essay light cigarette tar content

The Curious Case of the Light Cigarette

What happens when consumers take things for granted?

Stine Grodal, assistant professor of strategy and innovation at BU’s Questrom School of Business, studied the evolution of light cigarettes. Photo by Michael D. Spencer

Barbara Moran

In the mid-1960s, a new type of cigarette appeared in America. Manufacturers called them “lights,” and advertised that more sophisticated filters, highly porous paper, and new tobacco blends reduced the tar and nicotine that smokers inhaled. The “lights” were the tobacco companies’ answer to public concern about the link between smoking and lung cancer. They pitched their new product to health-conscious smokers and printed test results—total milligrams of tar and nicotine—right on the pack. The light cigarettes were a hit, with sales surpassing regular cigarettes in the early 1980s.

But a funny thing happened over those decades. While smokers may have craved a healthier cigarette, they also craved full flavor and a strong nicotine “kick,” says Stine Grodal , an assistant professor of strategy and innovation at Boston University’s Questrom School of Business , who published an empirical study of light cigarettes in the journal American Sociological Review in February 2015. Over time, she says, many consumers stopped scrutinizing the tiny print on the packages, assuming that light cigarettes were healthier than “full” cigarettes and choosing the brand with the best flavor and kick. To compete for customers, manufacturers slowly pushed the amount of tar and nicotine in light cigarettes upward, with average tar increasing seven percent between 1964 and 1993, and nicotine increasing 74 percent. How did the tobacco industry get away with it? The answer, says Grodal, lies in a curious sociological phenomenon called “taken-for-grantedness.”

Taken-for-grantedness is just what it sounds like: the idea that, over time, many ideas go from outrageous to ordinary. When scientists first began to patent genetically modified organisms, for example, the public reacted with concern and dismay. “Then, over time, patenting just became a thing that you did if you were a scientist,” she says. “If you wanted to have a career in science, you would both publish and patent. It became a part of the way you showed your status, and it was not contested at all. It became taken for granted.”

While taken-for-grantedness is a common area of research in institutional theory—the study of how institutions, concepts, and meaning evolve over time—scientists haven’t used it much to examine business strategy. Grodal and her co-author, Greta Hsu of the University of California, Davis, decided to try that tactic after Grodal read Allan Brandt’s book The Cigarette Century and learned about the enormous data available on the cigarette industry. “It’s very difficult to know what goes on inside businesses because the documents are secret,” she says. “But here was a case in which a lot of the internal documents had been revealed through the lawsuits, so we could have insight on how businesses function that we normally don’t have.”

To make sense of the industry documents, Grodal and Hsu had to first understand when American consumers started assuming that light cigarettes were healthier than regular cigarettes and stopped squinting at the fine print on the packs. To do this, they looked for references to light cigarettes in four major media outlets: the New York Times , Los Angeles Times , the Washington Post , and the Wall Street Journal . Over time, as the public became more familiar with light cigarettes, journalists described the cigarettes’ features less often and less explicitly. Grodal says that this declining description serves as a good proxy for taken-for-grantedness, because it reflects the public’s growing understanding and acceptance of light cigarettes. She found that public attention to the light cigarettes’ nicotine content decreased quickly but people paid closer attention to “tar”—an imprecise mixture of particles and chemicals, some of which were carcinogenic.

“People’s attention was very much on tar,” she says. “Tar was the bad thing, they thought. However, the cigarette producers were more concerned about nicotine, because they knew people smoked because of nicotine.”

According to internal documents unearthed by Grodal and Hsu, the cigarette companies recognized these consumer trends and used them to their advantage, raising nicotine levels in their light cigarettes to give them more kick and, to a much lesser extent, raising levels of tar to give them more flavor. Because the “light” label wasn’t regulated, they got away with it.

“They could create whatever and call it ‘light,’” says Grodal. “It was all based on ‘Does the consumer accept this as ‘light?’ There was a blurring of that boundary. Some ‘full’ cigarettes had lower tar and nicotine than some that were labeled ‘light.’” This is no longer the case: in 2010, a law went into effect banning tobacco manufacturers from labeling cigarettes as “light,” “low,” or “mild.”

What does taken-for-grantedness mean for consumers today? While some product labels, like “very low sodium” or “cholesterol-free” are tightly regulated by the FDA , other terms and labels like “healthy” or “natural” are more vague. The take-home message, says Grodal, is to “put on your skeptical hat sometimes, not just with the shopping cart but also in other decisions.”

“We make a lot of choices based on people’s claims, whether it’s a service or a product,” she says. “Sometimes it just pays to be a little more aware, to stop and think, ‘what do they mean when they say that?’”

Explore Related Topics:

• Business & Social Sciences
• Share this story
• 1 Comments Add

Barbara Moran is a science writer in Brookline, Mass. Profile

Comments & Discussion

Boston University moderates comments to facilitate an informed, substantive, civil conversation. Abusive, profane, self-promotional, misleading, incoherent or off-topic comments will be rejected. Moderators are staffed during regular business hours (EST) and can only accept comments written in English. Statistics or facts must include a citation or a link to the citation.

There is 1 comment on The Curious Case of the Light Cigarette

In my country, electric hookah has become fashionable!

Post a comment. Cancel reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Latest from The Brink

Bu’s innovator of the year has pioneered devices to advance astronomy, microscopy, eye exams, bu study shows a correlation between social media use and desire for cosmetic procedures, covid-19 photo contest winners capture moments of joy, sorrow, meaning in crisis, how high-level lawsuits are disrupting climate change policies, the h5n1 bird flu is a growing threat for farm animals and humans—how serious is it, why is a bu researcher so fascinated with the diets of dung beetles, we are underestimating the health harms of climate disasters, three bu researchers elected aaas fellows, should people be fined for sleeping outside, secrets of ancient egyptian nile valley settlements found in forgotten treasure, not having job flexibility or security can leave workers feeling depressed, anxious, and hopeless, bu electrical engineer vivek goyal named a 2024 guggenheim fellow, can the bias in algorithms help us see our own, do immigrants and immigration help the economy, how do people carry such heavy loads on their heads, do alcohol ads promote underage drinking, how worried should we be about us measles outbreaks, stunning new image shows black hole’s immensely powerful magnetic field, it’s not just a pharmacy—walgreens and cvs closures can exacerbate health inequities, how does science misinformation affect americans from underrepresented communities.

• Article Information

See More About

Select your interests.

Customize your JAMA Network experience by selecting one or more topics from the list below.

• Academic Medicine
• Acid Base, Electrolytes, Fluids
• Allergy and Clinical Immunology
• American Indian or Alaska Natives
• Anesthesiology
• Anticoagulation
• Art and Images in Psychiatry
• Artificial Intelligence
• Assisted Reproduction
• Bleeding and Transfusion
• Caring for the Critically Ill Patient
• Challenges in Clinical Electrocardiography
• Climate and Health
• Climate Change
• Clinical Challenge
• Clinical Decision Support
• Clinical Implications of Basic Neuroscience
• Clinical Pharmacy and Pharmacology
• Complementary and Alternative Medicine
• Consensus Statements
• Coronavirus (COVID-19)
• Critical Care Medicine
• Cultural Competency
• Dental Medicine
• Dermatology
• Diabetes and Endocrinology
• Diagnostic Test Interpretation
• Drug Development
• Electronic Health Records
• Emergency Medicine
• End of Life, Hospice, Palliative Care
• Environmental Health
• Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion
• Facial Plastic Surgery
• Gastroenterology and Hepatology
• Genetics and Genomics
• Genomics and Precision Health
• Global Health
• Guide to Statistics and Methods
• Hair Disorders
• Health Care Delivery Models
• Health Care Economics, Insurance, Payment
• Health Care Quality
• Health Care Reform
• Health Care Safety
• Health Care Workforce
• Health Disparities
• Health Inequities
• Health Policy
• Health Systems Science
• History of Medicine
• Hypertension
• Images in Neurology
• Implementation Science
• Infectious Diseases
• Innovations in Health Care Delivery
• JAMA Infographic
• Law and Medicine
• Leading Change
• Less is More
• LGBTQIA Medicine
• Lifestyle Behaviors
• Medical Coding
• Medical Devices and Equipment
• Medical Education
• Medical Education and Training
• Medical Journals and Publishing
• Mobile Health and Telemedicine
• Narrative Medicine
• Neuroscience and Psychiatry
• Notable Notes
• Nutrition, Obesity, Exercise
• Obstetrics and Gynecology
• Occupational Health
• Ophthalmology
• Orthopedics
• Otolaryngology
• Pain Medicine
• Palliative Care
• Pathology and Laboratory Medicine
• Patient Care
• Patient Information
• Performance Improvement
• Performance Measures
• Perioperative Care and Consultation
• Pharmacoeconomics
• Pharmacoepidemiology
• Pharmacogenetics
• Pharmacy and Clinical Pharmacology
• Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation
• Physical Therapy
• Physician Leadership
• Population Health
• Primary Care
• Professional Well-being
• Professionalism
• Psychiatry and Behavioral Health
• Public Health
• Pulmonary Medicine
• Regulatory Agencies
• Reproductive Health
• Research, Methods, Statistics
• Resuscitation
• Rheumatology
• Risk Management
• Scientific Discovery and the Future of Medicine
• Shared Decision Making and Communication
• Sleep Medicine
• Sports Medicine
• Stem Cell Transplantation
• Substance Use and Addiction Medicine
• Surgical Innovation
• Surgical Pearls
• Teachable Moment
• Technology and Finance
• The Art of JAMA
• The Arts and Medicine
• The Rational Clinical Examination
• Tobacco and e-Cigarettes
• Translational Medicine
• Trauma and Injury
• Treatment Adherence
• Ultrasonography
• Users' Guide to the Medical Literature
• Vaccination
• Venous Thromboembolism
• Veterans Health
• Women's Health
• Workflow and Process
• Wound Care, Infection, Healing

Others Also Liked

• Download PDF
• X Facebook More LinkedIn

Tanner NT , Thomas NA , Ward R, et al. Association of Cigarette Type With Lung Cancer Incidence and Mortality : Secondary Analysis of the National Lung Screening Trial . JAMA Intern Med. 2019;179(12):1710–1712. doi:10.1001/jamainternmed.2019.3487

Manage citations:

© 2024

• Permissions

Association of Cigarette Type With Lung Cancer Incidence and Mortality : Secondary Analysis of the National Lung Screening Trial

• 1 Health Equity and Rural Outreach Innovation Center (HEROIC), Ralph H. Johnson Veterans Affairs Hospital, Charleston, South Carolina
• 2 Thoracic Oncology Research Group, Medical University of South Carolina, Charleston
• 3 Hollings Cancer Center, Medical University of South Carolina, Charleston
• 4 Department of Public Health Sciences, Medical University of South Carolina, Charleston

In response to increasing evidence implicating cigarette smoking as a cause of lung cancer in the 1950s, tobacco manufacturers introduced filtered and “lower-tar” cigarettes to allay consumer concerns, knowing they did not actually reduce health risks. Puncturing ventilation holes of varying sizes and numbers into the filter to dilute inhaled smoke became the optimum way to reduce tar yield. 1

Despite these changes, smoking remains responsible for 80% to 90% of lung cancer diagnoses and 5-year survival is 18%, highlighting the importance of prevention. 2 Lung cancer screening with low-dose computed tomography has been shown to improve mortality, and tobacco treatment is a required component of effective screening. We investigated the association of filter status, tar level, and menthol flavor with lung cancer outcomes in the National Lung Screening Trial.

This is a secondary data analysis of 14 123 National Lung Screening Trial participants who completed detailed smoking questionnaires. 3 We examined baseline cigarette tar level (regular, light, or ultralight), flavor (unflavored or menthol), and filter status (filtered or unfiltered) and their association with lung cancer diagnosis, mortality, and all-cause mortality. Cox regression models were used to study the influence of cigarette tar level, flavor, and filter on clinical outcomes, controlling for sex, age, race, pack years, nicotine dependence (as measured by the Fagerström Test for Nicotine Dependence), and treatment arm. This study was approved by the Medical University of South Carolina institutional review board. Patient consent was waived because deidentified data were used. Two-sided t testing was conducted as indicated with a P value less than .05 being considered significant.

Of 14 123 participants, 7056 (50%) were current smokers, 13 038 (92%) were white, and had a history of smoking an average of 60 pack of cigarettes per year ( Table 1 ). Most individuals (12 488 [88%]) smoked filtered cigarettes, and nearly half smoked light (4660 [33.0%]) or ultralight (1562 [11.1%]) cigarettes. After adjustment, unfiltered cigarette smokers were nearly 40% (hazard ratio, 1.37; 95% CI, 1.10-1.17) more likely to develop lung cancer and nearly twice (hazard ratio, 1.96; 95% CI, 1.46-2.64) as likely to die of lung cancer compared with those who smoked filtered cigarettes. Additionally, all-cause mortality was nearly 30% (hazard ratio, 1.28; 95% CI, 1.09-1.50) higher ( Table 2 ). There was no difference in mortality outcomes between light/ultralight or flavored vs regular cigarette smokers.

This study evaluated mortality in the setting of lung cancer screening based on the type of cigarette smoked and found that smoking unfiltered cigarettes is associated with significantly higher lung cancer incidence and death. There was no difference in lung cancer outcomes when comparing light/ultralight or menthol smokers with regular cigarette smokers.

This study confirms that smoking filtered and unfiltered cigarettes is associated with increased risk of lung cancer incidence and mortality and is consistent with other studies in the literature. 4 Identifying individuals who smoke unfiltered cigarettes is important as they stand to benefit greatly from aggressive tobacco treatment. Although filtered cigarettes fared better than unfiltered cigarettes, this study demonstrated lung cancer mortality in filtered cigarette smokers to be 1600 per 100 000 persons compared with a never-smoking cohort with just 34 lung cancer deaths per 100 000 persons. 5 The difference in outcomes in those smoking filtered and unfiltered cigarettes observed in this study and others likely reflects filtered cigarette design features including the amount, density, and blends of tobacco in the column, additives, and filter paper porosity. 5 , 6 Further, evidence suggests that despite adoption of new cigarette designs, cigarette smoking continues to pose enormous health risk. 1 , 5

Light/ultralight cigarette smokers had similar mortality rates compared with those smoking regular cigarettes. This outcome may be explained by the concept of compensatory smoking in which smokers achieve higher nicotine levels by changing smoking behaviors. 6 Tobacco companies marketed low-tar cigarettes to consumers as an alternative to quitting, suggesting that this improved health risks. Unfortunately, most smokers believe light/ultralight cigarettes reduce risk, and this misconception may dissuade them from quitting. 7

This study confirms that smoking any type of cigarette conveys serious health risks. Within the context of this study, unfiltered cigarettes are the most dangerous, and individuals who smoke them should be targeted for aggressive tobacco treatment interventions. Some smokers may switch to light or ultralight cigarettes believing they are safer; however, this is not the case. Lung cancer screening is considered a teachable moment, and the findings here should lead to the design of personalized tobacco treatment interventions within this context. Importantly, this study adds to the overwhelming evidence showing the risk of developing and dying of lung cancer caused by smoking both filtered and unfiltered cigarettes.

Accepted for Publication: June 21, 2019.

Corresponding Author: Nichole T. Tanner, MD, MSCR, Health Equity and Rural Outreach Innovation Center (HEROIC), Ralph H. Johnson Veterans Affairs Hospital, 109 Bee St, Charleston, SC 29425 ( [email protected] ).

Published Online: October 21, 2019. doi:10.1001/jamainternmed.2019.3487

Author Contributions: Dr Tanner had full access to all of the data in the study and takes responsibility for the integrity of the data and the accuracy of the data analysis.

Concept and design: Tanner, Thomas, Rojewski, Toll, Silvestri.

Acquisition, analysis, or interpretation of data: All authors.

Drafting of the manuscript: Tanner, Thomas, Ward, Rojewski, Gebregziabher, Silvestri.

Critical revision of the manuscript for important intellectual content: All authors.

Statistical analysis: Ward, Gebregziabher, Silvestri.

Obtained funding : Toll.

Supervision: Toll, Silvestri.

Conflict of Interest Disclosures: Dr Tanner reports grants from the American Cancer Institute during the conduct of the study; grants from Cook Medical, Exact Sciences, Olympus America, and Veracyte outside the submitted work; and consulting from Cook Medical, Exact Sciences, Biodesix, and Olympus America outside the submitted work. Dr Rojewski reports grants from the National Cancer Institute during the conduct of the study. Dr Toll reported personal fees from Pfizer and has consulted on an advisory board regarding e-cigarettes and has offered testimony on behalf of plaintiffs who filed litigation against tobacco companies. No other disclosures were reported.

Funding/Support: This study was supported in part by research funding from the Hollings Cancer Center at the Medical University of South Carolina.

Role of the Funder/Sponsor: The funder had no role in the design and conduct of the study; collection, management, analysis, and interpretation of the data; preparation, review, or approval of the manuscript; and decision to submit the manuscript for publication.

Additional Contributions: We thank K. Michael Cummings, PhD, MPH (Medical University of South Carolina), for his thoughtful review and comments on this paper. He received no compensation for his assistance.

• Register for email alerts with links to free full-text articles
• Access PDFs of free articles
• Manage your interests
• Save searches and receive search alerts

• - Google Chrome

Intended for healthcare professionals

• Access provided by Google Indexer
• My email alerts
• BMA member login
• Username * Password * Forgot your log in details? Need to activate BMA Member Log In Log in via OpenAthens Log in via your institution

Search form

• Advanced search
• Search responses
• Search blogs
• The fallacy of “light”...

The fallacy of “light” cigarettes

• Related content
• Peer review
• Nancy A Rigotti , associate professor of medicine, director ,
• Hilary A Tindle , research fellow
• Harvard Medical School Boston, MA, Tobacco Research and Treatment Massachussetts General Hospital Boston, MA
• Division of General Internal Medicine Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center Harvard Medical School Boston, MA

Low tar is not low risk

Just 40 years ago, the 1964 Surgeon General's Report on Smoking and Health alerted the American public to the health risks of cigarette smoking. It launched a remarkably successful public health campaign that dramatically cut adult smoking prevalence, from 42.4% in 1965 to 22.8% in 2001, and recast the cultural acceptability of tobacco use. 1 Less well known is the fact that the cigarette itself has undergone major change in the past 40 years. Today's 46.2 million American smokers buy a product very different from the cigarette sold in 1964.

In the late 1960s, tobacco manufacturers introduced “light” or “low tar” brands that yielded 7-14 mg tar per cigarette, compared to the 22 mg tar of the average cigarette sold at that time. 2 Later, “ultralight” brands appeared, with tar yields below 7 mg per cigarette. Today, almost 90% of cigarettes sold in the United States are in these categories. 3 Better taste is not the reason why smokers buy light cigarettes. They buy them because they have the misconception that smoking lower tar products reduces their risk of lung cancer and other tobacco-related diseases. 4 Advertisements for these brands carry the implicit and tempting message that switching to a light brand is an alternative to quitting smoking. This issue of BMJ USA contains an important study (p 94) that demonstrates, more definitively than previous work, the fallacy of this belief.

Studies have already shown that medium tar, filtered cigarettes are associated with less lung cancer mortality than high tar, non-filtered cigarettes, but this comparison is irrelevant today in the US, where the average tar content of cigarettes is below 15 mg. 5 Harris and colleagues are the first to examine prospectively the relationship between risk of lung cancer death among smokers who reported smoking very low tar (≤ 7 mg) and low tar (8-14 mg) cigarettes relative to smokers of medium tar (15-21 mg) cigarettes. They found no difference among these categories in lung cancer death rates over a 6-year follow-up. Lung cancer mortality was much lower in all these categories than in smokers of high tar (> 22 mg tar) non-filtered cigarettes, confirming the results of previous studies. Equally important, lung cancer mortality was markedly reduced among former smokers compared with current smokers (even those smoking light and ultralight brands), demonstrating that switching to these brands is not a rational alternative to quitting smoking.

These findings are convincing. They are derived from a very large, well-conducted longitudinal study. A potential study limitation is the fact that smokers' cigarette brand was recorded only once and later brand changes were not captured. To address this, the authors restricted follow-up to 6 years, thereby reducing the possibility of misclassification of smokers who switched tar categories after entering the study. Because low tar cigarette brands became common only in the 1970s, it was impossible to compare mortality rates between participants who exclusively smoked very low or low tar cigarettes and those who smoked higher tar cigarettes. Instead, the study compares individuals who smoked medium tar cigarettes with those who had switched from medium to lower tar brands. It is possible that individuals who exclusively smoke lower tar brands might have lower lung cancer mortality, but determining this will require a different study and at least another decade. In the meantime, the findings of this study apply to most of today's smokers who have switched from higher tar to lower tar brands. Even the best observational data have inherent limitations, but in this case a randomized controlled trial testing these questions is not ethically feasible. The body of evidence is more than sufficient to support clinical and policy recommendations.

These findings may seem counterintuitive. Why do low tar cigarettes fail to reduce lung cancer risk if the health risks of tobacco smoking are dose related? The explanation is that low tar cigarettes do not reduce a smoker's exposure to tobacco carcinogens. When smokers switch to lower tar cigarettes, they alter their smoking pattern to maintain a desired nicotine intake, a phenomenon known as compensation. 6 They may smoke more cigarettes per day, inhale more deeply, decrease the time between puffs, or cover the airholes in the low tar cigarette that otherwise dilute the smoke delivered to the smoker. Because of compensation, smokers of light and ultralight cigarettes can actually be exposed to equivalent or even higher doses of tar and other tobacco smoke carcinogens than smokers of medium tar cigarettes. 7 These findings underline the inaccuracy of the current method used by the Federal Trade Commission to classify tar yields of cigarette brands and highlight the urgent need for change. 8 They also support calls for tighter controls on the marketing of light and ultralight cigarettes. 9

What is the message of this study for physicians in practice? Forty years ago, doctors played a major role in communicating the news from the Surgeon General to the public. Today, that information is old news. Nearly all smokers already know that smoking is hazardous, although they may not believe that their own smoking is dangerous or appreciate the full spectrum of tobacco-related risk. 10 This paper gives doctors the opportunity to deliver fresh information about smoking that actually is news to most smokers: that light and ultralight cigarettes do not translate into less health risk and are no substitute for quitting smoking. The message should help physicians counsel the most challenging smokers: those who profess no interest in quitting. These smokers often rationalize continued smoking by choosing light cigarette brands. Physicians can address the misconception that low tar means low risk. This might spur recalcitrant smokers to reconsider their continued smoking and increase their interest in using the broad range of cessation aids that physicians can now offer. 11

Competing interests NAR has received a research grant and honoraria for lectures from GlaxoSmithKline.

• Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
• Shopland DR ,
• Benowitz NL ,
• Kozlowski LT ,
• O'Connor RJ ,
• US Federal Trade Commission
• Hoffmann D ,
• Djordjevic M ,
• Brunnemann K
• Jarvis MJ ,
• Boreham R ,
• Primatesta P ,
• Feyerabend C ,
• Djordjevic MV ,
• Stellman SD ,
• Wilkenfeld JD ,
• Henningfield J ,
• Ayanian JZ ,
• Bailey WC ,

Center for Tobacco Control Research and Education

The Lessons of “Light” and “Low Tar” Cigarettes: Without Effective Regulation, “Reduced Risk” Tobacco Products Threaten the Public Health

• U.S. House of Representatives

After the U.S. Surgeon General concluded in 1964 that cigarette smoking causes lung cancer, tobacco companies recognized that health issues concerned millions of Americans smokers. The companies responded by introducing “light,” “filtered,” “low tar,” and “ultra low tar” brands and marketing them as less dangerous than regular cigarettes. Millions switched brands but experienced no health benefits as a result. The “light” and “low tar” experiment was a public health disaster. Today, the U.S. tobacco industry is marketing a new generation of “reduced risk” tobacco products. These include “low nitrosamine” cigarettes, “heated” nicotine delivery devices, and smokeless tobacco. Companies are claiming they are “safer,” have “less toxins,” and deliver “reduced carcinogens.” An essential question regarding these products is whether history is repeating itself.

At the request of Reps. Henry A. Waxman and Janice D. Schakowsky, this report compares the history of “light” and “low tar” cigarettes to available evidence about the new “reduced risk” tobacco products, including previously undisclosed internal company documents. The report finds striking parallels between current “reduced risk” products and past experience with “light” and “low tar” cigarettes.

Marketing to Counter Health Fears

Starting in the late 1960s, tobacco companies sold “light” and “low tar” brands as important scientific advances that addressed the growing anxiety smokers felt about their health. The companies’ claims could be explicit, as when Brown & Williamson marketed Fact, “the low gas, low ‘tar’” cigarette that should appeal to “critics of smoking.” More frequently, cigarette manufacturers exploited the widespread belief that since nicotine and tar were harmful, cigarettes offering less of these toxins had to be safer. As a result, when Philip Morris relied on machine-based testing of nicotine and tar to declare “Merit Science Works” or Brown & Williamson stated “Latest U.S. Gov’t Laboratory test confirms . . . Carlton is lowest,” smokers heard a clear message about health. The tobacco industry also sought to enlist health officials in their campaign to promote these products, with one company hoping “to generate statements by public health opinion leaders which will indicate tolerance for smoking and improve the consumer’s perception of ultra low ‘tar’ cigarettes.”

The tobacco industry is making strikingly similar claims for its “reduced risk” products today. For example, Brown & Williamson markets its Advance Lights brand as a “revolutionary breakthrough in cigarette technology” that provides “All of the taste . . . less of the toxins.” Vector Tobacco has promoted Omni as offering: “Reduced carcinogens. Premium taste.” In marketing Eclipse, R.J. Reynolds proclaims that “the toxicity of [Eclipse’s] smoke is dramatically reduced compared to other cigarettes.”

According to internal company documents, Brown & Williamson’s parent company has developed a public relations campaign for “lower risk products” based on partnerships with the public health community.

Deceiving Consumers

Even as their advertisements promoted “light” and “low tar” cigarettes as better for health, tobacco companies knew that smokers generally received the same amount of nicotine and other toxins from these products as from their regular cigarettes. In fact, the companies designed cigarettes to score low on machine-based testing but still allow users to inhale their usual amounts of nicotine and tar. To accomplish this, manufacturers took such steps as adding ventilation holes that drew in diluting air on machine testing but were blocked by smokers during actual use. An Illinois judge recently called one company’s actions in creating these brands “immoral, unethical, oppressive and unscrupulous.”

While new “reduced risk” products are still in their infancy, there are warning signs that tobacco companies may again be deceiving consumers. In 2000, in an internal company email, a senior scientist at Brown & Williamson’s corporate parent flatly dismissed the advertised advantages of the company’s special “low nitrosamine” tobacco.

He wrote to other company officials that the technology to make cigarettes “appreciably less lethal . . . does not exist.” He added: “We should tone down future expectations. Firstly, it is not ethical and secondly we shall be asked to explain our failures at some point in the future.”

On its website today, R.J. Reynolds claims to have evaluated its “reduced risk” product Eclipse using a rigorous four-step verification process. However, the Department of Justice recently determined that “all R.J. Reynolds did was look at all of the work it already had done to evaluate Eclipse to date, categorize it, and retroactively dub it a ‘four step methodology.’” The head of the supposedly “independent” scientific effort reviewing Eclipse has received more than $1.5 million from R.J. Reynolds.

Marketing to Deter (or Reverse) Quitting

Tobacco companies marketed “light” and “low tar” brands to the health-conscious smoker as viable alternatives to quitting. For example, Lorillard’s brand True was advertised with the slogan, “Considering all I’d heard, I decided to either quit or smoke True. I smoke True.”

There are signals that similarly irresponsible marketing is occurring today. In 1998, Philip Morris introduced Accord as a tobacco product with less secondhand smoke.

In January 2003, the Department of Justice determined that “to the extent that Philip Morris has sought to market Accord . . . there is evidence showing that it had its advertising agency assist in marketing Accord to those who want to quit or who have quit and are rejoining the cigarette market.”

In 2000, the President of the U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Company wrote that a key company objective was “Promoting Dual Consumption” of smokeless tobacco among smokers frustrated by indoor air laws. Starting in 2001, the company began to market a new product, Revel, with the slogan “a fresh new way to enjoy tobacco when you can’t smoke.” This marketing strategy, if successful, could sustain nicotine addiction and make it harder for smokers to quit.

Exploiting the Absence of Effective Regulation

Health officials did not recognize the dangers posed by “light” and “low tar” cigarettes before it was too late. Without full access to information, some government officials even believed that substantial disease reductions were likely among “light” and “low tar” smokers. For decades, cigarette manufacturers advertised the numbers from the Federal Trade Commission’s flawed machine-based testing method while simultaneously fighting effective tobacco regulation.

Today, tobacco companies are making a blizzard of health claims about new “reduced risk” products without any significant government oversight. No agency has the authority to assess the claims made by the companies before they are made, routinely review company research and documents, or set standards for what might justifiably pose a reduced risk to consumers. As a result, the unregulated promotion of “reduced risk” products threatens to undermine smoking cessation (which is proven to save lives), cause former smokers to resume their addiction, and even attract young people to tobacco products.

Low-Yield Cigarettes

Cigarette descriptors and design, compensatory smoking, users of low-yield cigarettes, health risks of smoking.

“Low-yield cigarettes” are those that tobacco manufacturers label “light,” “low,” or “mild.”

Tobacco advertisements once implied that “low-yield” cigarettes were safer than regular or “full-flavor” cigarettes. 1,2 However, low-yield cigarettes are not less harmful to health than regular cigarettes. 1

The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 now prohibits manufacturers from selling or distributing any tobacco products that have “light,” “low,” or “mild” on their labels. 3

There is no risk-free level of exposure to tobacco smoke, and there is no safe tobacco product. 4

In the past, the tobacco industry categorized low-yield cigarettes using measurements of tar on standardized smoking machines. 1

• Cigarette brands that yielded approximately 1–6 milligrams (mg) of tar were called “ultra light.”
• Those with approximately 6–15 mg of tar were called “light.”
• Brands yielding more than 15 mg of tar were called “regular” or “full flavor.”

The following cigarette design changes made over the past decades affected the tar and nicotine measurements: 1,2,4

• Addition of different size and density filters
• Ventilation holes in the cigarettes to bring in air and dilute the smoke measured
• Chemical additives in the paper and/or tobacco
• Tobacco (i.e., using different types, blends, and curing methods)

Changes in cigarette design have not made cigarettes safe. 1,5

• Changes in cigarette design have not been scientifically shown to lead to a decrease in diseases caused by smoking cigarettes.

Most people who smoke are addicted to nicotine. They may compensate when smoking low-yield cigarettes in order to take in more nicotine. 1,5,6

• Many people who smoke block the ventilation holes, thus inhaling more tar and nicotine than measured by machines.
• Many people smoking low-yield cigarettes inhale longer, harder, and more frequently to get more nicotine.
• People who smoke may get as much or more tar and nicotine from cigarettes with low-yield ratings as from regular cigarettes because of the ways they compensate when smoking them.
• Many people who smoke consider smoking low-yield cigarettes, menthol cigarettes, or additive-free cigarettes to be safer than smoking regular cigarettes. However, no strong scientific evidence exists to support these beliefs. 1,2,5
• Many people who smoke may have switched to low-yield brands instead of quitting. 1,5,6
• Tar decreased from 38 mg in 1954 to 12 mg in 1993; nicotine decreased from 2.7 mg to 0.95 mg.
• Tar and nicotine levels have remained stable since 1993. 4
• Changes in cigarette designs over the last five decades have not reduced overall disease risk among people who smoke. In fact, they might have hindered prevention and cessation efforts. 4
• encourage tobacco use among people who would otherwise be unlikely to use a tobacco product, or
• delay cessation among people who would otherwise quit using tobacco altogether. 4
• National Cancer Institute. Risks Associated with Smoking Cigarettes with Low Machine-Measured Yields of Tar and Nicotine. Smoking and Tobacco Control Monograph 13 . Bethesda: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health, National Cancer Institute, 2001 [accessed 2021 Mar 18].
• Institute of Medicine. Clearing the Smoke: Assessing the Science Base for Tobacco Harm Prevention. Washington: National Academy Press, 2001 [accessed 2021 Mar 18].
• S. Food and Drug Administration. Guidance for Industry and FDA Staff: Use of “Light,” “Mild,” “Low,” or Similar Descriptors in the Label, Labeling, or Advertising of Tobacco Products . [PDF–161 KB] Rockville (MD): U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Center for Tobacco Products, 2010 [accessed 2021 Mar 18].
• S. Department of Health and Human Services. How Tobacco Smoke Causes Disease: The Biology and Behavioral Basis for Smoking-Attributable Disease. A Report of the Surgeon General . Atlanta: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, Office on Smoking and Health, 2010 [accessed 2021 Mar 18].
• Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids. Light and Low Tar Cigarettes: The Essential Facts . [PDF–464 KB] Washington: Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, 2010 [accessed 2021 Mar 18].
• U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Reducing Tobacco Use: A Report of the Surgeon General. Atlanta: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, CDC, National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, Office on Smoking and Health, 2000 [accessed 2021 Mar 18].

To receive email updates about Smoking & Tobacco Use, enter your email address:

• Tips From Former Smokers ®
• Division of Cancer Prevention and Control
• Lung Cancer
• National Comprehensive Cancer Control Program
• Division of Reproductive Health

Exit Notification / Disclaimer Policy

• The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) cannot attest to the accuracy of a non-federal website.
• Linking to a non-federal website does not constitute an endorsement by CDC or any of its employees of the sponsors or the information and products presented on the website.
• You will be subject to the destination website's privacy policy when you follow the link.
• CDC is not responsible for Section 508 compliance (accessibility) on other federal or private website.

• Unethical Practice Reporting
• ENG ENG KOR
• Corporate/Business philosophy
• Core values
• Ginseng/Oriental Medicine
• Health/Life
• Pharmacy/Bio
• Sangsang Stay
• Global Performance
• Global Network
• Corporate Governance
• Shareholders
• Board of Directors
• Audit Committee
• Articles of Incorporation
• Statement of Financial Position
• Audit Report
• Credit Rating
• Current Price
• Minute Price
• Daily Price
• Market View
• Trading Trend
• Chart Analysis
• Foreign Ownership
• Announcement
• Earnings Release
• Annual Report
• ESG Activities
• KT&G SNS
• KT&G News
• Sustainability
• 2030 KT&G Green Impact
• Social Contribution
• Supply Chain
• Next Generation Products
• Ethical Management
• Policies and Sustainability Rules
• KT&G Report
• TCFD Report

Brands To become a transparent, righteous company

Detail view, esse lights.

A brand which has a soft, clean flavor

100mm Super Slim

Tar/Nicotine

Tar 4.5mg / Nic. 0.45mg

Launch Date

Original tabaco

Related goods

Contesting the Science of Smoking

A decade after a judge ordered tobacco companies to acknowledge the dangers of low-tar cigarettes, they continue to dispute the scientific consensus.

In a landmark ruling nearly a decade ago, a federal judge ordered tobacco companies to stop lying.

After listening to 84 witnesses and perusing tens of thousands of exhibits, U.S. District Judge Gladys Kessler of the District of Columbia took a year to write a 1,652-page opinion detailing the companies’ elaborate strategy to deny the harmful effects of smoking.

“In short, [the companies] have marketed and sold their lethal product with zeal, with deception, with a single-minded focus on their financial success, and without regard for the human tragedy or social costs that success exacted,” Kessler wrote in United States of America v. Philip Morris USA .

Latest from Politics

The best hope for electric cars could be the gop districts where they’re made.

Trump’s Latest Abortion Position Is More Radical Than It Sounds

The Woman Keeping the ‘Special Relationship’ Special

Kessler noted that the Justice Department, in a racketeering lawsuit, had presented “overwhelming evidence” of a conspiracy to defraud the public. She ordered the companies to take a number of actions, including ceasing to claim there was such a thing as a low-tar cigarette that reduced the risk of disease. The evidence showed this simply was not true.

Yet in about a dozen pending lawsuits, Philip Morris continues to do just that. As of 2010, it still routinely argued that the nation’s top-selling cigarette, once known as Marlboro Lights and now called Marlboro Gold, reduces the risk of cancer.

To find scientists willing to make this claim, Philip Morris turned to consultants for the chemical industry. The experts Philip Morris hired work for firms whose scientists regularly contend in medical journals, courtrooms, and regulatory arenas that their clients’ chemical products pose little or no health risks to the public. The firms have been instrumental in delaying new regulations by criticizing the work of other scientists, and emphasizing the doubt inherent in health science. The resultant uncertainty has helped delay attempts by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to crack down on ubiquitous chemicals with known dangers, such as formaldehyde, arsenic, and hexavalent chromium.

The irony in this arrangement is that the tobacco industry pioneered such tactics. “The tobacco industry wrote the playbook for the rest of the industries,” said Matt Myers, president of the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids. “Whether it’s the chemical industry, whether its climate change … You see it in industry after industry.” Now, it’s hiring consultants who took its techniques and pushed them further in other industries, relying on their experience to contest the scientific consensus on the dangers of low-tar cigarettes.

The industry’s tactics continue to have catastrophic consequences. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention attribute 480,000 deaths each year to smoking, equal to one in every five deaths. Since 1964, when the U.S. Surgeon General warned that smoking caused cancer, the government estimates that tobacco has killed more than 20 million Americans. That is 15 times the number of Americans who have perished in all wars combined.

Although millions have quit, smoking continues to be the most preventable cause of death in the United States today.

At the turn of the 20th century, cigarette smoking was not yet in vogue. Lung cancer was so rare that some doctors had never seen a case . But scenes of everyone lighting up in “Mad Men” are no exaggeration. By 1955, two-thirds of men and one-third of women in the United States smoked cigarettes. Eventually, lung cancer became the leading killer among cancers in the United States.

Medical researchers noticed the parallel rise. In December 1952, a brief article in Readers Digest sent shock waves by summing up research linking smoking to an epidemic of lung cancer. A year later Time reported that mice painted with tobacco tar developed tumors. A medical researcher told the magazine that it was now “beyond any doubt” that cigarettes cause cancer.

Panic ensued at the tobacco companies. On December 14, 1953, the CEOs of the six largest cigarette makers met secretly at New York’s Plaza Hotel to discuss a strategy for countering the bad publicity. What developed over time, as Kessler’s opinion details, was a joint strategy to twist science and mislead the public about the dangers of smoking.

The industry announced that it was forming a research committee to look into the matter. It hired independent scientists such as cancer researcher Clarence Cook Little to do interviews, insisting that there was no proof that cigarettes cause cancer.

In reality, scientific evidence that cigarettes cause cancer was becoming overwhelming. In 1964, the Surgeon General seemed to put an end to any controversy when he released the report of an independent advisory committee that had considered more than 7,000 published articles.

The Surgeon General’s warning had a profound effect on the public, prompting many smokers to quit. But the tobacco companies and their scientists would continue to deny that cigarettes cause cancer for another 35 years.

To discourage smokers from quitting, companies redesigned their cigarettes to seem safer. First, they added filters. Then they introduced “low-tar” cigarettes. Within a few years, these cigarettes dominated the market. Marlboro Lights, which debuted in 1971, became the nation’s best-selling cigarette.

Tobacco companies knew from extensive internal research that smokers were addicted to nicotine and needed a certain amount of it every day to satisfy their habit. Given a “low-tar” cigarette, they would change the way they smoked to get their fix.

With the passage of a new law, the Federal Trade Commission in 1967 began testing all cigarette brands on special smoking machines that measured the amount of tar inhaled. Cigarettes were reformulated, not so much to reduce tar but to fool the machines, according to an NCI report. Tiny holes were cut in the cigarette paper to vent tar when a cigarette was smoked by a machine. Those holes, however, didn’t reduce the tar inhaled by smokers.

“If you reduce the amount of nicotine coming through, the person changes a pattern of it. They take bigger puffs, they take deeper puffs, they take longer puffs, they smoke more cigarettes per day to get the amount of nicotine they are seeking to satisfy their addiction,” said David Burns, a retired medical professor at the University of California, San Diego, who edited some of the Surgeon General’s reports on smoking.

Burns testified for the plaintiffs in the recent St. Louis class-action trial.

Also testifying was William Farone, the research director at Philip Morris from 1977 to 1984. He said studies done at the company even before he was hired showed that smokers who switched to light cigarettes would take deeper puffs to get the same amount of nicotine they’d received from regular ones. Farone said other than those tiny holes in the paper, the differences between a Marlboro Red and a Marlboro Light were small.

Public-health scientists would not figure this out for several more years. A study by the American Cancer Society published in 1996 found that the rate of lung cancer deaths among 200,000 smokers actually went up after light cigarettes began dominating sales. Experts believe that the low-burning temperature of a low-tar cigarette and deeper puffs by smokers allow more carcinogens to go deeper into the lungs.

The rewards for disputing the scientific consensus are high while the risks are low. The Justice Department’s racketeering lawsuit had sought to have the tobacco industry repay illegal profits of $480 billion. But an appellate court ruled that federal racketeering laws didn’t allow for fines for past behavior.

Judge Kessler’s only power was to order cigarette makers to stop engaging in illegal behavior. Companies appealed her order to quit making claims about low-tar cigarettes, arguing it violated their First Amendment rights. But Kessler’s ruling was upheld.

Nonetheless, Philip Morris hired scientists from the consulting firms Gradient Corp. and Ramboll Environ to testify in lawsuits that so-called low-tar cigarettes are safer than regular ones.

Sharon Eubanks, the former Justice Department attorney who led the lawsuit, believes Philip Morris is violating Kessler’s order. The order forbids public statements declaring that low-tar cigarettes have health benefits, even if such statements come from a Philip Morris consultant.

To enforce the order, the Justice Department would have to file a motion with Kessler. A department spokesman would not comment on the case. Calls to Philip Morris seeking comment were not returned.

After the case wound through appeals, Kessler issued a revised order in February reiterating that tobacco companies must make the following “corrective statements” on their websites and in advertising:

Many smokers switch to low-tar and light cigarettes rather than quitting because they think low-tar and light cigarettes are less harmful. They are not.

Low-tar and filtered cigarette smokers inhale essentially the same amount of tar and nicotine as they would from regular cigarettes.

All cigarettes cause cancer, lung disease, heart attacks, and premature death-including lights, low-tar, ultra-lights, and naturals. There is no safe cigarette.

A decade after the original order, and five years after Kessler first issued these statements, tobacco companies are still appealing her ruling. None have printed the statements.

Congress agreed with Kessler’s original findings, and in 2009 passed a law also forbidding the tobacco companies from calling cigarettes “light” or “low-tar.” But Philip Morris says research done since Kessler’s 2006 order justifies the company’s claims that such cigarettes are safer than regular ones.

Peter Valberg of Gradient Corp. was Philip Morris’s star witness in a Boston class-action lawsuit that went to trial last November after dragging on for 17 years. He has impressive credentials, having been a faculty member at the Harvard School of Public Health for 24 years and served as a consultant to the EPA and the Justice Department. Valberg has testified that he had help with his research from another principal scientist at Gradient, Julie Goodman.

Valberg presented a slideshow with data showing that Marlboro Lights delivered less tar to smokers. It made sense, he concluded, that the cigarettes also reduced the risk of disease.

Some of Valberg’s findings were based on his own unpublished analysis of public data. But the most persuasive evidence came from a study underwritten by Philip Morris.

Published two years after Kessler’s decision, the 24-week study analyzed urine samples of about 70 smokers who switched from full-flavored Marlboro Reds to Marlboro Lights. The test revealed that their average nicotine levels dropped significantly within six months.

There was another aspect of the study that Valberg did not mention. Researchers also tracked nicotine levels of Marlboro Red smokers who did not switch. Known as the “control group,” these smokers were akin to patients given sugar pills, or placebos, in a drug trial. In a clinical trial, a control group allows researchers to see if a new drug is any better than a placebo. In this experiment, it enabled researchers to see if switching to Marlboro Lights was any better than not switching.

In fact, switching was no better. Nicotine levels fell for all smokers. The researchers said in the published study that being in a controlled environment might have influenced how people smoked.

Asked about the control group in cross-examination, Valberg seemed flustered. He argued that the goal of the study was to look at what happened to smokers who switched, not to compare them to those who did not.

Peter Shields, a tobacco expert at Ohio State University Comprehensive Cancer Center who analyzed Valberg’s findings for lawyers suing Philip Morris, said the study actually supports other research showing light cigarettes have no health benefits.

“Dr. Valberg is taking a very unusual position in tobacco class-action suit cases claiming that light cigarettes result in a 25-percent reduction in lung cancer risk in contrast to a scientific consensus that they increase lung cancer risk,” Shields said.

Valberg’s testimony contradicts the findings of the Surgeon General , the National Academy of Sciences , and the National Cancer Institute .

In 2001, a panel of experts wrote a 236-page report for the National Cancer Institute, saying, “In fact, the use of these cigarettes may be partly responsible for the increase in lung cancer for long term smokers who have switched to the low-tar/low-nicotine brands.”

Another consultant for Philip Morris and the chemical industry, Kenneth Mundt of Ramboll Environ, has attacked the NCI report. Mundt did not testify at the Boston trial but has written expert reports in other lawsuits saying that the conclusions of some of the nation’s leading tobacco experts, including the authors of the NCI report, “fail to address the totality of relevant evidence and largely remain unsubstantiated.”

Jonathan Samet, a professor at the University of Southern California’s medical school who was asked by the NCI to be one of the reviewers of its report, said the findings went through rigorous peer review. Samet himself chaired a panel of 25 experts who met for 10 days in 2002 to hash out a report on smoking for the International Agency for Research on Cancer, an arm of the World Health Organization.

Samet said the clear consensus was that low-tar cigarettes do not reduce the risk of disease.

Stanton Glantz, director of the Center for Tobacco Control Research and Education at the University of California, San Francisco , was blunter about Mundt’s attack on the NCI report. “That’s ridiculous,” he said. “Those things are put through the peer-review grinder. If anything they are too cautious.” Valberg and Mundt did not respond to interview requests.

The Philip Morris study was also peer-reviewed, appearing in the journal Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology,   with a record of publishing research paid for by the chemical industry.

The journal’s editor, Gio B. Gori, has a controversial history, first as a former NCI deputy director and later as a tobacco industry consultant. In 1976, while at the NCI, Gori made national news when he claimed people could smoke as many as two packs of low-tar cigarettes a day with minimum risk of cancer.

Later, Gori was paid by Brown & Williamson to write several letters to scientific journals attacking other researchers’ work. He also penned a manuscript in 1987 that started with this claim: “During the last decade and especially in the last few years scientific evidence has been gradually emerging, and now indicates that smoking may in fact provide a net contribution in the prevention of certain diseases and in extending life expectancy.”

After reviewing the manuscript, another paid consultant, Peter Lee, wrote a confidential letter to a corporate officer at British-American Tobacco, saying, “I think the paper is pretty valueless, partly as it is completely unbalanced, partly as the (many) wild claims made are not substantiated by detailed evidence.”

A critique by a BAT attorney suggests that the company closely monitored  the work of its consultants: “It obviously needs to be honed into a first-class scientific paper. There seems to be a fairly widespread opinion that that will be difficult to do.”

Gori did not respond to phone messages.

In February, Superior Court Judge Edward Leibensperger ruled in favor of the plaintiffs in the Boston class-action lawsuit and ordered Philip Morris to pay $4.9 million in damages. The judge wrote:

“Dr. Valberg's analysis of the data provided by the published studies was shown to be inconsistent and contrary to the consensus of the scientific community. Dr. Valberg's analysis has never been published or subjected to peer review. I find that the testimony of Dr. Shields was far more persuasive and credible than the testimony of Dr. Valberg.”

It’s not the first time Valberg’s work has come under attack. In 2008, Valberg agreed to try to publish scientific articles based on an asbestos defense lawyer’s theory that smoking causes mesothelioma, a rare cancer virtually always linked to asbestos exposure.  The articles could have helped the lawyer win lawsuits, but peer reviewers attacked the manuscript and recommended its rejection.

Philip Morris’s latest claims in court that low-tar cigarettes are safer fail to account for the industry’s own internal research. Still, the company has proven extremely effective at defending itself against legal claims brought by smokers. According to Philip Morris, of the 149 smoker lawsuits that have gone to trial since 1999, verdicts have gone in the company’s favor 77 times. The company says it has paid out about $323 million in judgments and interest. Its efforts to fund research to support its claims, and to hire experts willing to testify in support of them, may be one reason for its success in persuading juries not to hold it liable.

Neal Benowitz, a professor at the University of California, San Francisco, who did early research on low-tar cigarettes, said testifying that light cigarettes are safer is so at odds with the scientific consensus that it would likely damage the reputation of a tobacco researcher. But Philip Morris doesn’t hire scientists who’ve devoted their careers to studying tobacco. “Valberg is not someone who’s known in the tobacco research area,” Benowitz said. “I presume it’s not affecting his reputation.”

“These people are not scientists,” said Glantz, of the Center for Tobacco Control Research and Education. “They are public-relations people who happen to have degrees in science. These are people who make their living producing results that their clients want. And that’s not science.”

This story appears courtesy of the Center for Public Integrity .

Related Video

TALK WITH SHIVI

Essay on Light Cigarettes

Table of Contents

The Complex Reality of Light Cigarettes

Introduction.

In the pursuit of healthier alternatives to traditional cigarettes, light cigarettes emerged as a seemingly promising option. Marketed as a “healthier” and “safer” choice, these cigarettes were introduced to address concerns about the health risks associated with smoking. However, the term “light cigarette” can be misleading. This essay delves into the history, marketing strategies, and health implications of light cigarettes, shedding light on their complex reality.

The Birth of Light Cigarettes

Light cigarettes, also known as low-tar and low-nicotine cigarettes, first appeared in the mid-20th century in response to mounting evidence of the harmful health effects of smoking. Manufacturers claimed that these cigarettes provided a milder, less harmful smoking experience, primarily by reducing the levels of tar, nicotine, and other harmful chemicals in the smoke.

Marketing Strategies

• Misleading Labels: Light cigarettes were often labeled as having lower tar and nicotine content, creating an illusion of reduced health risks. Smokers believed they were making a healthier choice, which boosted sales.
• Filter Technology: Manufacturers introduced filters, which were perceived as reducing exposure to harmful substances. However, many studies have shown that filters do not significantly reduce health risks, as smokers compensate by inhaling more deeply or smoking more cigarettes.
• Flavor and Sensation: Light cigarettes often used additives to mimic the taste and sensation of regular cigarettes, making them more appealing to consumers who were trying to quit or reduce their smoking.

Health Implications

• False Perception of Safety: One of the most significant drawbacks of light cigarettes is that they foster a false sense of safety. Smokers tend to believe that by choosing light cigarettes, they are avoiding the health risks associated with regular cigarettes. This misconception can lead to reduced motivation to quit or cut down on smoking.
• Compensation Behavior: Smokers of light cigarettes tend to engage in compensation behavior, such as inhaling more deeply or smoking more cigarettes, to maintain their desired level of nicotine intake. As a result, the health benefits of smoking light cigarettes are often negated.
• Health Risks Persist: Research has shown that light cigarettes are not significantly less harmful than regular cigarettes. Smokers of light cigarettes can still develop various smoking-related diseases, including lung cancer , heart disease, and respiratory disorders.

Regulations and Warnings

In response to the deceptive marketing of light cigarettes and their health implications, governments and health organizations have implemented regulations and warnings. These measures include:

• Labeling: Cigarette packaging is required to include warnings about the health risks of smoking, regardless of whether the cigarettes are marketed as light or regular.
• Tar and Nicotine Reporting: Some countries mandate that manufacturers report tar and nicotine levels in cigarettes, allowing consumers to make more informed choices.
• Advertising Restrictions: Regulations limit the use of terms like “light” and “mild” in cigarette advertising, as they can be misleading.

The concept of light cigarettes emerged as a well-intentioned response to concerns about the health risks of smoking. However, the reality is far more complex. Light cigarettes have not proven to be a safer alternative to regular cigarettes, as they often lead to false perceptions of safety and compensation behaviors. As public awareness grows, and regulatory measures become more stringent, it is essential for individuals to understand the risks associated with smoking, irrespective of the type of cigarette they choose. Ultimately, the most effective way to reduce health risks related to smoking is to quit altogether or seek healthier alternatives, rather than relying on the misleading promise of light cigarettes.

Read More :  Essay on Advantages and Disadvantages of Selling Cigarettes

Leave a Comment Cancel reply

Save my name, email, and website in this browser for the next time I comment.

Do 'Light' Cigarettes Deliver Less Nicotine To The Brain Than Regular Cigarettes?

For decades now, cigarette makers have marketed so-called light cigarettes — which contain less nicotine than regular smokes — with the implication that they are less harmful to smokers' health. A new UCLA study shows, however, that they deliver nearly as much nicotine to the brain.

Reporting in the current online edition of the International Journal of Neuropsychopharmacology, UCLA psychiatry professor Dr. Arthur L. Brody and colleagues found that low-nicotine cigarettes act similarly to regular cigarettes, occupying a significant percentage of the brain's nicotine receptors.

Light cigarettes have nicotine levels of 0.6 to 1 milligrams, while regular cigarettes contain between 1.2 and 1.4 milligrams.

The researchers also looked at de-nicotinized cigarettes, which contain only a trace amount of nicotine (0.05 milligrams) and are currently being tested as an adjunct to standard smoking-cessation treatments. They found that even that low a nicotine level is enough to occupy a sizeable percentage of receptors.

"The two take-home messages are that very little nicotine is needed to occupy a substantial portion of brain nicotine receptors," Brody said, "and cigarettes with less nicotine than regular cigarettes, such as 'light' cigarettes, still occupy most brain nicotine receptors. Thus, low-nicotine cigarettes function almost the same as regular cigarettes in terms of brain nicotine-receptor occupancy.

"It also showed us that de-nicotinized cigarettes still deliver a considerable amount of nicotine to the brain. Researchers, clinicians and smokers themselves should consider that fact when trying to quit."

In the brain, nicotine binds to specific molecules on nerve cells called nicotinic acetylcholine receptors, or nAChRs. When nerve cells communicate, nerve impulses jump chemically across gaps between cells called synapses by means of neurotransmitters. The neurotransmitters then bind to the receptor sites on nerve cells — in the case acetylcholine resulting in the release of a pleasure-inducing chemical called dopamine. Nicotine mimics acetylcholine, but it lasts longer, releasing more dopamine.

"It can cause specific neurons to communicate and thus increases dopamine for an extended period of time," Brody said. "Most scientists believe that's one key reason why nicotine is so addictive."

In an earlier study, researchers determined that smoking a regular, non-light cigarette resulted in the occupancy of 88 percent of these nicotine receptors. However, that study did not determine whether inhaling nicotine or any of the thousands of other chemical found in cigarette smoke resulted in this receptor occupancy. The central goal of the present study was to determine if factors associated with smoking — other than nicotine — resulted in nAChR occupancy.

The authors reasoned that if nicotine is solely responsible for receptor occupancy, then smoking a de-nicotinized cigarette or a low-nicotine cigarette would result in the occupancy of roughly 23 percent and 78 percent of nicotine receptors, respectively, based on the cigarettes' nicotine content.

"That would still be substantial," Brody said.

Fifteen smokers participated in the study. Each was given positron emission tomography (PET) scans, a brain-imaging technique that uses minute amounts of radiation-emitting substances to tag specific molecules. In this case, the tracer was designed to bind to the nicotine receptors in the brain.

The researchers could then measure what percentage of the tracer was displaced by nicotine when the research subjects smoked. In total, 24 PET scans were taken of participants' brains before and after three different conditions: not smoking, smoking a de-nicotinized cigarette and smoking a low-nicotine cigarette.

The PET data showed that smoking a de-nicotinized cigarette and a low-nicotine cigarette occupied 26 percent and 79 percent of the receptors, respectively, which was very close to what the researchers had originally estimated.

"Given the consistency of findings between our previous study with regular cigarettes and the present study — that showed us that inhaling nicotine during smoking is solely responsible for occupancy of brain nicotine receptors," Brody said.

In addition to Brody, other authors of the study were Mark A. Mandelkern, Matthew R. Costello, Anna L. Abrams, David Scheibal, Judah Farahi, Edythe D. London, Richard E. Olmstead, Jed E. Rose and Alexey G. Mukhin. The researchers report no conflicts of interest. Rose, from the Duke University School of Medicine, has received research support for a study unrelated to the present paper from Vector Tobacco Inc., the manufacturer of Quest cigarettes.

The research was supported by the National Institute on Drug Abuse, the Veterans Administration, the Tobacco-Related Disease Research Program, the National Alliance for Research on Schizophrenia and Depression, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy.

• Brain Tumor
• Nervous System
• Lung Cancer
• Smoking Addiction
• Brain Injury
• Tobacco smoking
• Anticonvulsant
• Cells of the stomach

Story Source:

Materials provided by University of California - Los Angeles . Note: Content may be edited for style and length.

Cite This Page :

Explore More

• Planet Glows With Molten Lava
• A Fragment of Human Brain, Mapped
• Symbiosis Solves Long-Standing Marine Mystery
• Surprising Common Ideas in Environmental ...
• 2D All-Organic Perovskites: 2D Electronics
• Generative AI That Imitates Human Motion
• Hunting the First Stars
• Kids' Sleep Problems Linked to Later Psychosis
• New-To-Nature Enzyme Containing Boron Created
• New Target for Potential Leukemia Therapy

Trending Topics

Strange & offbeat.

Subscribe Now! Get features like

• Latest News
• Entertainment
• Real Estate
• MI vs SRH Live Score
• Lok Sabha Election 2024
• Election Schedule 2024
• MI vs SRH Live
• IPL 2024 Schedule
• IPL Points Table
• IPL Purple Cap
• IPL Orange Cap
• The Interview
• Web Stories
• Virat Kohli
• Mumbai News
• Bengaluru News
• Daily Digest

Smoking mild or light cigarettes puts you at greater risk of lung cancer, finds study

A us study finds that mild or light cigarettes, marketed by the tobacco industry as a “healthier” option, may have contributed to the rise of lung adenocarcinoma – the most common type of lung cancer..

If you are a smoker using the so-called “light” cigarettes, for their lower levels of tar or nicotine, think twice. According to a study, you may be at an increased risk of developing a certain form of lung cancer that occurs deep in the lungs.

Cigarettes labelled as lights, milds, or low-tar – also known as high-ventilation (light) cigarettes – are generally considered to have a lighter, less pronounced flavour, lower levels of tar, nicotine, or other chemicals than regular cigarettes. They are thus marketed by the tobacco industry as a “healthier” option.

On the contrary, these cigarettes may have actually contributed to the rise of lung adenocarcinoma – the most common type of lung cancer, say researchers.

The findings, appearing in the Journal of the National Cancer Institute, showed that the higher incidence rates of lung adenocarcinoma were attributable to the filter ventilation holes, which allow smokers to inhale more smoke that also has higher levels of carcinogens, mutagens and other toxins.

“The filter ventilation holes change how the tobacco is burned, producing more carcinogens, which then also allow the smoke to reach the deeper parts of the lung where adenocarcinomas more frequently occur,” said Peter Shields from Ohio State University, US.

Holes in cigarette filters were introduced 50 years ago and were claimed to be safer. “This was done to fool smokers and the public health community into thinking that they actually were safer,” Shields said.

“Our study suggests a clear relationship between the addition of ventilation holes to cigarettes and increasing rates of lung adenocarcinoma seen over the past 20 years. What is especially concerning is that these holes are still added to virtually all cigarettes that are smoked today,” he added.

The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) should take immediate action, possibly banning use of ventilation holes on cigarettes, the researchers urged.

Follow @htlifeandstyle for more.

Join Hindustan Times

Create free account and unlock exciting features like.

• Terms of use
• Privacy policy
• Weather Today
• HT Newsletters
• Subscription
• Print Ad Rates
• Code of Ethics

• IPL Live Score
• T20 World Cup Schedule
• IPL 2024 Auctions
• T20 World Cup 2024
• Cricket Teams
• Cricket Players
• ICC Rankings
• Cricket Schedule
• T20 World Cup Points Table
• Other Cities
• Income Tax Calculator
• Budget 2024
• Petrol Prices
• Diesel Prices
• Silver Rate
• Relationships
• Art and Culture
• Taylor Swift: A Primer
• Telugu Cinema
• Tamil Cinema
• Board Exams
• Exam Results
• Competitive Exams
• BBA Colleges
• Engineering Colleges
• Medical Colleges
• BCA Colleges
• Medical Exams
• Engineering Exams
• Horoscope 2024
• Festive Calendar 2024
• Compatibility Calculator
• The Economist Articles
• Lok Sabha States
• Lok Sabha Parties
• Lok Sabha Candidates
• Explainer Video
• On The Record
• Vikram Chandra Daily Wrap
• EPL 2023-24
• ISL 2023-24
• Asian Games 2023
• Public Health
• Economic Policy
• International Affairs
• Climate Change
• Gender Equality
• future tech
• Daily Sudoku
• Daily Crossword
• Daily Word Jumble
• HT Friday Finance
• Explore Hindustan Times
• Privacy Policy
• Terms of Use
• Subscription - Terms of Use

7 Healthiest Brands of Cigarettes: Pro Picks

Are you a devoted smoker who’s aware of the risks but can’t quit the habit? If quitting isn’t an option, you can still reduce the health risks associated with smoking. In this article, we’ll explore the seven cigarette brands with the lowest levels of tar and nicotine . So, let’s dive into the world of smoking alternatives that might just be the right choice for you.

Table of Contents

1. Lucky Strike Click & Roll

Owned by British American Tobacco, Lucky Strike offers a viable option for health-conscious smokers. Lucky Strike Original Red contains 0.7 milligrams of nicotine and 10 milligrams of tar, while the lighter variant, Lucky Strike Click & Roll, contains 0.5 milligrams of nicotine and 7 milligrams of tar . What’s interesting is that these cigarettes have a menthol capsule, so you can switch up the flavor by clicking the capsule.

2. Camel Light

Camel Light is known for its long-burning properties and the natural tobacco taste. Camel One, a lighter version, contains just 0.1 milligram of nicotine and 1 milligram of tar . The regular Camel Filters have 0.8 milligrams of nicotine and 10 milligrams of tar, offering a unique flavor profile that sets it apart. You can also read Third Hand Smoke to know more about it.

3. Davidoff

Davidoff has both stronger and lighter versions. Davidoff One has 0.1 milligram of nicotine and 1 milligram of tar , while the Davidoff Classic contains 0.9 milligrams of nicotine and 10 milligrams of tar. Despite being a lighter version, Davidoff One boasts a fruity tang that many passionate smokers appreciate.

4. Dunhill International

Dunhill International offers a contrast between the strong and light versions of its cigarettes. While Dunhill International contains 1 milligram of nicotine and 12 milligrams of tar , Dunhill Fine Cut is much milder, with 0.1 milligram of nicotine and 1 milligram of tar. The brand is owned by British American Tobacco and is known for its pure and pleasant taste.

5. Marlboro

Marlboro is a trusted name in the Healthiest Brands of Cigarette industry. Marlboro Filter +1, the lighter version, contains 0.1 milligram of nicotine and 1 milligram of tar . On the other hand, Marlboro Red has 0.8 milligrams of nicotine and 10 milligrams of tar. Enjoy quality tobacco taste with reduced risk.

6. Pall Mall Super Slim Silver 100’s

Pall Mall Super Slim Silver 100’s offers nicotine and tar levels identical to Marlboro’s lighter version . Whether you choose the stronger or lighter version, you can expect consistent quality from this brand. Produced by Reynolds American in the US and marketed by British American Tobacco, it’s a brand worth considering.

7. Winston White

Winston White takes the top spot on our list with only 0.1 milligram of nicotine and 1 milligram of tar . For those who prefer a stronger option, Winston Red has 0.8 milligrams of nicotine and 10 milligrams of tar . Winston is a reliable choice for passionate smokers looking for a balanced smoking experience.

If you’ve struggled to quit and are looking for a healthier alternative, these seven cigarette brands with low tar and nicotine levels may be your best bet. While quitting is always the best choice for your health, these options can help you reduce the risks associated with smoking.

Enjoy the high-quality tobacco taste with less danger. Remember to smoke responsibly and be aware of the health risks associated with smoking.

Disclaimer: Smoking is harmful to your health, and it is strongly recommended to quit smoking altogether. The information provided here is for informational purposes only and should not be considered as an endorsement of smoking.

Frequently Asked Questions(FAQs)

1. what defines a “healthy” cigarette brand.

A “healthy” cigarette brand refers to a brand with lower levels of nicotine and tar compared to other brands. While no cigarette can be deemed truly healthy, some brands have taken measures to reduce these harmful components.

2. Why are low nicotine and tar levels important?

Low nicotine and tar levels are important because they can potentially reduce the health risks associated with smoking. Nicotine and tar are linked to various health issues, so minimizing their intake may lead to less harm for smokers.

3. Is it safe to smoke cigarettes with lower nicotine and tar levels?

While cigarettes with lower nicotine and tar levels may pose reduced risks compared to higher levels, they are not safe. Smoking any cigarette is harmful to health and increases the risk of numerous diseases and health conditions.

4. Which cigarette brands have the lowest nicotine and tar content?

Some cigarette brands known for relatively lower nicotine and tar content include Lucky Strike, Camel Light, Davidoff, Dunhill International, Marlboro (lighter versions), Pall Mall Super Slim Silver 100’s, and Winston White.

5. Are there alternative ways to reduce smoking risks?

The most effective way to reduce smoking risks is to quit smoking altogether. Smoking cessation programs, support groups, nicotine replacement therapy, and counseling can aid in quitting. Additionally, seeking professional help and adopting a healthier lifestyle can contribute to minimizing risks.

6. What are the alternatives to smoking traditional cigarettes?

There are several alternatives to traditional cigarettes, including electronic cigarettes (e-cigarettes or vapes), nicotine gum, nicotine patches, and smokeless tobacco products. These alternatives aim to provide nicotine in a potentially less harmful way compared to smoking, but their long-term effects are still being studied.

Leave a comment Cancel reply

Save my name, email, and website in this browser for the next time I comment.

Log in using your username and password

• Search More Search for this keyword Advanced search
• Latest content
• Current issue
• Anniversary
• BMJ Journals More You are viewing from: Google Indexer

You are here

• Volume 9, Issue 1
• Reflections on the saga of tar content: why did we measure the wrong thing?
• Article Text
• Article info
• Citation Tools
• Rapid Responses
• Article metrics

• European Institute of Oncology, Milan, Italy
• Dr Nigel Gray, European Institute of Oncology, Via Ripamonti 435, 20141, Milan, Italy nigel{at}uicc.ch

https://doi.org/10.1136/tc.9.1.90

Statistics from Altmetric.com

Request permissions.

If you wish to reuse any or all of this article please use the link below which will take you to the Copyright Clearance Center’s RightsLink service. You will be able to get a quick price and instant permission to reuse the content in many different ways.

In 1999, it seems timely to reflect on the beginnings of the campaign to reduce tar and nicotine content of cigarettes, and on the mistakes made over the past three decades.

As a persistent and experienced critic of the tobacco industry I am nevertheless surprised to find, in 1999, that they have exceeded my more pessimistic expectations, with what can only be described as a foolishly casual approach to addressing the carcinogenic content of the smoke they feed their customers, combined with an efficient and intense focus on the addictive elements.

In 1968 I became director of the Anti-Cancer Council of Victoria (ACCV), Australia. My predecessor had commissioned a US analysis of the tar content of 10 randomly selected Australian brands of cigarettes by Fred Bock. I recall that we were not asked to pay for the tests, which were a simple fishing expedition.

The tar content of the sample ranged from 17–33 mg per cigarette and David Hill, then director of education in the ACCV, published this in our newsletter, Victorian Cancer News , under a headline “Victorian cigarettes a case of Russian roulette”. The responses were instantaneous.

The first were major headlines in Australian newspapers, attacks from various tobacco industry sources, and a consequential controversy, with us arguing that the levels were too high and wanting them brought down and printed on the packet.

• Download figure
• Open in new tab
• Download powerpoint

The second was a very large increase in the sales of Kent which happened to have the lowest tar of the brands we had tested (17 mg). This experience persuaded us to set up our own testing to explore the whole market, as only the Americans were publishing this material at this time.

We commissioned Professor John Swan, a distinguished organic chemist, to organise the testing of all Australian brands, which was easily done with a little ingenuity. His engineer, Ben Baxter, designed and built a machine similar to that used by Fred Bock. The principle was extremely simple. Twelve ports were set up in which cigarettes were smoked by applying a standard vacuum for a standard period to produce a puff volume of 35 ml. The smoke was then channelled through a narrowed outlet through a filter paper of consistent manufacture. The particulate matter, which was captured by the filter, was weighed.

An excited John Swan phoned me a few months later. The honours student doing the tests had found a discrepancy within a single brand—Hallmark. The single port results were showing variable results, an unusual thing. Swan had purchased a carefully designed national sample. Hallmark purchased in New South Wales was delivering a consistent 14 mg, while those purchased in Victoria delivered a consistent 7 mg.

Clearly we had happened upon a marketing experiment in which the industry was test marketing a lower tar version of the brand to discover whether their customers could tell the difference. We had seriously disturbed their experiment and our published results produced a publicity storm, which reportedly expanded sales by some orders of magnitude. The demand caught them short of filters so a planeload was flown out from England, amid continuing publicity. In the absence of detailed industry figures we could only assume that Hallmark had stolen market share from higher tar brands, and we were pleased with the very widespread publicity which allowed us to focus on the dangers of higher tar cigarettes. Our policy response was to “measure, publish, debate” which we did, on and off, for another two to three decades

By the mid 1980s, 80% of Australian brands delivered 12 mg of tar or less. 1 In 1991 half of Victorian smokers could recount the tar content of the cigarette they smoked. In the context of the times this was seen as progress.

In the early 1970s, being young in the job, I was willing, at least until I learned better, to talk to a couple of people the industry sent around to see me without a third party present. The first was an old footballing friend, recently hired but well briefed, who explained to me the industry's “positions” on various subjects. It was at this time in my life that I discovered that a “position” is not the same as a fact. Phrases like “It's only statistical” and 20 or 30 other industry euphemisms became familiar to me. My friend did not enjoy his job as his employer's “positions” were different from my facts and he found himself believing me. He left the industry not long after. However, he did me the favour of sending around one of their senior biochemists, who educated me considerably.

After we put aside discussion about whether cigarettes caused lung cancer, on which I was obdurate and he was elegantly obfuscative and non-committal, we had some useful dialogue about tar content. Reducing tar could be done by filtration, by choice of tobacco and paper, by blending, by use of reconstituted leaf, and various other means. Ventilated filters, which artificially reduce machine yields, were unknown in those days. Adding burning agents made the cigarette keep burning when not being puffed, which reduced puff count and what reached smokers' lungs, but increased what went elsewhere. A high tar cigarette in those days (the Philip Morris brand in Australia was 32 mg) delivered 9–10 puffs; a low tar brand delivered 7–8 mg. We were both aware of Ernst Wynder's experiments in painting mouse skin with tobacco tar, and of the dose-response between the amount applied and the yield of tumours. 2 3

My approach at the time was simple and not particularly intellectual. It seemed to me that if smoke with lots of particles produced lots of cancer, as it clearly did, then smoke with a large proportion of particles removed had a good chance of being significantly less carcinogenic.

This reasoning should have been correct. It did not occur to me then that the industry would be silly enough to actually increase the amount of carcinogen within the smaller number of particles, although, as shown later, it seems that this is what they have done. Their biochemist actually mentioned it as a possibility, but we both dismissed it on the grounds that it would be preposterous.

There were some hilarious moments in these discussions. I remember bursting into laughter when he used the words “quality control” but he did make it clear to me that they were trying, for obvious reasons, to produce a consistent product.

These were the early 1970s and the debate was to become much more intense as time went on. The industry trick of discussing a “safer” cigarette failed in Australia as we countered, vigorously, with phrases like “more dangerous”. By and large the civilities were observed on both sides at that time. I probably breached the code, and personalised the issue for the first time, when the chairman of a tobacco company was given a knighthood in the early 1970s, by pointing out that “You get a knighthood for pushing cigarettes but a gaol sentence for pushing marihuana”. A number of senior people on my side of the fence deprecated this. However, there were no more tobacco knighthoods in Australia. These were certainly trying times for the tobacco industry. A pleasant habit had been revealed as seriously dangerous and, in due course, addictive; and a then respectable industry came under progressive and increasing attack, which has continued and is now focused in the courts of the United States.

Over the next decade I had many debates with my public health friends over tar. They were rightly concerned about the concept of the “safer cigarette” which was propagated by the industry and compliant journalists in countries where they were allowed to get away with it. For this reason the Union Internationale Contre le Cancer (UICC) monograph on tobacco policy of 1977 4 promoted reduction by regulation rather than by the industry responding to market demand. In Australia we continued our policy as before, as the debate was useful in keeping the issue of the (unnecessarily) dangerous cigarette in the public arena.

The 1980s and on

In the mid 1980s the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) convened a working party, in which I participated, to write a monograph on tobacco smoking. 5 The group reviewed six epidemiological studies 6-11 concluding “The low tar cigarette appears to reduce the risk for lung cancer”. This fitted my conceptions of the time. I also took notice of what the chemists in that working party were saying. They noted the carcinogenicity of the tobacco specific nitrosamines (TSNA) in particular N'nitrosonornicotine (NNN) and 4-(methylnitrosamino)-1-(3-pyridyl)-4-buta-none (NNK), and the relation between these and the amount of nitrate in tobacco. 12

Nicotine posed a very different problem to tar. I probably learned about addiction from reading Michael Russell in the 1970s 19 and certainly learnt about compensatory smoking in the same decade from the same source 20 and others. 21 Nevertheless I went along with the prevailing opinion that reducing tar, which incidentally reduced nicotine (or so I believed at the time), was sound policy. Russell in 1976 22 proposed a cigarette with limited tar (6 mg) and “adequate” nicotine (1–1.2 mg) but few took much notice. The main objection then to the low tar cigarette was the possibility that it could serve as an alternative to quitting, a proposition the industry exploited with the development of Lights, Milds, and Ultra Lights.

In the late 1980s it became apparent that there were straws in the wind suggesting that all was not well with the low tar/nicotine policy.

There were four areas to be concerned about. As the evidence has unfolded in the 1990s these concerns have become serious.

Hoffmann 23 progressively published data which showed an increase over time in the NNK yield of a single non-filter brand in the United States, of about 45%, occurring over a period when benz(a)pyrene (BaP) was stable. He also noted an increase in nitrate levels in US tobaccos. Others 24 25 recorded great diversity in nitrosamine yields in cigarettes from different countries. So there were great qualitative differences between cigarettes in this respect, which should logically mean that some cigarettes were more carcinogenic than others. This was unnecessary, as the nitrate content of the tobacco, plus the curing and storage processes used, is under the control of the manufacturer.

The swing towards adenocarcinoma became obvious at least in some countries. 26-36 Wynder and Hoffmann 37 considered this to be a consequence of the higher nitrosamines in smoke and the greater exposure of the lungs to smoke particles, especially NNK, caused by compensatory smoking.

The reviews of cancer prevention study No. 1, 1959 through 1965 (CPS1) and CPS2 (1982 through 1988) showed an increase in mortality among long duration (40–49 years), one pack or more per day smokers, 38 whose experience includes significant periods of use of lower tar cigarettes. It was concluded that “the potential benefits of reduced tar, as measured by machine smoking, appear to be overwhelmed by adverse changes in smoking practices and perhaps by other unidentified factors”.

It became increasingly obvious that industry manipulation of nicotine bioavailability in cigarettes is ensuring that modern cigarettes are as addictive as ever, or more so. I knew that nicotine levels could be easily controlled, as the industry chemist had told me so in the 1970s. I was also told by John Swan in the late 1980s about protonated and unprotonated nicotine, and its relation to pH, in the context of the smoking/chewing usage in India, but only understood that the modern cigarette was progressively delivering more unprotonated (“free”) nicotine when the industry documents started to leak through the court system in the United States. I was certainly startled to discover that Marlboro had been using ammonia technology since 1965 39 and that their competitors knew it and copied the practice.

It is relatively easy with hindsight to put these four issues side by side and conclude that the modern cigarette is not an improvement and may be about as carcinogenic as its predecessor, although in a slightly different way. It also seems that it is at least as addictive as its predecessor, or more so, despite numerically lower levels of nicotine. The low tar/low nicotine policy has been, at best, a slight success; at worst, a snare and a delusion.

In this mea culpa I am, or should not be, alone. The public health establishments which advised governments committed the same mistakes and we have all been enlightened by the revelations brought forth by the US courts, which have confirmed that the tobacco industry always had clear policy intentions and that the making of a less addictive, less dangerous cigarette was not among them.

Although the social and legislative elements of tobacco policy have been clear, accepted and progressively implemented, at least in developed countries, for several decades, we have shied away from attempting to regulate the product. There are at least two reasons for this.

The first is that, as I discovered when I raised this with the poisons committee in Victoria in the late 1970s, no sensible bureaucrat wants to legitimise something as toxic as a cigarette by taking responsibility for “approving” or even “permitting” it. I accepted this then as a reasonable view.

The second is that the problem is extremely complex and the “horse has bolted” to the extent that the unregulated cigarette is ubiquitous, loaded with additives, and manufactured in diverse environments. Taking control of the cigarette through regulation, as has been done with nicotine replacement products, seems difficult at a technical level regardless of the political problems.

This inactivity can no longer be condoned and our lobbying endeavours need to be directed with more clarity at bringing the cigarette under regulatory control. There are two problems. One is political, the other technical. Neither is insuperable. Regulation is unlikely to start as a global process and a number of national and supra national governments are candidates for leadership. They are the US, Canada, the European Union, and Australia and New Zealand.

POLITICAL ISSUES

In the US the question of regulation by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is before the courts and is likely to be resolved in the year 2000. If the US government fails, then the matter becomes one for the currently constipated, tobacco industry friendly, US Congress. However the tobacco industry is not yet finished with the jury system in the US and the loss of further court cases may well bring them back to Congress wanting another settlement, or release from liability, of the sort which was lost by divisions in the public health community in 1998.

In Europe, there is a new European Commission and the 1996 recommendations of the European high level cancer experts committee 40 are before it. These lay a base for regulation of tar and nicotine as well as for the abolition of additives. This base depends on tar and nicotine as no other measuring system currently exists, but the future must surely hold regulation of individual smoke components, as the concept of tar as a homogeneous substance is now out of date. Lowering tar beyond what is currently proposed cannot be expected to deliver benefits. Ireland already has legislation requiring disclosure and facilitating regulation.

The New Zealand government has already taken powers to regulate cigarette design and Australia has a strong legislative base for tobacco control. Canada is in a similar position.

Several individual US states and Canadian provinces (Massachusetts and British Columbia, among others) are requiring major disclosure of smoke constituents, and seem likely to move toward regulation as a natural progression.

The technical issues in regulation are not as complicated as they might seem. Abolition of additives has already been proposed to the European Commission. 40 This is well within the industry's capacity, given two to three years to comply. Over that time, any additives which may be beneficial to public health can then be considered in the same way as they would be for nicotine replacement products—carefully, one by one, and on the basis of not only toxicology but also the effects on the addictive and carcinogenic/toxic effects of the cigarette, with the onus of proof resting with the manufacturer. Additives need to be clearly defined, as anything added anywhere in the growing and manufacturing process, from nitrate fertiliser to citrates in the paper. The “quickfix” and easy to learn to smoke cigarette with its sugars, flavourings, ammonia, and other additives, and particularly its high nicotine “kick”, would be replaced by the old fashioned “gasper”. However, the gasper would have some limits set.

Although the industry will protest against a prohibition of additives, the failures of the voluntary codes are serious. In the UK, some 600 additives are disclosed. They include a number of ammonium salts and various sugars. Ammonia increases free nicotine. Sugars, when burnt, yield acetaldehyde which is synergistic with nicotine 41 but is also a carcinogen. 23 Sugar may be suitable as an additive for tea, but, since it leads to acetaldehyde when burnt, is hardly suitable for a cigarette.

Carcinogens need to be regulated by the setting of upper limits, as has been proposed, 42 based on what levels are actually on the market and starting with the median as an initial upper limit. The starting points could be: BaP, as a surrogate for other polyaromatic hydrocarbons; NNK, as a surrogate for TSNA; and the various inorganic compounds such as heavy metals. This is not a matter of telling the tobacco industry how to manufacture a cigarette, but simply to set limits on the emissions produced by what they market. Tar measurement should be replaced by measurement of a prescribed set of nominated carcinogens.

The question of nicotine regulation becomes simpler once additives which can influence pH and bioavailability are removed. Regulation may require setting limits on the amount of nicotine permitted in the rod of the cigarette and, perhaps, limits on smoke pH. Alternatively, regulation based on levels in mainstream smoke produced by a more realistic smoking pattern may be suitable. The debate over whether to reduce nicotine levels progressively over time 43 needs to be resolved, but the more immediate issue is the necessity of establishing a regulatory system.

Will this make a less dangerous cigarette? Certainly a cigarette with less addictive power and lower carcinogen levels should be less dangerous, although it will never be safe or acceptable in the long term. While there is no excuse for allowing unnecessarily high levels of carcinogens in cigarettes, there is, similarly, no excuse for allowing marketing claims as to safety to be based on reduction, but not elimination, of carcinogens. Misleading concepts such as light and mild, simply have no place. The future of the product, if it has one, may lie in the evolution of less objectionable alternative forms of nicotine delivery which bring fewer, or no, carcinogens and toxins in their wake.

Whether we can rid the world of the cigarette as we have of smallpox remains a question, but there is no doubt the product can be cleaned up. Whether nicotine addiction disappears in 50 years is less important than whether the delivery systems have been improved. I am not prepared to pontificate on whether nicotine addiction, fed by less toxic delivery systems, needs to be treated as a public health evil on the basis of today's evidence, but it is certainly a public health evil while cigarettes are the major delivery system.

Is this a plea for prohibition? No—for evolution, and for a regulatory approach to the cigarette similar to that taken with other nicotine delivery systems and consumer products.

Acknowledgments

I wish to gratefully acknowledge the wisdom and support of my colleague, David Hill, over the 30 years spanned by this report, and the support of Peter Boyle, with whom I currently work. It is a pleasure to acknowledge that this work was conducted within the framework of support from the Italian Association for Cancer Research(Associazone Italiana per la Ricerca sul Cancro)

• Winstanley M ,
• Woodward S ,
• Wynder EL ,
• Graham EA ,
• Croninger AG
• International Agency for Research on Cancer
• Hawthorne VM ,
• Rimington J
• Mabuchi K ,
• Beattie EJ , jr
• Stellman SD
• Hammond EC ,
• Garfinkel L ,
• Seidman H ,
• Morris JK ,
• Zaridze DG ,
• Waller RE ,
• Russell MA ,
• Benowitz NL ,
• Herning RI ,
• Hoffmann D ,
• O'Neill IK ,
• Fischer S ,
• Spiegelhalder B ,
• Preussmann R
• Vincent RG ,
• Pickren JW ,
• El-Torkey M ,
• El-Zeky F ,
• Anneges JF ,
• Woolner LB ,
• Cutler SJ ,
• Devesa SS ,
• Hendersom BE ,
• Thomas DC ,
• Flannery JT ,
• US Department of Health and Human Services
• Connelly GN ,
• Henningfield JE ,
• Jacob P , 3rd ,

The Cancer Society of Finland launched a new anti-tobacco campaign for teenagers and young adults recently. The theme of the campaign is “Serial killer” and is built around a dedicated internet site ( www.serialkiller.fi ) designed like a police report file. On the web site teenagers are challenged to create their own anti-smoking video (examples are shown) or other material as a competition. The web site is advertised with postcards, posters, and mysterious looking “missing” ads.

Read the full text or download the PDF:

• Skip to primary navigation
• Skip to main content
• Skip to footer

Stanford Research into the Impact of Tobacco Advertising

Collection: Low Tar

Claims of low ‘tar,’ less ‘tar,’ or even lowest ‘tar’ have been circulating in cigarette advertisements for decades. This theme features ads which revolve around deceptive low tar claims which try to out-do each other, some going as far as to claim less than 1 mg of tar per cigarette. By ‘tar,’ tobacco companies are referring to the brown, sticky accumulation of chemicals amassed when tobacco is burned. This residue is considered to be one of the most damaging components of smoking, as it contains a multitude of identified carcinogens and causes harmful build-up in the lungs. It is therefore no surprise that, early on, tobacco companies began to make their cigarettes appear less harmful by advertising reduced tar levels. Low tar cigarettes are intended to keep concerned smokers from quitting by providing these smokers with what appears to be a healthy alternative. Unfortunately, lower tar ratings have no bearing on the safety of the brand in question. As internal tobacco documents have revealed, tobacco companies have been fully knowledgeable that lower tar cigarettes were not actually safer or healthier.

It was not until quite recently that any action was taken in the United States to address the deceptive and dangerous mislabeling. However, when the FDA was granted regulatory authority over tobacco products in 2009, these concerns came to the forefront of regulation. As of July 2010, the words “mild,” “low,” or “light” are not to be used on tobacco products, as these words cause consumers to underestimate their health risks. This new regulation means that brands previously marketed as “light” or “low-tar” can no longer include these words on their packaging or advertising.

Unsurprisingly, tobacco manufacturers have figured out a creative way to escape this regulation. Now, they rely on different colored packages to indicate whether a certain product is light, ultra-light, or full-flavor. The colors vary slightly among brands, but generally adhere to the following standards: red indicates regular; dark green indicates menthol; light green, blue, or gold indicate previously “light” cigarettes; and silver or orange indicate previously “ultra light” cigarettes. Camel, for example, replaced their “Camel Lights” product with “Camel Blue.” Philip Morris stuck with the idea that lighter shades indicate a “lighter” cigarette, and thus Marlboro Lights became Marlboro Gold, and Marlboro Ultra-Lights became Marlboro Silver. Likewise, R.J. Reynolds’ Salem Ultra-Lights became “Salem Silver Box.” The FDA has regulatory authority to demand that tobacco companies discontinue their color branding techniques in the future.

117 Images in Collection

About SRITA

SRITA’s repository of tobacco advertising supports scholarly research and public inquiry into the promotional activities of the tobacco industry. Learn more

Explore SRITA

• Ad Collections
• Brand Histories
• Publications