluative attitudes, such as admiration or love (e.g., Brentano 1889 [1969]; Chisholm 1986; Wiggins 1987; Gibbard 1990; Scanlon 1998). That one object is more valuable than another is thus to be understood, on this view, in terms of the fact that that object is more worthy of positive evaluation. Thus, the value problem for reliabilism on this conception of value comes down to the question why knowledge is more worthy of positive evaluation on this view than mere true belief. Brady’s contention is that, at least within this axiological framework, it is possible for the reliabilist to offer a compelling story about why reliable true belief—and thus knowledge—is more valuable than mere true belief.

Central to Brady’s argument is his claim that there are many ways one can positively evaluate something, and thus many different ways something can be valuable. Moreover, Brady argues that we can distinguish active from passive evaluative attributes, where the former class of attitudes involve pursuit of the good in question. For example, one might actively value the truth, where this involves, for instance, a striving to discover the truth. In contrast, one might at other times merely passively value the truth, such as simply respecting or contemplating it.

With this point in mind, Brady’s central thesis is that on the reliabilist account knowledge is more valuable than true belief because certain active positive evaluative attitudes are fitting only with regard to the former (i.e., reliable true belief). In particular, given its intrinsic features, reliable true belief is worthy of active love, whereas an active love of unreliable (i.e., accidental) true belief because of its intrinsic features would be entirely inappropriate because there is nothing that we can do to attain unreliable true belief that wouldn’t conflict with love of truth.

This is an intriguing proposal, which opens up a possible avenue of defense against the kind of machine-product objection to reliabilism considered. One problem that such a move faces, however, is that it is unclear whether we can make sense of the distinction Brady draws between active and passive evaluative attitudes, at least in the epistemic sphere. When Brady talks of passive evaluative attitudes towards the truth, he gives examples like contemplating, accepting, embracing, affirming, and respecting. Some of these attitudes are not clearly positive evaluative attitudes, however. Moreover, some of them are not obviously passive either. For example, is to contemplate the truth really to evaluate it positively , rather than simply to consider it? Furthermore, in accepting, affirming or embracing the truth, isn’t one actively positively evaluating the truth? Wouldn’t such evaluative attitudes manifest themselves in the kind of practical action that Brady thinks is the mark of active evaluative attitudes? More needs to be said about this distinction before it can do the philosophical work that Brady has in mind.

A further, albeit unorthodox, recent approach to the swamping problem is due to Carter and Rupert (2020). Carter and Rupert point out that extant approaches to the swamping problem suppose that if a solution is to be found, it will be at the personal level of description, the level at which states of subjects or agents, as such, appear. They take exception to this orthodoxy, or at least to its unquestioned status. They maintain that from the empirically justified premise that subpersonal states play a significant role in much epistemically relevant cognition, we should expect that they constitute a domain in which we might reasonably expect to locate the “missing source” of epistemic value, beyond the value attached to mere true belief.

So far this discussion has taken it as given that whatever problems reliabilism faces in this regard, there are epistemological theories available—some form of virtue epistemology, for example—that can deal with them. But not everyone in the contemporary debate accepts this. Perhaps the best known sceptic in this respect is Jonathan Kvanvig (2003), who in effect argues that while virtue epistemology (along with a form of epistemic internalism) can resolve the primary value problem (i.e., the problem of explaining why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief), the real challenge that we need to respond to is that set by the secondary value problem (i.e., the problem of explaining why knowledge is more valuable than that which falls short of knowledge); and Kvanvig says that there is no solution available to that . That is, Kvanvig argues that there is an epistemic standing—in essence, justified true belief—which falls short of knowledge but which is no less valuable than knowledge. He concludes that the focus of epistemology should not be on knowledge at all, but rather on understanding , an epistemic standing that Kvanvig maintains is clearly of more value than knowledge and those epistemic standings that fall short of knowledge, such as justified true belief.

What Kvanvig says about understanding will be considered below. First though, let us consider the specific challenge that he poses for virtue epistemology. In essence, Kvanvig’s argument rests on the assumption that it is essential to any virtue-theoretic account of knowledge—and any internalist account of knowledge as well, for that matter (i.e., an account that makes a subjective justification condition necessary for knowledge possession)—that it also includes an anti-Gettier condition. If this is right, then it follows that even if virtue epistemology has an answer to the primary value problem—and Kvanvig concedes that it does—it will not thereby have an answer to the secondary value problem since knowledge is not simply virtuous true belief. Moreover, Kvanvig argues that once we recognize what a gerrymandered notion a non-Gettierized account of knowledge is, it becomes apparent that there is nothing valuable about the anti-Gettier condition on knowledge that needs to be imposed. But if that is right, then it follows by even virtue epistemic lights that knowledge—i.e., non-Gettierized virtuous true believing—is no more valuable than one of its proper sub-sets—i.e., mere virtuous true believing.

There are at least two aspects of Kvanvig’s argument that are potentially problematic. To begin with, it isn’t at all clear why the anti-Gettier condition on knowledge fails to add value, something that seems to be assumed here. More generally, Kvanvig seems to be implicitly supposing that if an analysis of knowledge is ugly and gerrymandered then that is itself reason to doubt that knowledge is particularly valuable, at least assuming that there are epistemic standings that fall short of knowledge which can be given an elegant analysis. While a similar assumption about the relationship between the elegance (or otherwise) of the analysis of knowledge and the value of the analysandum is commonplace in the contemporary epistemological literature—see, for example, Zagzebski (1999) and Williamson (2000: chapter 1)—this assumption is contentious. For critical discussion of this assumption, see DePaul (2009).

In any case, a more serious problem is that many virtue epistemologists—among them Sosa (1988, 1991, 2007), Zagzebski (e.g., 1996, 1999) and Greco (2003, 2007, 2008, 2009)—hereafter, ‘robust virtue epistemologists’—think that their view can deal with Gettier problems without needing to add an additional anti-Gettier condition on knowledge. The way this is achieved is by making the move noted above of treating knowledge as a state that includes both the truly believing and the virtuous source by which that true belief was acquired. However, crucially, for robust virtue epistemologists, there is an important difference between (i) a belief’s being true and virtuously formed, and (ii) a belief’s being true because virtuously formed. Formulating knowledge along the latter lines, they insist, ensures that the target belief is not Gettiered. Even more, robust virtue epistemologists think the latter kind of formulation offers the resources to account for why knowledge is distinctively valuable.

To appreciate this point about value, consider the following ‘performance normativity framework’ which robust virtue epistemologists explicitly or implicitly embrace when accounting for the value of knowledge as a true belief because of virtue.

Performance Normativity Framework

Dimensions of evaluation thesis Any performance with an aim can be evaluated along three dimensions: (i) whether it is successful, (ii) whether it is skillful, and (iii) thirdly, whether the success is because of the skill.

Achievement thesis If and only if the success is because of the skill, the performance is not merely successful, but also, an achievement.

Value thesis Achievements are finally valuable (i.e., valuable for their own sake) in a way that mere lucky successes are not.

Notice that, if knowledge is a cognitive performance that is an achievement , then with reference to the above set of claims, the robust virtue epistemologist can respond to not only the secondary value problem but also the tertiary value problem (i.e., the problem of explaining why knowledge is more valuable, in kind and not merely in degree, than that which falls short of knowledge). This is because knowledge, on this view, is simply the cognitive aspect of a more general notion, that of achievement, and this is the case even if mere successes that are produced by intellectual virtues but which are not because of them, are not achievements. (Though, see Kim 2021 for a reversal of the idea that knowledge involves achievement; according to Kim, all achievements, in any domain of endeavour, imply knowledge).

As regards the value thesis , one might object that some successes that are because of ability—i.e., achievements, on this view—are too trivial or easy or wicked to count as finally valuable. This line of objection is far from decisive. After all, it is open to the proponent of robust virtue epistemology to argue that the claim is only that all achievements qua achievements are finally valuable, not that the overall value of every achievement is particularly high. It is thus consistent with the proposal that some achievements have a very low—perhaps even negative, if that is possible—value in virtue of their other properties (e.g., their triviality). Indeed, a second option in this regard is to allow that not all achievements enjoy final value whilst nevertheless maintaining that it is in the nature of achievements to have such value (e.g., much in the way that one might argue that it is in the nature of pleasure to be a good, even though some pleasures are bad). Since, as noted above, all that is required to meet the (tertiary) value problem is to show that knowledge is generally distinctively valuable, this claim would almost certainly suffice for the robust virtue epistemologist’s purposes.

In any case, even if the value thesis is correct—and indeed, even if the achievement and dimensions of evaluation theses are also correct—the robust virtue epistemologist has not yet satisfactorily vindicated any of the aforementioned value problems for knowledge unless knowledge is itself a kind of achievement—and that is the element of the proposal that is perhaps the most controversial. There are two key problems with the claim that knowledge involves cognitive achievement. The first is that there sometimes seems to be more to knowledge than a cognitive achievement; the second is that there sometimes seems to be less to knowledge than a cognitive achievement.

As regards the first claim, notice that achievements seem to be compatible with at least one kind of luck. Suppose that an archer hits a target by employing her relevant archery abilities, but that the success is ‘gettierized’ by luck intervening between the archer’s firing of the arrow and the hitting of the target. For example, suppose that a freak gust of wind blows the arrow off-course, but then a second freak gust of wind happens to blow it back on course again. The archer’s success is thus lucky in the sense that it could very easily have been a failure. When it comes to ‘intervening’ luck of this sort, Greco’s account of achievements is able to offer a good explanation of why the success in question does not constitute an achievement. After all, we would not say that the success was because of the archer’s ability in this case.

Notice, however, that not all forms of luck are of this intervening sort. Consider the following case offered by Pritchard (2010a: ch. 2). Suppose that nothing intervenes between the archer’s firing of the arrow and the hitting of the target. However, the success is still lucky in the relevant sense because, unbeknownst to the archer, she just happened to fire at the only target on the range that did not contain a forcefield which would have repelled the arrow. Is the archer’s success still an achievement? Intuition would seem to dictate that it is; it certainly seems to be a success that is because of ability, even despite the luckiness of that success. Achievements, then, are, it seems, compatible with luck of this ‘environmental’ form even though they are not compatible with luck of the standard ‘intervening’ form.

The significance of this conclusion for our purposes is that knowledge is incompatible with both forms of luck. In order to see this, one only needs to note that an epistemological analogue of the archer case just given is the famous barn façade example (e.g., Ginet 1975; Goldman 1976). In this example, we have an agent who forms a true belief that there is a barn in front of him. Moreover, his belief is not subject to the kind of ‘intervening’ luck just noted and which is a standard feature of Gettier-style cases. It is not as if, for example, he is looking at what appears to be a barn but which is not in fact a barn, but that his belief is true nonetheless because there is a barn behind the barn shaped object that he is looking at. Nevertheless, his belief is subject to environmental luck in that he is, unbeknownst to him, in barn façade county in which every other barn-shaped object is a barn façade. Thus, his belief is only luckily true in that he could very easily have been mistaken in this respect. Given that this example is structurally equivalent to the ‘archer’ case just given, it seems that just as we treat the archer as exhibiting an achievement in that case, so we should treat this agent as exhibiting a cognitive achievement here. The problem, however, is that until quite recently many philosophers accepted that the agent in the barn façade case lacks knowledge. Knowledge, it seems, is incompatible with environmental luck in a way that achievements, and thus cognitive achievements, are not (see, for example, Pritchard, e.g., 2012).

Robust virtue epistemologists have made a number of salient points regarding this case. For example, Greco (2010, 2012) has argued for a conception of what counts as a cognitive ability according to which the agent in the barn façade case would not count as exhibiting the relevant cognitive ability (see Pritchard 2010a: ch. 2 for a critical discussion of this claim). Others, such as Sosa (e.g., 2007, 2015) have responded by questioning whether the agent in the barn façade case lacks knowledge, albeit, in a qualified sense. While Sosa’s distinctive virtue epistemology allows for the compatibility of barn façade cases with animal knowledge (roughly: true belief because of ability), Sosa maintains that the subject in barn façade cases lacks reflective knowledge (roughly: a true belief whose creditability to ability or virtue is itself creditable to a second-order ability or virtue of the agent). Other philosophers (e.g., Hetherington (1998) have challenged the view that barn façade protagonists in fact lack (any kind of) knowledge. In a series of empirical studies, most people attributed knowledge in barn façade cases and related cases (Colaco, Buckwalter, Stich & Machery 2014; Turri, Buckwalter & Blouw 2015; Turri 2016a). In one study, over 80% of participants attributed knowledge (Turri 2016b). In another study, most professional philosophers attributed knowledge (Horvath & Wiegmann 2016). At least one theory of knowledge has been defended on the grounds that it explains why knowledge is intuitively present in such cases (Turri 2016c).

Even setting that issue aside, however, there is a second problem on the horizon, which is that it seems that there are some cases of knowledge which are not cases of cognitive achievement. One such case is offered by Jennifer Lackey (2007), albeit to illustrate a slightly different point. Lackey asks us to imagine someone arriving at the train station in Chicago who, wishing to obtain directions to the Sears Tower, approaches the first adult passer-by she sees. Suppose the person she asks is indeed knowledgeable about the area and gives her the directions that she requires. Intuitively, any true belief that the agent forms on this basis would ordinarily be counted as knowledge. Indeed, if one could not gain testimonial knowledge in this way, then it seems that we know an awful lot less than we think we know. However, it has been argued, in such a case the agent does not have a true belief because of her cognitive abilities but, rather, because of her informant’s cognitive abilities. If this is correct, then there are cases of knowledge which are not also cases of cognitive achievement.

It is worth being clear about the nature of this objection. Lackey takes cases like this to demonstrate that one can possess knowledge without it being primarily creditable to one that one’s belief is true. Note though that this is compatible, as Lackey notes, with granting that the agent is employing her cognitive abilities to some degree, and so surely deserves some credit for the truth of the belief formed (she would not have asked just anyone, for example, nor would she have simply accepted just any answer given by her informant). The point is thus rather that whatever credit the agent is due for having a true belief, it is not the kind of credit that reflects a bona fide cognitive achievement because of how this cognitive success involves ‘piggy-backing’ on the cognitive efforts of others.

As noted above, the main conclusion that Kvanvig (2003) draws from his reflections on the value problem is that the real focus in epistemology should not be on knowledge at all but on understanding, an epistemic standing that Kvanvig does think is especially valuable but which, he argues, is distinct from knowing—i.e., one can have knowledge without the corresponding understanding, and one can have understanding without the corresponding knowledge. (Pritchard [e.g., 2010a: chs 1–4] agrees, though his reasons for taking this line are somewhat different to Kvanvig’s). It is perhaps this aspect of Kvanvig’s book that has prompted the most critical response, so it is worth briefly dwelling on his claims here in a little more detail.

To begin with, one needs to get clear what Kvanvig has in mind when he talks of understanding, since many commentators have found the conception of understanding that he targets problematic. The two usages of the term ‘understanding’ in ordinary language that Kvanvig focuses on—and which he regards as being especially important to epistemology—are

when understanding is claimed for some object, such as some subject matter, and when it involves understanding that something is the case. (Kvanvig 2003: 189)

The first kind of understanding he calls “objectual understanding”, the second kind “propositional understanding”. In both cases, understanding requires that one successfully grasp how one’s beliefs in the relevant propositions cohere with other propositions one believes (e.g., Kvanvig 2003: 192, 197–8). This requirement entails that understanding is directly factive in the case of propositional understanding and indirectly factive in the case of objectual understanding—i.e., the agent needs to have at least mostly true beliefs about the target subject matter in order to be truly said to have objectual understanding of that subject matter.

Given that understanding—propositional understanding at any rate—is factive, Kvanvig’s argument for why understanding is distinct from knowledge does not relate to this condition (as we will see in a moment, it is standard to argue that understanding is distinct from knowledge precisely because only understanding is non-factive). Instead, Kvanvig notes two key differences between understanding and knowledge: that understanding, unlike knowledge, admits of degrees, and that understanding, unlike knowledge, is compatible with epistemic luck. Most commentators, however, have tended to focus not on these two theses concerning the different properties of knowledge and understanding, but rather on Kvanvig’s claim that understanding is (at least indirectly) factive.

For example, Elgin (2009; cf. Elgin 1996, 2004; Janvid 2014) and Riggs (2009) argue that it is possible for an agent to have understanding and yet lack true beliefs in the relevant propositions. For example, Elgin (2009) argues that it is essential to treat scientific understanding as non-factive. She cites a number of cases in which science has progressed from one theory to a better theory where, we would say, understanding has increased in the process even though the theories are, strictly speaking at least, false . A different kind of case that Elgin offers concerns scientific idealizations, such as the ideal gas law. Scientists know full well that no actual gas behaves in this way, yet the introduction of this useful fiction clearly improved our understanding of the behavior of actual gasses. For a defense of Kvanvig’s view in the light of these charges, see Kvanvig (2009a, 2009b; Carter & Gordon 2014).

A very different sort of challenge to Kvanvig’s treatment of understanding comes from Brogaard (2005, Other Internet Resources). She argues that Kvanvig’s claim that understanding is of greater value than knowledge is only achieved because he fails to give a rich enough account of knowledge. More specifically, Brogaard claims that we can distinguish between objectual and propositional knowledge just as we can distinguish between objectual and propositional understanding. Propositional understanding, argues Brogaard, no more requires coherence in one’s beliefs than propositional knowledge, and so the difference in value between the two cannot lie here. Moreover, while Brogaard grants that objectual understanding does incorporate a coherence requirement, this again fails to mark a value-relevant distinction between knowledge and understanding because the relevant counterpart—objectual knowledge (i.e., knowledge of a subject matter)—also incorporates a coherence requirement. So provided that we are consistent in our comparisons of objectual and propositional understanding on the one hand, and objectual and propositional knowledge on the other, Kvanvig fails to make a sound case for thinking that understanding is of greater value than knowledge.

Finally, a further challenge to Kvanvig’s treatment of knowledge and understanding focuses on his claims regarding epistemic luck, and in particular, his insistence that luck cases show how understanding and propositional knowledge come apart from one another. In order to bring the luck-based challenge into focus, we can distinguish three kinds of views about the relationship between understanding and epistemic luck that are found in the literature: strong compatibilism (e.g., Kvanvig 2003; Rohwer 2014), moderate compatibilism (e.g., Pritchard 2010a: ch. 4) and incompatibilism (e.g., Grimm 2006; Sliwa 2015). Strong compatibilism is the view that understanding is compatible with the varieties of epistemic luck that are generally taken to undermine propositional knowledge. In particular, incompatibilists maintain that understanding is undermined by neither (i) the kind of luck that features in traditional Gettier-style cases (1963) cases, nor with (ii) purely ‘environmental luck (e.g., Pritchard 2005) of the sort that features in ‘fake barn’ cases (e.g., Goldman 1979) where the fact that one’s belief could easily be incorrect is a matter of being in an inhospitable epistemic environment. Moderate compatibilism, by contrast, maintains that while understanding is like propositional knowledge in that it is incompatible with the kind of luck that features in traditional Gettier cases, it is nonetheless compatible with environmental epistemic luck. Incompatibilism rejects that either kind of epistemic luck case demonstrates that understanding and propositional knowledge come apart, and so maintains that understanding is incompatible with epistemic luck to the same extent that propositional knowledge is.

The received view in mainstream epistemology, at least since Gilbert Ryle (e.g., 1949), has been to regard knowledge-that and knowledge-how as different epistemic standings, such that knowing how to do something is not simply a matter of knowing propositions, viz., of knowledge- that . If this view—known as anti-intellectualism —is correct, then the value of knowledge-how needn’t be accounted for in terms of the value of knowing propositions. Furthermore, if anti-intellectualism is assumed, then—to the extent that there is any analogous ‘value problem’ for knowledge-how—such a problem needn’t materialize as the philosophical problem of determining what it is about knowledge-how that makes it more valuable than mere true belief.

Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson (2001) have, however, influentially resisted the received anti-intellectualist thinking about knowledge-how. On Stanley & Williamson’s view— intellectualism —knowledge-how is a kind of propositional knowledge, i.e., knowledge- that , such that (roughly) S knows how to φ iff there is a way w such that S knows that w is a way for S to φ. Accordingly, if Hannah knows how to ride a bike, then this is in virtue of her propositional knowledge—viz., her knowing of some way w that w is the way for her (Hannah) to ride a bike.

By reducing in this manner knowledge—how to a kind of knowledge—that, intellectualists such as Stanley have accepted that knowledge-how should have properties characteristic of propositional knowledge, (see, for example, Stanley 2011: 215), of which knowledge-how is a kind. Furthermore, the value of knowledge-how should be able to be accounted for, on intellectualism, with reference to the value of the propositional knowledge that the intellectualist identifies with knowledge-how.

In recent work, Carter and Pritchard (2015) have challenged intellectualism on this point. One such example they offer to this end involves testimony and skilled action. For example, suppose that a skilled guitarist tells an amateur how to play a very tricky guitar riff. Carter and Pritchard (2015: 801) argue that though the amateur can uncontroversially acquire testimonial knowledge from the expert that, for some way w that w is the way to play the riff, it might be that the expert, but not novice, knows how to play the riff. Further, they suggest that whilst the amateur is better off, with respect to the aim of playing the riff, than he was prior to gaining the testimonial knowledge he did, he would likewise be better off further—viz., he would have something even more valuable—if he, like the expert, had the lick down cold (something the amateur does not have simply on the basis of his acquired testimonial knowledge) ( Ibid : 801).

The conclusion Carter and Pritchard draw from this and other similar cases (e.g., 2015: §3; see also Poston 2016) is that the value of knowledge-how cannot be accounted for with reference to the value of the items of knowledge-that which the intellectualist identifies with knowledge-how If this is right, then if there is a ‘value problem’ for knowledge-how, we shouldn’t expect it to be the problem of determining what is it about certain items of propositional knowledge that makes these more valuable than corresponding mere true beliefs. A potential area for future research is to consider what an analogue value problem for knowledge-how might look like, on an anti-intellectualist framework.

According to Carter and Pritchard’s diagnosis, the underlying explanation for this difference in value is that knowledge-how (like understanding, as discussed in §4 ) essentially involves a kind of cognitive achievement, unlike propositional knowledge, for reasons discussed in §4. If this diagnosis is correct, then further pressure is arguably placed on the robust virtue epistemologist’s ‘achievement’ solution to the value problems for knowledge-that, as surveyed in §3 . Recall that, according to robust virtue epistemology, the distinctive value of knowledge-that is accounted for in terms of the value of cognitive achievement (i.e., success because of ability) which robust virtue epistemologists take to be essential to propositional knowledge. But, if the presence of cognitive achievement is what accounts for why knowledge-how has a value that is not present in the items of knowledge-that the intellectualist identifies with knowledge-how, this result would seem to stand in tension with the robust virtue epistemologist’s insistence that what affords propositional knowledge a value lacked by mere true belief is that the former essentially involves cognitive achievement.

John Hawthorne (2004; cf. Stanley 2005; Fantl & McGrath 2002) has argued that knowledge is valuable because of the role it plays in practical reasoning. More specifically, Hawthorne (2004: 30) argues for the principle that one should use a proposition p as a premise in one’s practical reasoning only if one knows p . Hawthorne primarily motivates this line of argument by appeal to the lottery case. This concerns an agent’s true belief that she holds the losing ticket for a fair lottery with long odds and a large cash prize, a belief that is based solely on the fact that she has reflected on the odds involved. Intuitively, we would say that such an agent lacks knowledge of what she believes, even though her belief is true and even though her justification for what she believes—assessed in terms of the likelihood, given this justification, of her being right—is unusually strong. Moreover, were this agent to use this belief as a premise in her practical reasoning, and so infer that she should throw the ticket away without checking the lottery results in the paper for example, then we would regard her reasoning as problematic.

Lottery cases therefore seem to show that justified true belief, no matter how strong the degree of justification, is not enough for acceptable practical reasoning—instead, knowledge is required. Moreover, notice that we can alter the example slightly so that the agent does possess knowledge while at the same time having a weaker justification for what she believes (where strength of justification is again assessed in terms of the likelihood, given this justification, that the agent’s belief is true). If the agent had formed her true belief by reading the results in a reliable newspaper, for example, then she would count as knowing the target proposition and can then infer that she should throw the ticket away without criticism. It is more likely, however, that the newspaper has printed the result wrongly than that she should win the lottery. This sort of consideration seems to show that knowledge, even when accompanied by a relatively weak justification, is better (at least when it comes to practical reasoning) than a true belief that is supported by a relatively strong justification but does not amount to knowledge. If this is the right way to think about the connection between knowledge possession and practical reasoning, then it seems to offer a potential response to at least the secondary value problem.

A second author who thinks that our understanding of the concept of knowledge can have important ramifications for the value of knowledge is Edward Craig (1990). Craig’s project begins with a thesis about the value of the concept of knowledge. Simplifying somewhat, Craig hypothesises that the concept of knowledge is important to us because it fulfills the valuable function of enabling us to identify reliable informants. The idea is that it is clearly of immense practical importance to be able to recognize those from whom we can gain true beliefs, and that it was in response to this need that the concept of knowledge arose. As with Hawthorne’s theory, this proposal, if correct, could potentially offer a resolution of at least the secondary value problem.

Recently, there have been additional attempts to follow—broadly speaking—Craig’s project, for which the value of knowledge is understood in terms of the functional role that ‘knowledge’ plays in fulfilling our practical needs. The matter of how to identify this functional role has received increasing recent attention. For example, David Henderson (2009), Robin McKenna (2013), Duncan Pritchard (2012) and Michael Hannon (2015) have defended views about the concept of knowledge (or knowledge ascriptions) that are broadly inspired by Craig’s favored account of the function of knowledge as identifying reliable informants. A notable rival account, defended by Klemens Kappel (2010), Christoph Kelp (2011, 2014) and Patrick Rysiew (2012; cf. Kvanvig 2012) identifies closure of inquiry as the relevant function. For Krista Lawlor (2013) the relevant function is identified ( à la Austin) as that of providing assurance , and for James Beebe (2012), it’s expressing epistemic approval/disapproval.

In one sense, such accounts are in competition with one another, in that they offer different practical explications of ‘knowledge’. However, these accounts all accept (explicitly or tacitly) a more general insight, which is that considerations about the function that the concept of knowledge plays in fulfilling practical needs should inform our theories of the nature and corresponding value of knowledge. This more general point remains controversial in contemporary metaepistemology. For some arguments against supposing that a practical explication of ‘knowledge’, in terms of some need-fulfilling function, should inform our accounts of the nature or knowledge, see for example Gerken (2015). For a more extreme form of argument in favor of divorcing considerations to do with how and why we use ‘knows’ from epistemological theorizing altogether, see Hazlett (2010; cf. Turri 2011b).

A further and more recent practically oriented approach to the value of knowledge is defended by Grindrod (2019), who considers specifically the ramifications of epistemic contextualism for the value of knowledge. Contextualists maintain that knowledge attributing sentences can vary in truth value across different contexts of utterance. This kind of position about the semantics of knowledge attributions is often motivated by context-shifting cases, such as DeRose’s (1992) bank case, which seem to suggest that the a knowledge attribution is true depends on the epistemic standards (as fixed by practical stakes) of the attributor of the knowledge ascription (see entry on Epistemic Contextualism ). Grindrod maintains that if epistemic contextualism is true, then epistemic value (including whatever epistemic value might separate knowledge from mere true belief) should be contextualised.

Laurence BonJour argues that reflecting on the value of knowledge leads us to reject a prevailing trend in epistemology over the past several decades, namely, fallibilism, or what BonJour calls the “weak conception” of knowledge.

BonJour outlines four traditional assumptions about knowledge, understood as roughly justified true belief, which he “broadly” endorses (BonJour 2010: 58–9). First, knowledge is a “valuable and desirable cognitive state” indicative of “full cognitive success”. Any acceptable theory of knowledge must “make sense of” knowledge’s important value. Second, knowledge is “an all or nothing matter, not a matter of degree”. There is no such thing as degrees of knowing: either you know or you don’t. Third, epistemic justification comes in degrees, from weak to strong. Fourth, epistemic justification is essentially tied to “likelihood or probability of truth”, such that the strength of justification covaries with how likely it makes the truth of the belief in question.

On this traditional approach, we are invited to think of justification as measured by how probable the belief is given the reasons or evidence you have. One convenient way to measure probability is to use the decimals in the interval [0, 1]. A probability of 0 means that the claim is guaranteed to be false. A probability of 1 means that the claim is guaranteed to be true. A probability of .5 means that the claim is just as likely to be true as it is to be false. The question then becomes, how probable must your belief be for it to be knowledge?

Obviously it must be greater than .5. But how much greater? Suppose we say that knowledge requires a probability of 1—that is, knowledge requires our justification or reasons to guarantee the truth of the belief. Call such reasons conclusive reasons .

The strong conception of knowledge says knowledge requires conclusive reasons. We can motivate the strong conception as follows. If the aim of belief is truth, then it makes sense that knowledge would require conclusive reasons, because conclusive reasons guarantee that belief’s aim is achieved. The three components of the traditional view of knowledge thus fit together “cohesively” to explain why knowledge is valued as a state of full cognitive success.

But all is not well with the strong conception, or so philosophers have claimed over the past several decades. The strong conception seems to entail that we know nearly nothing at all about the material world outside of our own minds or about the past. For we could have had all the reasons we do in fact have, even if the world around us or the past had been different. (Think of Descartes’s evil genius.) This conflicts with commonsense and counts against the strong conception. But what is the alternative?

The alternative is that knowledge requires reasons that make the belief very likely true, but needn’t guarantee it. This is the weak conception of knowledge . Most epistemologists accept the weak conception of knowledge. But BonJour asks a challenging question: what is the “magic” level of probability required by knowledge? BonJour then argues that a satisfactory answer to this question isn’t forthcoming. For any point short of 1 would seem arbitrary . Why should we pick that point exactly? The same could be said for a vague range that includes points short of 1—why, exactly, should the vague range extend roughly that far but not further? This leads to an even deeper problem for the weak conception. It brings into doubt the value of knowledge. Can knowledge really be valuable if it is arbitrarily defined?

A closely related problem for the weak conception presents itself. Suppose for the sake of argument that we settle on .9 as the required level of probability. Suppose further that you believe Q and you believe R , that Q and R are both true, and that you have reached the .9 threshold for each. Thus the weak conception entails that you know Q , and you know R . Intuitively, if you know Q and you also know R , then you’re automatically in a position to know the conjunction Q & R . But the weak conception cannot sustain this judgment. For the probability of the conjunction of two independent claims, such as Q and R , equals the product of their probabilities. (This is the special conjunction rule from probability theory.) In this case, the probability of Q = .9 and the probability of R = .9. So the probability of the conjunction ( Q & R ) = .9 × .9 = .81, which falls short of the required .9. So the weak conception of knowledge along with a law of probability entail that you’re automatically not in a position to know the conjunction ( Q & R ). BonJour considers this to be “an intuitively unacceptable result”, because after all,

what is the supposed state of knowledge really worth, if even the simplest inference from two pieces of knowledge [might] not lead to further knowledge? (BonJour 2010: 63)

BonJour concludes that the weak conception fails to explain the value of knowledge, and thus that the strong conception must be true. He recognizes that this implies that we don’t know most of the things we ordinarily say and think that we know. He explains this away, however, partly on grounds that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning, which creates strong “practical pressure” to confabulate or exaggerate in claiming to know things, so that we can view ourselves as reasoning and acting appropriately, even though usually the best we can do is to approximate appropriate action and reasoning. (BonJour 2010: 75).

So far, in common with most of the contemporary literature in this regard, we have tended to focus on the value of knowledge relative to other epistemic standings. A related debate in this respect, however—one that has often taken place largely in tandem with the mainstream debate on the value of knowledge—has specifically concerned itself with the value of true belief and we will turn now to this issue.

Few commentators treat truth or belief as being by themselves valuable (though see Kvanvig 2003: ch. 1), but it is common to treat true belief as valuable, at least instrumentally. True beliefs are clearly often of great practical use to us. The crucial caveat here, of course, concerns the use of the word ‘often’. After all, it is also often the case that a true belief might actually militate against one achieving one’s goals, as when one is unable to summon the courage to jump a ravine and thereby get to safety , because one knows that there is a serious possibility that one might fail to reach the other side. In such cases it seems that a false belief in one’s abilities—e.g., the false belief that one could easily jump the ravine—would be better than a true belief, if the goal in question (jumping the ravine) is to be achieved.

Moreover, some true beliefs are beliefs in trivial matters, and in these cases it isn’t at all clear why we should value such beliefs at all. Imagine someone who, for no good reason, concerns herself with measuring each grain of sand on a beach, or someone who, even while being unable to operate a telephone, concerns herself with remembering every entry in a foreign phone book. Such a person would thereby gain lots of true beliefs but, crucially, one would regard such truth-gaining activity as rather pointless. After all, these true beliefs do not seem to serve any valuable purpose, and so do not appear to have any instrumental value (or, at the very least, what instrumental value these beliefs have is vanishingly small). It would, perhaps, be better—and thus of greater value—to have fewer true beliefs, and possibly more false ones, if this meant that the true beliefs that one had concerned matters of real consequence.

At most, then, we can say that true beliefs often have instrumental value. What about final (or intrinsic) value? One might think that if the general instrumental value of true belief was moot then so too would be the intuitively stronger thesis that true belief is generally finally valuable. Nevertheless, many have argued for such a claim.

One condition that seems to speak in favor of this thesis is that as truth seekers we are naturally curious about what the truth is, even when that truth is of no obvious practical import. Accordingly, it could be argued that from a purely epistemic point of view, we do regard all true belief as valuable for its own sake, regardless of what further prudential goals we might have (e.g., Goldman 1999: 3; Lynch 2004: 15–16; Alston 2005: 31; Pritchard 2019; cf. Baehr 2012: 5). Curiosity will only take you so far in this regard, however, since we are only curious about certain truths, not all of them. To return to the examples given a moment ago, no fully rational agent is curious about the measurements of every grain of sand on a given beach, or the name of every person in a random phone book—i.e., no rational person wants to know these truths independently of having some prudential reason for knowing them.

Still, one could argue for a weaker claim and merely say that it is prima facie or pro tanto finally good to believe the truth (cf. David 2005; Lynch 2009), where cases of trivial truths such as those just given are simply cases where, all things considered , it is not good to believe the truth. After all, we are familiar with the fact that something can be prima facie or pro tanto finally good without being all-things-considered good. For example, it may be finally good to help the poor and needy, but not all-things-considered good given that helping the poor and needy would prevent you from doing something else which is at present more important (such as saving that child from drowning).

At this point one might wonder why it matters so much to (some) epistemologists that true belief is finally valuable. Why not instead just treat true belief as often of instrumental value and leave the matter at that? The answer to this question lies in the fact that many want to regard truth—and thereby true belief—as being the fundamental epistemic goal, in the sense that ultimately it is only truth that is epistemically valuable (so, for example, while justification is epistemically valuable, it is only epistemically valuable because of how it is a guide to truth). Accordingly, if true belief is not finally valuable—and only typically instrumentally valuable—then this seems to downplay the status of the epistemological project.

There are a range of options here. The conservative option is to contend that truth is the fundamental goal of epistemology and also contend that true belief is finally valuable—at least in some restricted fashion. Marian David (2001, 2005) falls into this category. In contrast, one might argue that truth is the fundamental goal while at the same time claiming that true belief is not finally valuable. Sosa (see especially 2004, but also 2000a, 2003) seems (almost) to fall into this camp, since he claims that while truth is the fundamental epistemic value, we can accommodate this thought without having to thereby concede that true belief is finally valuable, a point that has been made in a similar fashion by Alan Millar (2011: §3). Sosa often compares the epistemic domain to other domains of evaluation where the fundamental good of that domain is not finally valuable. So, for example, the fundamental goal of the ‘coffee-production’ domain may be great tasting coffee, but no-one is going to argue that great tasting coffee is finally valuable. Perhaps the epistemic domain is in this respect like the coffee-production domain?

Another line of response against the thesis that true belief is finally valuable is to suggest that this thesis leads to a reductio . Michael DePaul (2001) has notably advanced such an argument. According to DePaul, the thesis that true belief is finally valuable implies that all true beliefs are equally epistemically valuable. Though this latter claim, DePaul argues, is false, as is illustrated by cases where two sets each containing an equal number of true beliefs intuitively differ in epistemic value. Ahlstrom-Vij and Grimm (2013) have criticized DePaul’s claim that the thesis that true belief is finally valuable implies that two sets each containing an equal number of true beliefs must not differ in epistemic value. Additionally, Nick Treanor (2014) has criticized the argument for a different reason, which is that ( contra DePaul) there is no clear example of two sets which contain the same number of true beliefs. More recently, Xingming Hu (2017) has defended the final value of true belief against DePaul’s argument, though Hu argues further that neither Ahlstrom-Vij and Grimm’s (2013) nor Treanor’s (2014) critique of DePaul’s argument is compelling.

Another axis on which the debate about the value of true belief can be configured is in terms of whether one opts for an epistemic-value monism or an epistemic-value pluralism—that is, whether one thinks there is only one fundamental epistemic goal, or several. Kvanvig (e.g., 2005) endorses epistemic-value pluralism, since he thinks that there are a number of fundamental epistemic goals, with each of them being of final value. Crucial to Kvanvig’s argument is that there are some epistemic goals which are not obviously truth-related—he cites the examples of having an empirically adequate theory, making sense of the course of one’s experience, and inquiring responsibly, and more recently, Brent Madison (2017) has argued by appealing to a new evil demon thought experiment, that epistemic justification itself should be included in such a list. This is important because if the range of goals identified were all truth-related, then it would prompt the natural response that such goals are valuable only because of their connection to the truth, and hence not fundamental epistemic goals at all.

Presumably, though, it ought also to be possible to make a case for an epistemic-value pluralism where the fundamental epistemic goals were not finally valuable (or, at least, à la Sosa, where one avoided taking a stance on this issue). More precisely, if an epistemic-value monism that does not regard the fundamental epistemic goal as finally valuable can be made palatable, then there seems no clear reason why a parallel view that opted for pluralism in this regard could not similarly be given a plausible supporting story.

In his essay, “ Meno in a Digital World”, Pascal Engel (2016) questions whether the original value problem applies to the kind of knowledge or pseudo-knowledge that we get from the internet? (2016: 1). One might initially think that internet and/or digitally acquired knowledge raises no new issues for the value problem. On this line of thought, if digitally acquired (e.g., Googled knowledge, information stored in iPhone apps, etc.) is genuine knowledge, then whatever goes for knowledge more generally, vis-à-vis the value problems surveyed in §§1–2, thereby goes for knowledge acquired from our gadgets.

However, recent work at the intersection of epistemology and the philosophy of mind suggests there are potentially some new and epistemologically interesting philosophical problems associated with the value of technology-assisted knowledge. These problems correspond with two ways of conceiving of knowledge as extending beyond traditional, intracranial boundaries (e.g., Pritchard 2018). In particular, the kinds of ‘extended knowledge’ which have potential import for the value of knowledge debate correspond with the extended mind thesis (for discussion on how this thesis interfaces with the hypothesis of extended cognition, see Carter, Kallestrup, Pritchard, & Palermos 2014) and cases involving what Michael Lynch (2016) calls ‘neuromedia’ intelligence augmentation.

According to the extended mind thesis (EMT), mental states (e.g., beliefs) can supervene in part on extra-organismic elements of the world, such as laptops, phones and notebooks, that are typically regarded as ‘external’ to our minds. This thesis, defended most notably by Andy Clark and David Chalmers (1998), should not be conflated with comparatively weaker and less controversial thesis of content externalism (e.g., Putnam 1975; Burge 1986), according to which the meaning or content of mental states can be fixed by extra-organismic features of our physical or social-linguistic environments.

What the proponent of EMT submits is that mental states themselves can partly supervene on extracranial artifacts (e.g., notebooks, iPhones) provided these extracranial artifacts play kinds of functional roles normally played by on-board, biological cognitive processes. For example, to borrow an (adapted) case from Clark and Chalmers (1998), suppose an Alzheimer’s patient, ‘Otto’, begins to outsource the task of memory storage and retrieval to his iPhone, having appreciated that his biological memory is failing. Accordingly, when Otto acquires new information, he automatically records it in his phone’s ‘memory app’, and when he needs old information, he (also, automatically and seamlessly) opens his memory app and looks it up. The iPhone comes to play for Otto the functionally isomorphic role that biological memory used to play for him vis-à-vis the process of memory storage and retrieval. Just as we attribute to normally functioning agents knowledge in virtue of their (non-occurrent) dispositional beliefs stored in biological memory (for example, five minutes ago, you knew that Paris is the capital of France), so, with EMT in play, we should be prepared to attribute knowledge to Otto in virtue of the ‘extended’ (dispositional) beliefs which are stored in his notebook, provided Otto is as epistemically diligent in encoding and retrieving information as he was before (e.g., Pritchard 2010b).

The import EMT has for the value of knowledge debate now takes shape: whatever epistemically valuable properties (if any) are distinctively possessed by knowledge, they must be properties that obtain in Otto’s case so as to add value to what would otherwise be mere true (dispositional) beliefs that are stored, extracranially, in Otto’s iPhone. But it is initially puzzling just why, and how, this should be. After all, even if we accept the intuition that the epistemic value of traditional (intracranial) knowledge exceeds the value of corresponding true opinion, it is, as Engel (2016), Lynch (2016) and Carter (2017) have noted, at best not clear that this comparative intuition holds in the extended case, where knowledge is possessed simply by virtue of information persisting in digital storage.

For example, consider again Plato’s solution to the value problem canvassed in §1 : knowledge, unlike true belief, must be ‘tied-down’ to the truth. Mere true belief is more likely to be lost, which makes it less valuable than knowledge. One potential worry is that extended knowledge, as per EMT—literally, often times, knowledge stored in the cloud—is by its very nature not ‘tethered’, or for that matter even tetherable, in a way that corresponding items of accurate information which fall short of knowledge are not. Nor arguably does this sort of knowledge in the cloud clearly have the kind of ‘stability’ that Olsson (2009) claims is what distinguishes knowledge from true opinion (cf., Walker 2019). Perhaps even less does it appear to constitute a valuable cognitive ‘achievement’, as per robust virtue epistemologists such as Greco and Sosa.

EMT is of course highly controversial, (see, for example, Adams & Aizawa 2008), and so one way to sidestep the implications for the value of knowledge debate posed by the possibility of knowledge that is extended via extended beliefs, is to simply resist EMT as a thesis about the metaphysics of mind.

However, there are other ways in which the technology-assisted knowledge could have import for the traditional value problems. In recent work, Michael P. Lynch (2016) argues that, given the increase in cognitive offloading coupled with evermore subtle and physically smaller intelligence-augmentation technologies (e.g., Bostrom & Sandberg 2009), it is just a matter of time before the majority of the gadgetry we use for cognitive tasks will be by and large seamless and ‘invisible’. Lynch suggests that while coming to know via such mechanisms can make knowledge acquisition much easier, there are epistemic drawbacks. He offers the following thought experiment:

NEUROMEDIA: Imagine a society where smartphones are miniaturized and hooked directly into a person’s brain. With a single mental command, those who have this technology—let’s call it neuromedia—can access information on any subject […] Now imagine that an environmental disaster strikes our invented society after several generations have enjoyed the fruits of neuromedia. The electronic communication grid that allows neuromedia to function is destroyed. Suddenly no one can access the shared cloud of information by thought alone. […] for the inhabitants of this society, losing neuromedia is an immensely unsettling experience; it’s like a normally sighted person going blind. They have lost a way of accessing information on which they’ve come to rely […] Just as overreliance on one sense can weaken the others, so overdependence on neuromedia might atrophy the ability to access information in other ways, ways that are less easy and require more creative effort. (Lynch 2016: 1–6)

One conclusion Lynch has drawn from such thought experiments is that understanding has a value that mere knowledge lacks, a position we’ve seen has been embraced for different reasons in §4 by Kvanvig and others. A further conclusion, advanced by Pritchard (2013) and Carter (2017), concerns the extent to which the acquisition of knowledge involves ‘epistemic dependence’—viz., dependence on factors outwith one’s cognitive agency. They argue that the greater the scope of epistemic dependence, the more valuable it becomes to cultivate virtues like intellectual autonomy that regulate the appropriate reliance and outsourcing (e.g., on other individuals, technology, medicine, etc.) while at the same time maintaining one’s intellectual self-direction.

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Williamson, Timothy, 2000, Knowledge and Its Limits , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/019925656X.001.0001
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–––, 2003a, “The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good”, Metaphilosophy , 34(1–2): 12–28; and reprinted in Brady and Pritchard 2003. doi:10.1111/1467-9973.00257
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Gardiner, Georgi, 2012, “Understanding, Integration, and Epistemic Value”, Acta Analytica , 27(2): 163–181. doi:10.1007/s12136-012-0152-6
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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

Brogaard, Berit, 2005, “ I Know. Therefore, I Understand ”, manuscript, available at philpapers.org.
Epistemic Value , a weblog devoted to the topic of epistemic value.
Epistemic Value , entry by Patrick Bondy in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2015).

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Earl Conee, Alan Millar and several referees at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy for useful comments on earlier versions of this entry.

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Speech on Knowledge

Knowledge is like a treasure chest. You open it and find a world of information, ideas, and understanding. It’s more than just facts; it’s the understanding of how and why things work.

You are on a journey with knowledge. It shapes your mind, inspires your thoughts, and helps you grow. Every new piece of knowledge is like a new adventure.

1-minute Speech on Knowledge

Good day, everyone. Today, we talk about a magical thing called ‘knowledge’.

Knowledge, my friends, is like a key. It unlocks the doors to many wonders. It helps us know about the world, like why the sun shines in the day or why it rains. It helps us solve problems. If we get a math problem, we use our knowledge to solve it. If we are lost, we use our knowledge to find our way back home.

Now, let’s think about how we gather knowledge. It’s like collecting seashells on a beach. We learn from books, we learn from our teachers, and we learn from our parents. We also learn from our mistakes. Each mistake is a lesson that adds to our knowledge.

But, knowledge is not just about learning things. It’s also about sharing. When we share our knowledge, it grows. Like when we help our friends with their homework. The more we share, the more we know.

Lastly, knowledge is power. The more we know, the stronger we become. It helps us make good choices. It helps us to dream big and reach for the stars. With knowledge, we can become doctors, teachers, or astronauts.

So, let’s promise today that we will keep learning, keep sharing, and keep growing our knowledge. Let’s use this power to make a better world for everyone. Thank you.

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Essay on Knowledge

2-minute Speech on Knowledge

Good day, everyone! Today we’re going to talk about something magical. Something that can open doors, build dreams, and change the world. That something is knowledge.

Knowledge is a bit like a superpower. It helps us to understand the world around us. When we know about things, we can make better choices. For instance, if you know that eating too many sweets is bad for your teeth, you might choose to eat an apple instead. Knowledge helps us to make decisions that are good for us and for others.

But knowledge isn’t just about making the right choices. It’s about understanding others too. Have you ever met someone from a different country or culture? The more we know about their language, traditions, and beliefs, the better we can understand and respect them. Knowledge brings us closer together, it helps us build bridges and not walls.

There’s something else special about knowledge. It’s like a seed. Once you plant it, it grows and grows. Let’s say you start learning about planets. Soon, you might want to know about stars, then galaxies, then the whole universe! Knowledge makes us curious, it makes us want to learn more. It’s a journey that never ends.

Here’s the best part. Knowledge is for everyone. It doesn’t matter where you come from, how old you are, or what you look like. Knowledge is not a gift, it’s a right. Every one of us has the right to learn, to explore, to ask questions, and to seek answers.

But remember, with power comes responsibility. Knowledge is a power that should be used wisely. It’s not just about knowing a lot of things. It’s about using what we know to make the world a better place. To help others. To protect our planet. To fight for what’s right.

In the end, knowledge is like a light. It shines in the darkness, guiding us forward. It helps us see things as they really are. It shows us the beauty of the world, the beauty of other people, and the beauty within ourselves.

So let’s go out there and learn. Let’s read books, ask questions, explore new ideas. Let’s fill our minds with knowledge, because knowledge is the most powerful tool we have to change the world.

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Value of Knowledge by Erik J. Olsson LAST REVIEWED: 24 July 2018 LAST MODIFIED: 26 August 2013 DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780195396577-0008

Everyone agrees that it is good to know. If you know that it will rain tomorrow, you can adapt your traveling plans accordingly; if you know that the euro crisis will soon be over, you can make a fortune buying euros; if you know a lot about philosophy, you can become a highly regarded teacher; and so on. Knowledge is clearly valuable in the sense of securing success in practical life, or at least making success more likely. Even philosophers, who disagree about many other things, do not normally debate the proposition that knowledge is of great value in practical terms. Moreover, they normally do not dispute the claim that knowledge is, in some ways, more valuable than other, lesser things, such as mere true belief. But this is where agreement usually ends. Philosophers disagree widely over what it is that makes knowledge more valuable than mere true belief. The question of why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief, raised with characteristic clarity by Plato in the dialogue Meno , has therefore been in the focus of the epistemological debate. The value of knowledge was long not considered to be a serious epistemological concern until it emerged, in the late 1990s, as the central problem of a new research program with contributions from, among others, Jonathan Kvanvig, Ernest Sosa, Richard Swinburne, and Linda Zagzebski. Other authors followed, for example, John Greco, Wayne Riggs, and Duncan Pritchard, marking what has been referred to as a “value turn” in epistemology. A characteristic feature of this movement is that the value problem is used to guide inquiry into the traditionally more debated issue regarding the nature of knowledge. Thus, authors in the value tradition tend to think that any reasonable definition of knowledge should satisfy the condition that knowledge comes out as being distinctively valuable. These authors generally believe, moreover, that the reliabilist account of knowledge, according to which knowledge amounts to reliably produced true belief, does not satisfy this condition because of the so-called swamping problem: if a belief is true, the fact that it was reliably acquired does not seem to add value. Hence, they are inclined to reject the reliabilist theory in favor of other definitions of knowledge, such as a definition that explicates knowledge in terms of intellectual (epistemic) virtue or some variation on that theme.

There are not too many books that deal exclusively with the value of knowledge. The most well-known book-length study is Kvanvig 2003 . Kvanvig’s book was instrumental in setting the agenda for the value debate, and it continues to be one of the most cited texts in this area of epistemology. Published in 2003, it is still a useful introductory text starting with classical approaches and leading up to contemporary work. Classical and early responses to the value problem are dismissed in the first chapter (for reasons that later authors have sometimes contested). It can also be used as a textbook if supplemented with articles that provide different outlooks on the topic, such as the overviews Olsson 2011 , Pritchard 2007 , and Pritchard and Turri 2011 .

Kvanvig, Jonathan. The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding . Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511498909

Kvanvig argues that virtue epistemology can solve the value problem as that problem was understood by Plato. But he also thinks that the problem in its most general form—showing why knowledge is more valuable than its conceptual parts—does not admit of a plausible solution. Instead, he argues that understanding, not knowledge, is what has distinctive value.

Olsson, Erik J. “The Value of Knowledge.” Philosophy Compass 6.12 (2011): 874–883.

DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00425.x

This article provides an overview of the area, starting with historical figures and early work. The contemporary debate is surveyed and some recent developments are highlighted, including recent criticisms of virtue epistemology. The emphasis is on classical and reliabilist-externalist responses.

Pritchard, Duncan H. “ Recent Work on Epistemic Value .” American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2007): 85–110.

Focusing on virtue epistemology, Pritchard’s extensive survey covers most works on the value of knowledge that had been published up to 2007. It also treats some nonstandard, though related, subjects such as the relation between epistemic value and the problem of skepticism, and the value of true belief.

Pritchard, Duncan H., and John Turri. “ The Value of Knowledge .” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy . Edited by Edward N. Zalta. 2011.

This is a useful overview of the problem of the value of knowledge, covering a number of the most significant and useful debates and positions.

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81.177.182.136

Speech Script: Knowledge Is Power

It is a privilege to address you today on a topic that has resonated throughout history and continues to hold immense relevance in our modern world: “Knowledge is power.” These four simple words encapsulate a profound truth—that knowledge possesses the ability to empower individuals, shape societies, and drive progress. In this article, we will explore the art of crafting a compelling speech centered around the theme of knowledge as power. We will delve into key elements of speech writing, from structuring your content to engaging your audience, all with the aim of delivering a powerful message that inspires, informs, and ignites a thirst for knowledge.

Table of Contents

Knowledge Is Power Speech Tips

Setting the stage: establishing context.

To begin your speech on knowledge as power, it is important to set the stage by establishing the context and significance of the topic. Introduce the concept of knowledge as a transformative force that has shaped the course of history, citing examples from different fields such as science, literature, and technology. Highlight how knowledge has empowered individuals and societies, driving innovation, fostering personal growth, and bringing about positive change.

Captivating Opening: Grabbing Attention

A captivating opening is crucial to engage your audience from the start. Consider using a compelling anecdote, a thought-provoking quote, or a striking statistic related to knowledge and its impact. This will pique the curiosity of your listeners and create an emotional connection, making them eager to hear more.

Clear Message: Delivering the Core Idea

Craft a clear and concise central message that encapsulates the essence of your speech. In the case of “knowledge is power,” emphasize the transformative potential of knowledge and the ways in which it empowers individuals and societies. This core idea will serve as the guiding thread throughout your speech.

Structuring the Speech: Organizing Your Thoughts

To ensure coherence and clarity, structure your speech into distinct sections. Begin with an introduction that captures attention and establishes the relevance of the topic. Then, move on to the body of your speech, where you can explore various aspects of knowledge as power. Consider dividing this section into subtopics, such as the acquisition of knowledge, the application of knowledge, and the impact of knowledge on personal and societal development. Conclude your speech with a memorable ending that reinforces your core message and leaves a lasting impression.

Compelling Content: Supporting Your Ideas

Support your central message with compelling content. Use real-life examples, relevant stories, and concrete evidence to illustrate the power of knowledge. Share inspiring stories of individuals who have harnessed knowledge to overcome challenges, achieve success, or make a positive impact in their communities. Incorporate research findings, quotes from experts, and historical references to reinforce your arguments and add credibility to your speech.

Engaging Delivery: Connect with Your Audience

A successful speech not only relies on its content but also on the delivery. Connect with your audience by maintaining eye contact, using appropriate gestures, and varying your tone and pace. Incorporate rhetorical devices, such as rhetorical questions, vivid imagery, and impactful metaphors, to evoke emotions and create a memorable experience for your listeners. Encourage audience participation through interactive elements, such as asking thought-provoking questions or inviting them to share their own experiences related to knowledge and empowerment.

Call to Action: Inspire Change

Conclude your speech with a powerful call to action. Encourage your audience to embrace a lifelong pursuit of knowledge, emphasizing its potential to transform lives and create positive change. Provide practical suggestions on how individuals can continue their learning journeys, such as reading books, attending seminars or workshops, or engaging in online courses. Inspire your listeners to become advocates for knowledge, fostering a culture of curiosity, critical thinking, and continuous learning in their personal and professional lives.

Closing Remarks: Leave a Lasting Impression

End your speech with impactful closing remarks that summarize your key points and leave a lasting impression on your audience. Reiterate the central message of knowledge as power, expressing your hope that they will harness the transformative potential of knowledge to enrich their lives and contribute to a better world.

Knowledge Is Power Example #1

Ladies and gentlemen,

Good morning/afternoon/evening!

Today, I stand before you to emphasize a timeless truth that has shaped the course of human history: “Knowledge is power.” These three simple words hold profound significance, for they encapsulate the transformative potential that lies within the pursuit and acquisition of knowledge.

Throughout the ages, knowledge has served as the bedrock of progress and the catalyst for change. From the ancient philosophers of Greece to the modern-day innovators of technology, individuals who have sought knowledge and harnessed it effectively have been able to shape the world around them.

But what does it truly mean for knowledge to be power? It means that knowledge empowers us to understand the world, to navigate the complexities of life, and to overcome challenges that come our way. It equips us with the tools to make informed decisions, to broaden our perspectives, and to unlock our full potential.

Knowledge liberates us from the shackles of ignorance and prejudice. It enables us to question the status quo, challenge societal norms, and envision a better future. It empowers us to engage in critical thinking, to seek truth and justice, and to advocate for positive change.

In today’s rapidly evolving world, where information is readily available at our fingertips, the value of knowledge has never been more important. However, it is essential to distinguish between mere information and true knowledge. Information is abundant, but knowledge is the understanding and application of that information. It is the ability to discern what is relevant, to synthesize diverse perspectives, and to draw meaningful conclusions.

To harness the power of knowledge, we must cultivate a thirst for learning—a lifelong pursuit of intellectual growth and personal development. We must embrace curiosity and approach each day as an opportunity to expand our horizons, to explore new ideas, and to challenge our existing beliefs.

Education is a cornerstone of knowledge. It provides us with a formal structure to acquire knowledge, develop critical thinking skills, and refine our abilities. However, knowledge is not confined to the walls of a classroom. It is found in the books we read, the conversations we have, and the experiences we encounter. It is a continuous journey that extends beyond formal education and encompasses a wide array of disciplines and perspectives.

Moreover, knowledge is not meant to be hoarded or kept for personal gain. It is meant to be shared, disseminated, and used for the betterment of society. When we share our knowledge, we contribute to the collective wisdom of humanity, fostering innovation, collaboration, and progress. By empowering others with knowledge, we uplift communities and create opportunities for growth and prosperity.

In conclusion, let us recognize the immense power that lies within knowledge. It is a force that can shape our lives, transform societies, and pave the way for a brighter future. Let us embrace the pursuit of knowledge, not only for personal gain but also for the betterment of humanity as a whole. May we never cease to learn, to explore, and to share our knowledge, for it is through knowledge that we can truly unleash our potential and make a lasting impact in the world.

Thank you for your attention, and may we continue to harness the power of knowledge to create a better tomorrow.

Knowledge Is Power Example #2

Today, I stand before you to emphasize a fundamental truth that has resonated throughout the ages: “Knowledge is power.” These three words hold a timeless wisdom that speaks to the transformative potential of knowledge in our lives and in society.

Knowledge is not merely a collection of facts or information. It is a force that empowers us to grow, to evolve, and to effect positive change. It is the key that unlocks doors of opportunity and opens windows to new perspectives. With knowledge, we gain the ability to make informed decisions, to understand complex issues, and to navigate the challenges that confront us.

In a world that is constantly evolving, where advancements in science, technology, and communication shape our daily lives, the acquisition and application of knowledge have never been more crucial. As individuals, we have the power to expand our intellectual horizons, to dive deeper into subjects that captivate our curiosity, and to become lifelong learners.

Knowledge equips us with the tools to become more engaged citizens, to contribute meaningfully to our communities, and to participate in the democratic process. Informed citizens, armed with knowledge, are better prepared to analyze policies, evaluate the actions of their leaders, and advocate for social justice and equality.

Furthermore, knowledge empowers us to challenge the status quo, to question prevailing beliefs, and to explore innovative solutions to the problems that plague our world. It fosters creativity, critical thinking, and the ability to connect disparate ideas in novel ways. Through knowledge, we become catalysts for progress and agents of positive change.

It is important to recognize that knowledge does not exist in isolation. It thrives in an environment of intellectual curiosity, open-mindedness, and collaboration. By engaging in meaningful dialogue, sharing different perspectives, and seeking out diversesources of knowledge, we enrich our understanding and broaden our horizons. We must embrace the idea that knowledge is not limited to our individual pursuits but is a collective endeavor that benefits from the contributions of others.

Education is a cornerstone for the acquisition of knowledge, providing structured learning opportunities and access to a wealth of information. However, knowledge is not confined to formal education alone. It can be gained through various means, such as reading books, engaging in discussions with experts, attending lectures, or exploring different cultures and experiences. The pursuit of knowledge is a lifelong journey that extends beyond the boundaries of a classroom.

In harnessing the power of knowledge, it is essential to adopt a mindset of continuous learning and growth. We must be willing to challenge our preconceptions, to embrace intellectual humility, and to remain open to new ideas. This requires intellectual curiosity, a hunger for knowledge, and a willingness to step outside of our comfort zones.

In using knowledge as a source of power, we have a responsibility to apply it ethically and responsibly. Knowledge should be used to uplift and empower others, to address societal challenges, and to create a more equitable and just world. It is through the responsible application of knowledge that we can truly harness its power for the betterment of humanity.

In conclusion, let us recognize the immense power that lies within knowledge. It is a force that can transform lives, shape societies, and drive progress. As individuals, we have the capacity to acquire knowledge, expand our understanding, and apply it in meaningful ways. Let us embrace the pursuit of knowledge, not only for personal growth but also for the betterment of our communities and the world at large. By harnessing the power of knowledge, we can become agents of positive change, making a lasting impact in our lives and the lives of others.

Thank you for your attention, and may we continue to embrace the power of knowledge in our journey of personal and collective growth.

Knowledge Is Power Example #3

Today, I want to emphasize the significance of a timeless phrase that has resonated throughout history: “Knowledge is power.” These three words encapsulate the transformative potential that lies within the acquisition and application of knowledge.

Knowledge is not a static entity; it is a dynamic force that propels us forward, shapes our perspectives, and enables us to understand and interact with the world around us. It empowers us to navigate the complexities of life, make informed decisions, and overcome obstacles that come our way.

In its essence, knowledge is the accumulation of information, insights, and wisdom that we gain through learning and experience. It equips us with the tools to analyze, interpret, and make sense of the vast array of data and stimuli that bombard us daily. With knowledge, we can distinguish between fact and fiction, discern truth from falsehood, and make sound judgments.

But knowledge is not limited to the accumulation of facts and figures. It extends beyond the realm of information to encompass understanding, creativity, and critical thinking. It enables us to connect dots, identify patterns, and draw meaningful conclusions. Knowledge empowers us to ask pertinent questions, challenge existing paradigms, and explore new frontiers.

Moreover, knowledge liberates us from the constraints of ignorance and superstition. It dispels myths, eradicates unfounded beliefs, and broadens our horizons. By seeking knowledge, we open ourselves up to diverse perspectives, cultures, and ideas, fostering empathy, tolerance, and global understanding.

In today’s rapidly changing world, knowledge has become more accessible than ever before. The advent of the internet and the digital age has democratized information, enabling individuals from all walks of life to access a wealth of knowledge at their fingertips. However, with this abundance of information comes the need for critical discernment. We must develop the skills to evaluate the credibility and reliability of sources, to separate fact from opinion, and to navigate the vast sea of information with discernment.

Education plays a pivotal role in the acquisition and dissemination of knowledge. Formal educational institutions provide structured learning environments, guidance from knowledgeable instructors, and opportunities for personal growth. However, education should not be confined to the walls of classrooms. Lifelong learning, fueled by curiosity and a thirst for knowledge, allows us to continuously expand our intellectual horizons and adapt to the ever-changing demands of the world.

Knowledge is not meant to be hoarded or wielded as a means of control. It is a resource that flourishes when shared, nurtured by collaboration and open dialogue. When we share knowledge, we contribute to the collective well-being of society, fostering innovation, progress, and social cohesion. By empowering others with knowledge, we uplift communities, bridge divides, and create a more equitable and inclusive world.

In conclusion, let us embrace the profound wisdom encapsulated in the phrase “Knowledge is power.” Let us recognize the transformative potential that lies within the pursuit and application of knowledge. Through continuous learning, critical thinking, and the responsible sharing of knowledge, we can harness its power to shape a brighter future for ourselves and for generations to come.

Thank you for your attention, and may we continue to embrace the power of knowledge in our personal and collective journeys of growth and progress.

Final Thoughts

Crafting a speech on the theme of “knowledge is power” requires thoughtful planning, engaging content, and an inspiring delivery. By establishing context, delivering a clear message, organizing your content, and employing captivating storytelling techniques, you can create an impactful speech that resonates with your audience. Remember, the purpose of your speech is to inspire, inform, and ignite a passion for knowledge, empowering individuals to embrace lifelong learning and make a positive impact in their lives and society as a whole.

About Mr. Greg

Mr. Greg is an English teacher from Edinburgh, Scotland, currently based in Hong Kong. He has over 5 years teaching experience and recently completed his PGCE at the University of Essex Online. In 2013, he graduated from Edinburgh Napier University with a BEng(Hons) in Computing, with a focus on social media.

Mr. Greg’s English Cloud was created in 2020 during the pandemic, aiming to provide students and parents with resources to help facilitate their learning at home.

Whatsapp: +85259609792

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Comprehending and Communicating Knowledge

Communication and comprehension are the giving and receiving of knowledge, and until knowledge has been received by a student, it’s fair to say that it hasn’t truly been communicated by a teacher. The challenge for teachers, of course, is how to get knowledge out of their own heads and into someone else's—and how to know it's there. This challenge is compounded by the fact that teachers and students confront something more than the everyday adventures that greet individuals trying to understand, relate to, negotiate with other individuals. On top of that, they also face a paradox at the heart of teaching and learning: on the one hand, the more expert you are, the more knowledge you have to offer a novice; on the other hand, the more expert you are, the less "like" a novice you’ve become and the less attuned you might have grown to how novices experience their learning. This gap between novices and experts needn’t become an impasse, however.

The Gap between Minds

As a teacher, it is important to acknowledge what is known as the gap between minds. Broadly speaking, this entails being aware of the gap between what you know and what your students know, and then taking the appropriate steps to bridge that gap. This section looks at the factors that create or exacerbate this gap between minds, and how to address the identified issues to lessen the gap. There are four main factors associated with the gap between minds, namely: (1) mental state inference; (2) the curse of knowledge; (3) hindsight bias; and (4) egocentrism.

Mental state inference . You know that you have a mind, and you know what you are thinking and feeling at any given time. But how do you know what other people are thinking and feeling? Since you don’t have access to the contents of other people’s minds, you have to do your best to guess what they are thinking based on information you can observe. Psychologists call this challenging task mental state inference, and it is a cornerstone of basic human interaction (Epley & Waytz, 2010). What kind of information can you use to infer the mental states of others? Luckily, humans are quite skilled at figuring out what someone is thinking based on their physical behavior, what they say, and your own ability to put yourself in their shoes and imagine how you would feel in their situation (Epley & Waytz, 2010). In your role as a teacher, acknowledging your assumptions about what determines individual students’ behaviors (and performance) may help shape how you teach to better support their learning and comprehension. This can be done by using a variety of instructional tools (such as active and collaborative learning techniques), as well as finding out (by explicitly asking students) how students learn best.

Egocentrism . Egocentrism refers to an individual’s inability to take the perspective of others into account. As is evident in the previous discussions around the curse of knowledge and hindsight bias, being unable or unwilling to analyze and incorporate perspectives outside your own can prevent you from thoroughly comprehending information. Although your role as a teacher is to impart your knowledge to others, it is important to consider the most effective ways to do so. Instead of exposing your students to masses of information that they need to consume, consider their prior knowledge and how best to support their comprehension of this information. This may take the form of encouraging your students to actively engage with the information they are given, and use it to construct their own knowledge and arrive at their own conclusions, as is done through the constructivist teaching approach.

This awareness and critical evaluation is also valuable for teachers. Rather than only consider how you would like to teach a certain concept, think about the best way for a student (with limited prior knowledge) to interact with and comprehend said concept. This should then inform how you approach teaching for the purposes of comprehension. However, to do so, you need to actively identify and challenge any biases or misconceptions you may have. The same can be said for how you encourage your students to approach every learning experience.Interlinked with this notion of egocentrism is that of perspective-taking (as mentioned above). As the inverse of egocentrism, perspective-taking refers to the act of consciously acknowledging and “taking” the perspective of another. Through their research on egocentrism and perspective taking, Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, and Gilovich (2004) found that both adults and children tend to initially adopt egocentric, contextually-incorrect views of an event (where an alternative perspective is available). While neither adults nor children tend to perfectly adjust from their own perspectives to accommodate others, what children find especially difficult is quickly correcting this error in favor of taking the alternative perspective, and viewing the event from the position of another person (Epley et al., 2004). This correction is a conscious effort, which becomes less cognitively-demanding as individuals mature and are continually exposed to perspectives other than their own.

Over time, the ability to correct, or at least acknowledge, egocentric interpretations and behaviors becomes a quicker process. However, it is still a process that individuals need to actively partake in. In the context of the learning environment, teachers can act as facilitators of this development by encouraging collaboration, and (where possible) providing students with various views or research to ensure exposure to and interrogation of multiple viewpoints. In doing so, the explicit aim of such activities should be to highlight the value (academic and personal) to be gained from perspective-taking. This notion of incentivizing perspective-taking is a key takeaway that Epley et al. (2004) have discovered through their research. They found that individuals are more willing to correct egocentric interpretations when there is an incentive associated with doing so.

Levels of Abstraction

Levels of abstraction refer to the level of detail at which content is delivered or discussed. As such, it is a concept that is tied to communication. As with the levels of hindsight bias discussed earlier, the levels of abstraction build upon one another. The higher the level, the more abstract the concept under discussion (and therefore the discussion taking place) (Hinds, Patterson & Pfeffer, 2001). There are three identified levels of abstraction, namely:

Objects: The first level of abstraction deals with tangible objects. The truth (validity) and existence of these objects is not dependent on people or their beliefs.
Experiences: The second level of abstraction focuses on individual experiences. Although these experiences may involve the same objects, they differ according to personal interpretation. This level is therefore subjective.
Concepts: The third level of abstraction involves discussions around abstract thoughts and ideas (concepts), such as beliefs, values, and individual cognitive frameworks (schemas). Concepts are based on reality, but often do not literally reflect it. (Hinds, Patterson, & Pfeffer, 2005)

As they progress, the information at each level of abstraction become more difficult to communicate, because conceptual knowledge often requires a deeper understanding than concrete details. As a result, while experts can tend to think and explain ideas with highly abstract language, novices often start with more concrete questions. Understanding these levels of abstraction is vital because effective communication and scaffolding are prerequisites of being an effective teacher. To support a student in their comprehension of an abstract or theoretical concept, try to first start with simple, object-based explanations, and then work your way towards abstract concepts.

Fluency and comprehension are closely linked. For students to comprehend what they are being taught, they first need to be able adequately take in the information with speed and accuracy. This property of how information is presented is known as fluency. In his article on the impact of the use of unnecessarily-complex language, Daniel Oppenheimer (2005) notes that increasing fluency increases perceptions of truth, confidence (in the author), frequency, and liking of the information. During five experiments on the perception of intelligence based on overly-academic writing, Oppenheimer found that participants consistently rated writing containing long, complex words harder to read and understand. This perception extended to the authors of the text, who were deemed less intelligent than the authors of text containing more straightforward language (Oppenheimer, 2005:151-152).

To provide you greater context around Oppenheimer’s (2005) findings, brief summaries of some of the experiments are included below:

Experiment 1: Participants were asked to judge admission into a graduate program based on student writing excerpts. Authors who wrote more complex text were given poorer admissions ratings.
Experiment 2: Participants were asked to rate author intelligence based on excerpts from Descartes’ Meditation IV . The more complex the translation, the lower the participant’s assessment of the text (regardless of previous expectations of author intelligence).
Experiment 3: Participants were asked to rate author intelligence and comprehension level based on sociology dissertation abstracts. The more (unnecessarily) complex the abstract, the lower participants’ evaluation of the author.
Experiment 4: Participants were asked to rate author intelligence when reading passages in an assortment of different fonts. Excerpts presented in “non-fluent” (illegible) fonts were deemed to have been written by less intelligent authors.

From the results of the experiments above, it appears that it is worthwhile to “write clearly and simply if you can, and you’ll be more likely to be thought of as intelligent” (Oppenheimer, 2005:152). This is true not only of students, in their writing, but also of teachers, in their delivery of content. Although there may be jargon that is specific to your discipline, it is a good idea to first introduce concepts using language (and fonts) that is clear, concise, and easy to understand. Once you have established (through testing) student fluency and comprehension, you can then refer to and discuss these concepts using the technical terms with which they are associated, when necessary.

An analogy is a linguistic tool used to explain the relationship between two concepts. Teachers often make use of analogies to better facilitate and support student comprehension of (the relationship between) complex or abstract concepts. There are different types of analogies, including synonyms, antonyms, cause and effect, and symbols and their representations (Heick, 2017).

Table 1: The common types of analogies (and their relationships) available to teachers. (Adapted from: Heick, 2017)

Broadly speaking, analogies can be divided into two categories, namely surface analogies and deep analogies:

Surface analogies: A surface analogy is one that is straightforward and easy to understand. Concepts that are explained through surface analogies often have simple relationships with one another. Part-to-whole and category type analogies are examples of surface analogies.
Deep analogies: A deep analogy tends to explore a more complex relationship between concepts. These analogies may be used to explain how elaborate systems or abstract concepts work. Cause-and-effect and symbol-and-representation analogies can be considered deep analogies.

In the context of the learning environment, analogies help students comprehend unfamiliar concepts by grounding them in the familiar. To do so, students are required to first critically analyze the familiar concepts and how they relate to each other, and then apply that knowledge (gained through analysis) to the unfamiliar concepts. Analogies can therefore be a way of promoting active learning, as students are encouraged to take part in the construction of their own knowledge (Heick, 2017).

Implicit vs. Explicit Knowledge

Implicit or “embedded” knowledge refers to the knowledge individuals have of processes (i.e., understanding how to do something like ride a bicycle). These processes (once learned explicitly) are often unconscious and therefore may be difficult to explain to others. Access to implicit knowledge is largely based on the automatic recall of codified information. As you will recall, this is characteristic of System 1 thinking. Sources of implicit knowledge include culture as well as routines or habits (whether learned or innate) (Beilock et al., 2001).

As with the curse of knowledge, when teaching students, it is important to be aware of the implicit knowledge you have of a concept or process, and how students may not have access to that knowledge. If this knowledge is integral to their academic progress and performance, it helps to actively make that implicit knowledge explicit to your students. This can be done by providing them with explicit sources based on their implicit knowledge.

Explicit knowledge, by contrast, is formalized, codified, articulated knowledge. It is knowledge that is easily stored and freely available through various sources (such as textbooks, websites, articles, etc.) and can therefore be identified in and taught to others with greater ease (Beilock et al., 2001).

Due to the nature of explicit knowledge, it is important that individuals continually review, update, or discard this information to ensure it remains relevant. As a teacher, this is a vital part of your role as a learning facilitator. This can be done by using formal and summative assessments to test and monitor student acquisition and recall of explicit knowledge (through multiple-choice or definition-based questions, for example). As explicit knowledge is based on the explicit recall of information (without analysis), it is associated with System 1’s cognitive processes.

For more information...

Association for Psychological Science. 2012. ‘I knew it all along…didn’t I?’ – Understanding hindsight bias.

Beilock, S. L., Afremow, J. A., Rabe, A. L., & Carr, T. H. 2001. “Don’t miss!” The debilitating effects of suppressive imagery on golf putting performance. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology . 23(3):200-221.

Epley, N. & Waytz, A. 2010. Mind perception. Handbook of social psychology . John Wiley & Sons: New Jersey.

Epley, N., Keysar, B., Van Boven, L. & Gilovich, T. 2004. Perspective taking as egocentric anchoring and adjustment. Journal of Personality and Social psychology . 87(3):327.

Fischhoff, B. 1975. Hindsight is not equal to foresight: The effect of outcome knowledge on judgment under uncertainty. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance . 1(3):288.

Heick, T. 2017. A guide for teaching with analogies .

Hinds, P.J., Patterson, M. & Pfeffer, J. 2001. Bothered by abstraction: The effect of expertise on knowledge transfer and subsequent novice performance. Journal of Applied Psychology . 86(6):1232.

Nickerson, R. S. 1999. How we know—and sometimes misjudge—what others know: Imputing one's own knowledge to others. Psychological Bulletin . 125(6):737.

Oppenheimer, D.M. 2005. Consequences of erudite vernacular utilized irrespective of necessity: Problems with using long words needlessly. Applied Cognitive Psychology . 20(2):139-156.

Roese, N.J. & Vohs, K.D. 2012. Hindsight Bias. Perspectives on Psychological Science . 7(5):411 – 426.

Waytz, A. 2017. 2017: What scientific term or concept ought to be more widely known?

Zander, T., Öllinger, M. & Volz, K. G. 2016. Intuition and insight: Two processes that build on each other or fundamentally differ? Frontiers in Psychology . 7:1395.

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Knowledge is Power Speech

Speech on Knowledge is Power

Knowledge is power means that a person who has an education can completely control his life by using that knowledge. It empowers people to know how to control and use the forces of nature for profit. We can differentiate between right and wrong, good or bad employing our knowledge. Knowledge helps us to plan and guides us on the right path in our future. It also helps us overcome our faults and our confidence and control as soon as possible to face problems in our lives. It strengthens the person through the advancement of his mental and moral life.

Knowledge is a crucial tool for bringing about positive social change. We can say knowledge is the pillar of good fortune and success. We should therefore acquire knowledge and work honestly to protect our society against evil. Knowledge, in short, keeps people away from the struggles and other social evils in society.

Short Speech on Knowledge is Power

In the lives of humans, knowledge plays a key role. It helps people to achieve success, strength, and a position in their lives. I want to talk about "Knowledge is Power" in my speech today. Educated persons can easily handle the things in life. Knowledge is the most vital tool to give power to people, and any other power cannot defeat the power of knowledge on earth. We can also say that knowledge gives power to a person who fights for his rights and competes with the world.

It has created a difference between a man and an animal. Human beings cannot be compared to animals in physical power, but human beings have been the most powerful creature on earth only because of the power of knowledge. There is no doubt that someone with physical strength is influential, but a person with knowledge strength dominates above all. It helps us to distinguish between good and bad. It brings us forward in spirit, morally and mentally. Man now has the authority to control nature with knowledge.

Humans gained knowledge for centuries to transform society from a non-civilized phase to modern technology. Knowledge contributes to the development of art, literature, science, philosophy, and religion. With the help of knowledge, a mighty mind can rule the world. You're going to understand that money is just an object if you acquire knowledge. Knowledge is the real asset of human life. Human beings are too sharp and sensible creatures on earth as they have the power to change the world with their knowledge, research, and experiments.

Long Speech on Knowledge is Power

Today I would like to deliver the best speech on Knowledge is Power. We all know that "Knowledge is power." Our calling for knowledge is the power that can transform all your life and activities. Knowledge can function as an instrument for creating and destroying life on earth. We need the power of Knowledge to differentiate between humans and animals. We get the ability to help others with the help of knowledge, which helps us free ourselves. Everyone should gain knowledge to succeed in life. The two power instruments are called physical strength and money. A powerful physical man controls power over other people. However, knowledge is more powerful because it directs our actions and allows us to discover the differences between right and wrong, good or evil. It helps people overcome their weaknesses and defects to face extreme courage, confidence, fears, and difficulties. It brings us forward mentally, morally, and spiritually.

Furthermore, humans gained control over nature with the help of knowledge. We know that people were in a non-civilized stage some thousands of years ago. We were living in cellars and dens. Civilization gradually came into society, and we gained knowledge. We became civilized with attaining knowledge. Knowledge has now made us the ruler. We used nature's strength to meet our requirements. Man has been an outstanding scientist, an accomplished artist, a strong producer, and found a noble life path. Without knowledge, it would be challenging to advance society and culture. The advancement in art, literature, technology, philosophy, and religion plays a vital role in knowledge. Awareness is force, therefore. It led people to advance. knowledge affects and influences our development and our relationship with work and life. It can last for a lifetime and is important for personal growth and development. Knowledge can be gained through any form, such as art, dance, history, architecture, or even through personal development. Knowledge gives us the insight to make life-changing choices in life. However, to learn more, make progress, and achieve one's goals, it is important to adopt a positive attitude. Mighty minds, with the power of Knowledge, will rule the minds of millions. Knowledge is so powerful that it can ruin the entire world, and, on the other hand, it is a weapon that can bring harmony to the earth. A knowledgeable person is the wealthiest person on earth, and no one can steal their knowledge. But someone can easily take your money and power from you at any moment.

Moreover, it never decreases with usage and only increases with time. Consequently, a knowledgeable person is more valuable than a rich person since a rich person can give money to a country, but a knowledgeable person can give information to a nation, and that knowledge can also increase the wealth of a nation. In conclusion, we can say that real knowledge allows a person to grow. It also takes people away from war and corruption. Besides, knowledge brings prosperity and happiness to the country. Awareness, above all, opens the door to success for all.

10 Lines for Speech on Knowledge is Power

The proverb 'Knowledge is Power' implies that knowledge is the true power that remains with all of us throughout our lives.

Knowledge is of great importance to our lives.

Knowledge helps us to distinguish between right and wrong. It helps us overcome all the situations and dangers around us.

It helps the advancement of one's community or country.

The efficient use of knowledge can accomplish a good life.

Knowledge affects our personal growth and affects our advancement and our relationship between work and personal life.

With the aid of knowledge, you can solve problems. It improves our thinking and problem-solving skills.

One must remain open-minded to embrace and obtain knowledge. It helps to build a solid foundation.

Communication plays a crucial role in the transfer of knowledge. It helps us to identify our mistakes and help us to clarify our doubts.

Knowledge forms our professional and personal life and allows us to succeed.

FAQs on Knowledge is Power Speech

1. Why is knowledge considered to be powerful?

We may distinguish between right and wrong, good and terrible, through knowledge. Knowledge helps us in future planning and directs us in the proper direction. It also teaches us how to overcome our flaws and flaws, as well as how to meet life's challenges with confidence and control as quickly and easily as possible. Knowledge is the condition of being aware of, comprehending, and gaining precise knowledge about something, which is acquired by experience or study. This implies that a person can dynamically express himself and make informed judgments based on his daily experiences and comprehension. When a person utilises his knowledge to move in the correct direction, he is considered to be strong. A person develops power when he has the ability or capacity to act or perform successfully with his knowledge. Knowledge not only builds up over time, but it also grows exponentially. Furthermore, factual information aids cognitive functions such as problem-solving and thinking.

2. What's the meaning of the phrase 'A little knowledge is a dangerous thing'?

The saying 'A little knowledge is a dangerous thing' represents the idea that a little bit of information can persuade individuals to believe they are more knowledgeable than they are, which can lead to blunders. When a person shares his opinions with others and lacks sufficient understanding of a certain issue, particularly in the medical or educational fields, it can lead to harmful circumstances. People with limited expertise frequently mislead others. Innocent people or those who lack information may readily trust the person claiming to know everything since they are usually quite convincing. Due to their overconfidence, a person with insufficient information and understanding can potentially become a source of agony and even death. Alexander Pope is credited with creating this proverb. In 1709, he stated in his work An Essay on Criticism, "A little learning is a hazardous thing." Later, in 1774, Lady's Complete Magazine adopted it in its second edition, modifying the phrase to "A little knowledge is a hazardous thing." Since then, it has been customary to employ the proverb in nearly the same wording as it first appeared.

3. What are the benefits of knowledge?

The benefits of knowledge are:

Knowledge is essential for shaping our personalities and perfecting our actions and interactions with others. It teaches us to be wise enough to make our own decisions in life.

Knowledge sharpens one's critical thinking abilities. Knowledge is required to establish an opinion or build a line of thinking.

Knowledge gives a person the ability to analyse and assert situations. A solid knowledge foundation allows minds to perform more easily and effectively.

Knowledge enables a person to analyse and assert situations. Minds can function more simply and effectively when they have a firm knowledge basis.

Individuals' confidence can be boosted by knowledge.

A person can grasp the ways of changing and conforming to changes in his environment and living conditions with information.

Knowledge is crucial and beneficial in everyday situations. For example, if I need to buy airline tickets online, I must be familiar with the online sites and their discounts, terms and conditions, and also online banking. If I lack expertise, I end up paying more. So learning is a continuous process that is important every day.

4. What is the best way to write a speech?

Giving a class speech pushes students to step outside of their comfort zone, especially if they are required to give a speech on a social issue. With practice, students acquire confidence, conviction, and fluency as they learn to face their anxieties and respond articulately to objections. The following pointers will help students in making an effective speech:

When making a speech, one of the most important factors to consider is the size of the audience. Before diving into stacks of research resources, high school students should evaluate the audience and set for the speech.

Students should focus their attention and create a concise thesis statement that will serve as a guide for the rest of the presentation. The presenters should next select two or three significant subjects that they can cover in the allotted time.

Determine if your speech or presentation's primary objective is to inform, present, or entertain.

When practising, keep track of your time from start to finish and read the entire speech several times.

Incorporating hand gestures to illustrate points in your speech might be effective. Not only can hand gestures help you connect with the audience, but they will also help you recall crucial topics.

A few audience members will ask questions regarding your speech. Consider some of the things you may receive. Then write down your answers and practise saying them out loud.

5. Where can I get the English Speeches on important topics for school competitions?

Vedantu provides students with the necessary tools to create a speech or essay for a school competition. Students can use the free download option in both online and offline study tools to match their unique needs. Vedantu also offers a variety of example papers and revision notes for all topics. Subject matter experts created these study tools to assist students to improve their academic performance. Because our aim is on the student's entire improvement, the PDF is also written with the knowledge of key ideas in mind.

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Student Engagement

I n his book Drive , Daniel Pink suggests that we operate today with a misguided understanding of what really motivates us. Often, we assume that the only way to get people to perform is to incentivize them through external rewards and punishments, or extrinsic motivation, rather than focusing people on a desired behavior, or intrinsic motivation.

As a seasoned educator who has taught in the classroom for nearly 40 years, I see this paradigm consistently. Students have become more focused on the rewards and punishments, namely grades (an extrinsic motivator), and less on the desired behavior, learning (an intrinsic motivator). Students often refer to themselves as “A” students, “B” students, or “C” students in conversations with each other and feel a sense of shame when they get failing grades. When they refer to their classes, they say things like, “That class is an easy A,” or, “It’s hard to get a good grade in that class,” or, “Don’t take that class because it will ruin your GPA.” When students ask questions about assignments, quizzes, exams, or absences, it’s almost always in reference to points and grades. A favorite question is, “Can I get any extra credit to raise my grade?”

What’s apparent in all this focus on grades is that there’s no real emphasis on learning—the true purpose of education. It is a rare occurrence that students come to talk with me about concepts or new material presented, and even in learning-focused discussions, the topic of grades almost always arises. When I encounter students after they have graduated, they almost always remember what grade they received in my class; yet when I ask about what concepts they learned, they hesitate before answering.

“What’s apparent in all this focus on grades is that there’s no real emphasis on learning—the true purpose of education.”

What can we as educators do to refocus students on the learning and get away from this emphasis on grades? I’ve found Montessori educational principles can provide us with some useful ways to rethink our current grading system and get students interested in what matters most—the learning.

Emphasizing Learning Over Grades

Why students focus on grades—and how to reverse the trend.

Carl Rogers, a psychologist and one of the founders of the humanistic psychology movement, offers some insight into why students focus so much on grades as opposed to learning in his book On Becoming a Person . Rogers suggests that a person focuses on that which is important to the maintenance of the “Self.” Students focus on grades and degrees because they think that will help them get a good job and advance their careers—maintaining the Self. It appears they don’t relate acquired knowledge and skillsets with getting a good job.

The irony is that what was acquired and developed during their formal education is what is imperative to retaining employment. After a few years in a career, a person is rarely asked about GPA. What is learned, not the grades earned, is more important to keeping a job and advancing a career.

According to Rogers, we are born with a desire to learn and reach our human potential. Students need to be placed in the proper environment to nurture this desire. Yet, as educators, we continue to reward student behavior with grades while putting less emphasis on developing this innate desire to develop and grow. Instead, learning should be the goal of education.

Let’s imagine a fully engaged classroom where, instead of learning and education being viewed as a chore, our students follow their innate tendency to explore their environment, i.e., their intrinsic desire to grow and learn. A key ingredient in this vision is autonomy—which is a principle of Montessori education. It puts emphasis on students’ freedom, within limits, to control their own educational process and goal setting, which links both success and failure with their actions and the consequences of their decisions. In other words, students are encouraged to be creative, imaginative, and free to make mistakes. Learning from those mistakes and failures is normalized as part of the process.

As such, Montessori teachers are viewed as guides, rather than people who impart knowledge. One important focus for these teachers is to design, organize, and prepare an appropriate learning environment for students, where they can freely take responsibility and self-direction for the ways they choose to learn.

Following the intrinsic motivation model, Montessori principles believe that students will be guided by their interests. They are led to those things that are valuable and meaningful to them personally. The result of this process is the development of competence, self-confidence, and mastery. Competence fosters confidence, which in turn inspires students to tackle subsequent challenges. This cycle builds on itself and leads to a lifelong quest for learning.

Rethinking the Grading Paradigm

From my experience in the classroom, our current paradigm based on grades creates an environment in which students fear the possibility of failure rather than focusing on the possibility of learning. Students are afraid to speak up, ask questions, and make mistakes for fear that it will impact their grade.

But when classes are structured as learning laboratories—like they are at Montessori schools—and students aren’t penalized for exploring new methods, making mistakes, asking questions, or admitting failure, they become more creative and self-directed. They seem to open up and thrive when asked to write one-page reflections and implication papers about what the concepts or materials mean to them. In many such classes, students appear to be having fun while they are working on class exercises and engaging in active discussions related to the topic presented.

DO EMPLOYERS REALLY CARE ABOUT GRADES?

Many people think that without grades and grade point averages (GPAs), employers would have no way of evaluating students for potential employment. But smart employers have already put less emphasis on GPAs and have instituted their own internal tests and simulations to figure out what a potential job applicant knows or is interested in knowing.

Asking students what they know about a particular subject or topic is a great way to find out about a student’s knowledge in a given area. Some employers will even look at the courses a student has taken and ask questions about what they learned in a particular class. These are all great ways to assess knowledge and may be better indicators of what a student knows than relying on a GPA or an individual grade.

I believe that if more educators used this grading structure, student cheating would be diminished, grade inflation would be eliminated, and students would be much more inclined to discuss what they are learning because the classroom would become more creative, self-directed, and meaningful to them. By becoming learning labs, these classrooms would nurture a love of learning. What’s more, perhaps implementing these changes would make achieving excellence more attainable for all student groups.

Restoring Students’ Love of Learning

Why do we educators hang on to the current extrinsically motivated grading paradigm? I think at a gut level many of us feel that it is not working well, yet the whole educational system is built around it. And trying to imagine how the whole educational system would function without grades can seem monumental.

Reimagining how this would change our roles as educators can be threatening to both individuals and their institutions. Yet, if there is one thing that we have all learned from the COVID-19 pandemic, it’s that both people and organizations can adapt to change very quickly and creatively when necessity dictates.

It is time for the entire educational system to start re-examining our current grading paradigm. With the help of other educators, students, parents, and interested groups, we can take steps to improve this grading system and restore students’ love of learning. Change starts with conversation, and I hope that all of you will join me in this one.

Gerald E. Knesek , EdD, MBA, is a senior lecturer in the School of Management at the University of Michigan–Flint. He’s a retired human resources professional who spent his entire career of over 30 years in the automotive industry at General Motors Corporation. Since his retirement, he has held positions in educational administration and teaching. Knesek is known as a student-oriented teacher.

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Speech Topics For Kids

Speech on Knowledge

You all might have heard the phrase that ‘knowledge is power’, but how would you convince someone that knowledge is the ultimate weapon one can use? This article will guide you through different topics that you should include in your speech on knowledge.

What is knowledge, how is knowledge helpful.

FAQs on Speech on Knowledge

When you say the word ‘knowledge’, what do you understand by it? How can knowledge be the most powerful asset that human beings possess? Knowledge includes information/facts that a person acquires all through their life, either through education or experience. A person who is aware of different facts and possesses awareness can easily manage the different situations that might arise. Knowledge can be acquired at any age, and one has to have a thirst for knowledge. Even a person who hasn’t attended school can have knowledge about more things than the one who went to school. There are various ways to gather knowledge, and if a person is interested in acquiring knowledge, they can easily access these sources. A truly knowledgeable person knows how to differentiate between right and wrong.

Having proper knowledge proves to be beneficial in many ways. Here are some ways by which knowledge can prove to be helpful. Let’s have a look at them.

Educational knowledge helps children to understand the different concepts much better. Students who have knowledge about different topics make them stay at the top of their game. These children do exceptionally well in activities like quizzes. A student who has the right knowledge can easily refute age-old hypotheses with proper logic and reasons.
Having knowledge will help students know more about the topic and point out its pros and cons. A student who does enough research while they study tends to have a deeper knowledge about the concept/subject, which will prove to be useful in future.
A knowledgeable person has the ability to understand and respect the opinions and perspectives of other people. They respect the different opinions on a matter. Thus, it can be said that being knowledgeable also makes a person tolerable in nature.
In a workplace, a knowledgeable person can easily and quickly get accustomed to the new skills and analyse a difficult situation with much ease. They can easily chart different ways to do the work smoothly.

Knowledge never fails a person. Even if you don’t find it suitable to use today, in the future, it would prove beneficial in a way that you would have never expected.

Frequently Asked Questions on Speech on Knowledge

What is knowledge.

Knowledge includes information/facts that a person acquires all through their life, either through education or by experience.

Is knowledge useful for children?

Yes, knowledge is essential as well as useful for children.

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Great Marks Is Not a Measure of Your Success

Marks are not important for a successful career
Life skills can take you far when it comes to building your career
What employers look for

90% is good, but it’s not everything……..

From early childhood, students are trained to believe that great careers are born from great scores in examinations. Parents at home and teachers at school reiterate what they think is the sole aim of education.

That is, scoring great marks in examinations means getting into a good college and studying in a good college is proof that your career will soar. This might be true for a percentage of the population but not exactly a fool proof package.

In reality, the knowledge you gain from your education is more important than the marks you score. The question now arises, are grades important for a great career?

To answer this question, are grades important, let’s go back to our Indian education system and decipher it step by step.

The education system in India dates back to the era of the Gurukul system. The Gurukul system of education was more a way of living rather than a race for marks.

Shishyas as they were called then would live near the home of the Guruji and attend to all the daily work. The learning included cooking up simple meals, cleaning the surroundings, science, basic calculations and medicinal studies. The pupils were taught how to live life.

In a stark difference, today the education system seems to have strayed away from the lessons on living, to a more marks oriented system. Some of the drawbacks of our education system that has led to this emphasis on marks can be summed up as follows

Inadequate Criteria to Measure Skills

One of the drawbacks of our education system is that there is no definite criteria to measure how good or how bad a student is in certain skills required for a job.

On the other hand, there is a definite measure in the performance of theory based subjects.

Marks and Grades Are the Sole Criteria for Admission Into Colleges

Another drawback of our education system is that marks are the sole criteria for admissions into colleges . Many colleges have entrance examinations which decide the caliber of the student. This remains an unfair criteria as it assesses a student based on the performance in one examination.

The System of Grading Is Based on How Much You Can by Heart.

The education system today is based more on how much you can by heart and reproduce on a sheet of paper within an allotted time. Not much importance is given to practical learning and skills needed for a job.

Prestige Attached to Only Certain Professions

In India, unfortunately, prestige is attached to a few professional courses, neglecting a thousand other educational courses that make great careers.

Owing to these disadvantages, the education system in India is suffering a big blow. However, the advent of technology and communications has opened up a range of educational and career opportunities for students.

These new career choices are more open to students skills , knowledge and understanding rather than numbers on a mark sheet.

With times changing, parents should now be aware that there are a host of opportunities awaiting your child. Learning is more important than grades.

The art of learning the subject and gaining knowledge is more important than tha marks obtained in an examination.

With great scores and high marks, a student may be able to secure a good job initially, but the true test lies in sustenance and growth and that is possible only if the student has gained knowledge in the subject, whether the grades are high or low.

Motivating students to “learn” rather than study is one of the best ways to ensure a great career. Stress on gaining knowledge on the subject rather than obtaining extra marks in a single examination.

Students comparing grades with their peers can be termed as healthy competition. However, when this same comparison is made by parents and teachers it might prove detrimental to the interests of the students.

Parents must note that each childs’ learning capacity is different. The IQ level varies from person to person. IQ or Intelligence Quotient is a score derived from a set of standard tests designed to assess human intelligence.

Comparing grades with other students can in fact be discouraging for a child and prove to work against the actual intention of a parent.

Now that you have a fair understanding that there are a wide range of career opportunities awaiting you, let’s look at why grades are not important to build a successful career.

Grades Do Not Measure Your Knowledge

One of the reasons why marks don’t matter is that grades or marks don’t measure the knowledge you have gained. Many students may not have the gift of writing but may have knowledge of the subject.

Such students will do extremely well in their careers as they are able to apply what they have learnt into a practical situation. Marks are just numbers. It won’t evaluate your talents . It values only your memory power.

Marks Are Not Important In the Long Run

Though great marks give you a morale boost and an initial push in your career, remaining at the top depends on the implementation of your knowledge. Great careers are made when you are able to use your educational knowledge in the real world.

Being industry ready is far from the theoretical knowledge you have gained in your years of college. Designing a machine on an examination paper is easier than designing, creating and working an actual machine.

Employers Look for Skills Rather than Grades

The sole aim of a good education is to kick start a great career. Facing an interview is the first step in the hunt for a job . So, do employers care about grades? Do employers check your grades before offering you a job?

The answer to this cannot be a point blank -No. However, it is safe to say that what employers look for in an employee is the experience and skill, while just giving a “glance” to the mark sheets. .

What employers look for is your practical knowledge and how ready you are to face the big industrial world.

In a fast paced world, employers do not have the time or money to spend on training students to face the real world. Employers are now looking for industry ready candidates to take on jobs immediately.

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What Skills Are Required for A Job?

The recent trend in hiring shows that soft skills are more important than grades or marks scored in examinations. Infact, the World Economic Forum, in its Future of Jobs Report has stated top 10 skills students require to learn for jobs in 2025. The t op ten skills of 2025 according to the Future of Jobs Report 2020 , World Economic Forum will be

Analytical Thinking and innovation
Active Learning and learning strategies
Complex problem solving
Critical thinking and analysis
Creativity, originality and initiative
Leadership and social influence
Technology use monitoring and control
Technology design and programming
Resilience, stress tolerance and flexibility
Reasoning, problem solving and ideation

Good Grades Are Not a Testament to Great Careers

History has shown that great inventions were not made by scientists who scored a 100.

In a book titled Einstein and the poet : In search of the cosmic man, 1983, one of the greatest physicists of all time, ALbert Einstein is quoted saying “School failed me, and I failed the school. It bored me. The teachers behaved like Feldwebel (sergeants). I wanted to learn what I wanted to know, but they wanted me to learn for the exam. What I hated most was the competitive system there, and especially sports. Because of this, I wasn’t worth anything, and several times they suggested I leave. This was a Catholic School in Munich. I felt that my thirst for knowledge was being strangled by my teachers; grades were their only measurement. How can a teacher understand youth with such a system?”

Infact, there are numerous examples of great scholars and performers who have not achieved much educationally, but have managed to achieve, what seemed to have been the impossible.

An interesting quote by Bill Gates reads “ I failed my exam in some subjects but my friend passed. Now he is an engineer in Microsoft and I am the owner.”

When It Comes to Achieving Success in Life, Are Marks Really Important?

Students must keep in mind that though marks are not important in life, completely ignoring its significance can also be detrimental.

Aim to achieve big scores, because good scores will give you a boost in morale and that’s half the battle won. At the same time, absorb the knowledge and enjoy the process. Here are some points to keep in mind when it comes to the learning journey.

Concentrate on Gaining Knowledge Rather than The Marks

Marks are not as important as knowledge and imagination . Being creative and implementing your knowledge in the work front has more weightage than the grades you score in an examination.

Enjoy While You Learn

One of the first and foremost rules of life is that you must enjoy the process of learning. Focusing only on the end results omits the joy of learning. When you learn for scoring marks, you limit the power of comprehension and understanding.

Marks Are Momentary

Always remember great marks are a momentary pleasure but knowledge gained will remain with you for life.

Marks only Identify Your Command Over the Theory

The marks you score in an exam only test your theoretical skills. These theoretical skills are insignificant compared to the practical expertise required to make a great career.

Concentrate on your practical knowledge and soft skills in order to make a mark.

Knowledge Is Not Always Gained from Books

Another reason why marks are not important is that knowledge is not gained entirely from books but by interaction with peers, social relations and team efforts .

With the adoption of the New Education Policy in 2021 , the education system in the country is all set for an overhaul change. With more emphasis on practical learning rather than grades, students can now be taught to learn rather than to cram for the examinations.

Universities and colleges can now be more inclusive when it comes to introduction of new systems of learning and practical tutoring.

Onsite visits, laboratory training and practical assessments are just some of the methods educational institutions can adopt to increase hands-on learning experience amongst students in order to make them industry and future ready.

We understand that good marks are a great boost, morally and mentally. However, it is not the sole purpose of your education.

Dig deeper and seek guidance from the experienced when it comes to making smart educational and career choices. Low marks with high knowledge is better than high marks with no knowledge.

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Why Knowledge is More Important than Marks?

(Marks or knowledge, what’s your goal?)

Be it admissions, scholarships, internships, or jobs, marks open up many career opportunities. But when it comes to being successful in real life outside the classroom, knowledge is what we tap into. What is more important? Marks or knowledge? Read on to find out…

A few days ago, I ran into the parent of one of our students. He told me when he was a student, everyone had a clear career path. Whoever scored 80% or more in SSC would go to the science stream. Those who scored somewhere between 65 and 80% would go into commerce. And others would opt for arts.

I asked him, so what stream did you get into? He replied with a sad smile, “I scored 86% so naturally, I opted for 11 th science. But by the time I completed my B.Sc., I realized that I was actually inclined toward management. So, I jumped ships and took up MBA (finance). Then I cracked banking exams and now I am happily working with a reputed bank.

Marksheet or Real-Life Success?

Did you know Bill Gates doesn’t hold a college degree? Surprised? Neither does Mark Zuckerberg! As a matter of fact, he is a Harvard University dropout! That’s not it! Albert Einstein, a synonym for intelligence was apparently a ‘bad student’ and failed many entrance exams. Be it Steve Jobs, Brad Pitt, Ellen DeGeneres, or our very own, the God of Cricket, Sachin Tendulkar. If you look around, you can easily list many university dropouts who are highly successful in real life.

This is an eye-opener for everyone who thinks marks are the benchmark for assessing the real talent of a student. I personally believe that grades are the ultimate outcome of the teamwork of students, their parents, and their teachers. But all we do is judge a student by his/her marks and ignore his/her real talent.

If marks were the only criteria to evaluate talent, Henry Ford wouldn’t have been an automobile legend. Or my close friend who hardly scored 62% in his SSC would not have been a Chartered Accountant in the 1st go! When I asked him how did he have the courage to go for CA with such low grades, he said giggling, “Oh that was a big deal, I scored 12% more than the passing line of CA exams (50%)”.

Every one of us knows this well, but what are we doing about it?

How much did you score?

As soon as the SSC or HSC board results are out, friends, relatives, neighbors everyone asks this one question! Of course, including the educational institutes! We, as a society, have been obsessing over marks for generations. But are they really that important? They are simply a measure of students’ academic performance. And this parameter or criteria is by no means foolproof.

Imagine a student who studied so hard the entire year. But somehow on the day of the board examination, he/she couldn’t perform well. Maybe he/she was unwell or dealing with some personal or familial issue. So naturally, he will not get high marks. But does that mean he/she doesn’t know the subject well? Let’s imagine another scenario. A particular student gets lucky because everything that he/she had prepared for was asked in the exam. Now he/she will stand among the top ten students. But does that mean he/she knows the subject well?

Knowledge ≠ Marks

Knowledge or talent does not equal marks. Knowledge and marks, though correlated and often confused with each other, are two entirely different things. If you ask me, marks are simply a reflection of how well you performed on a certain day when certain questions were asked. Of course, marks will determine your eligibility for admissions, scholarships, internships, or job opportunities. But knowledge is what will help you succeed in life beyond the classroom.

What is Knowledge?

Knowledge is the information, skills, and understanding you have gained through your education and experiences. It is the foundation upon which your expertise is built. To put it differently, it is the practical application of what you have learned in school or college. And when it comes to solving real-world problems, you will have to turn to your knowledge, not your mark sheets.

If you are a parent, ask yourself this. When was the last time you had a look at your SSC mark sheet?

For a student, the aim or the real end goal of education should be knowledge, not a degree. If you have the knowledge, marks will automatically come. Instead of focusing on getting good grades, if you focus on acquiring knowledge, you will grow as a profound learner and a good human being.

Students today are under a lot of pressure. They work really hard throughout the year. They solve a lot of question papers and attempt endless mock tests. But sadly, all they seek are marks, not knowledge. Marks will help you cruise through your academic years, but deep knowledge and experience will help you succeed in life.

How would you define success?

Over the years, we have come across many people of both kinds. There are those who did very well at school. Always passed with flying colors. But in the end, didn’t turn out to be anyone remarkable. And there are those who probably did not score well but stayed on the path of gaining knowledge. And today they have reached top positions and have become successful. Which ones do you want to be?

Marks can be a motivator to learn. They can also open up opportunities. So, striving for good marks is not wrong. But let’s not forget that we should pursue building a solid foundation of knowledge. Let’s learn to prioritize knowledge over marks and strive to reach our real potential. Let’s save ourselves from this meaningless rat race and stop judging students based on their marks only.

Marks and knowledge serve different purposes.

It is possible to have good marks without a deep understanding of a subject, and it is possible to have a deep understanding without achieving top grades. If we learn to emphasize knowledge more than marks, exam days will not be as stressful. Students will learn to learn, rather than simply mugging up their syllabus and forgetting everything soon after the exam. Let’s raise our future generations to be knowledge seekers instead of seeking a few numbers on a sheet of paper.

So, if you clapped whenRanchoddas Chanchad in 3 Idiots said “Follow the perfection, the success and marks will follow you”, do not be a hypocrite and pressurize your child to score more at the cost of actually learning something.

Just give it a thought!

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Free Speech Zone: Is human life more valuable than art?

Juan Velasquez, Studio Art

“Art goes away eventually and it’s a materialistic thing, and I love painting so I know how important it is and would love for it to exist forever, but it can’t so care more about the lives that can give us the art”

Bobby Adam, Art

“Probably the people, because the art can be replaced.”

Cassandra Gonzalez, Sociology

“The lost of humans, humans life’s are way more important”

Leslie Duran, Sociology

“Persons life is more important people are more valuable than art.”

Sovauuika Touch, Nursing

“I think human life means more, although the art is very enspwnsive and sometimes can’t replace, it cannot replace a life.”

Cerritos College • Norwalk, Calif.

Comments (1)

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Skyler Rains • Mar 17, 2023 at 12:22 pm

Art matters. It is not simply a leisure activity for the privileged or a hobby for the eccentric. It is a practical good for the world. The work of the artist is an expression of hope – it is homage to the value of human life, and it is vital to society. Art is a sacred expression of human creativity that shares the same ontological ground as all human work. Art, along with all work is the ordering of creation toward the intention of the creator. -Michael Gungor This quote approaches the immediate opposite of what most people would answer when answering the question “Is human life more valuable than art?”. Look at both sides. Art is a preservative of history. History is a very important part of the world. Quote: “The “sanctity of life” is the idea that human lives are inherently valuable — more valuable than any other material thing there is.The fact that we value human life owes itself to various religious traditions. Without religion, can it be justified? Philosophers often reference human rationality as the reason for their value. Is this good enough today?” While material achievements from one person, especially earlier on in human history are extremely important, they do not deem risking one’s life in an attempt to rescue that achievement, because, human life, is infinitely more important than material objects. Especially nowadays, when art can be viewed by anybody with a device, and even replicated to perfection by skillful artists. While art is a wonderful means of self expression, and an insightful look into our history, it does not deem risking the most valuable thing we, as a people can have, life. Draw the easy conclusion for yourself.

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Confidence vs Knowledge

. Update: Jul 5, 2021 4:01 pm

Table of Contents

Points to speak for the topic ‘Confidence vs Knowledge’:

Knowledge is essential t o understand and solve problems . Confidence is necessary to take opportunities and to put the knowledge to use. So, both knowledge and confidence are important to achieve success.
When we have knowledge, we feel confident. More knowledge often increases confidence .
Knowledge alone may not give us success. Even if we have expertise, l ack of confidence results in not utilising the knowledge , and hence wastage of resources.
Similarly, confidence without knowledge is not helpful in many circumstances. Sometimes, overconfidence without having the appropriate knowledge results in negative consequences.
Confidence alone is not sufficient to maintain success . To sustain the success in any field, one must work hard to gain and update the required knowledge.
But in some situations, confidence saves us even if we have no knowledge . For example, in group discussions, if we are confident enough we can understand what other participants are saying and we can manage to form new related points. If we are not confident enough and if we feel panicked, we cannot do so.
Sometimes more knowledge creates confusion and self-doubt. At that point, confidence helps in taking risks and in trying new things.
Most of the successful people are confident people or at least they fake confidence to overcome self-doubt. They work hard to increase their knowledge to maintain the level of confidence.

Conclusion:

Both confidence and knowledge are essential to achieve success. However, the importance of each varies depending on the situation.

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COMMENTS

Albert Einstein on the power of ideas and imagination in science
The text below is based on excerpts from the book composed by me into a short article. Actually, this article elaborates Einstein's famous quote: "Imagination is more important than knowledge. For knowledge is limited, whereas imagination embraces the entire world, stimulating progress, giving birth to evolution.
The Value of Knowledge
1. Value problems. In Plato's Meno, Socrates raises the question of why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief.Call this the Meno problem or, anticipating distinctions made below, the primary value problem.. Initially, we might appeal to the fact that knowledge appears to be of more practical use than true belief in order to mark this difference in value.
Speech on Knowledge is Power
1-minute Speech on Knowledge is Power. Ladies and Gentlemen, I stand before you today to discuss a simple yet profound topic, "Knowledge is Power". This phrase holds a powerful meaning that highlights the importance of learning and education. It proclaims that those who possess knowledge hold the key to understanding, influencing, and ...
Speech on Knowledge
Knowledge is like a treasure chest. You open it and find a world of information, ideas, and understanding. It's more than just facts; it's the understanding of how and why things work. You are on a journey with knowledge. It shapes your mind, inspires your thoughts, and helps you grow. Every new piece of knowledge is like a new adventure.
Value of Knowledge
Knowledge is clearly valuable in the sense of securing success in practical life, or at least making success more likely. Even philosophers, who disagree about many other things, do not normally debate the proposition that knowledge is of great value in practical terms. Moreover, they normally do not dispute the claim that knowledge is, in some ...
Speech Script: Knowledge Is Power
To begin your speech on knowledge as power, it is important to set the stage by establishing the context and significance of the topic. Introduce the concept of knowledge as a transformative force that has shaped the course of history, citing examples from different fields such as science, literature, and technology.
Why imagination is more important than knowledge
emotional strength; and, routinely, imagination. Knowledge and technical skill are the tools that turn an idea into reality, and emotional strength earns mention because many great achievers endure discouragement and disparagement on the route to creative success. Though Hoffert's comments dovetailed easily with this view, they also seemed a ...
Knowledge is Power Speech for Students and Children in English
In dictionary terms, Knowledge is the familiarity of a situation gained by experience. In other words, all human Knowledge proceeds from experience. Without experience one cannot attain Knowledge. The fundamental identity of one's capability is the amount of Knowledge they have acquired. With this, let me relate Knowledge with power.
Comprehending and Communicating Knowledge
Sources of implicit knowledge include culture as well as routines or habits (whether learned or innate) (Beilock et al., 2001). As with the curse of knowledge, when teaching students, it is important to be aware of the implicit knowledge you have of a concept or process, and how students may not have access to that knowledge.
The Value in Science : speech on knowledge
Neil deGrasse Tyson gives an entertaining speech on knowledge in this interview with Stephen Colbert. Tyson tells Colbert that it's always better to have knowledge than to remain ignorant. As an example, he says that if an individual had five years to live, they would probably want to know about it, so that they could live differently and try ...
Knowledge is Power Speech in English for Students
Speech on Knowledge is Power. Knowledge is power means that a person who has an education can completely control his life by using that knowledge. It empowers people to know how to control and use the forces of nature for profit. We can differentiate between right and wrong, good or bad employing our knowledge.
Why Focusing on Grades Is a Barrier to Learning
Rogers suggests that a person focuses on that which is important to the maintenance of the "Self.". Students focus on grades and degrees because they think that will help them get a good job and advance their careers—maintaining the Self. It appears they don't relate acquired knowledge and skillsets with getting a good job.
Speech on Knowledge
Knowledge can be acquired at any age, and one has to have a thirst for knowledge. Even a person who hasn't attended school can have knowledge about more things than the one who went to school. There are various ways to gather knowledge, and if a person is interested in acquiring knowledge, they can easily access these sources.
"Why Knowledge Counts More Than Skill"
Prior knowledge affects comprehension—in many cases, far more than generic "reading skills" do. The ability to build knowledge by reading and to learn from texts is a crucial driver of student success. …. It is crucial to equity because many students' lack of background knowledge causes them to fall further and further behind.
Prioritising knowledge over high marks
Samapika. In the modern education ecosystem, students often prioritise on scoring high marks and keeping up with their peers instead of focussing on gaining optimum amount of knowledge. In today's world, competition in the field of academics has gone up to such an extent that students feel the pressure to do well in exams rather than learning ...
Imagination is more important than knowledge
Albert Einstein's quote, "Imagination is more important than knowledge," serves as a reminder that our ability to think creatively and see beyond the constraints of our current reality is an ...
Marks Vs Knowledge
Marks are temporary; the knowledge that you acquire is permanent. Also, practical day-to-day application of what is learnt is much more important and holds more value than theoretical bookish knowledge. This unending quest to score more marks continues even in college. There are 5 things that matter more than having good grades to be successful:
Are Grades Important for Jobs?: Clear Your Confusion!
The recent trend in hiring shows that soft skills are more important than grades or marks scored in examinations. Infact, the World Economic Forum, in its Future of Jobs Report has stated top 10 skills students require to learn for jobs in 2025. The t op ten skills of 2025 according to the Future of Jobs Report 2020, World Economic Forum will be.
Why Knowledge is More Important than Marks?
Marks and knowledge serve different purposes. It is possible to have good marks without a deep understanding of a subject, and it is possible to have a deep understanding without achieving top grades. If we learn to emphasize knowledge more than marks, exam days will not be as stressful. Students will learn to learn, rather than simply mugging ...
Gaining knowledge is more important than scoring high marks
We advise the children that knowledge is imperative, and one should strive to attain excellence at the personal , state , national and international levels. When the students strive for excellence, good marks are its by-product. As an institution we are aware that academic grades rarely assess qualities like creativity, leadership and teamwork ...
The Jack Ma Story: Why Thinking Big Is More Important Than ...
Intuition Is More Important Than Book Knowledge. Jack Ma's example shows that entrepreneurial intuition and, above all, the willingness to be open to new ideas, and to always be ready to adapt a ...
Free Speech Zone: Is human life more valuable than art?
Leslie Duran, Sociology. "Persons life is more important people are more valuable than art.". Sovauuika Touch Photo credit: Derrick Coleman. Sovauuika Touch, Nursing. "I think human life means more, although the art is very enspwnsive and sometimes can't replace, it cannot replace a life.". Story continues below advertisement.
Confidence vs Knowledge ~ Group Discussion Ideas
Confidence is necessary to take opportunities and to put the knowledge to use. So, both knowledge and confidence are important to achieve success. When we have knowledge, we feel confident. More knowledge often increases confidence. Knowledge alone may not give us success. Even if we have expertise, l ack of confidence results in not utilising ...
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The Value of Knowledge

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Value of Knowledge by Erik J. Olsson LAST REVIEWED: 24 July 2018 LAST MODIFIED: 26 August 2013 DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780195396577-0008

Speech Script: Knowledge Is Power

Knowledge Is Power Speech Tips

Captivating Opening: Grabbing Attention

Clear Message: Delivering the Core Idea

Structuring the Speech: Organizing Your Thoughts

Compelling Content: Supporting Your Ideas

Engaging Delivery: Connect with Your Audience

Call to Action: Inspire Change

Closing Remarks: Leave a Lasting Impression

Knowledge Is Power Example #1

Knowledge Is Power Example #2

Knowledge Is Power Example #3

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The Gap between Minds

Levels of Abstraction

Implicit vs. Explicit Knowledge

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Neil deGrasse Tyson's Speech on Knowledge on Valuing Information

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10 Lines for Speech on Knowledge is Power

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Great Marks Is Not a Measure of Your Success

Inadequate Criteria to Measure Skills

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The System of Grading Is Based on How Much You Can by Heart.

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Marks Are Not Important In the Long Run

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What Skills Are Required for A Job?

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When It Comes to Achieving Success in Life, Are Marks Really Important?

Concentrate on Gaining Knowledge Rather than The Marks

Enjoy While You Learn

Marks Are Momentary

Marks only Identify Your Command Over the Theory

Knowledge Is Not Always Gained from Books

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