logistics disasters case study

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Our directorate delivers critical commodities and manufactured housing units following disasters. There are eight distribution centers in the United States and OCONUS strategically located to provide rapid support including commodities like food and water. Also, we established commercial contracts and agreements with multiple public and private sector partners to provide additional support.  We also set up incident support bases and federal staging areas to quickly deliver resources to disaster survivors.

• Our Distribution Management Division manages a comprehensive supply chain, warehouse operations where we receive, store, and issue commodities and equipment, and transportation operations to effectively and efficiently distribute supplies, equipment and services in response to domestic disasters and emergencies.
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• Our Office of Business, Industry, and Infrastructure Integration (OB3I) works to stabilize lifelines to optimize survivor access to critical services and business continuity.  We do this through effective sequencing of effort based on analysis of system interdependencies for local, state, regional, or national benefit; preventing events  or mitigating  cascading failures across multiple sectors; creating harmony and coordination between all levels of government and business during cross-sector operations; stabilizing supply chains and distribution networks both within the affected area and outside to protect public health and safety, reduce economic impacts; and, creating an monitoring indicators of degradation of critical infrastructure and supply chains that impact national security and the national economy are identified, prioritized, and addressing as indicated
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View the FEMA Offices & Leadership page to learn about this program's key staff.

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It’s Time to Rethink Your Global Logistics

• Willy C. Shih
• Adrien Foucault

The pandemic has overloaded companies’ usual shipping networks.

The initial supply and demand shocks caused by the pandemic were followed by an import surge as suppliers tried to replenish inventories, which threw normal transportation operations into turmoil. In the United States, this has included a lack of freight-handling capacity at Los Angeles and Long Beach ports, overloaded U.S. intermodal rail networks, and a lack of containers. But alternatives to established logistics networks exist. It’s time for companies to take advantage of them.

Over the last three decades, companies have established wide-ranging global supply chains that have taken advantage of steadily improving scale economies in global logistics. Efficient and reliable ocean and air cargo have linked low-cost manufacturing hubs across Asia with major markets in the United States and Europe. Much of this global sourcing was driven by the cost savings reaped through labor arbitrage, cost savings that were so dramatic that it more than covered the expense associated with moving products across vast distances to markets, or the extra cost of carrying inventory in long pipelines.

• Willy C. Shih is a Baker Foundation Professor of Management Practice at Harvard Business School.
• Adrien Foucault is an MBA student at Harvard Business School and has worked at maritime transport company CMA CGM.

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3 True Stories of Supply Chain Management Disasters (And How to Avoid Them)

• Post author: prodadmin
• Post published: July 31, 2020
• Post category: Acumatica / Inventory / Supply Chain
• Post comments: 1 Comment

The fear of a supply chain disaster destroying years, even decades, of hard-earned company growth is enough to keep managers up at night — and for good reason: the smoking ruins of once-thriving companies have littered history, and fatal SCM mistakes have often been the culprit.

But with disaster comes new opportunities and, perhaps most importantly, new lessons that can help us learn from the mistakes of other businesses. These three SCM nightmares from history, though sobering, offer some valuable insights: 

1. The Massive Boeing 787 Delay and Its Painful Supply Chain Birth Pangs

In the mid-2000s, Boeing’s shiny new game-changing commercial airliner, the 787, was sending waves of excitement throughout the transportation industry.

But the planes weren’t getting finished quickly enough.

Initially scheduled to enter service in May of 2008, disastrous SCM problems resulted in a delay of over three years. It finally went into service in October of 2011, as  Air Transport World noted  with exasperation.

So what went wrong with Boeing’s supply chain management?

To put it simply: Boeing badly wanted to do more than it could handle, and they failed to assess the risks properly as they charged ahead. They attempted to rapidly change the assembly process and the supply chain simultaneously — and too quickly — to disastrous results.

Aerospace-Technology.com made these observations  about the debacle:

Changing the supply chain and the assembly process all at once is probably two steps too far too soon. “Boeing probably underestimated the size of the risks involved,” says Robin Jackson, chief executive at ADR International.

In the same report, an analyst cautioned companies to be careful about how quickly they introduce innovations: “If Boeing mismanaged anything, it is that they have tried to introduce an innovation in their supply systems at the same time they have innovated in product and assembly.”

In other words, their supply chain really wasn’t ready yet. But they charged ahead anyway.

2. Target Canada Ruined by Epic Barbie SUV Traffic Jam

In more recent history, Target announced in January 2015, as reported by USA Today, that they were pulling all their stores out of Canada and leaving the market. Why?

They had a traffic jam of pink Barbie SUVs — literally. As Reuters reported:

A pink Barbie-branded SUV that seats two toddlers offers a surprising glimpse into the myriad problems that jammed up Target Corp’s supply chain…The toy was one of many products that piled up in bewildering volume at Target’s new distribution centers…Goods were coming into the warehouses faster than they were going out, in part because the barcodes on many items did not match what was in the computer system.

Like Boeing, they took on too much too quickly, as Reuters noted: “Instead of a slow province-by-province rollout, the retailer clinched a big real estate deal, locking itself into a rapid, coast-to-coast launch that later magnified supply chain problems.”

The failure cost Target more than $2 billion. Their supply chain traffic jam left shelves empty and shoppers frustrated.

Marc Wulfraat, the president of logistics consulting firm MWPVL International — a man who has analyzed and written about Target’s supply chain extensively — summed up the epic scope of Target’s failure with one sentence: “The Target Canada story will go down in the history books as one of the great supply chain disasters of Canadian history.”

As a Target spokeswoman Molly Snyder confessed to USA Today: “We tried to do too much, too fast.”

3. It's All In the Timing: The Great Hershey's Chocolate Meltdown of '99

In 1999, in the months leading up to the over-hyped Y2K doomsday, Hershey’s had a little doomsday of their own: they failed to deliver $100 million of Hershey’s Kisses and Jolly Ranchers to stores in time for Halloween. As a result, the company’s stock lost 8% in one day when the problem was announced.

As CIO.com noted in their coverage of the Hershey incident in the early 2000s: “Hershey’s only real failure was its timing in launching its new order-taking and distribution system: the system went live right about the time when orders were pouring in for Halloween, and they couldn’t be fulfilled.”

What’s the common thread here?

Don’t rush the launch of new systems and supply chain protocols. And get outside help. Every company has blind spots in their judgment, even behemoths like Boeing and Target. Getting an outsider’s input will diagnose any fatal blind spots. (MaxQ Technologies, for example, offers superb application development and business intelligence consulting under one roof to ensure companies transition into new systems with success.)

Tips for Avoiding Disaster

The general principle is clear: don’t try to do too much too quickly. Beneath that generality there are some specific, practical things to remember:

Always operate with comprehensive visibility throughout every step in the supply chain.

As Chris Kushmaul, the vice president of finance for the American Production and Inventory Control Society’s greater Detroit chapter told Enterprise Apps Today: “If you don’t know where your raw materials originate from, what locations they will have to pass through, where your distributors are located and where your finished goods will travel, that could be costing you inefficiencies today and will hamper your risk management efforts in the future.”

Always be prepared for disruptions in the supply chain.

Jeff Karrenbaur, president of Insight, Inc., told Enterprise Apps Today how to be prepared: “Companies must be prepared for business disruptions by having in place overall risk management and resilience plan. They must perform rigorous analysis of their supply chain network to uncover its vulnerabilities and manage risk.”

Avoid launching a new product with multiple suppliers (unless you have enough resources to pull it off).

Akhil Oltikar, vice president of supply chain solutions at Riverwood Solutions, explains it this way: “…With a multiple contract manufacturer launch, the brand owner is faced with managing two of everything – a process that is far more complex than simply doing the same things twice. Managing the complexities introduced by launching a new product at multiple contract manufacturers almost always slow things down and causes more problems than it solves.”

Bridge the disconnect between the planning stage and the delivering stage.

This is a more tragic example of what poor supply chain management can do. Lithium-ion batteries — the little packets of power in our mobile devices, laptops, and other daily tech devices — explode when overheated, and such incidents have caused damages, injuries, even fatalities. Some of these explosions occurred while being shipped. Air carriers even refused to ship the batteries for that reason.

Toby Gooley, the editor of Supply Chain Quarterly, analyzed the exploding battery problem and came to this conclusion in a recent June 2015 article: “…it seems likely that the product planning phase did not take into account all of the activities and conditions that would occur at each subsequent stage in the supply chain.”

A Fresh Perspective

Oftentimes, these supply chain problems — whether it’s a company rushing into something or it’s a disconnect between critical nodes in the supply chain — can be remedied by bringing in the right kind of outside help.

In a February 2015 article about supply chain management in health care, Jean Skora, materials manager at The Surgery Center of Pinehurst (N.C.), explained the value of getting help from outside consultants — whether it’s implementing powerful new distribution software carefully tailored to your needs or it’s getting fresh advice: “They can provide your supply chain staff with a new point of view. A fresh perspective can re-energize an overwhelmed staff.”

MaxQ Technologies has that fresh perspective you need. Contact us to learn about our highly effective distribution software solutions and consulting services that will help you avoid supply chain management disasters.

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Challenges in disaster relief operations: evidence from the 2017 Kermanshah earthquake

Journal of Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management

ISSN : 2042-6747

Article publication date: 24 December 2020

Issue publication date: 4 February 2021

This paper identifies the challenges during a recent disaster relief operation in a developing country where the humanitarian response is dominated by national actors, with international actors having a minor role.

Design/methodology/approach

A case study design is used; the main data sources are semi-structured interviews with 43 informants involved in the 2017 Kermanshah earthquake relief operation.

The findings suggest that humanitarian practitioners deal with multiple challenges during disaster relief operations. One group of challenges relates to humanitarian logistics (HL) like needs assessment, procurement, warehousing, transportation and distribution, all widely discussed in the literature. Another involves the growing use of social media, legitimacy regulations and the engagement of new humanitarian actors (HAs) like social media activists and celebrities. These factors have not been extensively studied in the literature; given their growing influence, they require more scholarly attention.

Practical implications

The findings will help humanitarian practitioners and policymakers better understand the challenges involved in disaster relief operations conducted by multiple actors and thus help them improve their practices, including the creation of proper regulations, policies and logistics strategies.

Originality/value

The study uses primary data on a recent disaster to assess and extend the findings of previous studies regarding HL challenges. It also elaborates on the critical non-logistical challenges that influence aid delivery in emergency responses, including the growth of social media, regulations and the engagement of new HAs. The results may motivate future empirical and modelling studies to investigate the identified challenges and identify practices to mitigate them.

• Humanitarian logistics
• Disaster relief operations
• Social media
• Celebrities
• Humanitarian actors
• Regulations

Maghsoudi, A. and Moshtari, M. (2021), "Challenges in disaster relief operations: evidence from the 2017 Kermanshah earthquake", Journal of Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management , Vol. 11 No. 1, pp. 107-134. https://doi.org/10.1108/JHLSCM-08-2019-0054

Emerald Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2020, Amin Maghsoudi and Mohammad Moshtari

Published by Emerald Publishing Limited. This article is published under the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY 4.0) licence. Anyone may reproduce, distribute, translate and create derivative works of this article (for both commercial and non-commercial purposes), subject to full attribution to the original publication and authors. The full terms of this licence may be seen at http://creativecommons.org/licences/by/4.0/legalcode

1. Introduction

Traditionally, logistics plays a central role in humanitarian assistance as the connecting point between preparedness and response, procurement and distribution, and headquarters and the field ( Thomas, 2008 ). Humanitarian logistics (HL) has been described as “the process of planning, managing, implementing and controlling the efficient, cost-effective flow and storage of relief items as well as related information and funds, from the point of origin (suppliers and donors) to the point of consumption for the purpose of meeting the end beneficiary's requirements” ( Thomas and Mizushima, 2005 , p. 60). HL involves a wide range of activities that includes needs assessments, procurement, resource mobilization, transportation, warehousing and last mile distribution ( Gustavsson, 2003 ). HL activities can account for up to 80% of the total cost of humanitarian assistance ( Van Wassenhove, 2006 ).

The existing HL literature discusses a wide range of practical HL challenges identified during disaster relief operations. These range from specific deficiencies such as a lack of logistical knowledge and trained logisticians, the absence of standards and performance indicators, security problems and inadequate funding and investment in information technology ( Fritz Institute, 2004 ; Maiers et al. , 2005 ; Balcik and Beamon, 2008 ; Kovács and Spens, 2009 ; Sandwell, 2011 ) to general characteristics of the humanitarian environment such as extreme supply and demand uncertainty, the presence of myriad humanitarian actors (HAs), the breakdown of the rule of law and media attention ( Thomas and Kopczak, 2005 ; Van Wassenhove, 2006 ; Kovács and Tatham, 2009 ; Sandwell, 2011 ).

Although previous research has identified many challenges involved in HL, further investigation of and suggestions for understanding challenges and how to mitigate their impact on logistics activities in disaster relief operations can improve humanitarian response and eventually lead to a significant reduction in the level of human suffering. As any disaster relief operation is highly context-specific and dynamic, challenges vary with the type, intensity, location and timing of a given disaster ( Kovács and Moshtari, 2019 ). Over the last decade, humanitarian operations have been affected by new influences like information and communication technology innovations, regulatory changes and the entry of new actors. This study seeks to contribute to this literature by providing additional insights into the both logistical and non-logistical challenges of disaster relief operations through a case study of a recent humanitarian response in a developing county. The findings will help humanitarian practitioners and policymakers better understand the challenges involved in disaster relief operations conducted by multiple actors and thus help them improve their practices, including the creation of proper regulations, policies and logistics strategies. Moreover, the results of the present study can motivate future empirical and modelling studies to investigate the challenges identified and identify practices to mitigate them.

This paper explores a practical approach to identifying the challenges of HL, particularly in cases where established HAs such as government agencies must coordinate with national non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations and new emerging actors like ad hoc groups, celebrities and teams sponsored by religious organizations during disaster relief operations. This paper thus attempts to answer the following research questions: (1) What were the key challenges in disaster relief operations in the 2017 Kermanshah earthquake? and (2) What were the critical challenges in the 2017 Kermanshah earthquake that influenced disaster relief operations but have not been extensively explored in previous studies?

The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 , we provide an overview of the previous HL literature on all aspects of challenges. In section 3 , we describe the case study as a method for this research, while section 4 contains our findings regarding the challenges identified. In section 5 , we provide a discussion of those findings, connecting them back to the HL literature. In section 6 , we present several implications for research and practice, along with study limitations, as a conclusion.

2. Literature review

Bölsche et al. (2013) observe that if the right relief items of the right quality and in the right quantities are distributed and received by the right affected population at the right time and in the right place, HL can contribute to alleviating the suffering of vulnerable people. In the complex environment of a humanitarian setting, logisticians must first aim to meet beneficiaries' requirements. This task is like the supply-demand matching carried out in a business setting. The response will then focus on procuring the required relief items, whether from inside or outside the affected area. Finally, relief items need to be mobilized, stored, transported and distributed over the last mile to affected populations ( Tatham et al. , 2017 ). We have conducted a narrative review of the previous literature and identified a wide range of challenges to logistical activities at the operational level; see Table 1 for a summary.

Discussing needs assessment, Balcik and Beamon (2008) refer to the extreme unpredictability of demand in terms of disaster location, timing, type and size, which can create a bottleneck for logisticians trying to determine accurate numbers and needs in the affected population. L'Hermitte et al. (2015) discuss the cross-border logistical challenges and cross-border refugee movements that complicate needs assessment at the operational level. For instance, to estimate the needs of an affected population in Somalia, HAs had to operate remotely out of Kenya and other parts of Somalia. Furthermore, due to disruptions in communication infrastructure after a disaster, affected populations might not be able to articulate their needs related to culture and language ( Kovács and Spens, 2011 ). Thus, the process of needs assessment or demand capture is vastly more challenging in the HL community than in the everyday business environment ( Tatham et al. , 2017 ).

As to procuring necessary supplies, it is difficult to obtain access to local markets and suppliers in areas with limited or no security, confronting HAs with the late delivery of supplies and time pressure arising from the urgent need for those supplies ( Balcik and Beamon, 2008 ). Scarcity of resources like data and information, supplies, people, technology and transportation, along with inadequate infrastructure, warehouses and funding are but some of the many examples of operational constraints that add to the logistical challenges of the procurement, warehousing and last mile distribution of aid (e.g., Balcik and Beamon, 2008 ; Baporikar and Shangheta, 2018 ; Fritz Institute, 2004 ; Kovács and Spens, 2009 ; Makepeace et al. , 2017 ; Sandwell, 2011 ). In Somalia, HAs lacked basic information relating to crucial items like transport rates, routes and mechanisms to move cargo from the port to their destinations. Because of Kenya's limited port capacity, there was congestion at Mombasa's port and late delivery of aid. Similarly, the movement of affected populations from one place to another can lead to changes in needs and logistics requirements such as supply chain remapping and a plan to increase storage requirements, adding another constraint for HAs that are already faced with limited resources in a highly competitive and vulnerable environment ( L'Hermitte et al. , 2015 ). Kovács and Spens (2009) , studying disasters in Ghana, reveal the HL challenges from HAs' perspective as a lack of resources like funding, transportation infrastructure, early warning systems and warehouses. From a governmental perspective, limited supplies, vehicles and information technology are the primary challenges. Tatham and Houghton (2011) discuss Myanmar in the aftermath of the 2008 Nargis cyclone and report that international HAs had difficulty obtaining access to warehouses. Along the same lines, Kunz and Reiner (2016) refer to transportation regulation and government restrictions as the key HL challenges imposed on international HAs. These challenges can arise due to import barriers and tariffs, travel restrictions, border closures and excessive bureaucracy.

Normally, each of the many HAs responding to a disaster has its own organizational approach, with a distinct mission concept and relief operation structure. Thus, coordinating logistics activities at both the organizational and inter-organizational levels has been repeatedly reported as a factor that can impede the procurement of goods, warehousing and the last mile distribution of aid (e.g., Baporikar and Shangheta, 2018 ; Balcik et al. , 2010 ; Fritz Institute, 2004 ; Kovács and Spens, 2009 ; Makepeace et al. , 2017 ; Tatham et al. , 2017 ). At the organizational level, poor communication and teamwork have been identified as factors that impede the work of program and logistics staff ( Makepeace et al. , 2017 ). The lack of HL standards and guidelines and inadequate training for logisticians have been cited as a factor decreasing the performance of inter-organizational collaboration efforts ( Moshtari and Gonçalves, 2017 ).

The complexity of operations is another HL challenge, particularly with last mile distribution of relief supplies. HAs operate in an extremely complex humanitarian environment, with continuous supply chain disruption in the form of access limitations, capacity constraints and security concerns at the last mile. The nature of distribution is extremely dynamic, with frequent changes in routes and unpredictable road infrastructure. Yet, the last mile process poses the most significant challenges due to the travel ban, border closures, breakdowns and blockages ( Maghfiroh and Hanaoka, 2017 ). In addition, relief supplies can be delivered from different locations, involving myriad local and international HAs. The distribution of scarce supplies with uncertain needs adds to the complexity of delivery processes. Finally, demand fulfilment depends heavily on the nature of a given disaster: type, impact, demographics, and social and economic conditions of the affected areas ( Balcik et al. , 2008 ).

Apart from logistical challenges, non-logistical challenges that are largely external to the focal organizations have been identified in the literature as directly or indirectly hampering the logistics of aid operations, including regulation and the role of social media and new emerging actors (see Table 2 ). First, the HL literature refers to problematic rules and regulations in the affected countries that influence humanitarian aid delivery ( Kunz and Gold, 2017 ; Kunz and Reiner, 2016 ). Kovács and Spens (2009) identify a regulatory environment that could be challenging for HAs due to a lack of reliable governance and the absence of legislation during disaster relief operations. Part of Kovács and Tatham's (2009) study addresses the potential breakdown of the rule of law and national and international scrutiny through multiple forms of public and social media in disasters, all of which hinder the efficient and effective delivery of aid to affected populations. Given the powerful impact of national regulations on international and local HAs' entry to and level of engagement in humanitarian relief activities, this topic has not sufficiently explored.

Second, there is a growing literature on the benefits of social media in terms of its connectivity for rapid information sharing (e.g., Palen et al. , 2009 ) and expressing emotional support for affected communities (e.g., Hughes et al. , 2008 ). Indeed, HAs are becoming more reliant on social media platforms as a means of collecting, sharing and disseminating information before, during and after a disaster. Despite the benefits of social media ( Houston et al. , 2015 ; Wamba et al. , 2017 ), several practitioners and scholars have expressed concerns about the potential challenges of incorporating social media into organizations, particularly HAs. For example, a large volume of content shared via social media might disrupt the supply chain and distract staff from work-related communications, leading to lower productivity ( Barnawal, 2014 ; Leonardi et al. , 2013 ). Likewise, the leakages of an organization's data and its dissemination to external actors via social media platforms could disclose confidential information and thus put the organization's intellectual property rights at risk. Furthermore, the provision of the right type and amount of assistance to beneficiaries affected by the 2010 Haiti earthquake was hampered by how information published on social platforms was used ( Kirac and Milburn, 2018 ). Oh et al. (2013) determined the community-based information processing via Twitter using data from the three disaster situations of the Mumbai terrorist attacks in 2008, the Toyota recall in 2010, and the Seattle café shooting incident in 2012. The result showed that shared data and information with no clear and reliable sources was the most important rumor causing factor on Twitter in disaster relief operations. However, the use of social media in disaster situations is still in its early stages, and there is debate among HAs about whether to accept it as a standard sharing tool during disaster relief operations (e.g., Pender et al. , 2014 ). Further research on the operational benefits and risks of social media will thus also be useful.

The third challenge influencing humanitarian aid delivery is the engagement of a high number of diverse actors, including emerging actors (e.g., Van Wassenhove and Besiou, 2013 ). The number of actors responding to highly mediatized disasters has increased substantially, as was demonstrated as long ago as the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami relief operations ( Besiou and Van Wassenhove, 2019 ). For instance, there were over a thousand new actors, each with different cultures and structures, operating in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake ( Van Wassenhove and Besiou, 2013 ). While Alexander (2015) has examined the role of celebrities and the impact of celebrity culture on the way people react to disasters, there remains a lack of research to more thoroughly investigate the role of new HAs and how they coordinate with more established HAs in disaster relief operations.

Overall, even though HL challenges have been studied extensively, further research is required to investigate non-logistics challenges at the national level, in particular as to rules and regulations, social media use and the emergence of new actors. Further research is required to understand the HL challenges in different contexts and then to implement tailored mitigation solutions ( Kovács and Moshtari, 2019 ). This paper explores a practical approach to identifying the challenges of HL, particularly in cases where government agencies must coordinate with NGOs and new emerging actors like ad hoc groups and celebrities. This case study identified and discussed HL challenges related to the 2017 Kermanshah earthquake, where the humanitarian response was dominated by national actors, with international actors playing only a minor role, and the disaster affected a relatively small geographical region. In addition, the recency of the earthquake provides an opportunity to explore the operational implications of communication and information technology innovations like social media solutions in response operations, which have not yet been fully explored ( Yan and Pedraza Martinez, 2019 ).

3. Research methodology

The case study approach, which enables the collection of rich data, the in-depth exploration of a complex phenomenon ( Stuart et al. , 2002 ), and the identification of factors explaining that phenomenon ( Voss et al. , 2002 ) is appropriate for answering the present study's research questions. Given their high level of complexity, HL challenges must be investigated in their natural setting, and a case study allows for such an in-context analysis ( Yin, 2009 ). The 2017 Kermanshah earthquake was selected as the case due to the numerous challenges during the disaster relief operations that were reported and mediatized by the organizations involved. The humanitarian response to the Kermanshah earthquake was largely carried out by national actors, with international actors playing only a minor role. Moreover, even though Iran is a disaster-prone area, few studies in humanitarian operations have collected and analyzed empirical data from Iran, meaning that its overall context is not as well understood as it should be, especially given its susceptibility to earthquakes in particular.

The main data sources are semi-structured interviews conducted with HAs involved in Kermanshah earthquake relief operations. In response to the disaster, some of the many groups of actors (government, private sector, local NGOs, international NGOs and social media activists) were directly engaged in HL; others were indirectly engaged through social media activism and community groups that were active in resource mobilization and last mile distribution (see Table 3 ). To obtain a comprehensive view of the response performance, we interviewed multiple informants in each group of actors by means of purposive sampling, covering actors governed by different mandates in various sectors, government officials, practitioners in the private sector and employees of local and international NGOs (see Appendix 1 ). The criteria for inclusion in the study were that respondents were knowledgeable and had been involved in the response to the Kermanshah earthquake. To contribute to the richness and variety of the data ( Heckathorn, 1997 ), respondents with moderate to extensive experience (i.e., 15 years of experience in disasters on average) and in different positions (e.g., logistics officer, deputy head of relief, disaster relief manger and project manager) were selected from different sectors (i.e., provision of food, water, shelter, education and health services) using a snowballing technique.

A total of 43 face-to-face or telephone interviews were conducted. Background information that could identify individual interviewees is not included, as anonymity was a condition of participant involvement. However, information regarding organization type and mission, interviewee position, years of working experience and date of interview for each interviewee appears in Appendix 1 .

The semi-structured interviews lasted an average of 60 minutes and included open-ended questions and probes to encourage detailed responses. Based on the initial literature review, an interview protocol was developed to provide a structure for the data collection process (see Appendix 2 ). The interview protocol was designed to capture HL activities, related logistical and non-logistical challenges, and the performance of the humanitarian response during the Kermanshah earthquake relief operations.

In analyzing the data, we applied an open coding procedure ( Miles and Huberman, 1984 ) to identify and categorize HL challenges. We used a data reduction approach, coding data items that ranged in length from a few words to several paragraphs ( Miles and Huberman, 1994 ). We were careful to code only those challenges related to HL that influenced HAs' performance due to specific actions and interactions rather than the personal views of the respondents. To connect our data to the existing literature ( Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007 ), the data were coded following a recursive (iterative) process in which data collection, data analysis and coding, and interpretation all occur throughout the study and thus influence one another ( Willis, 2007 ).

The data coding was manually analyzed using a color-coded system through cross tabulations and tables in Microsoft Word. The transcripts were read through several times, with notes taken in tabular form. A set of codes and categories regarding the challenges was then defined and assigned to the text to identify when patterns appeared. The codes were linked to conceptual themes and used as a working template for the other transcripts. Then, the extracted themes were linked to the HL challenges identified in the literature, such as those associated with needs assessments, procurement, warehousing, transportation and last mile distribution. Two researchers analyzed the data. In order to reduce the possibility of bias, in a first step, each researcher separately summarized the challenges in the transcripts and recorded them in the tables. Challenges were highlighted in different colors to follow patterns throughout the transcripts. Then, a set of codes and sub-categories were defined, with similar logistical and non-logistical challenges grouped together. Each researcher applied the coding frame in consistent ways to insure intercoder reliability ( O'Connor and Joffe, 2020 ). In the next step, the two authors compared their results and discussed the differences, overlaps and divergences within their analysis to reach a consensus ( Thomas and Hardens, 2008 ). The codes were then linked to the conceptual or categorical themes identified in the literature review.

The researchers organized a seminar in July 2019, after data collection was complete and preliminary data analysis had been carried out, to present the project's findings. The forum was hosted by the Department of Industrial Engineering at Tarbiat Modarres University in Tehran; it lasted about three and a half hours. There were 25 participants; 12 had been interviewed beforehand, and the rest were academics. The results were presented, after which participants shared their views on the results with the researchers. This event also allowed facilitated discussions among participants. The insights obtained during the seminar enabled the authors to further clarify their findings, ensure the trustworthiness of the qualitative data, and identify any misunderstandings or omissions ( Voss et al. , 2002 ).

3.2 Case description

On Sunday, November 12, 2017, a magnitude 7.3 earthquake occurred along the Iran–Iraq border, with its epicenter near Ezgeleh, Salas-e Babajani County, Kermanshah Province (Iranian Red Crescent Societies [IRCS], 2017). It was the world's deadliest earthquake of 2017; there were at least 630 fatalities and more than 9,000 injuries. A total of 427,266 people were affected in 8 districts of Kermanshah province. The earthquake seriously damaged 30,000 residential units in rural areas, while some cities were partially or completely destroyed ( IRCS, 2017 ). In Sare-Pole-Zahab, some residents blamed the widespread destruction on poor-quality construction. It was noted that older buildings remained standing, while many newer blocks collapsed, including hospital and health clinic structures ( IRCS, 2018 ).

The Iranian government announced that the disaster had caused at least €5 billion in damage. During the response phase, basic needs were tents, blankets, clean water supplies and public sanitation facilities ( International Institute of Earthquake Engineering and Seismology, 2017 ). As people from other provinces entered disaster-stricken areas during the recovery phase, the total population actually increased, which led to a quick shift in urgency from the necessities listed above to sewage overflows and other environmental issues. When the earthquake occurred, local HAs were of course under immense pressure to respond. There was no established mechanism through which the various not-for-profit, private, military and governmental agencies could coordinate their efforts or collectively identify the needs of the affected population ( Ahmadi and Bazargan-Hejazi, 2018 ). Many community groups and new actors knew very little about how to respond to a disaster or how to collaborate to meet beneficiaries' requirements. This resulted in some areas like Sare-Pole-Zahab receiving a great deal of attention, while other affected populations living in remote areas struggled to survive with little support.

A sheltering emergency phase was rapidly completed in affected cities and villages. Emergency water, sanitation and hygiene supplies in affected areas were provided through coordination between the government, the IRCS, municipalities, the private sector and international NGOs. In addition, several other actors attempted to deliver aid directly to the affected populations. These actors preferred to use their own vehicles, travelling not only from neighboring provinces such as Hamadan but also from more distant areas like Tehran, Mashhad, Tabriz and Isfahan. Apart from domestic actors, a few international actors like the Government of Turkey, the European Union and The International Committee of the Red Cross offered and delivered aid ( IRCS, 2017 ).

4. Findings

4.1 logistical challenges experienced during the 2017 kermanshah earthquake relief operations.

Table 4 presents the HL challenges related to needs assessments, procurement, warehousing, transportation and last mile distribution of relief supplies implemented by HAs and their associated impact on supply performance during the 2017 Kermanshah earthquake relief operations. The table also provides representative quotes from the respondents.

The subsections below reveals the findings in detail for each HL challenge.

4.1.1 Needs assessment challenges

Our interview respondents cited several factors that impeded needs assessment procedures during the Kermanshah response. We have categorized them into three groups: inaccurate needs assessment, the lack of shared data on needs and the dynamic nature of the needs themselves. As to inaccurate needs assessment, respondent 10 reported that the humanitarian staff was too tired to complete a rapid needs assessment after being stuck in heavy traffic for an extended time. In addition, respondents 10 and 12 noted that the presence of many actors, some with no experience or expertise, led to the field delivery of large amounts of redundant items and materials because these actors had not carried out a proper needs assessment. As a result, there were reported instances of expired materials like mineral water and food being delivered and of some relief items not being distributed to the population for which they were intended (respondent 33). These actors also failed to capture the overall demand as determined by the cultural, lifestyle, demographic and geographic profiles of the affected populations. For example, there are three main ethnic groups in Kermanshah, and some actors failed to understand the actual needs of each group (respondent 41).

Second, respondents noted a lack of data and information sharing on needs assessment. Some respondents reported difficulty in accessing information on needs from other actors and thus relied on their own needs assessments. Due to disruptions in the communication infrastructure, they could not even share their own information on needs with other actors, although they were able to share the information among their own members. As access to remote areas was difficult, even local and state authorities could not assess the needs of those affected by the disaster in these areas (respondent 19). Some argued a joint needs assessment could help mitigate the challenges caused by the lack of shared data. For instance, respondents 15 and 16 agreed on the importance of executing a joint needs assessment with other HAs in the relief network. This assessment could be done in coordination with NGOs, international NGOs, local community groups, military units and ad hoc groups. However, respondents 24 and 29 cautioned that a lack of trust among these actors could hinder the effectiveness of a joint needs assessment and subsequent information sharing.

We did a joint needs assessment at the field level in coordination with our own team and local communities. We were in fact a source of reliable information for other NGOs and volunteers who aimed to deliver aid at the last mile. We have been working in Kermanshah for 12 years; therefore, we have local experience with and knowledge about the region.

Finally, as to the dynamic nature of needs, some respondents mentioned the challenge created by the evolving nature of what was required and referred to the merits of an iterative needs assessment process running from initial response to the recovery phase. Respondent 33 said that “needs assessment is dynamic, meaning that it changes over time. For example, we received the information on local needs in the morning with statistics; later, at noon and in the evening or the next day we would receive a different needs assessment report.” Other HA representatives noted difficulties in receiving updated and accurate information on needs.

4.1.2 Procurement, transportation and warehousing challenges

HAs normally pre-position relief items in established warehouses. However, constraining factors such as funding may prohibit the completion of such efforts before a disaster occurs: “Prior to the disaster, local HA warehouses were empty of pre-positioned items in Kermanshah” (respondent 28). Coordination among HAs and ad hoc groups was a major obstacle in post-disaster procurement actions. For instance, respondent 17 noted that the lack of coordination between government water and power organizations, municipalities and the private sector delayed the installation of sanitation facilities for affected populations. In other cases, the direct involvement of civilians and ad hoc groups in the distribution of relief items disrupted the supply chain for unsolicited bilateral donations (UBDs), as these actors were not able to unpack and sort the items to meet the affected populations' needs.

Transportation was another significant HL challenge that HAs faced during the earthquake relief operations. Some roads and bridges had collapsed, and there was tremendous congestion on roads connecting to major centers like Sare-Pole-Zahab. The traffic jams were exacerbated by the presence of multiple actors coming from other cities in their own vehicles, according to respondent 29. One solution to the traffic issues was air transportation, which was costly but enabled quicker delivery of relief items and the transport of injured people to the capital city's hospitals in cases where local hospitals had collapsed.

Another problem was theft. A significant number of items were stored in local warehouses, and some were stolen due to poor security. Shared warehouses had been implemented in coordination with religious teams and ad hoc groups that did not have security teams. Unsecure places such as mosques, schools, residential yards and mobile containers were used as warehouses in disaster-stricken areas (respondents 23 and 28).

4.1.3 Challenges with last mile distribution

Organizations and ad hoc groups gave priority to their own relatives and family members. Then they went for other villages and communities. This led to the presence of those people who had not received aid and came and jumped into the trucks.

In addition, HAs could not control crowds in some instances, and some people jumped on trucks to take tents and blankets, which deprived the elderly population of receiving that aid, according to respondent 27. Furthermore, as the government agencies and NGOs operated in an independent, uncoordinated fashion, many procured items were wasted or oversupplied, while other needs remained unmet in some remote areas. For example, respondents 23 and 39 reported that some areas did not receive stoves for heating because the bulky food items they received filled the limited storage space. While the IRCS was authorized to provide last mile delivery, several unauthorized NGOs and ad hoc groups provided last mile support without coordinating with the IRCS relief team (respondent 5). These groups also distributed items that varied in terms of brand and quality in the same region, creating a problem for the HAs because it raised the beneficiaries' expectations of and requests for high-quality products, as noted by respondent 27.

We did final distribution points inside the military camps and had mixed genders for the final distribution, as within Muslim communities' women prefer to be served by the same gender. We, therefore, received a shared and secure warehouse that saved us the warehousing cost.

4.2 Non-logistical challenges identified during the 2017 Kermanshah earthquake relief operations

The analysis of our data revealed three non-logistics challenges influencing humanitarian response: social media use, regulations and the emergence of new actors (see Table 5 ). These factors have rarely been analyzed by prior studies, but their potential impact on humanitarian operations – and the likelihood that at least social media use and new actors will grow in significance – demands more academic attention.

4.2.1 Growing use of social media

During the Kermanshah earthquake, social media platforms like Telegram and Instagram were beneficial, despite certain inherent drawbacks. The use of social media platforms helped HAs mobilize local, national and international support for the affected populations, facilitating immediate assistance for thousands. Social media also enabled victims, friends and families to share valuable and timely information. This proved to be of immense help in rescue and relief efforts for those affected, as one respondent noted: “We could connect to local communities and identify their needs quickly” (respondent 16). In addition, social media helped some individuals and community groups post links to receive donations that funded assistance for earthquake victims. Social media use was particularly important given that, as respondent 24 indicated, it prompted numerous volunteers, local and non-local civilians, and community groups to participate in delivering aid.

It was rumored around social media that one affected family did not receive shelter in a village. This led to negative feedback and reputation for the responsible HOs providing shelters and the escalation of tent supplies in excess of needs (respondent 19).

4.2.2 Regulations on the roles and involvement of HAs

Our study reveals an absence of regulations to define the roles and involvement of ad hoc groups in disaster relief operations and to ensure coordination with established HAs' supply chains. While such groups have extensive capacity in terms of logistics in areas like transportation, volunteer manpower and funding, the respondents agreed that strict regulation of their involvement is needed. After the Kermanshah earthquake, some actors – government agencies, military teams, smaller NGOs, among – misused the information on needs obtained by other actors like the IRCS. In some cases, HAs shared information with other actors over public or social media, and competitors like NGOs used that information for their own benefit. In one instance, a temporary warehouse used by larger HAs was soon emptied of vital supplies because a large number of new actors descended on the warehouse due to an information disclosure. In another example, respondent 23 stated that if NGOs were to provide transport schedules and reporting containing needs and support, government agencies may cease funding because of suspected fraud and questions about how and from what source the budget and items were procured and for whom they were intended. Furthermore, some local community groups, ad hoc groups and celebrities took advantage of larger NGOs' brands and logos for their own purposes, receiving more volunteers and funding.

Many fundraising campaigns were established immediately after the disaster. Some were unauthorized, as they did not register through Iran's Ministry of Interior and were not under government control. Although these entities could deliver aid to the affected populations, respondents 26 and 32 noted that established HAs such as the IRCS and other NGOs did not trust them to cooperate and jointly mobilize their resources.

A small number of HAs, including international NGOs, were forced to restrict sharing information on their activities, requirements and relief operations to internal channels due to government regulations that prohibited them from publicly sharing such information. In fact, international humanitarian actors (IHAs) were not authorized to participate in disaster relief operations in Iran beyond coordinating with government authorities on matters related to refugee settlement and food security. Respondents 10 and 35 indicated that IHAs are mainly responsible for providing support to refugees living in their home country. These kinds of restrictive policies can suppress the capabilities of IHAs and their logistical capacity to engage with other HAs during disaster relief operations.

Overall, respondents reported a failure on the part of government agencies to exercise control and auditing to establish basic rules and principles for information sharing, logistical procedures and the roles and responsibilities of each actor within the HA network. Other potentially useful policies and protocols exist but were not approved before the Kermanshah earthquake; for example, according to respondent 21, procedures for establishing an integrated logistical databank system and promoting information technology development had been written but were still under review by government bodies before they could be implemented by certain HAs like the IRCS.

4.2.3 Interference of new actors

Some celebrities like Mahnaz Afshar [an Iranian cinema and television actress active since 1998] used Twitter to announce needs, and then we observed large numbers of sanitary items such as diapers and sanitary pads distributed to the disaster-stricken areas, more than was needed and in large volumes exceeding demand.

In some cases, the celebrities did not send the items and money collected to the field or were unable to do so because the government barred their involvement and froze their bank accounts. Often, the pooled donations and mobilized resources went to waste, either in the capital of Tehran or in Kermanshah itself.

There was a lack of coordination between celebrities and the IRCS. For example, Ali Daei, one of the greatest Iranian football players in the world, arranged to import two shipping containers of powdered baby milk from Germany. While it had faced problems due to tariff and custom clearance issues – apart from the sanctions imposed by the US – the IRCS helped them to release the containers and deliver them to Kermanshah; however, that amount of baby milk powder was not required, and the expiration date was about to occur.

Many new actors – ordinary individuals, celebrities and representatives from other communities – visited the site immediately after the quake to deliver aid. This influx of individuals into the province was clearly motivated by a desire to help, but it also led to an increase in temporary dwellers in major villages and cities already burdened by the disaster. The HAs whose operations were observed for this study all confirmed that the massive ingress and engagement of ordinary individuals in the field created operational difficulties due to congestion along the roads connecting the most severely devastated areas and thus had a negative impact on HA performance.

5. Discussion

The results of the qualitative data analysis in this paper lead to several conclusions. First, the HL challenges accord with and, in some cases, expand on previous findings in the HL literature ( Kovács and Spens, 2009 ; Kovács and Tatham, 2009 ; Leiras et al. , 2014 ; Sandwell, 2011 ). Needs assessments, for instance, were identified in this study as an especially critical issue, confirming previous findings (e.g., Balcik and Beamon, 2008 ; L'Hermitte et al. , 2015 ; Tatham et al. , 2017 ). The process of demand capture within the HL community was noted to be considerably more difficult than demand capture in the business context ( Tatham et al. , 2017 ). Indeed, inaccurate and ineffective needs assessments conducted by HAs, particularly by emerging actors, can negatively impact performance by delaying relief item procurement, fostering the distribution of unnecessary items, creating redundancies in resources and increased oversupply costs, occupying warehouse space with items already procured, and causing inequitable aid distribution to affected populations.

The lack of coordination between the network of actors, particularly between established HAs and new actors, coupled with mistrust among HAs and the impact of devastated infrastructure, creates challenges for relief item procurement, warehousing and transportation within disaster-stricken areas. This finding confirms reports in previous studies such as Baporikar and Shangheta (2018) , Balcik et al. (2010) , Fritz Institute (2004) , Kovács and Spens (2009) , Makepeace et al. (2017) , Tatham et al. (2017) , and Kunz and Reiner (2016) . These obstacles delay procurement, increase costs due to oversupplying, cause shortages of some necessary items, raise warehousing costs, and extend lead times. Based on the statements of the respondents, the failure of established HAs to pre-position commodities prior to the Kermanshah earthquake led to stockout costs, increased lead times, unmet demand capture and higher costs of procuring commodities because the HAs were forced to make purchases on the black market. Security problems were another challenging issue that occurred during the 2017 earthquake disaster relief operation; it led to increased costs from the need to replace stolen items. The findings here confirm the importance of ensuring safety and security during a crisis, as established in studies such as L'Hermitte et al. (2015) .

Finally, the lack of an integrated HL logistics databank and standards at the local and national levels made it difficult for HAs to track the delivery of aid, which increased their supply and distribution costs because they were not aware of what actors were present, what capacity these actors had, or which types of aid they were providing. While attempts have been made in the past to resolve the databank issue, many HAs still struggle to achieve the optimal end-to-end visibility for their supply networks in a real-time and open-source format (e.g., Tatham et al. , 2017 ; Makepeace et al. , 2017 ). These findings also complement frequently reported concerns about a lack of standards, training and guidelines in HL ( Fritz Institute, 2004 ; Kovács and Spens, 2009 ; Sandwell, 2011 ).

Besides the HL challenges listed above, our exploratory study revealed another set of issues, i.e., non-logistical challenges, influencing humanitarian response efforts: the growing use of social media, an absence of regulations on the legitimacy and involvement of HAs, and the interference of new actors. There is scant literature providing insight into these factors or elaborating on their operational implications (e.g., Kunz and Reiner, 2016 ; Kovács and Spens, 2009 ; Kirac and Milburn, 2018 ; Besiou and Van Wassenhove, 2019 ; Lewin et al. , 2018 ), and future studies may help understand them and find solutions to lessen their impact on humanitarian response operations.

In addition, our findings reveal that the heavy use of social media by HAs, particularly new actors, resulted in large volumes of unstructured data and content being produced and disseminated through social networks. That content spread virally, encouraging newcomers to become involved. This brought many of these individuals and groups into the field, causing traffic jams and other supply chain bottlenecks. In terms of logistics, social media disrupts supply chains through inaccurate needs assessments that result from the large volume of unstructured data and content, redundancies in unnecessary items due to the presence of many emerging actors, shortages of storage space and greater procurement expenses due to higher prices.

Poor or nonexistent implementation of governmental regulations and policies created challenges in the response to the Kermanshah earthquake. Similar findings have previously been reported in studies of other disasters (e.g., Baporikar and Shangheta, 2018 ; Kovács and Spens, 2009 ). The results of the present study reveal that the organizations most culpable for not enforcing regulations during the Kermanshah relief operations were government agencies. Problems such as a lack of international NGO operational visibility due to government restrictions, the absence of a policy regarding the engagement of new actors, and the lack of external auditing and control over logistics activities were all problems in this category. Furthermore, the extremely lengthy bureaucratic procedures involving international NGOs and government agencies such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, NDMO in the Ministry of Interior, and the Bureau for Aliens and Foreign Immigrant Affairs hindered effective coordination and cooperation between these parties and led to reduced amounts of funding and in-kind aid from international donors and agencies.

Finally, the emergence of new actors in the Kermanshah earthquake was overwhelming and challenging, as these actors had poor logistics capabilities, occupied vital storage space, consumed scarce resources, and contributed to the inequitable distribution of relief items. Many respondents reported inefficient UBD use and oversupply costs. Research on the emergence of new actors in disaster relief operations and the management of their engagement remains scant in the HL literature ( Lewin et al. , 2018 ; Van Wassenhove and Besiou, 2013 ).

6. Academic contribution and managerial implications

The purpose of this paper was to extend the understanding of HL challenges with respect to the findings in previous studies by answering the following research questions: (1) What were the key challenges in disaster relief operations in the 2017 Kermanshah earthquake? and (2) What were the critical challenges in the 2017 Kermanshah earthquake that influenced disaster relief operations but have not been extensively explored in previous studies?

The findings suggest that humanitarian logisticians deal with multiple challenges during disaster relief operations. One group of challenges is related to HL (i.e., needs assessment, procurement, warehousing, transportation and distribution) and has been discussed extensively in the literature. Other influences on the performance of HL activities are the growing use of social media, regulations associated with aid delivery, and the engagement of new humanitarian actors such as social media activists and celebrities. These factors have not been extensively examined in the literature and – given their critical influence on HAs' performance – require much more scholarly attention. These issues all contributed to disruptions of the established HAs' supply chains and thus negatively affected the supply performance of actors during disaster relief operations in Kermanshah. These effects included transportation delays, long lead times for last mile distribution, duplication of efforts and redundancies, and the inequitable distribution of relief items to affected populations. In overall, this research contributes to the body of HL literature in terms of categorization of both operational and nonoperational challenges. In terms of logistics, challenges connected to needs assessment were identified (including the sub-categories of inaccurate needs assessment, lack of shared data on needs and the dynamic nature of needs), procurement, warehousing and transportation (including sub-categories of the lack of prepositioning relief items, lack of coordination, UBDs, transportation constraints and lack of security in the field and risk of looting). While prior studies have revealed most of these challenges, the overall research result is fragmented. Therefore, this categorization and sub-categorization denoting the logistics challenges could provide further detailed explanations. Moreover, other challenges including the growing use of social media, regulations on the legitimacy and the use of social media for HAs, and interference of new emerging actors, during disaster relief operations have been explored and identified in this research.

Practitioners suggested strategies to mitigate the risk of poor implementation of regulations. For example, the disaster management authorities at the governmental level felt that there should be a working group that engages key actors like national and international NGOs, community leaders and committed celebrities to establish the rules of engagement for multiple actors in disaster response contexts. In particular, more formal coordination meetings need to occur between government agencies, international NGOs and UN agencies to determine rules and encourage the involvement of international actors to shorten the timeframes of administrative procedures.

The strategies recommended by practitioners to mitigate the risk of social media challenges are varied in terms of identifying the roles and responsibilities of social media players and activists from the preparedness phase prior to disasters throughout the entire disaster management cycle. Additionally, HAs need to increase their basic knowledge of how to incorporate social media into their logistics activities and standard operating procedures around sharing information about needs, procurement, transportation schedules and both intra- and inter-organizational coordination. The development of standard practices on the use of social media could provide additional support to HAs in disaster relief operations; more regular training on how to use social media platforms may be required for disaster management organizations. Finally, government agencies like Iran's NDMO should establish themselves as leaders in coordinating and connecting new and established HAs. Indeed, this study's results suggest that an effective coordination unit should be established to deal with new actors and thus increase the speed of operations.

7. Limitations and further research

This study has several limitations. First, insights from a single case study may not be generalized through abstraction and the attendant loss of context, but they may be applicable to other situations through reflection on similarities and differences between contextual factors ( Greenwood and Levin, 2007 ). While examining a single case study limits the transferability of findings, it offers convincing insights, particularly when the situation (i.e., a disaster response) is deliberately selected to provide certain contributions that alternative cases may not reveal ( Siggelkow, 2007 ). This case study identified and discussed HL challenges related to the 2017 Kermanshah earthquake, and the lessons learned from that experience might apply to other contexts, regions and disaster types. The results could be particularly cogent in contexts where the humanitarian response is effectively dominated by national actors, with international actors playing only a minor role in operations, and in situations where the disaster affects a relatively small geographical region, meaning that a large number of HAs will compete for media visibility and local resources. Future studies should collect their own empirical data to test the generalizability of the challenges discussed here and assess their impact in other contexts.

Second, the data collection in this explorative study was based on a set of semi-structured questions, not a set of measures or statements with which informants could specify a level of agreement; therefore, we were not able to provide the number of respondents who agreed with a particular statement. Future studies may assess these findings though large-scale surveys and compare the perceptions of people associated with HAs.

Third, this paper uses an explorative case study method intended to identify and elaborate on the challenges that HAs faced in a recent natural disaster in a developing country. It did not seek to further develop theory, but future studies may explore and provide theoretical explanations of the role and impact of challenges such as the growing use of social media, the emergence of new actors, and regulating the performance of HAs.

In addition to the findings gleaned from this analysis, some points of interest extracted from the case study merit further research. The first is the inaccurate needs assessment procedures that lead to the distribution of unnecessary items, resource redundancies, and higher costs for HAs' UBDs and warehousing. While the Geneva-based Inter-Agency Standing Committee has developed a complete set of standards for needs assessment procedures for HAs, policy specialists and decision-makers should take note that difficulties in conducting an effective needs assessment translate to a lack of in-country preparedness. Conducting coordinated needs assessments might be one solution to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of logistics services, but the issue of trust among HAs needs to be considered ( Tatham and Kovács, 2010 ), and there must be a clear understanding of the dynamic nature of needs assessments. Considering the importance of joint needs assessments, further research is needed on the topic in the context of HL, along with additional research on policy support for HAs regarding when and how data on needs should be shared during disaster relief operations.

The second point of interest is the lack of logistics coordination, relief item pre-positioning, and supply chain security that hinders effective and efficient delivery of aid to affected populations. Just as these challenges can be exacerbated by the lack of a national integrated logistics databank, these deficiencies result in performance pitfalls such as oversupply, unfair distribution, stockouts, the need to repurchase goods and poor transparency regarding supply chain tracking and tracing. This point reinforces the need for more and better educational programs for local and national humanitarian logisticians on an effective relief-item and services pre-positioning structure and for improved security for staff and goods during relief operations. Indeed, security is a key element of any successful response. Thus, further studies should help develop a framework for security elements across supply chains that connect multiple actors, including the military, government agencies and NGOs.

The third point of interest is the lack of clear regulation or legislation supporting international NGOs and their engagement with local and national HAs. Considering the lengthy bureaucratic procedures between international NGOs and national authorities in Iran, further research is needed on government policy support for national disaster preparedness through coordination mechanisms that involve IHAs.

In addition, and as noted above, the emergence of new actors shows no sign of slowing. Some of these actors have thousands or even millions of followers of their social media presence. While they can support aid delivery through resource mobilization and fundraising, they can also disrupt other HA supply chains by failing to coordinate with the other actors in a network. Therefore, further study is recommended on the involvement of new HAs and policy support to better prepare this emerging group. Further studies are also needed to explore effective and efficient ways for established HAs such as the IRCS to interact and coordinate with new HAs.

Logistics challenges discussed in the literature

Non-logistical challenges identified

Number of interviews per humanitarian actor group

Codes related to logistics challenges

Non-logistical challenges identified during disaster relief operations

Table of interviewee group

Appendix 2 Interview Protocol

Introduction:.

Explain the research objective. Inform the interviewee that (1) he/she can receive the executive summary of study, (2) all the collected information will be used for academic purposes, (3) any personal or organizational information collected that could identify them will remain strictly confidential and the firm's name will be anonymized in the paper.

Organization General Operations:

Obtain the title, experience and responsibilities of interviewee, and basic information. Request contact information of other informants within the organization and its partners.

Describe the services or programs provided by the organization, its number of employees and the geographical distribution of its activities.

Describe the organization's role within the humanitarian supply chain network and their relations with other humanitarian actors such as the government, national Red Crescent, NGOs and local communities.

Describe the role of the organization in delivering aid to beneficiaries, and the factors that distinguish it from other actors.

Challenges of HL during disaster relief operations

Describe the performance outcomes of relief operations in Kermanshah.

Explain whether your organization faced challenges in its operations in the Kermanshah Earthquake (in particular with logistics challenges in terms of needs assessment, procurement, warehousing, transportation and last mile distribution), give examples.

Explain the other challenges and limitations that the focal organization faced during their disaster relief operation in Kermanshah.

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Acknowledgements

The authors gratefully acknowledge Maria Besiou (the associate editor) and two anonymous reviewers for their valuable suggestions and helping to improve the quality of this manuscript. The Academy of Finland (Grant no. 332921) supported this piece of research work. In addition, the authors would like to thank to all respondents whom spent their valuable time with us during the interviews.

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Designing humanitarian logistics network for managing epidemic outbreaks in disasters using Internet-of-Things. A case study: An earthquake in Salas-e-Babajani city

Affiliations.

• 1 School of Industrial & Systems Engineering, College of Engineering, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.
• 2 School of Industrial Engineering, K. N. Toosi University of Technology, Tehran, Iran.
• PMID: 36506844
• PMCID: PMC9720066
• DOI: 10.1016/j.cie.2022.108821

Along with the destructive effects of catastrophes throughout the world, the COVID-19 outbreak has intensified the severity of disasters. Although the global aid organizations and philanthropists aim to alleviate the adverse impacts, many employed actions are not impactful in dealing with the epidemic outbreak in disasters. However, there is a gap in controlling the epidemic outbreak in the aftermath of disasters. Therefore, this paper proposes a novel humanitarian location-allocation-inventory model by focusing on preventing COVID-19 outbreaks with IoT-based technology in the response phase of disasters. In this study, IoT-based systems enable aid and health-related organizations to monitor people remotely, suspect detection, surveillance, disinfection, and transportation of relief items. The presented model consists of two stages; the first is defining infected cases, transferring patients to temporary hospitals promptly, and accommodating people in evacuation centers. Next, distribution centers are located in the second stage, and relief items are transferred to temporary hospitals and evacuation centers equally regarding shortage minimization. The model is solved by the LP-metric method and applied in a real case study in Salas-e-Babajani city, Kermanshah province. Then, sensitivity analysis on significant model parameters pertaining to the virus, relief items, and capacity has been conducted. Using an IoT-based system in affected areas and evacuation centers reduces the number of infected cases and relief item's shortages. Finally, several managerial insights are obtained from sensitivity analyses provided for healthcare managers.

Keywords: COVID-19 management; Humanitarian logistics; Internet-of-Things; Inventory management; Location-Allocation problem; Supply Chain Design.

© 2022 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

A location-inventory-distribution model under gradual injection of pre-disaster budgets with application in disaster relief logistics: a case study

• Optimization
• Published: 31 October 2023
• Volume 28 , pages 2125–2159, ( 2024 )

Cite this article

• Leyla Fazli 1 ,
• Majid Salari   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-8064-7327 1 &
• Hossein Neghabi 1  

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Natural disasters lead to massive human and financial losses yearly; thus, disaster planning is of critical importance. One of the most crucial measures for disaster planning is developing an efficient disaster relief supply chain (DRSC) network. Thus, many researchers have focused on this field while overlooking some crucial actual conditions as a result of the complexity of the problem. Consequently, this study develops a DRSC network considering the perishability of relief commodities (RCs), the gradual injection of the limited pre-disaster budgets, pre-disaster lateral transportation, and the time value of money. In this respect, a novel multi-period multi-commodity mixed-integer non-linear programming model is presented, which optimizes pre-disaster warehouse location and inventory management and the post-disaster re-procurement and distribution of RCs in each period. Utilizing a new service utility index, the proposed model strives to minimize deprivation cost while maximizing demand coverage and fair service. To provide the required RCs in the pre-disaster phase, a bidirectional quantity flexibility contract (BQFC) is proposed, which is integrated with multi-sourcing and allows for two-part buybacks, installment and delayed payments, and quantity-based discounts on its terms. The applicability and performance of the model are validated via a real case study in Mashhad, Iran. Various sensitivity analyses are provided to highlight the desirable performance of the model and achieve helpful managerial insights.

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An Integrated Disaster Relief Supply Chain Network Model with Time Targets and Demand Uncertainty

A bi-level stochastic optimization model for multi-commodity rebalancing under uncertainty in disaster response

Scenario-robust pre-disaster planning for multiple relief items

Data availability.

The datasets generated during and, or analyzed during the current study and the model's codes in IBM ILOG CPLEX 12.10 software are available in the Github repository, https://github.com/leylafazli/ DRSC.

It is a special case of the supplier selection problem, which determines which suppliers should be selected and how much should be purchased from each selected supplier.

Lateral transportation refers to horizontal transportation within the same echelon.

In an OC, a specific quantity of the suppliers' inventory can be reserved.

A BC allows the buyer to return commodities up to the quantity of the initial purchase at an identical price for each unit.

A QFC supplies the commodity up to a certain pre-agreed amount in excess of the initial order quantity.

The concept of equity and how to measure it have been widely investigated in the literature. Braveman and Gruskin ( 2003 ) defined equity as the lack of systematic disparities among groups of people. The consideration of the equity concept in allocation/distribution decisions represents supplying demand points in a fair manner, as well as the best efforts to ensure that the required relief commodities are equally distributed among all demand points. Fair relief distribution among demand points is also an important point in HRSC (Beamon and Balcik 2008 ). The three main approaches frequently used to achieve equity as an objective in relief distribution include: 1. Minimax approach, 2. Maximin approach, and 3. Maxisum approach (Ransikarbum and Mason 2016 ).

Social cost includes both logistics costs and deprivation costs. Deprivation costs include the costs imposed on casualties due to lack of access to required items or services (Holguín-Veras et al. 2013 ); consequently, these costs represent human suffering. Given the importance of deprivation costs in HRSC, certain researchers including Holguín-Veras have focused on how to estimate deprivation cost for each person affected by a disaster and have presented different deprivation cost functions.

The possibility of returning commodities such that the supplier purchases a part of the total returned commodities at a specific unit price and the rest at another unit price.

The duration an affected person is deprived of relief commodities.

We conducted oral interviews with three experts from Mashhad's Red Crescent Society, one expert from the Department of Passive Defense of Mashhad's Governorate, and one expert from the Department of Passive Defense of Astan Quds Razavi, who specialize in crisis management and have complete information on the performance and situation of Iran's relief systems. We also conducted oral interviews with three professors of Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, who specialize in earthquakes.

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\(\sum_{w,d,g,t}F\left({\overline{t} }_{wd}\right){z}_{wdgt}+\sum_{s,d,g,t}F\left({\overline{\overline{t}}}_{sdg}\right){u}_{sdgt}\) (Cotes and Cantillo 2019 )

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Appendix 1: Data of the case study

Tables 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 and Figs. 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 present the data and information of the case study conducted in the present research.

Seismicity map of Iran from 1900 to 2020 (IIEES, www.iiees.ac.ir )

Seismic hazard level map of different areas of Mashhad (Hafezi-Moghaddas 2007 )

Locations of affected areas, candidate warehouses, and suppliers

Vulnerability rating of Mashhad's network of passages

As can be seen in Table 12 , by increasing \({\beta }_{1}\) or decreasing \({\beta }_{2}\) , the optimal values of TSU and TES follow an incremental trend and a decremental trend, respectively. Notably, TSU has slightly increased, and TES has been realized very little by raising \({\beta }_{1}>\) 0.5 or decreasing \({\beta }_{2}<\) 0.5. Moreover, by decreasing \({\beta }_{1}<\) 0.5 or increasing \({\beta }_{2}>\) 0.5, TSU has considerably reduced, while TES has significantly increased. Therefore, considering the higher priority of the efficacy-distress measure than the balance measure and the obtained results, \({\beta }_{1}\) and \({\beta }_{2}\) are set to 0.5 in this case study.

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Fazli, L., Salari, M. & Neghabi, H. A location-inventory-distribution model under gradual injection of pre-disaster budgets with application in disaster relief logistics: a case study. Soft Comput 28 , 2125–2159 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00500-023-09184-8

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DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/s00500-023-09184-8

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