religious extremism essay with quotations

Essay on Religious Extremism: Causes, Effects and Solutions

Essay on religous extremism for matric, fa, fsc, 2nd year, ba and bsc.

Here is an essay on Religious Extremism for the students of 10th Class, 12th Class and Graduation. Religious Extremism will discuss that there is no connection between Islam and Religious Extremism or Terrorism. It will also discuss Causes of Religious Extremism, Effects of Religious Extremism and solutions of Religious Extremism. Essay on Pollution is also available.

Religious Extremism Essay for Class 10, Class 12, Graduation

Religious Extremism means fighting or killing those who do not accept one’s point of view regarding religion. It is very common in the world and even modern countries are not safe from it. Nobody can connect it with Muslims or Islam even Muslims are attacked many times by the religious extremists in other countries. However, Religious extremism is very common and popular in Pakistan. Pakistan is a religious country. It came into being in the name of Islam. But unfortunately, some of its religious ulemas and thinkers divided the country into many sects. The unity of the Muslims lies in pieces. The people of one sect hate strongly the people of other sects. Religious extremism means that one religious group considers it thinking correct and truthful. He thinks that views held by it are final and conclusive. The religious views of the other groups are incorrect. He hates the other group and feels uncomfortable with it. This leads to hostility against the other group. In this way, every person adheres to his point of view and considers the other person wrong.

Reasons of Religious Extremism

Religious extremism is produced in the people by the following factors:-

1. The observers and thinkers consider that religious extremism is produced by emotional and non-scientific thinking of the people. They claim that people become too much subjective and too much involved in their own thinking. Their thinking attains personal colour. 1st we need to read our Holy Quran to understand the message of God towards the humanity. Islam is not only a religion it is also a way of living from the beginning to end of life. The whole life of Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) is a role model for us and the whole world. The person who will understand it will never go near the religious extremism.Next, scientific and objective thinking is also a factor to avoid the menace of religious extremism.

2. Lack of modern knowledge and ignorance breeds religious extremism. A large number of our people are uneducated. They are blind to the modern trends of knowledge in all fields of life. This thing generates a clash between ignorance and knowledge. The religious scholars, ulemas, and thinkers stick to their point of view. They try to force their views on the others by force. This produces an atmosphere of fear, suspicion and mistrust.

3. Religious extremism takes place in those minds which are simple and credulous. They take every belief for granted and do not analyse it.

4. Religious extremism has generated many evils. It has produced tyranny and violence in many countries of the world. It has urged the religious extremists to resort to using force against those who do not agree with their views. This thing has built a strife between “Shias and Sunnies”. These two religious groups killed many people of the rival group. They killed innocent people which included thinkers, scholars, doctors, teachers and other civilized members of society. Such a type of religious extremism is very harmful to society and it can break up the integrity and unity of the country. The unity of the country is at stake due to the presence of this form of religious extremism.

Effects of Religious Extremism

Religious extremism produces the following evils:-

1. It builds an atmosphere of distrust and fear. People begin to hate one another and suspect each other’s intention.

2. Religious extremism leads to the formation of religious groups and organizations. Foreign Governments give funds to these groups to impose terrorist in developing countries for their own purposes. These groups organize themselves into armed groups and use force to intimidate and horrify the rival groups. In Pakistan such groups exist and, they kill one another mercilessly. The use of force leads to enmity and bitter hostility. An atmosphere of strife, tension and horror halts the economic progress of the country. The foreign investors stop investing their money in big projects.

Solutions to Control Religious Extremism

We can overcome religious extremism by taking the following steps.

• Modern education should be given to the students who study in Madrassas.
• Religious extremism comes into action for lack of tolerance. The people should be taught to show tolerance to each other. The teachings of Islam should be propagated through electronic media about human dignity, equality and justice. Islam is a religion of peace and justice. A campaign should be started on electronic media which should teach people the real principals of Islam.

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CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS article

A multidimensional analysis of religious extremism.

• 1 School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia
• 2 Department of Psychology, Universitas Islam Indonesia, Yogyakarta, Indonesia

Even though religious extremism is currently a hotly debated topic, it is often reduced to a unidimensional construct that is linked to religious violence. We argue that the contemporary use of the term “extreme” fails to capture the different interpretations, beliefs, and attitudes defining extreme religious identity. To address this issue, we unpack the meaning of the term “extreme” in religious contexts and answer the call by scholars to provide a more comprehensive framework that incorporates the many different dimensions that constitute religion. We develop a model of religious extremism in theological, ritual, social, and political dimensions of religion based on the variety of Islamic groups in Indonesia. Going beyond an analysis that equates Muslim extremism with violence, we argue that Muslims (or indeed any religious group) may be extreme in some dimensions but moderate in others, e.g., extreme in ritual and moderate in political. Interpreting extremism relative to these four dimensions provides new insights when examining the global issue of religious extremism and helps to better predict how religious extremism is expressed. More generally, our framework helps to develop an understanding of radicalism that goes beyond a focus on violence.

Introduction

Recently, we witnessed a surge in psychological research examining the role of religion in human life (e.g., Ysseldyk et al., 2010 ; Coyle and Lyons, 2011 ; Brambilla et al., 2016 ). This rise in interest can probably be explained by recent concerns in the Western world about the social and political implications of the surge of “bad religion” ( Basedau et al., 2016 ). As a result, there has been an intense debate concerning the social risk vs. value of religion and its role within the state ( Coyle and Lyons, 2011 ). Yet, we would argue that the notions of “good” vs. “bad” religions, or even unidimensional and dichotomous categorizations of religiosity as moderate vs. extreme, do not do justice to the issues and lead to simplistic understandings whereby religious extremism is often only seen as a root cause of violence and terrorism.

Such notions and categorizations matter: religious group members are extremely diverse, whereby religion (or even religious extremism) is expressed in very different ways. Problematic too is that such simplistic representations are consequential in that they determine the perception of extremist groups. For example, following 9/11, almost 70% of the U.S. security policies targeted Arabs and Muslims as they were seen to be associated with the adherents of extremist movement ( Cainkar, 2009 ). It appears then that the term religious extremism engenders negative stereotypes toward particular groups of religious people among the public and policy-makers. This occurs despite frequent warnings that popular (or journalistic) uses of the term “extremism,” associating it with terrorism, might lead to misunderstandings of particular groups ( Schipper, 2003 ).

To counter such simplistic understandings of religious extremism, we present a multidimensional model of religious extremism that aims to advance our knowledge of religion as a complex and diverse social identity ( Ysseldyk et al., 2010 ). In particular, we challenge the idea that religious extremism manifests only in one particular way and suggest that one dimension of religious extremism (e.g., a radical agenda in politics) may not necessarily be accompanied by extremism in another dimension (e.g., intolerance for diversity in rituals). To understand people’s willingness to support violent political action, we therefore need to explore religious extremism on multiple dimensions and be open to the idea that not every form of religious extremism is associated with a willingness to achieve goals in violent ways.

In this paper, we briefly review the different interpretations and understandings of extremism within religion and propose an alternative model that allows for a more accurate and complete understanding of various dimensions of religion. We argue that our analysis will help to explain why, despite the perceived similarities that lead outsiders to cluster them together, extreme movements are often in conflict with one another over what it means to be a good religious person. To illustrate the multidimensional nature of religious extremism, we focus on one particular context: Indonesian Muslims. We propose that in other faith contexts, the dimensions proposed may need to be expanded or adjusted to be more accurate and useful.

Moderate vs. Extreme Religiosity

In psychological research, a variety of terms have been used to describe an engagement with religion, such as religiosity (e.g., Gibbs and Crader, 1970 ; Diener and Clifton, 2002 ; Paloutzian, 2017 ), religious fundamentalism ( Altemeyer and Hunsberger, 1992 ; Williamson, 2010 ; Liht et al., 2011 ), radicalism, or extremism (e.g., Simon et al., 2013 ; Webber et al., 2017 ; Kruglanski et al., 2018 ). These terms are sometimes used interchangeably, and sometimes contested (e.g., religious fundamentalism may be used by some scholars to refer to a rigid interpretation of scriptures, in contrast to religious extremism which is often associated with a particular political agenda). Moreover, while religiosity has been linked to positive outcomes such as higher well-being (e.g., Carlucci et al., 2015 ) and life satisfaction (e.g., Bergan and McConatha, 2001 ), religious fundamentalism and extremism have been linked to more negative outcomes such as prejudice ( Altemeyer and Hunsberger, 1992 ), hostility ( Koopmans, 2015 ), or even armed conflict ( Cornell, 2005 ).

One prominent definition of extremism as a motivation for terrorism is that extremism comprises ideological beliefs about an obligation to bring back the political system to a form suggested by religious norms through violence ( Arena and Arrigo, 2005 ). Therefore, the label of extremist is attributed to groups fighting for their political agendas against mainstream systems accepted by the majority of people (e.g., ISIS against the government of Syria, or MILF or Moro Islamic Liberation Front against the government of the Philippines). Such a definition of extremism associated with political violence is related to broad collective responses against perceived oppression or injustice, and it may be fueled by extreme religious dogma or not.

The understanding of religious extremism as political has been elaborated by many scholars. For example, religious extremists have been characterized by Sageman (2008) as seeking martyrdom, and fueled by anger regarding perceived injustice. Similarly, Wiktorowicz (2005) proposed a four-stage model of extremism culminating in violence: first, a cognitive openness to new people or new ideas followed by the experiences of personal or group grievance (e.g., discrimination and oppression). Second, the individual takes up activism, and the openness can lead to an acceptance of the group’s extreme norms (e.g., for violence). Belief in the group’s claims and willingness to act based on the group’s norms can overcome the actor’s rational choice perspectives. Thus, when the group’s norm allows the use of non-normative tactics such as violence to gain their objectives, the individuals will intentionally commit violence on behalf of the group.

A similar model of religious extremism as the culmination of a trajectory of religious identity into group-based violence is put forward by Silber and Bhatt (2007) . The process of being extreme begins with an openness to new thoughts (e.g., in religion) that leads into a process of worldview change. Within this process, a tragic experience can lead to the loss of meaning and connection with the initial identity (e.g., as a religious moderate). The adoption of extreme beliefs and norms fuelled by tragedy is enhanced by the indoctrination process operated by an extreme organization. Again, religious extremism is seen to reach its ultimate end in the expression of violence by the actor.

The above conceptual approaches to extremism associate extremism with violence committed as a group member. Other more individual-level analyses of extremism operationalize it as endorsement of particular beliefs, such as the duty to engage in violent holy war against the enemy ( Webber et al., 2017 ) or sympathy toward extremist groups and support for their political action ( Simon et al., 2013 ). Some analyses have spanned both individual and group levels: for example, Schmid (2014) proposes that either for individuals (i.e., personal beliefs) or groups (i.e., as embedded in salient group norms), the five warning signs of religious extremism include belief in absolute truth, endorsement of blind obedience, a quest to establish utopia, belief that the end justifies the means, and a declaration of holy war. Similarly, Hogg and Adelman (2013) have defined extremism through the aspects covering group level (i.e., a radical agenda, support for violent action, and authoritarian leadership) and individual level (i.e., extreme pro-group action).

While we applaud the development of more nuanced ways to understand religious extremism, and the diversity of definitions above, we propose that such distinctions do not go far enough in unpacking the multiple ways in which extremism can be expressed. To allow for the development of this diversity, we adopt a broader definition of extremism and define extremism as the extent to which there are clear norms about appropriate behavior and very little latitude in accepting different pattern of norms or particular behaviors. Thus, the focus is not so much on the behavior itself, but on the extent to which particular behaviors are normatively prescribed within a religious group with little room for deviating from that. Therefore, what is perceived as extreme in one historical or cultural context may be moderate or mainstream in another. This usage is in contrast to the definitions proposed by scholars who have associated extremism exclusively with violent intergroup conflict.

In line with Sedgwick (2010) , we propose that religion, either at individual or group level, can be expressed along a continuum ranging from moderate to extreme, but go further by arguing that there is not one continuum, but multiple dimensions of religion. We discuss the implication of embracing extremism in one dimension but not in others, and argue that the specific constellations of moderate vs. radical features are important when considering how religion is expressed. To illustrate the multiple dimensions of religious extremism, we focus on the context of Indonesian Muslim groups. We propose that our analysis should also help to understand religious extremism in other faith groups but that the dimensions on which moderate vs. extreme religiosity may be expressed may vary.

The Multidimensionality of Religion as a Framework to Understanding Extremism

We are certainly not the first to propose that there are multiple dimensions to religion and that these dimensions uniquely connect to important behaviors, such as life satisfaction, stress, youth deviancy. Glock and Stark (1965) suggested that within all religions, there are five distinct components: ideological (beliefs), intellectual (knowledge), ritual (overt religious behavior), experiential (feelings or emotions), and consequential (the effect of religiosity in the world). More recently, Saroglou (2011) proposed four basic dimensions of religion and individual religiosity that are partially distinct: believing (i.e., representing the cognitive function of religion), bonding (i.e., experiences that bond individuals with perceived transcendent reality, others, and the inner-self), behaving (i.e., specific norms and moral arguments defining right and wrong), and belonging (i.e., identification with particular tradition, denomination, or a specific religious group). According to these models, and others, the behavioral expression of religion is complex and multi-faceted.

We draw on these frameworks to examine religious extremism. Combining insights from these prior models, we propose a multidimensional structure to religion that can help to understand the ways in which moderate vs. extreme religion can be expressed. We elaborate our four-dimensional model below, but to summarize: our starting point is the literature on violent religious extremism, where the most common dimension identified (and often the only dimension considered) is the political dimension. In addition, we were inspired by various religious movements in Indonesia that have different emphasis on their narratives and actions. For example, a group named Wahdah Islamiyah has a strong campaign to purify Muslims’ theological beliefs and the way religious rituals are conducted, seeking to return to an ideal standard of the past. However, they tend to accept the current political system employed to rule the nation. In contrast, Hizbut Tahrir , a banned organization in Indonesia, proposes that Muslims are responsible to recreate an Islamic empire, by rejecting democratic systems and nation-states; however, Hizbut Tahrir does not typically engage in theological debates. Therefore, alongside the political dimension, we also consider three other dimensions which emerge in seeking to understand religious extremism in Indonesia. A second theological dimension of extremism that is relevant in the Indonesian context is adapted from Saroglou’s (2011) believing dimension: we propose that religions share theological beliefs, and these beliefs might be extreme or moderate. In the Indonesian context, a third, ritual, dimension is inspired by Saroglou’s (2011) bonding dimension indicating that religion bonds its members through ritual practices. Some groups have very little latitude in how they understand and practice their religious rituals and justify the other practices as forbidden innovation. Finally, we propose a social dimension that captures the intra- and intergroup relations of the religious group in Indonesia. Intra-group processes include the specific group norms that control the members’ moral compass and relations to each other. Intergroup processes include the categorization of in-groups and out-groups as reflected in Saroglou’s dimension of belonging , but also the specific group norms controlling relations to members of other faiths.

Before elaborating these dimensions, it is important to note that the four focal dimensions in the present paper do not imply that other dimensions do not exist when explaining religious extremism. We propose that the present dimensions are important in understanding religious groups’ perspective in the contemporary Indonesian context. Yet, these four dimensions may become more or less important as a result of particular historical and cultural developments or group comparisons, and this may also mean that other dimensions may need to be considered for other religious groups, and when studying other contexts (see also, Zarkasyi, 2008 ; Ysseldyk et al., 2010 ). Below we consider the four dimensions in turn, and identify how the dimensions might be used in research.

Moderate vs. Extreme Religion: A Multidimensional Approach Based on Religious Movements in Indonesia

We address religious extremism and the multiple dimensions of religion in Figure 1 . Using a classical standpoint that religion is expressed through multiple dimensions ( Glock and Stark, 1965 ; Saroglou, 2011 ), we propose to examine a multidimensional religious extremism through separate political, theological, ritual, and social dimensions which may or may not co-vary.

Figure 1 . Illustration of the extreme-moderate continuum across a multidimensional representation of religion. The figure illustrates a religious group with high extremism in theological and ritual dimensions but moderate beliefs in the social and political dimensions.

We argue that this exercise enables a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of religious extremism as presented in Table 1 . In what follows, we draw attention to the interplay of these different dimensions for different religious groups. We argue that the four dimensions of religious extremism (i.e., political, theological, ritual, and social) provide a useful framework to locate religious groups, which allows for a better understanding of the way in which their religion is expressed and, importantly, the way in which they aim to achieve religious goals by peaceful or less peaceful ways. Following our outline of the four dimensions, we discuss a methodology for measuring context-specific religious extremism and discuss research applications.

Table 1 . Mapping out the moderate and extreme end points of the four dimensions of religion.

From Moderate to Extreme: The Political Dimension

The way that religion and politics should relate has been a source of intense debate and struggle throughout history ( Armstrong, 2000 ). In the psychological literature, the political dimension of religion has not received much attention (e.g., Diener and Clifton, 2002 ; Saroglou, 2010 ) unless it is in the context of “bad” religion ( Basedau et al., 2016 ). Nevertheless, as noted above, political beliefs and actions have been the primary focus of “religious extremism” as defined by scholars (e.g., Webber et al., 2017 ). In this approach, extreme religious movements seek political power, to promote the adoption of their religious norms through laws or force.

Contemporary religious extremism in the political dimension for Islam is often associated with support for the Caliphate or Muslim empire, which persisted in various forms from the 700 s to 1924 AD, when the last Ottoman Caliphate was abolished in Turkey. During this time, Islam was associated with both a hierarchical, sometimes expansionist, imperial state and a specific system of religious, legal, and cultural practices called sharia law. More extreme groups advocate a radical agenda in political change (e.g., a resurrection of an Islamic empire, a borderless state encompassing all Muslim nations, Ward, 2009 ; Osman, 2010a ). They believe that political norms should be applied to change the current locally adapted political systems across many Muslim countries. Other, more moderate groups, however, strive for an integration of religious values within the current political systems (e.g., democracy, national state, etc.). They tend to believe that religion should not be politically represented through the legalization of its social order.

The political dimension is typically the most salient dimension for scholars when discussing Islamic religious extremism, as it is for other groups. More extreme stances on this political dimension such as support for comprehensive sharia , support for the resurrection of the Caliphate, and the rejection of democracy were used by Fealy (2004) to identify extremist groups in Indonesia (e.g., Darul Islam , Indonesian Mujahedeen Forum, Jihad troops, and Hizbut Tahrir ). In addition, the extent to which religious groups approve of and participate in current political systems in Indonesia has been used to identify the more moderate Islamic movements in Indonesia (e.g., Muhammadiyah , Nahdhatul Ulama , etc.).

It should be noted, however, that religious extremism on the political dimension can manifest in different ways, and that politically extremist groups propose different paths to reconcile the constitution with religious norms. For example, some religious groups propose to promote sharia laws through democratic governance, other groups reject the current political system by actively campaigning for the imposition of sharia without violence; and finally, still other groups are willing to use violence to destabilize the government (See Ward, 2009 ; Webber et al., 2017 ). With or without support for violent means of creating change, the advocacy toward comprehensive sharia law as well as the revival of an Islamic empire reflects a radical agenda to transform the current established political system.

In addition to these different views regarding the place of religion in the state, groups of Muslim also differ in their support for democracy (e.g., Halla et al., 2013 ). Some of them reject democracy, believing that democracy as a political system is incompatible with Islam ( Fealy, 2004 ; Ward, 2009 ), that Islamic instructions about all matters relating to life are clearly articulated in the Quran and Hadith (the words, behaviors, and approvals of the prophet). This view holds that the musyawara (political discussions to reach a consensus) should only be used for decisions about particular technical matters, not core principles of social functioning ( Nurhayati, 2014 ). In contrast, some other groups of Muslim do not favor or sanction a particular political system, but rather advocate for principles of tolerance and respect in the governance of all political systems. In this way, the latter groups perceive democracy as one way to manage national affairs that is not in conflict with Islam ( Ward, 2009 ; Nurhayati, 2014 ).

From Moderate to Extreme: The Theological Dimension

Theological beliefs define religion for lay people ( Saroglou, 2011 ), and researchers such as Stark and Glock (1968) have highlighted the importance of conceptual representations of God in understanding people’s engagement with their religion (see also, Granqvist et al., 2010 ). Different conceptualizations of God provide a meaningful snapshot of a believer’s religious worldview. How then do more moderate vs. more extreme forms of religion take shape? We propose that for religious groups that are located at the moderate end of the theological dimension, beliefs of an impersonal cosmic force distanced from worldly affairs (deism) dominate. Moderate views of God as a personal agent (theism; Bader and Palmer, 2011 ) present a being fostering love and not hostility, whereby the image of God is characterized by gracious images (e.g., The Merciful, The Benevolent, etc.) allowing different religious interpretations and expanding the acceptance toward different patterns of norms. In contrast, groups that are located at the extreme end of the theological continuum typically view God as a personal agent and embrace names for God that contain an authoritarian image (e.g., The Compeller, The Conqueror, etc.) leading into rigid interpretations and coercion to suppress different narratives.

There is evidence that these images of God are consequential. For example, normative beliefs associated with an authoritarian image of God predict more support for capital punishment ( Bader and Palmer, 2011 ). In addition, an authoritarian conception (e.g., God as the One who strikes down in anger) has been found to be associated with a disposition to think, feel, and act more punitively toward people considered to be “evil.” In contrast, people who characterize God in a more nurturing way (e.g., God is love) react in a more prosocial way toward others ( Granqvist et al., 2010 ). Historically, an authoritarian image of God was frequently associated with apocalyptic narratives to attract people to convert into their group and to force people to leave their “immoral” norms ( Bossy, 2001 ).

Building on this approach, we propose that variation on the theological dimension of extremism is associated with different behaviors to achieve group goals and to show loyalty to the religious group. Moderate positions on the theological dimension are indicated by the prominence of gracious images of God and an appreciation of differences in theological beliefs. Conversely, those groups located at the extreme end of the theological continuum, embracing an authoritarian image of God, are more likely to strike at perceived contrary theological beliefs. For example, we propose that those who believe in an authoritarian, persecuting God will be more likely to believe that natural disasters occur more frequently to groups who live in ways that God disapproves of. Furthermore, Muslims who endorse an authoritarian conception of God will tend to define the meaning of “ jihad ” as the duty to engage in a holy war, whereas those located at the more moderate end of the continuum will take a more flexible interpretation of the word “ jihad ” as behavior aimed at creating positive change ( Esposito, 2002 ). A similar distinction can be witnessed in Christianity: interpretations of the religious duty to build the “Kingdom of God” will be interpreted by moderates as a spiritual exercise to transform society toward being more loving, caring, and inclusive, whereas for those Christian groups located at the extreme end of the theological continuum, this duty is seen as a need to build a physical empire established through crusading military ventures ( Whitlark, 2011 ).

From Moderate to Extreme: The Ritual Dimension

Specific rituals allow for the expression of worship or shared feelings with others ( Whitehouse and Lanman, 2014 ), helping to construe notions of religion as a lived experience. Many religious people believe that their religious rituals are guided directly by God. For instance, most Muslims believe that God directs their main rituals including their prayers five times per day. However, once religion has spread to a wider community, different patterns of rituals may emerge from either local customs or from the integration of religious rituals with local traditions. This accommodation of new practices can often polarize religious adherents into groups who are either open to new influences, or who reject compromises and see them as forbidden innovations. For instance, some Mandinga immigrants in Portugal view a “writing-on-the-hand” ritual as essential for conferring both Muslim and ethnic identities ( Johnson, 2006 ). In the ritual, children are initiated into Quranic study (and adulthood) by having a verse written on their hands, which they then ceremoniously lick off, ingesting the verse. The ritual is contentious to those who feel that this Mandinga “custom” should be abandoned to keep Islam pure ( Johnson, 2006 ).

We propose that intolerance of diversity in ritual practices distinguishes moderates from extreme religious groups on this dimension. Moderate religion on the ritual dimension is indicated by tolerant views about the influence of local traditions on the way rituals are performed. Moderate groups can accept the influence of tradition within ritual as it is not a compulsory ritual and not directly taught by God. Conversely, those groups located at the extreme end of the theological continuum are more likely to strive to keep religious rituals pure. This often goes together with vigilance to protect the integrity of rituals, but also with intergroup tension whereby extreme groups accuse more moderate groups of being sinful in their practice. For example, the Salafi movement in Indonesia is the strongest group to strive for purity in rituals opposing more relaxed Muslim religious traditions such as allowing worship in the ancestors’ graveyard and the celebration of the Prophet’s birthday. To some extent, the Salafi movement labels the fellow Muslims who perform those rituals as idolatrous ( Musyrik ) or even infidels ( Kafir ). The labels, of course, are psychologically painful for the labeled groups of Muslims. Within the Christian tradition, the Puritan movement is one historical example of ritual extremism, rejecting other Christian denominations as insufficiently pure and compromised by lax tolerance of cultural practices.

From Moderate to Extreme: The Social Dimension

The social dimension is concerned with intergroup relations with other groups (religious and otherwise) as well as intragroup processes, reflected in norms regarding how to interact with others. Extremists on the social dimension typically have a hostile view of other faiths. In their view, out-groups use sinister conspirators as pawns to influence their religious group members ( Fealy, 2004 ; Kohut et al., 2006 ). As a result, blaming others (e.g., foreigners) for in-group disadvantage is a common narrative to raise support from the public for their agenda. In contrast, more moderate members of a religion often attribute the root causes of in-group problems to internal factors such as anti-intellectual biases, geopolitical instability, and corruption ( Lackey, 2013 ). The moderate groups tend to be more open to complexity in analyzing the causes of the in-group’s problems. Moderate groups also place greater emphasis on the need to change to address modern concerns.

Consequently, more moderate groups tend to be more open to collaboration in inter-religious and inter-cultural dialogue whereas more extreme religious groups emphasize rejection and avoidance. Interfaith dialogue is often developed by more moderate religious activists to strengthen inter-religious cooperation as a way to solve common problems (e.g., environmental issues, a cohesive national identity, economic issues, and law enforcement). However, more extreme religious groups often actively reject this collaborative effort, as they perceive inter-religious dialogue as part of a conspiracy to weaken the faith in their religion.

Turning to intragroup relations with other members of the faith community: religion serves as an organizing set of key values that are captured and expressed in group norms. In the context of social relationships, such group norms may vary in the extent to which they tolerate difference and dissent within the religious group. At times, harsh attitudes toward dissenters and deviants may prevail when universal values of tolerance and group-specific values clash and individuals are forced to follow group-specific values. For instance, because Islam forbids liquors, some Muslims would like to force the government to ban the trade in alcohol, without considering that other groups of people have different norms permitting alcohol consumption ( Osman, 2010a ). In the context of Indonesia, an active group called the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) is one of many aiming to force the entire nation to follow one version of Islamic social norms ( Arifianto, 2017 ). Hence, the social dimension of religious extremism in our approach is indicated in Indonesia by patterns of externally attributing the causes of in-group disadvantages, and forcing out-groups as well as all in-group members to follow narrow, prescriptive social norms. Naturally, social and political dimensions of religion will often be inter-related, especially where groups seek political power to impose their socially extreme viewpoint. However, in distinguishing the two dimensions, we highlight that some groups will be socially extreme without endorsing extreme political views or seeking political power. Groups who expel internal heretics and who shun contact with infidels without trying to dominate them may fall into this category, in our model.

The Interaction Among Multiple Dimensions of Religious Extremism in Indonesia

As mentioned, the discourse of religious extremism has mostly been related to the political context ( Fealy, 2004 ; Zarkasyi, 2008 ). To illustrate the importance of not just exploring the political dimension when understanding religious extremism, we took a closer look at some “extremist” Islamic movements in Indonesia (i.e., that score high in extremism on the political dimension). In an attempt to understand different forms of extremism more comprehensively, we compared these groups on the other three dimensions. Before outlining our findings, it is important to note that the classification of a particular group as politically extreme was based on specific historical events and developments: by acts of political rebellion by Darul Islam (Domain of Islam) and Negara Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic State) in 1949. This was also the basis for selecting as extreme the current political movement Hizbut Tahrir and Islamic defender front (FPI) who have gained support after the reform of 1998 ( Fealy, 2004 ; Muhtadi, 2009 ; Osman, 2010a ).

There are important similarities between Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), and Hizbut Tahrir (HT) across all four dimensions of religious extremism. All groups score high in extremism on the political dimensions in that they demand a comprehensive legalization of sharia , a fully Islamic state, recreation of Caliphate, and the abolition of democracy in Indonesia. However, these groups differ from other politically “extreme” groups in Indonesia. For example, the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) supports a comprehensive legalization of sharia, but endorses democracy and rejects the revival of the Islamic state and Caliphate ( Fealy, 2004 ). Another group ( Laskar Jihad or Jihad Troops) demands comprehensive sharia and rejects democracy, but also rejects the revival of the Islamic state and Caliphate. Both these commonalities and differences have consequences for their relationship with other religious groups and the way they aim to achieve their goals. While we acknowledge the importance of unpacking the political dimension into constituent elements in some cases, our argument is that to fully understand these groups, we also need to explore where these groups stand on the other three dimensions of religious extremism (i.e., theological, ritual, and social dimensions).

In terms of extremism in the theological dimension, notions about an angry God who uses natural disasters punitively are particularly important to tease the different extremist groups apart. For instance, some Muslim groups in Indonesia claim that ritual celebration of the local tradition in Palu in Central Sulawesi is a main cause of the earthquake and tsunami that hit the Indonesian coast in 2018, killing more than 2000 people. Likewise, such attributions also dominated when explaining the 2018 earthquake in Lombok Island ( Habdan and Baits, 2018 ). These groups emphasized that the earthquake is a punishment from God to show disapproval of the politically different attitudes that are promoted by the political leader of the Island ( Hasan, 2018 ). Interestingly, such theological beliefs do not lead to a push for change of the political system, but only to an invitation to return to Islamic norms as they understand them. This shows that an extreme theological belief may not be correlated with extremism on the political dimension.

However, extremism in the theological dimension may also be related to a narrow interpretation of jihad as a core principle in Islam. Most Muslim groups believe that jihad means any zealous effort to bring about a better world ( Esposito, 2002 ). However, some groups restrict its interpretation to waging holy war, such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Salafi Jihadi groups, and Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid ( Haron and Hussin, 2013 ). Theological beliefs restricting the meaning of jihad to waging holy war have an impact on political extremism, in that these can drive believers into intentions to verbally or physically attack the hated out-groups to engage in jihad.

Finally, some groups that are located at the extreme end of the ritual dimension are actively campaigning to purify religious rituals and to suppress local traditions that are perceived as deviating from Islam. For example, some groups such as the Salafi movement and al Wahdah al Islamiyah in Indonesia campaign against local traditions and push for the Muslims to relinquish traditions that are perceived as not taught by the prophet ( Salman, 2017 ). Importantly though, these movements do not use physical violence in their efforts, and they accept and participate in the political system in Indonesia. Thus, although these groups tend to be extreme on the ritual dimension, they are more moderate on other dimensions. For example, they have a broader conception of jihad (i.e., a struggle for positive change), and they do not prevent their members from participating in the current political system.

We have argued that extremism on the social dimension is represented by the tendency to blame others for the group’s disadvantage and to force compliance to specific in-group’s norms. We propose that the tendency to forcefully demand adherence to a narrow version of the in-group’s norms typically results from feeling threatened by out-groups’ norms. For example, the Muslim Forum of Bogor (FMB) released a public statement calling on the city mayor to ban the celebration of Cap Go Meh by Chinese people in the city. Even though such social extremism often involves intolerance of norm violations, social extremism is not always followed by extremism on other dimensions (e.g., ritual dimension). In particular, social extremism in Indonesia is rarely linked to terror campaigns.

The Consequences of Similarity in Extremism on Multiple Dimensions for Intergroup Relations

The different ways in which religious groups express their religious identity on the theological, ritual, social, and political dimensions affect not only the ways they aim to achieve their goals but also the ways they relate to other religious groups. Using social identity theory as a lens to conceptualize intergroup relations ( Turner and Oakes, 1986 ), we propose that the nature of intergroup relations between moderate and extreme religious groups is determined by the perceived degree of similarity on the four dimensions. As an illustration, two groups or more can cooperate with each other in their collective action when they perceive shared values and a larger identity, while breaking into conflict when internal differences are salient. For example, in Indonesia, when the former governor of Jakarta (Basuki Tjahaya Purnama aka Ahok) was eventually indicted on charges of insulting a section of the Quran, many Muslim groups were united in their efforts to demand punishment of him. A series of mass protests against the perceived blasphemy were attended by hundreds of thousands of people across the country ( Fealy, 2016 ). From an identity perspective, it can be argued that the shared outrage about the former governor who was perceived to have insulted Islam brought different Muslim groups together, and different groups worked together to address the common grievances and the common threats to the superordinate Muslim identity.

Despite this example of unity, it is also clear that there are many instances when relationships between moderate as well as more extreme religious groups are more tense. We argue that these tensions can also be better understood by taking account of the way in which moderate vs. more extreme expressions of identity take shape on the four identified dimensions. For example, members of The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and members of Hizbut Tahrir largely take the same stance on the social dimension in that both groups want to generate a new Islamic social order via the legalization of sharia in Indonesia. However, The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) frequently criticizes the members of Hizbut Tahrir because they disagree with the best “Islamic” method to achieve their shared goal. Their disagreement emerges on the political dimension because PKS supports the democratic system, as indicated by their participation in the general election, while Hizbut Tahrir absolutely rejects the democratic system and avoids democratic politics as a way to raise political power.

The possibility of compromise between two politically extreme movements depends on the level of identity (i.e., subgroup or subordinate identity) that is activated. When they confront common enemies (e.g., a group of Muslims or politicians who strongly support Indonesian diversity and oppose the legalization of Islamic law), the salience of their superordinate identity (i.e., as Muslim groups advocating the legalization of Islamic law in Indonesia) may increase, and they may compromise or even integrate. However, open conflict is also likely, even if the groups are similarly extreme on one dimension, when differences on another dimension are salient.

A similar pattern may be observed among groups of Muslims who are identified as extreme in ritual dimensions. The Salafy movement and other groups (e.g., Mathla’ul Anwar , Wahdah al Islamiyah , etc.) may unite to produce narratives for ritual purification, and to accuse Muslims who practice local traditions and their supporters of religious error. That is, when they face moderate Muslims (e.g., Nahdhatul Ulama , a group which supports the preservation of local traditions and diversity), they will activate a shared superordinate identity and work together. However, those ritually extreme groups can conflict with each other when political differences are salient. For example, many Salafy group members perceive that public protest is an illegitimate action according to Islam, while other groups who share their extreme identity on ritual dimension perceive it as legitimate tactic. The differences along the political dimension can lead them into efforts to dominate each other, and open contests for power.

The consequence of similarity and difference in the dimensions of religious extremism is relevant previous work on identity and conflict ( Haslam et al., 1999 ). In this model, the salience of subgroup identity (e.g., as an activist of PKS or Hizbut Tahrir ) can lead to a tendency to seek in-group favoritism, which in turn enhances their sense of self. However, when superordinate identity is salient (e.g., as Muslims who support the legalization of Islamic law in Indonesia, or as Muslims in a broader context), in-group members perceive the members of other Islamic movements as members of the same group. According to this, an approach to religious extremism that focuses solely on one dimension will miss the different ways in which the two groups align (e.g., socially) and are different (e.g., politically), which in turn would fail to predict the group members’ political alliances or conflict.

Applying the Model

To apply this model in more practical uses, we need to revisit the reason of this multidimensional model development. Unidimensional categorization of moderate vs. extremist lead to simplistic understandings whereby people with highly conservative beliefs in religion are associated with support for violence and terror. We propose that extremism is expressed along different dimensions and the mapping of groups and individuals using multiple dimensions in the model will help to understand the patterns of narratives and actions delivered by the groups. This allows for a more nuanced understanding of religious violence whereby we acknowledge that violence can be motivated by different reasons (not necessarily related to political causes) and that the interplay between different dimensions on which extremism can be expressed can either fuel or restrict religious violence (e.g., when a religious group is located at the extremist end of the political dimensions, but collectively shared theological beliefs preclude exercising violence).

Moving away from over-simplified representations of religious groups as politically motivated, the presented framework offers a practical method to understand the multi-faceted nature of extremism. It aims to analyze religion at both a group and individual level, augmenting scholarly understanding of the religious dimensions that may be relevant to enable accurate predictions of violent extremism based on ideological narratives ( Kruglanski et al., 2018 ). Even though the four dimensions of religious extremism that we present here are informed by prior research on extremism and religiosity, the model that we developed is tailored to the context of Indonesian Muslims and their religious movements. When adopting this model in different or wider contexts (e.g., Islamic movements in Pakistan or Egypt, or Christian groups in the Philippines or Northern Ireland), researchers need to think carefully about the transferability of the model.

Practically speaking, when adopting the model in other contexts, researchers need to engage in qualitative exploration of the dimensions religious groups use to express their religiosity. For every dimension found in a particular context, the researchers should then explore what the indicators are of extremism compared to moderate beliefs. Rich descriptive information about the context and specific intra- or intergroup processes need to be considered to enable a multidimensional model tailored and adapted to specific contexts. In this, some dimensions (e.g., ritual, political) may not apply to all contexts, while other new dimensions might need to be added.

Such an exploration may well lead to the conclusion that the political dimension is the most important dimension to explain violent behavior and that the other three proposed dimensions (e.g., theological, social, and ritual) are less relevant. Consider for example the current extremism by Rakhine Buddhist in Myanmar against Rohingya Muslims. Violent actions against Rohingya Muslims in 2017 by Rakhine Buddhist were justified as mere crackdowns against suspected Rohingya insurgents, suggesting that the political dimension may be most important to understand extremism in this context. However, in other contexts, other dimensions appear to have triggered violence. For instance, and also in the context of Buddhist violence, the terrorist sarin attack in the Tokyo subway in 1995 by the cult group Aum Shinrikyo was not so much driven by extremism on the political dimension, but by extremism on the theological and/or ritual dimension. Specifically, the attack was motivated by a strong consensually shared belief among cult members that violence of this form would wash away their sins and this would allow them as a group to survive the imminent Armageddon.

What these examples also make clear is that the content of the different dimensions and the way that moderate vs. extreme religiosity manifests itself differ for different religious groups. Specifically, while it is important to understand political violence among Indonesian Muslims in terms of views on sharia laws, in the Myanmar context, political extremism centers on views against minorities and their rights. Or, while theological extremism in Indonesia is concerned with the view of God and ritual extremism relates to tolerance for deviating from generally accepted normative ways of enacting religion, for Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, extremism on these dimensions is related to narratives and beliefs around Doomsday.

Finally, when applying the model in other contexts, it is important to consider new dimensions that may be important in understanding extremism. For example, Smart (1999) identifies seven dimensions of Buddhist religiosity, including novel dimensions such as the mythological and the experiential. Scholars would discover if these dimensions or others are relevant to differences between moderates and extremists (for example, if Buddhist groups who are more mystical are less likely to be extremist) through exploratory research and pilot testing.

We, of course, support the prevention of violent extremism, but we also support the notion that being extreme in religious beliefs is not always linked to support for employing violent tactics ( Austin, 2018 ). Motivating people to participate in violent intergroup conflict, strong narratives about injustice and expected changes may be involved ( Moghaddam, 2005 ; Horgan, 2008 ). However, in many contexts (i.e., when the conflict involves religious groups), religious narratives can fuel the willingness to join violent movements on behalf of their group. By capturing how extremism is manifested across particular dimensions and how these dimensions predict support for violence, policy-makers can be more focused in countering the religious narratives that might be employed as the catalyst of violence and which are not relevant to address (or even counter-productive).

Implications

This paper highlights that religious extremism is not a unified and ubiquitous phenomenon; rather, religious extremists differ on a number of dimensions in how they express their religion, and consequently, how they aim to achieve important group goals. Using the context of Indonesian Muslim groups to explore these ideas, we propose that religiosity in Muslims can be moderate on one dimension and radical/extreme on another. For instance, even though the Salafi movement has been generally identified as extremist ( Haron and Hussin, 2013 ; Jones, 2014 ), to understand their extremism, we argue that it is important to be both mindful of the group’s extreme position when considering theological and ritual dimensions, but also their comparatively moderate stand politically. For example, even though Salafi movements in Indonesia perceive politics as morally corrupt ( Chozin, 2013 ; Parveez, 2017 ), they nevertheless tend to avoid a political debate, and obey the rules of the existing government insofar as the government does not prohibit their religious rituals ( Haron and Hussin, 2013 ; Parveez, 2017 ).

In a similar vein, the group Hizb al-tahrir is extreme in its stance on the political dimension, as it aims to revive the Islamic empire by overthrowing the concept of the nation state (e.g., Ward, 2009 ; Osman, 2010b ). Nevertheless, their activists are moderate on the ritual dimension – they do not criticize other Muslims for their “innovative” rituals (e.g., celebration of the Prophet’s birthday) – and they do not support the use of physical violence in pursuing political demands (See: Ward, 2009 ; Schmid, 2013 ; Parveez, 2017 ). The group believes that jihad means a holy war, but not as the way to establish the Caliphate, but to conquer other nations after the Caliphate is established ( Azman, 2015 ). In addition, this group was actively involved in protests to reject the cultures and norms of other groups in Indonesia on behalf of Muslim as majority (e.g., rejecting the celebration of Valentine’s day). We might argue that Hizbut Tahrir is not only extreme in its political dimension, but also theological and social dimensions. Nevertheless, this group seems to be moderate in the ritual dimension.

Our purpose in this paper is to illustrate that different dimensions of religion are relevant to understanding religious extremism, and that the four dimensions discussed provide clarity in distinguishing a diversity of extreme vs. moderate presentations in the Indonesian Muslim context. Identifying religious extremism as multidimensional helps moving beyond labeling Muslims simply as liberal, extreme, progressive, moderate, or radical. These labels fail to capture the various religious groups’ similarities and differences across different dimensions, and wrongly cluster together religious actors with quite different historical pasts and future trajectories. This “concept creep” ( Haslam, 2016 ) or “jingle-jangle fallacy” ( Van Petegem et al., 2013 ) prevents scholars from identifying the antecedents, character, and consequences of religious extremism in different aspects of life.

We invite scholars to consider extremism in relation to individual and group positions on theological, ritual, social, and political dimensions, and to expect a diversity of contestations within a faith that do not always co-vary. With this approach, it is important to be mindful of the fact that when researchers explore the relationship of religious extremism and other psychological processes, the type (dimension) of extremism needs to be considered. For instance, as seen in the narratives of some extremist groups in Indonesia who highlight the “crisis of Islam” as a call to seek systemic change, we predict that perceived injustice toward the religion by outsiders can enhance extremism on the political dimension, but may not affect extremism on the other dimensions as strongly. In this way, we can advance knowledge of religious extremism, allowing us to move toward a more complete understanding of what is not just one phenomenon, but a constellation of related phenomena in an evolving, complex religious system of beliefs and acts embedded in broader historical and cultural change and stability.

Labeling groups or individuals as extremist is often misleading. The label has a narrow pejorative meaning which too often associates extremism with terrorism (e.g., the Bali bombings, or the Paris attacks). Failure to understand the complexity of religious extremism risks stigmatizing some religious groups as irrational and supporting of violence when this is not the case. These negative stereotypes can lead to separation, status loss, and discrimination, as well as wasted resources in mis-targeted counter-terrorism initiatives, and squandered political capital. Our hope is that a more comprehensive understanding of religious extremism will facilitate better insight and nuanced dialogue. Understanding the multidimensionality of religion in the context of religious extremism will help in accurately depicting this phenomenon, and will facilitate understanding by scholars of the complex group processes associated with religious change, which have been neglected to date.

Author Contributions

SW conceived of the presented idea. SW wrote the manuscript with support from WL and JJ. SW, WL, and JJ contributed to the final version of the manuscript, responding to reviewers’ feedback.

SW received a PhD scholarship from the Indonesian Endowment for Educational Fund (PRJ-3449/LPDP.3/2016). The research is also supported by an Australian Research Discovery grant (DP170101008) awarded to JJ.

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Joshua Rhee, Zahra Mirnajafi, and Sam Popple for helpful editing suggestions on earlier versions of the manuscript.

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Keywords: radical religion, religion, extremism, religious identity, social identity

Citation: Wibisono S, Louis WR and Jetten J (2019) A Multidimensional Analysis of Religious Extremism. Front. Psychol . 10:2560. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02560

Received: 22 May 2019; Accepted: 29 October 2019; Published: 18 November 2019.

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Copyright © 2019 Wibisono, Louis and Jetten. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY) . The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

*Correspondence: Susilo Wibisono, [email protected]

Disclaimer: All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article or claim that may be made by its manufacturer is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.

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Combating Religious Extremism: A New Approach

S.i. strong.

Religious and political extremism present democratic societies with a quandary:  how should a system built on tolerance deal with intolerant beliefs and behavior?  Traditionally, states have adopted one of two responses: (1) ignore the activity in question or (2) seek to restrict or ban the problematic individuals, groups or actions.  However, studies suggest that neither of these techniques has any real or lasting effect.

Fortunately, there is another alternative.  As I discuss in my book, Transforming Religious Liberties:  A New Theory of Religious Rights for National and International Legal Systems , scholars have found that the best way to limit both the spread and impact of religious and political extremism is by engaging with the issues underlying extremist philosophies rather than by shutting such views out of political discourse altogether. Although this approach may not convince individuals at the far end of the spectrum to abandon their particular beliefs or behaviors, a policy of engagement can help curb extremism by reducing the attractiveness of those types of messages among those who are in some ways sympathetic to the extremist cause and thereby decreasing direct and indirect support for extremist behavior among more moderate members of the community in question.

While the diversity of extremist groups can make generalizations difficult, religious extremists often justify their behavior on the claim that they and their co-religionists cannot fully or freely practice their faith. Primary among extremists’ demands is the desire to impose their religious standards even on those who do not wish to comply.  While religious moderates disagree with certain aspects of extremists’ behavior, they may agree with some of the extremists’ goals and may therefore provide moral, social or financial support to the extremist cause. This type of support is critical, since extremists – who actually account for a very small number of individuals within any religious group – cannot maintain or expand their operations without the support of moderates.   Thus, any mechanism that limits moderates’ willingness to align themselves with extremist views limits extremist behaviour.

Existing systems of religious rights were initially developed as a means of minimizing religio-legal conflict and thus might seem capable of addressing contemporary forms of religious extremism.  However, the current approach to religious rights was formulated in response to the seventeenth century European wars of religion and reflects both the values of that time as well as the nature (intra-religious as opposed to inter-religious) of that particular conflict.  While this framework has been largely successful, recent increases in religious pluralism and changes to the concept of both public and private concerns have created various difficulties as a matter of law and policy.  As a result, it may be time to consider whether it is possible to redesign the current approach to construct a system that will better protect the religious liberties of both religious and non-religious people, thereby reducing the level of support among religious moderates for extremist activities and groups.

The best model would likely maintain the most important aspects of the current religious rights regime while incorporating certain concerns enunciated by religious individuals.  In my book, Transforming Religious Liberties:  A New Theory of Religious Rights for National and International Legal Systems , I discuss how the contemporary religious rights regime can be adapted to increase protections for religious individuals of all faith traditions while maintaining a system that is acceptable to secularists and other non-religious individuals.  Such a system is expected to create a legal and political environment that will reduce direct and indirect support for religious extremism and thereby create a more peaceful world for us all.

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About The Author

Professor S.I. Strong is the Manley O. Hudson Professor of Law at the University of Missouri and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University Law Center, having formerly taught at...

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Berkley Forum

Religion and Violent Extremism: Contending Perspectives

May 3, 2019

Explore the Series

The role and efficacy of religious actors and institution in preventing and countering violent extremism has been an ongoing topic of debate amongst scholars of religion and foreign affairs. Policymakers and practitioners have at times invested in particular religious leaders or state-sanctioned sources of “moderate” religion in the hope that they will prove effective in discrediting religious extremists and dissuading potential recruits to their cause. Others have criticized government entanglement with religion in the context of national security affairs, or cast doubt on the credibility or capacity of religious actors to address these challenges.

In this Berkley Forum series, leading scholars, practitioners, and former policymakers offer varied perspectives on the intersection of religion and violent extremism. Read more on this issue in our policy brief Religion and the Prevention of Violent Extremism: Current Debates and Future Research Agendas .

In the Series

Response: Political Violence in the Name of God: Is It Really About Religion?

Jocelyne Cesari May 3, 2019

Response: Prosecuting Violent Extremism While Not Persecuting Extremism

James Patton May 3, 2019

Response: Religion and Violent Extremism and CVE: Politics Prevails

Eric Rosand May 3, 2019

Response: The Unintended Effects of Government Outreach to Religious Communities After 9/11

Annelle R. Sheline May 3, 2019

Articles on Religious extremism

Displaying 1 - 20 of 24 articles.

Music video controversy in Nigeria: Logos Olori misreads a religious time bomb

Sanya Osha , University of Cape Town

Kenya cult deaths: a new era in the battle against religious extremism

Fathima Azmiya Badurdeen , Technical University of Mombasa

How to poll 93 million voters – the challenge of pulling off Nigeria’s presidential elections

Emmanuel Remi Aiyede , University of Ibadan

Iranian women keep up the pressure for real change – but will broad public support continue?

Homa Hoodfar , Concordia University and Mona Tajali , Agnes Scott College

Religious lies, conmen and coercive control: how cults corrupt our desire for love and connection

Shane Satterley , Griffith University

A century after partition, Ireland’s churches are cooperating more closely than ever

Ger FitzGerald , George Mason University

Afghan government collapses, Taliban seize control: 5 essential reads

Catesby Holmes, The Conversation

Taliban ‘has not changed,’ say women facing subjugation in areas of Afghanistan under its extremist rule

Afghanistan after the US withdrawal: The Taliban speak more moderately but their extremist rule hasn’t evolved in 20 years

Sher Jan Ahmadzai , University of Nebraska Omaha

One year on, Muslim women reflect on wearing the niqab in a mask-wearing  world

Anna Piela , Northwestern University

Attacks on houses of worship are on the rise — and interfaith dialogue may combat this

Jennifer Otto , University of Lethbridge

Why Aceh is a rare place of welcome for Rohingya refugees

Max Walden , The University of Melbourne and Balawyn Jones , The University of Melbourne

After US and Taliban sign accord, Afghanistan must prepare for peace

Elizabeth B. Hessami , Johns Hopkins University

Preventing genocide in Myanmar: Court order tries to protect Rohingya Muslims where politics has failed

Hurst Hannum , Tufts University

US-Taliban truce begins, feeding hope of a peaceful, more prosperous Afghanistan

Al-Qaida is stronger today than it was on 9/11

Christian Taylor , George Mason University

Want a safer world for your children? Teach them about diverse religions and worldviews

Anna Halafoff , Deakin University ; Andrew Singleton , Deakin University ; Gary D Bouma , Monash University , and Mary Lou Rasmussen , Australian National University

Explainer: factors that foster conflict in Nigeria’s Kaduna state

Damilola Agbalajobi , Obafemi Awolowo University

How RE teachers see religion – and why it can be bad for pupils

David R. Smith , University of Aberdeen ; Graeme Nixon , University of Aberdeen , and Jo Pearce , UCL

Explainer: the role of foreign military forces in Niger

Craig Bailie , Stellenbosch University

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Associate Professor of International Relations and Women's, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, Agnes Scott College

Professor of Anthropology, Emerita, Concordia University

Director, Center for Afghanistan Studies, University of Nebraska Omaha

Faculty Lecturer, Johns Hopkins University

Emeritus Professor in the History of Religious Thought, The University of Queensland

PhD Candidate, Griffith University

Emeritus Professor of Sociology, Monash University

Professor of Sociology and Social Research, Deakin University

Professor, Head of Moray House School of Education and Sport, The University of Edinburgh

Professor of Political Institutions, Governance and Public Policy, University of Ibadan

Doctoral candidate, Regent University

PhD Candidate and Research Fellow, Melbourne Law School, The University of Melbourne

Senior Lecturer at Karlstad University, and Researcher at Centre for Theology and Religious Studies, Lund University

Professor of Philosophy, Public Policy and Governance, University of Washington

PhD Candidate and Member of Digital Media Research Centre, Queensland University of Technology

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Essay on Religious Extremism Causes Effects and Solutions

• December 1, 2023

Kainat Shakeel

Religious extremism, an intimidating global concern, transcends borders and societies, leaving a profound impact on societies. In this essay, we will delve into the causes, goods, and implicit results of this complex issue. We aim to understand the dynamics and foster meaningful exchanges. 

Causes of Religious Extremism:

A multifaceted problem, religious extremism frequently finds its roots in socioeconomic differences, political insecurity, and educational failings. These factors produce a terrain where revolutionist testaments can take hold, exploiting vulnerabilities for their docket. 

Consequences of Religious extremism:

The impacts of religious extremism are far-reaching. The consequences are severe, from violent conflicts that disrupt communities to the corrosion of introductory mortal rights. also, there is a conspicuous profitable impact as regions affected by extremism struggle to attract investment and foster development. 

Results in Religious extremism

Addressing religious extremism requires a comprehensive approach. Education and mindfulness juggernauts can debunk revolutionist narratives, while social and profitable development can produce openings and reduce the appeal of radical testaments. transnational cooperation is also vital, as extremism frequently transcends public boundaries. 

Case Studies:

Several countries have successfully combated religious extremism by enforcing effective strategies. Examining these case studies provides precious perceptivity into the practical operation of results and their issues. 

The part of Media:

Media plays a significant part in shaping public perception. Responsible reporting that avoids sensationalism and misinformation is pivotal in precluding the spread of revolutionist testaments. intelligencers and media outlets should be aware of the implicit impact their content may have on fostering understanding or immortalizing conceptions. 

Community Engagement:

Structure forbearance and understanding within communities is essential. Interfaith discourses and enterprises that promote diversity help ground gaps and produce surroundings where extremism struggles to take root. 

Government programs:

Governments can legislate legislation to check extremism, but it’s pivotal to balance security measures with the protection of moral rights. Inclusive governance that addresses the enterprises of all citizens can help produce a sense of belonging and reduce the appeal of revolutionist testaments.

The Psychology of Extremism:

Understanding the mindset of individualities drawn to extremism is vital. De-radicalization programs that concentrate on recuperation and reintegration into society can be effective in breaking the cycle of radicalization. 

Technology and extremism:

The internet and social media platforms have become breeding grounds for revolutionist extremists. neutralizing online radicalization requires combined trouble from tech companies, governments, and communities to cover and combat revolutionist content effectively. 

Challenges in Combating Religious extremism:

Relating and addressing the root causes of extremism presents significant challenges. Striking the right balance between security measures and guarding civil liberties is an ongoing struggle that requires careful consideration. 

International Cooperation:

Given the global nature of religious extremism, transnational cooperation is consummated. Collaboration among nations and associations, with the United Nations playing a central part, can produce a united front against extremism. 

Particular Stories:

Pressing particular narratives of individualities affected by extremism and sharing success stories of recovery humanizes the issue. These stories serve as an important memorial that change is possible and that individuality can overcome radicalization. In conclusion, addressing religious extremism requires a multifaceted approach encompassing education, community engagement, and transnational cooperation. While challenges persist, there’s room for sanguinity as nations and communities work inclusively towards a world free from the grip of extremism.

Kainat Shakeel is a versatile Content Writer Head and Digital Marketer with a keen understanding of tech news, digital market trends, fashion, technology, laws, and regulations. As a storyteller in the digital realm, she weaves narratives that bridge the gap between technology and human experiences. With a passion for staying at the forefront of industry trends, her blog is a curated space where the worlds of fashion, tech, and legal landscapes converge.

Encyclopedia of Psychology and Religion pp 1–3 Cite as

Religious Extremism

• Emeka Thaddues Njoku 2 &
• Joshua Akintayo 2  
• Living reference work entry
• First Online: 26 March 2018

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Religious extremism is a longstanding phenomenon that manifests in different forms. It is a concept which has been viewed as a high sense of ideological commitment that is expressed through certain actions that show deep loyalty to a belief system. It includes practices that characterize and define rituals and customs of many religious groups. Some of the characteristic features of religious extremism include isolation, evangelizing to nonmembers, maliciousness of members and nonmembers, criminalization, and elimination of recalcitrant persons or those considered to be enemies or “pagans.” Although nonmembers consider the behavioral patterns or actions of a religious group or groups among whom religious extremism holds sway, to be delusional, however, members of these groups think otherwise, as they view their actions as normal activities endorsed by their gods (Prus 2005 , p. 47). Religious extremism has also been viewed as the quest to enlarge the space of religious doctrines, as...

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Prus, R. (2005). Terrorism, tyranny, and religious extremism as collective activity: Beyond the deviant, psychological, and power mystiques. American Sociologist, 36 (1), 47–74.

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Njoku, E.T., Akintayo, J. (2018). Religious Extremism. In: Leeming, D. (eds) Encyclopedia of Psychology and Religion. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27771-9_200132-2

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Holy Hate: The Far Right’s Radicalization of Religion

2018 Spring Issue

The U.S. government, media organizations, and political scholars often characterize the “War on Terror” as a clash of civilizations or a battle against radical Islam. 

Many academic studies, government reports and news articles have analyzed the role of religion (or the misinterpretation of religious concepts and scripture) in radicalizing Muslims and mobilizing them to wage “Holy War” against their enemies around the globe. Few have discussed how right-wing extremism exploits Christianity and the Bible to radicalize and mobilize its violent adherents toward criminality and terrorism. Much like Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, violent right-wing extremists — who refer to themselves as “Soldiers of Odin,” “Phineas Priests,” or “Holy Warriors” — are also inspired by religious concepts and scriptural interpretations to lash out and kill in the name of religion. Yet very little is said or written about such a connection.

White supremacists , sovereign citizens , militia extremists and violent anti-abortion adherents use religious concepts and scripture to justify threats, criminal activity and violence. This discussion of religious extremism should not be confused with someone being extremely religious. It should also not be misconstrued as an assault on Christianity. Rather, it represents an exploration of the links between violent right-wing extremism and its exploitation of Christianity and other religions to gain a better understanding of how American extremists recruit, radicalize and mobilize their adherents toward violence and terrorism.

White Supremacy

Researchers have long known that white supremacists, such as adherents of Christian Identity (a racist, antisemitic religious philosophy) and racial Nordic mythology , use religion to justify acts of violence and condone criminal activity. Lesser known are the ways other white supremacy groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan and the Creativity Movement (formerly known as the Church of Creator or World Church of the Creator), incorporate religious teachings, texts, and symbolism into their group ideology and activities to justify violating the law and committing violent acts.

The Kloran, a universal KKK handbook, features detailed descriptions of the roles and responsibilities of various KKK positions, ceremonies, and procedures. There are many biblical references in the Kloran, as well as biblical symbolism in the detailed KKK ceremonies. Also, the KKK’s primary symbol (e.g. “Blood Drop Cross” or Mystic Insignia of a Klansman) — a white cross with a red tear drop at the center — symbolizes the atonement and sacrifice of Jesus Christ and those willing to die in his name.

A lesser-known white supremacist group is the neo-Nazi Creativity Movement . Ben Klassen is credited with creating this new religion for the white race in Florida in 1973. Klassen authored two primary religious texts for the Creativity Movement; “Nature’s Eternal Religion” and “the White Man’s Bible.” Creativity emphasizes moral conduct and behavior for the white race (e.g. “your race is your religion”) including its “Sixteen Commandments” and the “Five Fundamental Beliefs of Creativity.” Klassen had a vision that every worthy member of the Creativity religion would become an ordained minister in the Church.

Two other examples of entirely racist religious movements within white supremacy are the Christian Identity movement and racist Nordic mythology. The Christian Identity movement is comprised of both self-proclaimed followers who operate independently and organized groups that meet regularly or even live within insular communities. In contrast, racist Nordic mythology rarely consists of organized groups or communities, preferring to operate through an autonomous, loose-knit network of adherents who congregate in prison or online.

A unique concept within Christian Identity is the “ Phineas [sic.] Priesthood .” Phineas Priests believe they have been called to be “God’s Holy Warriors” for the white race. The term Phineas Priest is derived from the biblical story of Phineas, which adherents interpret as justifying the killing of interracial couples. Followers have advocated martyrdom and violence against homosexuals, mixed-race couples, and abortion providers.

Racial Nordic mysticism is most commonly embraced by neo-Nazis , racist skinheads and Aryan prison gang members . It is most prolific among younger white supremacists. Odinism and Asatru are the most popular Nordic mythological religions among white supremacists. These non-Christian religious philosophies are not inherently racist, but have been exploited and embraced by white supremacists due to their symbolically strong image of “Aryan” life and Nordic heritage. Aryan prison gang members may also have another reason for declaring affiliation with Odinism and Asatru due to prison privileges — such as special dietary needs or extra time to worship — given to those inmates who claim membership in a religious group.

Chip Berlet, a former senior analyst at Political Research Associates, points out that some white supremacists may be attracted to Nordic mythological religions as a result of their affinity toward Greek mythology, Celtic lore or interest in Nazi Germany, whose leaders celebrated Nordic myths and used Nordic symbolism for their image of heroic warriors during World War II. Neo-Nazi groups, such as the National Alliance and Volksfront, have used Norse symbolism, such as the life rune, in their group insignias and propaganda. Racist prison gangs have also been known to write letters and inscribe messages on tattoos using the runic alphabet. “These myths were the basis of Wagner’s “Ring” opera cycle, and influenced Hitler, who merged them with his distorted understanding of Nietzsche’s philosophy of the centrality of will and the concept of the Ubermensch, which Hitler turned into the idea of an Aryan ‘Master Race,’” says Berlet.

Militia Extremists

The militia movement compares itself to the “Patriots” of the American Revolution in an attempt to “save” the ideals and original intent of the U.S. Constitution and return America to what they perceive to be the country’s Judeo-Christian roots. They have adopted some of the symbols associated with the American Revolution, such as using the term “Minutemen” in group names, hosting anti-tax events (much like the Boston Tea Party), celebrating April 19 — the anniversary date of the Battles of Lexington and Concord in 1775 — and using the Gadsden Minutemen flag with its revolutionary “Don’t Tread on Me” slogan.

Many militia members have a deep respect and reverence for America’s founding fathers. Their admiration takes on religious overtones, believing the U.S. Constitution was “divinely inspired” and that the founding fathers were actually chosen and led by God to create the United States of America. For example, an Indiana Militia Corps’ citizenship recruitment pamphlet states, “The Christian faith was the anchor of the founding fathers of these United States.” The manual also states, “People of faith, Christians in particular, recognize that God is the source of all things, and that Rights come from God alone.” The militia movement erroneously believes that the principles the founding fathers used to create the U.S. Constitution are derived solely from the Bible.

Antigovernment conspiracy theories and apocalyptic “end times” Biblical prophecies are known to motivate militia members and groups to stockpile food, ammunition, and weapons. These apocalyptic teachings have also been linked with the radicalization of militia extremist members. For example, nine members of the Hutaree militia in Lenawee County, Michigan, were arrested in March 2010 for conspiring to attack police officers and blow up their funeral processions. According to the Hutaree, its doctrine is “based on faith and most of all the testimony of Jesus.” Charges against all nine were eventually dismissed.

On their website, the Hutaree referenced the story of the 10 virgins (Matthew 25: 1-12) as the basis for their existence. The verses declare, “The wise ones took enough oil to last the whole night, just in case the bridegroom was late. The foolish ones took not enough oil to last the whole night and figured that the bridegroom would arrive earlier than he did.” According to the Hutaree, the bridegrooms represented the Christian church today; the oil represented faith; and, those with enough faith could last through the darkest and most doubtful times, which Hutaree members believed were upon them. Further, militia members often reason that defending themselves, their families, and communities against the New World Order is a literal battle between good (i.e. God) and evil (i.e. Satan or the devil).

The militia movement has historically both feared and anticipated a cataclysmic event that could lead to the collapse of the United States. Some militia members believe that such cataclysmic events are based in biblical prophecies. For example, some militia members believe that the so-called “Anti-Christ” in the last days predicted in the Book of Revelation is a world leader that unites all nations under a “one world government” before being exposed as the agent of Satan. They further believe that Jesus will battle the Anti-Christ before restoring his kingdom on earth. Militia members cite the creation of Communism, the establishment of the United Nations, and attacks against their Constitutional rights as “signs” or “evidence” that the Anti-Christ is actively working to create the “one world government” predicted in the Bible (e.g. Book of Revelation). Towards the end of the 1990s, many in the militia movement prepared for the turn of the millennium (e.g. Y2K) due to the impending belief that American society would collapse and result in anarchy and social chaos. The failure of the Y2K prophecy left many in the militia movement disillusioned and they left as a result.

More recently, militia extremists have begun organizing armed protests outside of Islamic centers and mosques fearing a rise in Muslim terrorism, perceived encroachment of Sharia law in America and/or out of pure hatred of Muslims and Islam. Some militia extremists have also provided support to gun stores and firing ranges in Arkansas, Florida and Oklahoma that were declared “Muslim Free Zones” by their owners. These types of activities are meant to harass and intimidate an entire faith-based community. They are likely inspired by militia extremists’ personal religious views of preserving America as a Christian nation.

Sovereign Citizens

Sovereign citizen extremists believe their doctrine is both inspired and sanctioned by God. Many have their own version of law that is derived from a combination of the Magna Carta, the Bible, English common law, and various 19th century state constitutions. Central to their argument is the view of a Supreme Being having endowed every person with certain inalienable rights as stated in the U.S. Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights, and the Bible.

In particular, since there is a strong anti-tax component to the sovereign citizen movement, many adherents use Biblical passages to justify not paying income or property taxes to the government. They most often cite Old Testament scriptures, which reference paying usury and taking money from the poor, such as Ezekiel 22:12-13, Proverbs 28:8, Deuteronomy 23:19, and Leviticus 25:36-37. Sovereign citizen extremists further cite Nehemiah 9:32-37 to bolster the belief that oppressive taxation results from sin. Also, 1 Kings 12:13-19 is used to justify rebellion against the government for oppressive taxation.

Sovereign citizen extremists have also been known to avoid paying taxes. They misuse a financial option called “corporation sole.” In general, sovereign citizen extremists misuse the corporation sole (e.g. forming a religious organization or claiming to be a religious figure such as a pastor or minister) tax exemption to avoid paying income and property taxes. They typically obtain a fake pastoral certification or minister certificate through a mail-order seminary or other bogus religious school. Then they change their residence to a “church.” Courts have routinely rejected this tax avoidance tactic as frivolous, upheld criminal tax evasion convictions against those making or promoting such arguments, and imposed civil penalties for falsely claiming corporation sole status.

Violent Anti-Abortion Extremists

The majority of violent anti-abortion extremist ideology is based on Christian religious beliefs and use of Biblical scripture. A review of violent anti-abortion extremist propaganda online is filled with Biblical references to God and Jesus Christ. Many of the Biblical scriptures quoted in violent anti-abortion extremist propaganda focus on protecting children, fighting against evil doers, and standing up to iniquity or sin.

The ultimate goal of anti-abortion extremists is to rid the country of the practice of abortion and those who perform and assist in its practice. They use religious and moral beliefs to justify violence against abortion providers, their staff, and facilities. Violent anti-abortion extremists believe that human life begins at conception. For this reason, some equate abortion to murder. Using this logic, they rationalize that those performing abortions are murdering other human beings. Anti-abortion extremists also equate the practice of abortion to a “silent holocaust.” Some anti-abortion extremists go as far as claiming abortion providers are actually “serial killers” and worthy of death. This sentiment is echoed in passages from the Army of God (AOG) manual in which they declare that the killing of abortion providers is morally acceptable and justified as doing God’s work.

The AOG perpetuates the belief that violent anti-abortion extremists literally represent soldiers fighting in God’s Army and that a divine power is at the helm of their cause. “The Army of God is a real Army, and God is the General and Commander-in-Chief,” the AOG says. Their manual further states, “The soldiers, however, do not usually communicate with one another. Very few have ever met each other. And when they do, each is usually unaware of the other’s soldier status.”

The AOG also utilizes religious symbolism in its name and logo. The AOG name literally compares its adherents to soldiers in battle with Satan. They are fighting a war with Jesus Christ at their side in an effort to save the unborn. The AOG logo also includes a white cross (e.g. symbolizing the crucifixion of Christ and his resurrection). The logo has a soldier’s helmet hanging off the cross with a bomb featuring a lit fuse inside a box. The words “The Army of God” are inscribed over and below the cross and bomb. The AOG also uses the symbol of a white rose; a reference to the White Rose Banquet, an annual anti-abortion extremist event organized by convicted abortion clinic arsonist Michael Bray.

Religious concepts — such as Christian end times prophecy, millennialism and the belief that the Second Coming of Jesus Christ is imminent — play a vital role in the recruitment, radicalization and mobilization of violent right-wing extremists and their illegal activities in the United States. For example, white supremacists have adopted Christian concepts and Norse mythology into their extremist ideology, group rituals and calls for violence. Similarly, sovereign citizens use God and scriptural interpretation to justify breaking “man-made” laws, circumventing government regulation, avoiding taxation, and other criminal acts. Violent anti-abortion extremists have used Biblical references to create divine edicts from God and Jesus Christ to kill others and destroy property. And militia extremists and groups use religious concepts and scripture to defy the government, break laws, and stockpile food, ammunition and weapons to hasten or await the end of the world. As a result, religious concepts and scriptures have literally been hijacked by right-wing extremists, who twist religious doctrine and scriptures, to justify threats, criminal behavior and violent attacks.

Religion and scriptural interpretations have played an essential role in armed confrontations between right-wing extremists and the U.S. government during the 1980s and 1990s (e.g. the Covenant, Sword, Arm of the Lord standoff in 1985, the siege at Ruby Ridge in 1992, and raid and standoff at Waco in 1993) as well as today (e.g. the 2014 Bunkerville standoff and the takeover of the Malheur Wildlife Refuge in 2016).

These events not only demonstrate extremists rebelling against the U.S. government and its laws, but also served as declarations of their perceived divinely inspired and Constitutional rights. They also serve as radicalization and recruitment nodes to boost the ranks of white supremacists, militia extremists, sovereign citizens, and other radical anti-government adherents who view the government’s response to these standoffs as tyrannical and overreaching.

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Are religious beliefs truly the root cause of terrorism?

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This article explores religion as a cause for terrorism, looking at different causes for terrorism and discussions into the harms associated with popular conceptions of associating religion with terrorism. The results of this research demonstrate that there are multiple causes for terrorism, which are not associated with religion, despite “intelligence-led policing” methods pertaining to religious and racial profiling. Theocracies and democracies have both abused human rights, demonstrating that states will ultimately prioritize their interests at the expense of the rights and freedoms of civilians, including the right to life.

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Introduction.

After 9/11, there was a misinformed trend of identifying terrorism by factors such as race, religion, or political beliefs ( Patel, 2021 ). The response to the terrorist attack was all on account of national security by the two main Western protagonists, the United States and the United Kingdom, through the “Global War on Terror” ( Baker & Phillipson, 2011 ). Increasing reports of “intelligence-led policing” methods included racial and religious profiling (ibid.), inevitably suggesting that an Asian person was more likely to perform a terrorist attack than a non-Asian person (ibid.). Following the bombings on the London Tube on 7 July 2005, the Chief Constable of the British Transport Police clearly stated the government’s perspective on the matter: “Intelligence-led stop and searches have got to be the way … It is going to be young men, not exclusively, but it may be disproportionate when it comes to ethnic groups” (Dodd, 2006, cited in Baker & Phillipson, 2011 : 3). Ramirez et al. (2003) underline racial or religious profiling are not imperative or effective for the War on Terrorism. The consequences of such actions can be detrimental to long-term investigative activities, as racial or religious profiling prevents law enforcement agencies from conducting thorough criminal investigations (ibid.).

This investigation into the causes of terrorism relates to existing work and elaborates on previous research. The purpose of this study is not to understate the religious influence on terrorism, but rather focus on other factors that are just as important and need to be recognized. Furthermore, theocracies like Iran have been recognized as state sponsors of terrorism and for human rights abuses. However, there is a lack of acknowledgment that democracies also contribute to this phenomenon, with only some authors recognizing this integral problem. Newman (2006 : 749) highlights that many analysts are hesitant to recognize root causes as they reject the idea “that there may be any legitimate causes or grievances behind terrorism”. The lack of awareness and discussion of causes has led to the demonization of certain communities.

With the idea of racial and religious profiling being central to counter-terrorism methods and evidently not useful, this paper looks at whether religions/religious beliefs are root causes for terrorism, while aiming to identify the causes of terrorism. It is divided into three sections: the first examines religion and violence, the second explores causes of terrorism, and the third investigates the role of states, theocratic and democratic in engendering terrorism.

Religion and conflict

Huntington’s article “The Clash of Civilizations?” ( 1993 ) and book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order ( 1996 ) are well known for the argument that Islam is inclined to conflict, compared to other religions. Huntington separates the world into civilizations, to some degree centered around religion, except one. Future conflicts, according to Huntington’s main thesis, will be between these civilizations as opposed to being centered on a particular ideology (e.g., communism vs capitalism), national (US vs USSR), etc. Rather than focus on whether all religions are prone to conflict, Huntington’s position allows the idea that some religions, like Islam, are more conflict-prone. He argued that Islam was the most troublesome civilization as it encouraged “loyalty to the religion that supplants the nation-state, while it is hostile toward ideas such as democracy, liberty, individualism and universal human rights” ( Hamourtziadou, 2020 : 23). While Huntington did not predict the events of the 11 September 2001, attack, he has been credited with predicting the cultural and religious context that may give rise to an act like 9/11 ( Pew Research Center, 2006 ).

In Fighting Words: The Origins of Religious Violence , Hector Avalos (2005) argues that religion is subject to violence, as it is a breeding ground for conditions of scarcity, using the “scarce resource theory”. Four major scarce resources that are provoked by religion are discussed in his book: inscripturation, sacred space, group privilege, and salvation. He applies each scarce resource to the Abrahamic religions. According to Avalos, inscripturation inherently promotes violence for individuals who dispute the legitimacy of a specific sacred scripture. For example, Deuteronomy 18:20 sanctions those who follow other Gods to be put to death ( BibleGateway, 1982a ). Violence occurs when religious groups oppose one another. One example is when Muhammad (PBUH) used scripture as a justification for the attack on the Qurayza Jews in the 7th century CE ( Avalos, 2005 ). The Jews’ refusal to adopt Islam’s new doctrine and the objection to abdicating the Torah led to bloodshed and violence. This was an example of how conflicts arise over scripture, thus playing a key role in violence. In relation to the scarce resource theory, inscripturation has become a scarce resource to those who do not have access to these scriptures, or the education to read. “If these books are the basis of authority, then they are a scarce resource to those who cannot read them” ( Avalos, 2005 : 105).

Avalos claims that sacred space is shared by major religions and defines this as “bounded space whose value is placed above that of surrounding spaces for purely religious reasons” (ibid.:106). According to the scarce resource theory, sacred places are probable for conflict as not everyone has access to or inhabits sacred spaces. One cannot speak of sacred spaces without the most significant location that holds a home for three of the world’s biggest religions: the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. Jerusalem’s history has been habituated with attacks over the last century. This essentially validates Avalos’s (2005) study, where faith in these religions and scriptures can cause violence. Closely associated with inscripturation and sacred spaces is group privilege, which is the notion that “certain groups have privileges and rights not granted to those outside of the group” (ibid: 108).

Group privilege is implicit in the Tanakh, as when believing one is selected, insiders and outsiders are immediately created. Outsiders are then a reason for potential conflict when they do not have equal rights to the empowered groups. For example, Jews are advised against marrying non-Jews in Ezra 10:3-44 ( BibleGateway, 1982b ). Avalos (2005 : 143) postulates “the repeated notions that Yahweh will conquer the entire world do not differ much from some conceptions of jihad”. In summation, violence ensues from group privilege as a response to religious competition.

Salvation “refers to the idea that one receives certain more permanent supernatural status or benefit by joining a particular religion” (ibid.: 109). Respecting the scarce resource theory, salvation is not available to everyone as it may only be available to those joining a particular group or willing to pay a price. Salvation leads to violence when certain modes of salvation command violence when individuals want to attain this. Avalos refers to orthodox Christianity, stating that the foundations for salvation are based on violence, specifically the torture and death of Jesus Christ, and it is fundamental to attain salvation. Islamic salvation occurs when any obstacles concerning salvation may result in violence to attain this ( Avalos, 2005 ).

Avalos’ standpoint is simple yet clear, stating religion is a catalyst for violence. The scarce resource theory provides a theoretical framework where religion creates scarce resources, thus conflict arises. When practicing individuals recognize scarce resources as having a high value, religion has the potential to incite conflict and violence. It is not an unknown phenomenon that religious texts have been perverted to favor the ideology of the interpreter, however, Avalos goes against this perspective and is able to bring passages that elicit or have the possibility to lead to violence, without manipulating the text to fit a distorted purpose. It is notable that he makes the effort to read the Abrahamic texts in a manner other than the conventional non-violent one. Avalos (2005 : 381) states “We need to ask ourselves, as academics, why the Bible and the Qur’an, among other scriptures, are worth privileging at all”. While Avalos primarily focuses on Abrahamic religions, he also notes that all religions are subject to violence. Avalos’s perspective demonstrates that religion can be a root cause of terrorism, primarily on the basis of direct quotes from religious books and historical events that have been immoral and provoked violence. The perception of revenge in Judaism, the martial triumphalism of Islam and the custom for atonement in Christianity, require a call for violent acts to execute their religious worldviews ( Juergensmeyer, 2017 ).

Çınar (2009) highlights that religion is not a direct cause of terrorism, but it can be used as a justification for terrorism. Interviews with terrorists frequently show that they feel frustrated and defeated. By enlisting people in a more powerful movement and guaranteeing ultimate victory, religion offers some terrorists a chance to deal with these internal problems in a way that addresses their own shortcomings. While religion may help some people cope with their difficulties, it is not the primary cause of their frustrations.

To say that any religion is inherently evil and a harbor for violence is unfair and wrong, as this denies the individuals the Freedom of Religion or Belief (FoRB). “Article 18 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948, states that ‘everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion’” ( GOV.UK, 2022 ). When FoRB is threatened, other human rights are made vulnerable, including deprivations of freedom of expression and detention without trial. Respect between religious groups can hinder the spread of extremism. Religion or belief-based discrimination hurts society and obstructs economies. Finally, cultural relativism would protect and justify the concept of religion ( Zechenter, 1997 ). Juergensmeyer (2017) states that many Muslims, Christians, and Jews regard their religion as a peaceful one.

To solely focus on religion as a cause for terrorism can cause more harm than good to practicing civilians. For example, after the 9/11 attacks, Arab-Americans have been targeted for security checks, interrogation, and other investigations due to their skin color, clothes, name, or country of origin ( Ramirez et al., 2003 ). This ultimately created a demonization of the Muslim community. Communities of color and other minority groups are also less inclined to trust the law, when law enforcement practices are portrayed as unfair, biased, and disrespectful. Although President George W. Bush urged Americans not to place the blame for the 9/11 attacks on Islam, Islamophobia has invaded public discourse, with the belief that Islam supports terrorism.

Religion will never go away. Gerson et al. states:

Religion also happens to be one of the oldest, deepest, most universal needs of the human soul. It cannot be ignored. Most of the predictions of early modern sociology – that science and modernity would make religion marginal and irrelevant – have utterly failed. ( Gerson et al., 2010 : 3)

Instead of seeing religion as a source of terrorism, future research should instead explore the misrepresentation and perversion of religion. According to the World Population Review (2023) , approximately “85% of the world’s people identify with a religion”. If religion did cause terrorism, there would be a lot more terrorist attacks committed in the name of religion.

Causes of terrorism

Many studies have been conducted to demonstrate the correlation between why individuals join terrorist groups and why they become terrorists. For the purpose of this argument, mainstream religion will be void to demonstrate the significance of other factors leading to violence and terrorism, and how the religion has been utilized as a tool to attract some of these individuals. In the qualitative interviews by Scull et al. (2020) there emerged key themes regarding individuals and their involvement with terrorist groups, specifically members of ISIS and Al-Qaeda, for which they are apprehended in Kuwait’s Central Prison. Emergent themes were religious identity development, personal connections, propaganda, defense of Islam, social marginalization, and ideology. The study’s reliance on analysis of interviews with terrorist group members that concentrate on ideological aspects is one of its shortcomings. Terrorists may choose to support such organizations for other reasons, apart from ideology, that are essentially not captured by this sample. A study conducted by Gómez et al. (2021) observed patterns of coercion that resulted in individuals joining terrorist groups, like the loss of relational ties, such as through deaths of family members, were key components as to why they chose to join the terrorist group Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

Heitmeyer (2005) states there is no universally agreed theory to explain terrorism. Borum (2004) instead states that their individual behaviors for violence can fall under theoretical pretenses for example, social learning theory, cognitive theory, and biological factors that influence aggression. Lia and Skjølberg’s (2000) (cited in Heitmeyer 2005 ) survey of theories and hypotheses is respectable, however, it has its own set of problematic factors, due to its oversimplification and generalization of terrorism. Elliott and Lockhart (1980, cited in Alexander & O’Day 2015 ) and Krueger (2018) address the importance of acknowledging the backgrounds of terrorists. For example, in the study Elliott and Lockhart (1980), offenders of terrorist activities were intelligent, achieved higher educational achievements, displayed lower levels of evidence for early development concerns, with a decrease in court appearances compared to other “ordinary” offenders. Correspondingly, Krueger (2018) claims there is little correlation between poverty and lack of education as a root cause for terrorism, despite what world leaders and prominent thinkers may disclose. For example, President Bush said, “We fight against poverty because hope is an answer to terror” (G.W. Bush, 2002, cited in Krueger, 2018 : 12). Human rights activist, Elie Wiesel contested that “The fanatic has no questions, only answers. Education is the way to eliminate terrorism” (Jai, 2001, cited in Krueger, 2018 ).

Staub (2002, cited in Zeidan, 2006 : 220) on the other hand discusses a multitude of circumstances that interfere with fundamental human needs are the potential root causes of terrorism which are as listed: “poverty, relative deprivation, and sense of injustice; difficult life conditions, including great social and cultural change …” Scull et al. (2020) also state their sample of participants had lower levels of education, which affected them to think critically and independently. Consequently, they were more vulnerable to societal pressure and influence. Terrorist leaders are more likely to be educated and middle-class, however, those who are recruited display lower levels of education. Lack of job opportunities is also a factor in joining terrorist groups ( Çınar, 2009 ).

Religious extremism

Some authors argue religion is not the root cause of terrorism. But instead religious extremism is one of the main root causes of terrorism and is not restricted to one religion ( Zeidan, 2006 ). For example, “Gush Emunim, the Jewish Settlers Movement, has more in common with the Taliban than it does with ultra-orthodox Jews in terms of political action” (ibid: 220–221). Esposito (cited in Richardson, 2013 ) highlights the emergence of political Islam, and makes key differences regarding mainstream and extremist movements. He gives the example of bin Laden as his motivations were not religious but were based on the grounds of political and economic grievances; nonetheless, they use a history of religious extremism to justify their actions. Onimhawo and Ottuh (2007 : 92) discuss some reasons behind religious extremism: “religious fundamentalism, exclusivism, fanaticism, bigotism, ignorance, intolerance”. These individuals often act in ways that are contrary to their religious beliefs when they lack sufficient knowledge or ideas about them, thus giving a false impression of their religion.

Political terrorism

According to Kirk (1983) , political terrorism is violent political action that is predominantly intended to instill fear in the community, or a significant portion of it, for political goals. Political extortion occurs in the form of terrorism. Political objectives are often thought of as being ideological in nature. Political terrorists are consequently thought to be zealots who will kill and be killed in order to advance “the cause”. Terrorism is politically motivated violence and the majority of terrorism has the goal of political power, yet there is a large emphasis on religion. Schwenkenbecher (2012) categorizes terrorism as a political phenomenon which distinguishes it from other criminal strategies: terrorism objectives characterize it as a political tactic compared to criminal tactics. It is generally believed that the political aspect of religion is what motivates individuals or groups to use terrorism in the name of a particular religion: “In this sense, even religious terrorism is understood as a genuinely political strategy” (ibid.: 13). Gregg (2014) also concurs, stating the goals of religious terrorists are political and not religious. Al-Qaeda, for example, were a group in which their ultimate aims were religiously formulated, but their immediate objectives were almost purely political. Al-Qaeda uses religious grievances as vindications for their violence, but the issues solicited have correlations to political grievances, for example, oppression, poverty, and exploitation are reoccurring concepts ( Quiggin, 2009 ). Esposito (cited in Çınar 2009 ) alleges political and economic grievances are the main causes and religion turns into a tool for mobilization and legitimization. Onimhawo and Ottuh (2007) state individuals will exploit religion to achieve political goals. However, Schwenkenbecher (2012) argues that terrorists may claim to fight for a political cause, but in actuality they are influenced by personal motives, hatred, and/or lust for revenge.

Nationalist terrorism

Hamourtziadou and Jackson (2018) state that nationalist movements utilize force to either win the independence of their people or resist secession and claim to represent a nation. When the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was founded in 1919, it was regarded as a nationalist organization that aimed to remove British rule from Ireland and make it independent and unified ( Johnson & English, 2008 ). Pressman (2007) states that the IRA differs from Al-Qaeda, as the IRA defined its objectives through a national territory.

Ideologies are discussed by many authors as causes of terrorism. Drake (1998) states that ideologies not only fuel initial motives for terrorists, but they also play a central role in the terrorist’s target. The choice of a terrorist’s target is critically influenced by the ideology, which also gives them a primary motivation for their activities and a lens through which to evaluate other people’s behavior. Additionally, ideology enables terrorists to defend their acts of violence by placing the responsibility on either the targets or other actors, whom they believe has led them to use violence. Although it is not the only cause, ideology gives terrorists a starting point for valid targets and a way to defend their actions to the public and to themselves (Drake, 2007; Kruglanski & Orehek, 2011 ). Pape (2005, cited in Kruglanski & Orehek, 2011 ) gave one illustration of such ideology when he noted that terrorists frequently see the foreign occupation of their territory as a state of affairs that needs to be corrected. The occupier is the problem, and terrorist action is resolving the issue with the ultimate goal of coercing the occupier to leave the territory. Ethno-nationalistic or politico-religious can be variants of ideology ( Hassan, 2006 ). In an effort to persuade the government to ideologically concede to the terrorist’s position, terrorists who are said to be driven by ideology communicate with the government through its citizens ( Kirk, 1983 ).

Despite many authors claiming that an ideology is needed to drive the incentive for many terrorists, Barzegar et al. (2016 : 8) found that, through surveyed stakeholders, there was an overwhelmingly large consensus of agreement that there “exists no causal, predictive link between ideology and violence”. Holbrook and Horgan (2019) also reiterate this conception, claiming the link between ideology and terrorism is weak. There is also the notion of “little to no causal, linear link between particular Islamic beliefs and extremist violence” ( Barzegar et al., 2016 : 8). Barzegar et al. (2016) state the need to protect the rights of religious minorities. The importance of this conception stems from the human security framework aiming to protect individuals from discrimination. Civil rights violations and anti-Muslim hate crimes must be treated intently by law enforcement agencies, to dispel the misconception that Muslims are solely or even mostly to blame for violent extremism. Religious profiling offers extremist groups access to truths that they may use to gain sympathy and support for their cause. In order to combat this perception, law enforcement authorities must do everything within their ability to shield Muslims (and categorically all religious individuals) from hate speech, crimes, and unfair criminal investigations.

Mass media can serve as a powerful propaganda tool that has the ability to mold the attitudes of the public ( Slone, 2000 ). When the 7/7 London terror attacks and the 2007 Glasgow International Airport attack occurred, UK media outlets initiated stereotypes of Muslim terrorists and misrepresented Islamic beliefs as terrorism ( Ahmed & Matthes 2017 ). As the media infiltrates most of public discourse, it is not implausible to correlate the media with crimes inflicted upon practicing individuals. The Equality and Human Rights Commission’s ( 2015 ) five-yearly review of equality and human rights in Britain (2015) found individuals who did not practice religion were rarely distressed about crime, “In England, Muslims (67.8%), Buddhists (67.1%), Hindus (66.4%), Sikhs (61.6%) and Christians (38.6%) were more likely to report feeling worried about physical attack and acquisitive crime than those with no religion (32.3%) in 2012/13”. Zeidan (2006) additionally states that after 9/11 media bias against Muslims and Arabs radicalized moderate Muslims, as they felt that injustice had been imposed on them. When Muslim extremists did commit acts of terrorism, they received “357% more US press coverage than those committed by non-Muslims” ( Chalabi, 2018 ).

State terrorism

Theocracy is defined as a “belief in governance by divine guidance, a form of regime in which religion or faith plays the dominant role. It denotes thus a political unit governed by a deity or by officials thought to be divinely guided” (Zakai, 2008: 342, cited in Seyfi & Hall 2019 ). Similarly to the way a democracy is frequently run by elected officials, so too is a theocracy run by elected officials – in this case, the elected officials of God ( Cliteur & Ellian, 2020 ). The political issue with theocracy is that it cannot limit the role of religion to support morality. This is because the theocracy’s logic is to place speculative ideas on the state, regardless of how flawed they may be ( Ward, 2013 ). Therefore, this flawed notion could be imposing religious texts on people against their will, like in the case of Iran (abusing the human rights of Iranians) and using measures like terrorism to influence events beyond its borders for regional and emerging powers ( Fayazi, 2017 ). Oberschall (2004 : 37) claims Iran is important as it “was the first contemporary Muslim theocracy and also one of the first state sponsors of Islamist terrorists”. Iran is a country in which they have actively assisted terrorist organizations for example, “in 2019 Iran supported various Iraqi Shia terrorist groups, including Kata’ib Hizballah (KH), Harakat al-Nujaba, and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq” ( US Department of State 2019 ). Fayazi (2017) highlights the rationales for Iran’s support for terrorism. For example, Iran employs terror groups to endanger governments it opposes. Ben-Yehuda (2010) states that potentially violent and unpleasant flare-ups within and across cultures might occur from the conflicts and tensions between democracies and theocracies. Chenoweth (2006) and Li (2005) argue that terrorism will decline, as democracies provide platforms for citizens to express their interests and support peaceful solutions. By virtue of the increased ability to dispute and articulate grievances, individuals and groups are more likely to seek non-violent routes. Spinoza (cited in Ward 2013 ) favors democracy, considering it to be the most rational and natural form of government, and he regarded it as the pinnacle of political possibilities.

The conclusion, then, is that theocracies engender or enable terrorism, while democracies fight or disable terrorism. But is this the case?

To focus on theocracies as sponsors of terrorism would be one end of the spectrum. Democracies like the US have a controversial history of endorsing terror groups ( Fayazi, 2017 ). For example, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was employed by the CIA in the 1970s to prevent the Soviets from spreading and hindering the expansion of Marxist ideology to the Arab people (ibid.). Al-Qaeda and ISIS originated and are still financed by the US (ibid.). The British Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, informed the House of Commons that Al-Qaeda was a “product of Western intelligence agencies” (Ebrahim, 2017, cited in Fayazi 2017 ). Democracies may be involved with state terrorism, but they will not terrorize their own citizens, as this would go against the principles of democracy. Dictatorships, on the other hand, will terrorize their own citizens.

The “Global War on Terror” was launched by the US in response to the 2001 terrorist attacks ( George W. Bush Presidential Library and Museum n.d. ) as a military and moral endeavor to eradicate terrorism; yet the US and its partners (including the UK) have subsequently committed horrific crimes against civilians, essentially opposing human security and acting as “terrorists”. For example, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was based on the constructed threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) possessed by Saddam Hussein. But WMDs were not found ( Røssaak, 2017 ; Kimball, 2003 ) and the fear of Saddam Hussein’s affiliation with Al-Qaeda was fabricated and unreliable ( Bapat et al., 2007 ). This made-up narrative of labeling people outside of their borders as terrorists and then terrorizing other (foreign) civilians in the name of a social justice cause, like democratic imperialism ( Encarnación, 2005 ), is an example of the double standard. Russia was labeled as a state that uses “means of terrorism” after the “destruction of civilian infrastructure and other serious violations of international and humanitarian law amount to acts of terror and constitute war crimes” ( News European Parliament, 2022 ). Whereas the US and the UK are able to successfully claim the moral high ground after dropping bombs on innocent civilians. Hamourtziadou (2021) further underlines that the neoliberal democratic system that the US and its allies imposed on Iraq was incapable of producing either the outcomes expected in a developed country or a democracy, in the Western tradition. Highly developed countries like the UK and the US maintain economic prosperity, and long-lasting political stability, and experience little prospect of major war. To this day, on the other hand, Iraq continues to be a weak state.

The true intentions of the Global War on Terror lie within democratic imperialism. Hamourtziadou (2007) highlights that the US–UK coalition went to war “to change the regime, to gain control of the region and its oil, at the expense of Iran, China, Russia, to have more influence over other countries that depend on that oil”, producing violent resistance retaliations in the form of insurgency and terrorism, and giving rise to Al-Qaeda in Iraq ( Hamourtziadou, 2007 ). It was a clear abuse of power that would spark conflict and enmity in the region for decades, and result in hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths from force, poverty, disease, and displacement.

“US-led forces killed 37% of all civilian victims in the first two years” ( Hamourtziadou, 2023 ) of the Iraq war. Mike Prysner, a former Iraq veteran, spoke of the crimes committed by the US government: “We were told we were fighting terrorists, but the real terrorist was me and the real terrorism is this occupation. Racism within the military has long been an important tool to justify the destruction and occupation of another country… Racism is a vital weapon employed by this government” ( John, 2013 : 00:07:09–00:07:29). This is particularly important, as Hamourtziadou (2020) highlights that the War on Terror created “winners” and “losers”. The winners of this conflict were the ones who authorized the War on Terror, George W. Bush and Tony Blair, who, despite invading and destroying countries and killing civilians, were re-elected. The losers were the Iraqis.

Between 2003 and 2020, the only constants have been communal violence, terrorism, poverty, weapons proliferation, crime, political instability, social breakdown, riots, disorder and economic failure. In Iraq, we observe the lack of basic security that exists in “zones of instability”. ( Hamourtziadou, 2023 )

Theocracies and democracies have enabled or provoked terrorism, as well as committed acts of terror on civilian populations. Their actions have conflicted with the central beliefs and values of democracy and with those of religion. This study has argued that religion should not be regarded as a root cause of terrorism. While terrorists may commit crimes in the name of religion, there are underlying causes that motivate individuals to commit such acts that are not central to religion: social marginalization, propaganda, identity fusion, political, national and individual backgrounds. States – theocratic and democratic – are also factors in causing terrorism, either by sponsoring it or by provoking it. Democracies like the US and the UK have contributed to the grievances of terrorists and have acted on a scale terrorists could not reach.

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The Politics of Religious Extremism in Pakistan: An Analysis

• Sidra Karamat PhD Scholar, Department of Political Science and International Relations, GC University, Faisalabad, Pakistan
• Muhammad Muzaffar Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, GC Women University, Sialkot, Pakistan
• Ali Shan Shah Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, GC University, Faisalabad, Pakistan

In this study, the connection between Islamic values and country policies has been carefully connected to the foundations that create political legitimating and the basic nature of a country. Islam performs a crucial part in the social fabric of Pakistan and has been integrated as the guiding concept for the constitutional procedure and governmental systems of the country but at the same time produced implicit stress for their future improvements. Various government authorities have used religious beliefs for their quest for governmental authenticity and power. This has consequently brought about politicization of spiritual explanation in Pakistan demonstrated in the form of sectarian disputes, persecution of spiritual unprivileged or disempowerment of certain spiritual organizations and management. Whereas controversy about interpreting religious identity continues pervading the Pakistani community, it is observed that large parts of the Pakistani inhabitants follow pluralistic types of Islam based on heterogeneous spiritual and devotional methods. Islamic political parties should cooperate on federal or provincial levels with national and local political parties to eliminate the religious extremism in Pakistan.

Abbas, H. (2015). Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror. London, United Kingdom: Routledge.

Afzal, M. (2018). Pakistan Under Siege: Extremism, Society, and the State. ?Washington, D.C.,: Brookings Institution Press.

Cheema, P. I. (2008). Political Role of Religious Communities in Pakistan. Islamabad, Pakistan: Islamabad Policy Research Institute.

Day, A. J., &Degenhardt, H. W. (1984). Political Parties of the World (2nd ed.). London: Longman Group Limited.

Misra, A. (2003). Rise of religious parties in Pakistan: Causes and prospects. Strategic Analysis, 27(2), 186-215.

Murphy, E. (2013). The Making of Terrorism in Pakistan: Historical and Social Roots of Extremism. London, United Kingdom: Routledge.

Ullah, H. K. (2013). Vying for Allah's Vote: Understanding Islamic Parties, Political Violence, and Extremism in Pakistan. Washington, D.C., United States: Georgetown University Press.

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ADP English Essay Religious Extremism in Pakistan With Outline & Quotations

ADP English Essay Religious Extremism in Pakistan With Outline & Quotations

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1. Introduction

• What is religious extremism?
• Clashes of the followers of different religions

2. Factors of Religious extremism

• Emotional and unreasoning thinking
• Lack of education awareness and proper guidance

3. Evils of religious extremism

• Two sects are common ‘Shias and Sunnis’
• Terrorists use some young people in the name of Islam

4. How to overcome religious extremism

• Media must preach the true spirit of Islam
• Followers of all sects must realize the real nature of Islam

5. Conclusion

“Extremism in defense of liberty is no vice, but it reaches in such extent to kill other on religious difference is worse.” (Barry Goldwater)

Religious extremism means that one religious group thinks that his sect and thinking approach are correct and final while the followers of other sects are incorrect and liars. Pakistan came into being in the name of Islam, but unfortunately some so-called Ulemas and scholars have changed the true concept of Islam. The followers of other sect hate strongly the followers of other sect. Everyone adherence to his own point of view and considers the other sect wrong and false.

There are many factors behind religious extremism. Firstly, some modern thinkers and philosophers believe that religious extremism is only produced by emotions unreasoning and non-scientific thinking. They say that religious extremism become too much objective in their approach and do not believe in the approach of any other person. Secondly, lack of scientific education is another basic factor. Sometimes we observed that in our society common people have no proper guideline and knowledge about religion. In this way some so-called Ulemas and scholars misguide them and then try to force their views on the others by force. Thirdly, religious extremism can be observed in those minds that are single illiterate and credulous. They believe in the wrong stories of Ulemas and accept it without analyzing. Fourthly, some young people follow the same belief of their ancestors without observing whether their ancestors were wrong or right to their observations. They grow hatred and ill-will against the followers of other sects.

“It is better to understand a little than to misunderstand a lot.” (Anatole France)

There are various sect in Pakistan, but the followers of two sect ‘Shias and Sunnis’ are said to be the religious extremists. Sometimes the Ulemas of both the sects condemn each other. They never hesitate to abuse any person who does not believe in their views. Such type of extremism is very harmful to the society of a country. Such type of extremism produces hatred among the people. Sometimes these people are trained by the terrorists and they use them in the name of Islam to achieve their own purposes. They start killing the innocent people of other sects mercilessly. The use of force leads to enmity and bitter hostility.

There are some steps to overcome the religious extremism. The followers of every sect must tolerate and understand the views of the followers of other sects. The teaching of Islam in the correct spirit must be propagated through electronic media. There must be justice, equality and law and order for everyone. Most importantly, the followers of every sect must understand that Islam is a religion of peace and justice. They must observe that Islam never allows anybody to kill or abuse anybody whether he belongs to any sect or nation. The follower of every sect must follow the true principles of Islam. There is no doubt that in this way religious extremism can be removed.

“Religion is nothing else but love to God and man.” (Anonymous)

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Intermediate Islamiat 11th Ch 2 MCQs اسلامی تشخص محاسن و رزائل اخلاق

Intermediate Islamiat 11th Ch 2 MCQs اسلامی تشخص حقوق العباد، والدین، اولاد، میاں بیوی، اساتذہ، رشتہ داروں، ہمسایوں اور غیر مسلموں کے حقوق

Intermediate Islamiat 11th Ch 2 MCQs اسلامی تشخص روزہ، حج، جہاد، اللہ اور رسول اللہﷺ کی محبت و اطاعت

Intermediate Islamiat 11th Ch 2 MCQs اسلامی تشخص نماز، زکوۃ

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Bsc ba adp english essay religious extremism in pakistan with outline & quotations, bsc ba adp fsc ics fa icom english essay religious extremism in pakistan with outline & quotations essay notes online taleem ilmi hub.

To view Quotations for Essays. Click  Here .

1. Introduction

• What is religious extremism?
• Clashes of the followers of different religions

2. Factors of Religious extremism

• Emotional and unreasoning thinking
• Lack of education awareness and proper guidance

3. Evils of religious extremism

• Two sects are common ‘Shias and Sunnis’
• Terrorists use some young people in the name of Islam

4. How to overcome religious extremism

• Media must preach the true spirit of Islam
• Followers of all sects must realize the real nature of Islam

5. Conclusion

“Extremism in defense of liberty is no vice, but it reaches in such extent to kill other on religious difference is worse.” (Barry Goldwater)

Religious extremism means that one religious group thinks that his sect and thinking approach are correct and final while the followers of other sects are incorrect and liars. Pakistan came into being in the name of Islam, but unfortunately some so-called Ulemas and scholars have changed the true concept of Islam. The followers of other sect hate strongly the followers of other sect. Everyone adherence to his own point of view and considers the other sect wrong and false.

There are many factors behind religious extremism. Firstly, some modern thinkers and philosophers believe that religious extremism is only produced by emotions unreasoning and non-scientific thinking. They say that religious extremism become too much objective in their approach and do not believe in the approach of any other person. Secondly, lack of scientific education is another basic factor. Sometimes we observed that in our society common people have no proper guideline and knowledge about religion. In this way some so-called Ulemas and scholars misguide them and then try to force their views on the others by force. Thirdly, religious extremism can be observed in those minds that are single illiterate and credulous. They believe in the wrong stories of Ulemas and accept it without analyzing. Fourthly, some young people follow the same belief of their ancestors without observing whether their ancestors were wrong or right to their observations. They grow hatred and ill-will against the followers of other sects.

“It is better to understand a little than to misunderstand a lot.” (Anatole France)

There are various sect in Pakistan, but the followers of two sect ‘Shias and Sunnis’ are said to be the religious extremists. Sometimes the Ulemas of both the sects condemn each other. They never hesitate to abuse any person who does not believe in their views. Such type of extremism is very harmful to the society of a country. Such type of extremism produces hatred among the people. Sometimes these people are trained by the terrorists and they use them in the name of Islam to achieve their own purposes. They start killing the innocent people of other sects mercilessly. The use of force leads to enmity and bitter hostility.

There are some steps to overcome the religious extremism. The followers of every sect must tolerate and understand the views of the followers of other sects. The teaching of Islam in the correct spirit must be propagated through electronic media. There must be justice, equality and law and order for everyone. Most importantly, the followers of every sect must understand that Islam is a religion of peace and justice. They must observe that Islam never allows anybody to kill or abuse anybody whether he belongs to any sect or nation. The follower of every sect must follow the true principles of Islam. There is no doubt that in this way religious extremism can be removed.

“Religion is nothing else but love to God and man.” (Anonymous)

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Good essay.But it should be more lengthy.....

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Why Russia’s Vast Security Services Fell Short on Deadly Attack

The factors behind the failure to prevent a terrorist attack include a distrust of foreign intelligence, a focus on Ukraine and a distracting political crackdown at home.

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By Paul Sonne ,  Eric Schmitt and Michael Schwirtz

A day before the U.S. embassy in Moscow put out a rare public alert this month about a possible extremist attack at a Russian concert venue, the local C.I.A. station delivered a private warning to Russian officials that included at least one additional detail: The plot in question involved an offshoot of the Islamic State known as ISIS-K.

American intelligence had been tracking the group closely and believed the threat credible. Within days, however, President Vladimir V. Putin was disparaging the warnings, calling them “outright blackmail” and attempts to “intimidate and destabilize our society.”

Three days after he spoke, gunmen stormed Crocus City Hall outside Moscow last Friday night and killed at least 143 people in the deadliest attack in Russia in nearly two decades. ISIS quickly claimed responsibility for the massacre with statements, a photo and a propaganda video.

What made the security lapse seemingly even more notable was that in the days before the massacre Russia’s own security establishment had also acknowledged the domestic threat posed by the Islamic State affiliate in Afghanistan, called Islamic State Khorasan Province, or ISIS-K.

Internal Russian intelligence reporting that most likely circulated at the highest levels of the government warned of the increased likelihood of an attack in Russia by ethnic Tajiks radicalized by ISIS-K, according to information obtained by the Dossier Center, a London research organization, and reviewed by The New York Times.

Russia has identified the four men suspected of carrying out the attack as being from Tajikistan.

Now, Mr. Putin and his lieutenants are pointing fingers at Ukraine , trying to deflect attention from a question that would be front and center in any nation with an independent media and open debate in its politics: How did Russia’s vast intelligence and law enforcement apparatus, despite significant warnings, fail to head off one of the biggest terrorist attacks in the country in Mr. Putin’s nearly quarter century in power?

The full picture is still unclear, and U.S. and European officials, as well as security and counterterrorism experts, emphasize that even in the best of circumstances, with highly specific information and well-oiled security services, disrupting covert international terror plots is difficult.

But they say the failure most likely resulted from a combination of factors, paramount among them the deep levels of distrust, both within the Russian security establishment and in its relations with other global intelligence agencies.

They also point to the way Mr. Putin has hijacked his domestic security apparatus for an ever-widening political crackdown at home — as well as his focus on crusading against Ukraine and the West — as distractions that probably did not help.

This account of the Russian failure to prevent the concert attack is based on interviews with U.S. and European security officials, security experts and analysts specializing in international intelligence capabilities. Many spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive intelligence details.

“The problem is to actually be able to prevent terrorist attacks, you need to have a really good and efficient system of intelligence sharing and intelligence gathering,” said Andrei Soldatov, an expert on Russian intelligence, who underscored that trust is needed inside the home agency and with agencies of other countries, as is good coordination. He said, “That’s where you have problems.”

An Expanding Definition of Extremist

Mr. Putin’s definition of what constitutes an extremist began to expand even before his invasion of Ukraine in early 2022.

The agency primarily responsible for combating terrorism in Russia is called the Second Service, a branch of the Federal Security Service, or the F.S.B. It once focused on Islamist extremists, bands of assassins and homegrown neo-Nazi groups.

But as Mr. Putin has advanced his political crackdown at home, its list of targets ballooned to include opposition figures like Aleksei A. Navalny, who died last month in a Russian prison , and his supporters, as well as L.G.B.T.Q. rights activists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, peace activists and other Kremlin critics.

The number of Islamist-related organizations on the register of extremist organizations listed by Russian Federal Service for Financial Monitoring has declined since 2013. At the same time, hundreds of organizations have been added related to Jehovah’s Witnesses, which has its worldwide headquarters in the United States and is viewed with suspicion by the F.S.B.

Security experts said the expanding focus wasted resources and diverted the attention of senior leaders.

The head of the Second Service, for instance, was increasingly involved in areas far afield from counterterrorism; in 2020, according to the U.S. government, he and his branch of the F.S.B. were involved in the poisoning of Mr. Navalny .

“Overall, the F.S.B. is a political police force, and as such it reflects Kremlin concerns,” said Mark Galeotti, a specialist on Russia’s security operations and a senior associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute in London. “At present, the government is most exercised by political dissent and Ukrainian sabotage, so they are the F.S.B.’s priorities.”

Russia is one of the chief military backers of the Islamic State’s opponents in the Middle East, including Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, making Russian interests a key target of the Islamist extremist group. But as one European security official put it, the Russians were pursuing “fictitious threats” rather than real ones.

Still, U.S. and European officials say the Russian officials tracking Islamist extremists have their own unit within the Second Service that has remained robustly staffed and funded, despite the strains on the security services from the intensifying domestic political crackdown and the war against Ukraine.

The failure to prevent the attack was probably the result of a combination of other factors, including fatigue after being “especially alert” during the period before Russia’s recent presidential election , said a European security official, who tracks the activities of the Russian intelligence services.

There is also evidence that Russian authorities did respond to the warnings this month, at least initially.

Increased Security

On March 7, the day after the C.I.A. station issued the private warning to the Russians, the F.S.B. announced that it had killed two Kazakhs southwest of Moscow, while disrupting an ISIS-K plot to target a synagogue in the capital. U.S. officials thought the raid was possibly a sign that the Russian authorities were springing into action.

Iosif Prigozhin, a well-known Russian music producer, recalled that he and his wife, the Russian pop star Valeriya, who performed at Crocus City Hall this month, noticed how security had increased at the venue in early March; security guards checked people’s bags and cosmetics cases and took other measures he hadn’t seen there before, he said.

“I even called the general director and said, ‘Listen, what’s going on? Are you expecting high-ranking guests?'” Mr. Prigozhin said in an interview. “He said, ‘Iosif, I’ll tell you later.’ He didn’t say anything over the phone. He said it’s necessary — and that’s it.”

Around the same time, the venue’s staff was warned about the possibility of a terrorist attack and instructed on what to do in such an event, said Islam Khalilov, a 15-year-old student who was working in the coat check on the night of the attack, in an interview posted on YouTube .

One of Mr. Putin’s favorite singers, Grigory Leps, was performing there on March 8. Shaman , a singer whose pro-Kremlin jingoism has catapulted him to popularity amid wartime fervor, was scheduled to take the stage a day later.

But the heightened security didn’t ferret out one of the attackers, Shamsidin Fariduni. Employees at the music hall, speaking to Russian media, recalled seeing Mr. Fariduni at the concert venue on March 7. A photo of him in a light brown coat at the venue, verified by The Times, has circulated in the Russian press.

Aleksandr V. Bortnikov, the director of the F.S.B., emphasized Tuesday in public comments that the information the United States provided was “of a general nature.”

“We reacted to this information, of course, and took appropriate measures,” he said, noting that the actions the F.S.B. took to follow up on the tip didn’t confirm it.

The adversarial relationship between Washington and Moscow prevented U.S. officials from sharing any information about the plot beyond what was necessary, out of fear Russian authorities might learn their intelligence sources or methods.

In its March 7 public warning, the U.S. embassy said the risk of a concert venue attack in Moscow was acute for the next 48 hours. U.S. officials say it’s possible Russian authorities pushed hard around the 48-hour warning period but later grew more relaxed and distrustful when an attack didn’t occur.

It is unclear whether U.S. intelligence mistook the timing of the attack or the extremists delayed their plan upon seeing heightened security.

In the subsequent days, internal Russian intelligence reporting — which the Dossier Center said reached the Russian National Security Council — warned specifically about the threat that Tajiks radicalized by ISIS-K posed to Russia. The reporting pointed to the involvement of Tajiks in disrupted plots in Europe and attacks in Iran and Istanbul in recent months. The reporting didn’t mention the Western warnings or a possible Moscow attack.

The Dossier Center was founded in 2017 by the exiled Russian tycoon Mikhail B. Khodorkovsky, a longtime opponent of Mr. Putin. The authenticity of its report could not be independently verified.

But by then, the skepticism about the plot had grown within the Russian government, and Mr. Putin felt comfortable deriding the public warnings in a speech to top officers at the F.S.B., using the occasion to attack the West again.

“Because the F.S.B. — and Putin — sees the world through the prism that the United States is out to get Russia, any information that is not consistent with that frame is easily dismissed,” said Andrea Kendall-Taylor, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, who previously led analyses of Russia by the U.S. intelligence community.

She said, “That dynamic may have resulted in an intelligence failure with devastating consequences.”

‘Duty to Warn’

When it informed Russia privately about the potential terror plot, the C.I.A. was adhering to 2015 guidance known as “duty to warn” directives, requiring the intelligence establishment to inform “U.S. and non-U.S. persons” of specific threats aimed at “intentional killing, serious bodily injury and kidnapping.”

These directives are relatively rare, but the United States is obliged to issue them, even to adversaries, and has done so with both the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Iranian government in the past year. The warnings aren’t usually made public unless U.S. authorities think the threat could impact American citizens, which was the case in Moscow.

Mr. Putin, in both 2017 and 2019 , thanked the U.S. government for providing information that had helped Russia foil terrorist attacks in St. Petersburg. But analysts say a similar gesture would be impossible in the acrimonious environment he has created since invading Ukraine.

The United States has been tracking ISIS-K activities very closely in recent months, senior officials said. In the course of the monitoring, which has involved electronic intercepts, human informants and other means, American operatives picked up fairly specific information about plotting in Moscow, officials said.

Experts said Russia’s intelligence services have traditionally been focused on domestic terrorist threats emanating from separatist and religious extremist groups in Russia’s North Caucasus region. Large terrorist attacks on Russian soil attributed to international groups like the Islamic State or Al Qaeda have been rare, and the country’s domestic security services have less experience tracking those threats and are less skilled at penetrating Central Asian extremist cells.

In the days since the attack, Moscow has returned the favor to Washington for offering the tip by claiming its warning should be treated as evidence of possible American complicity.

Mr. Bortnikov, the F.S.B. director, said on Tuesday that Islamist extremists alone couldn’t possibly have carried out the attack. He blamed, among others, the United States.

Oleg Matsnev , Safak Timur and Aric Toler contributed reporting.

Paul Sonne is an international correspondent, focusing on Russia and the varied impacts of President Vladimir V. Putin’s domestic and foreign policies, with a focus on the war against Ukraine. More about Paul Sonne

Eric Schmitt is a national security correspondent for The Times, focusing on U.S. military affairs and counterterrorism issues overseas, topics he has reported on for more than three decades. More about Eric Schmitt

Michael Schwirtz is an investigative reporter with the International desk. With The Times since 2006, he previously covered the countries of the former Soviet Union from Moscow and was a lead reporter on a team that won the 2020 Pulitzer Prize for articles about Russian intelligence operations. More about Michael Schwirtz